Ismet Inonu | May 19, 1941
"... Johnson kept the U.S. entirely impartial and refused to give preference to Turkey or any other party. Furthermore, Johnson sent another letter to Cyprus’ President Makarios and Vice President Kutchuk the same day in which he warned that he would not “presume to judge the root causes, or rights and wrongs as between Cypriots of the two communities." ..."Meanwhile, the Soviet Union sent a letter to President Johnson on 7 February 1964 expressing their concern for the sovereignty for the Cyprus nation. As mentioned briefly before, the Soviets believed that the Turkish minority was “being exploited as a pretext for unconcealed intervention in the internal affairs of the republic of Cyprus” as a means to “place this small neutral state under the military control of NATO.”
The Primary Concern of the United States in the 1964 Cyprus
SOURCE
"In response to the erupting violence on the island, Turkey called the three guarantor states for a joint military intervention on 23 December. Britain and U.S. did not think this was a good idea. Turkey was under strong domestic pressure to intervene militarily. In addition to the public opinion, Turkish Armed Forces was also pressuring the government to take a more active position. On 24 December, The Turkish ambassador to U.S. told to Dean Rusk -U.S. Secretary of State- that : “real element of pressure was that Turkish armed forces would act with or without civilian government.”On 25 December, asserting that Turkish Cypriot community was in the danger of a massacre, Turkey threatened to intervene unilaterally in case guarantor powers failed to control the situation. Yet, Turkey refrained from intervention and merely sent its Fighter Aricrafts to conduct a warning flight over Cyprus.152 There are a number of reasons why Turkey did not carry out its threat and intervene unilaterally in December 1963 "
An Analysis Of The 1964 Johnson Letter: Lessons For The 2003 Iraq Crisis, Turkish American Relations, And Global Power Regional Partner Interactions
By Turgut Akgul December 2004 | Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California
SOURCE
"Although the Johnson letter was not made public for the next eighteen months, its contents were partially leaked to the Turkish press by the Turkish government soon after its receipt. Turkey, in both official and public opinion level, was shocked by the letter’s harsh tone and particularly by Mr. Johnson’s implication that NATO might not necessarily and automatically come to Turkey’s help against the Soviets, which led to questions concerning the reliability of the American commitments. The letter led to resentment against and disillusionment with the United States as the Turks felt abandoned by the U.S. despite Turkey’s total loyalty to the Western Alliance."
Turkish-American Relations (1945-1980): Quest For Security And Adapting To Change The Institute Of Economics And Social Sciences Of Bilkent University By Aykin Berk Pakel
SOURCE See embargoed items{1]
Military campaign to Cyprus was realised after 10 years from Johnson’s Letter to Turkish prime Minister Ismet Inonu from June 5th, 1964 ordering the Turks to drop their plans to invade Cyprus.
Mavi Boncuk | SOURCE
55. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State/1/
Ankara, June 5, 1964, 7 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP. Secret; Flash. Repeated to London, Paris for USRO, Athens, and Nicosia and to the White House, OSD, CIA, and JCS.
1609. Deptel 1296./2/ Have just returned from presenting President's letter to Inonu who read carefully, said disagreed with certain points which he would explain later but that he agreed with final sentence to effect that GOT would delay any action on understanding there would be full and frank discussion with view reaching peaceful solution of Cyprus problem. Added would present this for Cabinet approval tonight but seemed regard their acceptance as taken for granted.
/2/Document 54.
Said considered it important let public know that intervention postponed at our request and that American Government would assume active role in effort settle problem between allies, and asked my approval. I said unable give carte blanche but would be glad submit to Washington such text as GOT might propose./3/
/3/The White House released a statement before the Turkish Government could provide suggested language. The text of the U.S. statement was transmitted in telegram 1460 to Athens, June 5. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 CYP) In telegram 1617 from Ankara, June 6, Hare reported that Erkin had unsuccessfully sought a joint follow-up statement. (Ibid.)
Further details in separate tel but gist is GOT agrees forego intervention on condition we take active interest in seeking solution./4/
/4/Telegram 1616 from Ankara, June 6. (Ibid.)
General Lemnitzer was seeing PriMin immediately after I left./5/
/5/Lemnitzer reported on his meeting with Inonu in an unnumbered telegram to the Department of Defense, June 5. (Ibid.)
Hare
JOHNSON WARNS INONU ON CYPRUS; Invites Him to U.S. for Talks—Turkey Said to Give Up Plan for a Landing
June 6, 1964 | NYTimes
WASHINGTON, June 5 —President Johnson has moved to head off further inflammation of the Cyprus crisis by cautioning Turkey against any rash military moves and inviting the Turkish Premier, Ismet Inonu, here for discussions.
The White House announced tonight that the President had exchanged messages with Mr. Inonu on the progressive deteri oration of the situation on Cyprus and suggested that the two leaders meet bere “if convenient.”
[Premier Inonu met with his Cabinet in emergency session to discuss the Cyprus question and President Johnson's message, The Associated Press reported. A ranking Government informant said later that Turkey had given up the idea of a landing on Cyprus “for the time being,” the agency said.]
No date was given for the proposed meeting and the White House announcement indicated that the matter was “still under discussion.”
The announcement came amid reports from the Middle East that Turkey had massed a force 120 miles from Cyprus for a possible invasion to protect the Turkish Cypriote community on the island from the Greek Cypriote majority.
Violence between the two communities broke out in December over the Greek Cypriotes’ efforts to alter the Constitution to strengthen their governmental authority.
Officials here declined to confirm reports that a Turkish invasion fleet had been formed. But they noted that the Turkish Government some time ago announced plans for large amphibious maneuvers and that troops and vessels gathered near the port of Iskenderun. This is the nearest large port to Cyprus on the Turkish coast.
The Turkish military activity and a military alert that it touched off in Greece and Cyprus prompted the United States to move quickly during the last 24 hours to try to avoid a collision between Turkey and Greece over the Cyprus question.
Qualified sources indicated that the President had sent a message to Premier Inonu last night through the United States Ambassador in Ankara, Raymond A, Hare, with the invitation to visit Washington.
The White House announcement described the exchange of messages with the Turkish Premier as “only the latest step in a continuing pattern of consultation among close allies.”
In mid‐March, the United States also took steps to dissuade Turkey from invading the island of Cyprus. Shortly before, the United Nations put a peace‐keeping force in operation.
The force was established by a resolution of the United Na tions Security Council on March] 4. It came into being March 27 and its mandate will expire June 27 unless the countries that are financing the operation and the parties to the dispute approve its continuation.
Diplomats are already working toward that end. Officials here said that despite Turkey's complaints about the United Nations operation, there was no indication that Ankara would oppose continuation of the peace‐keeping force.
The White House statement said that in the consultations with Mr. Inonu “the United States has acted in full recognition that the role of peacekeeping and mediation on Cyprus belongs to the United Nations,”
To underscore its concern with the latest developments in the Cyprus situation, the United States sent Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Supreme Allied Commander for Europe, unannounced from Paris to Ankara yesterday.
General Lemnitzer met with Mr. Inonu and other top Turkish officials to encourage Turkey, to consult with her allies and not to make any moves that would complicate the situation.
President Johnson's invitation to the Premier was viewed as an effort to calm Turkey's ruffled feelings on the Cyprus issue and to give him assurances that Turkey's interests were not being overlooked.
[1] THE EMBARGOED MILITARY ITEMS
As mentioned in the thesis, the American arms embargo on Turkey
encompassed all American-made or American-licensed military equipment,
systems and their spare parts.
The Land Forces
1. Tanks, anti-tank cannons and similar systems and their ammunition and spare
parts.
2. Surface to surface tactical missiles and rockets and their spare parts.
3. Military engineering, communication (signals), loading systems and
equipments.
4. Communication systems.
5. Anti-aircraft systems.
6. Infantry arms.
7. Maintenance and repair systems of the above-mentioned military equipments
and systems.
133
8. Educational services, equipment and exemplars for the above-mentioned
military equipments and systems.
9. Measurement and calibration devices for the above-mentioned arms systems.
The Navy
1. Surface vessels and submarines and their ammunition and spare parts.
2. Anti-aircraft systems.
3. Systems facilitating loading and unloading in ports.
4. Navy aircrafts.
5. Electronic systems, maintenance and repair systems and measurement and
calibration devices.
6. Educational services, equipment and exemplars for the above-mentioned
military equipments and systems.
7. Communications (signals), radar and monitoring systems.
The Air Force
1. Aircrafts and their guided bullet, rocket and machine gun systems.
2. Helicopters.
3. Surface to air missile systems and their radars.
4. Anti-aircraft cannons and radars.
5. Communication (signals) systems.
6. Radar systems.
7. Air base storage, loading and unloading systems, devices and facilities.
8. Military engineering devices.
9. The maintenance and repair systems of the above-mentioned military
equipments and systems.
134
10. Educational services, equipment and exemplars for the above-mentioned
military equipments and systems.
11. Measurement and calibration equipment of the above-mentioned military
equipments and systems.
Source: Interview with retired Staff Colonel İsmail Pakel. November 22, 2006.
Ankara, Turkey.