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In Memoriam | Fikret Hakan (1934-2017)

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Well known and respecter actor Fikret Hakan passed away at 2 a.m. on July 11, 2017 at a hospital in Istanbul after being diagnosed with lung cancer.


Mavi Boncuk |


Fikret Hakan (23 April 1934 – 11 July 2017), also known as Bumin Gaffar Çitanak is a prolific Turkish film actor and a recipient of the honorary State Artist, a prestigious title awarded by the Turkish government.

Hakan was born in 1934 to Gaffar and Fatma Belkıs. His mother was a head nurse while his father was a literature teacher. He moved from Balikesir to Galatasaray High School in Istanbul along with his parents as a teenager.[1]

Hakan began his artistic career in 1950 as an actor for the Ses Theatre and a contributor to literary magazines.

Making his debut in Evli mi bekar mi, a short comedy directed by Muhsin Ertugrul in 1951, and his feature film debut in 1953 in Köprüalti Çocuklari (Kids Under the Bridge), he has made over 170 appearances in film to date, although his career was at its most productive throughout the 1950s and 1960s through to 1976.

He starred in films such as Revenge of the Snakes (Yılanların öcü) in 1962.







Word origin | Kep, şapka

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Mavi Boncuk |

Kep: Cap EN. [1]

şapka:[2]  hat EN[3].fromAR şabaka(t) شبكة   1. balık ağı, her türlü ağ, 2. bir tür başlık Aramaic śibkā סֽבְכָא 1. ağ, 2. bir tür başlık  Hebrew śəbākah סְבְכה a.a. Jastrow 950 Akkadian şabikū bir tür baş örtüsü .

şebeke: fromAR şabaka(t) شبكة . AR şabaka شبك ağ ördü. Aramaic sebek סֶבֶך ağ  Hebrew sābak סָבַך ağ örme, dokuma, çit ve kafes yapma )

(Below) FRENCH 1852 PATTERN KEPI OF A DIVISION GENERAL

[1] kepi (n.) soldier's peaked cap, 1861, from French képi (19c.), from German Swiss käppi, diminutive of German Kappe "a cap," from Late Latin cappa "hood, cap" 

The usual style of uniform cap in the American Civil War.From French képi, from Swiss German Käppi, diminutive of Kappe, from Middle High German kappe, from Old High German kappa, from Latin cappa. Akin to English cap.

Cap (n.) late Old English cæppe "hood, head-covering, cape," from Late Latin cappa "a cape, hooded cloak" (source of Spanish capa, Old North French cape, French chape), possibly a shortened from capitulare "headdress," from Latin caput "head" (see head (n.)). 

Meaning "women's head covering" is early 13c. in English; extended to men late 14c. Figurative thinking cap is from 1839 (considering cap is 1650s). Of cap-like coverings on the ends of anything (such as hub-cap) from mid-15c. Meaning "contraceptive device" is first recorded 1916. That of "cap-shaped piece of copper lined with gunpowder and used to ignite a firearm" is c. 1826; extended to paper version used in toy pistols, 1872 (cap-pistol is from 1879). 

The Late Latin word apparently originally meant "a woman's head-covering," but the sense was transferred to "hood of a cloak," then to "cloak" itself, though the various senses co-existed. Old English took in two forms of the Late Latin word, one meaning "head-covering," the other "ecclesiastical dress". 


hood (n.1) "covering," Old English hod "a hood, soft covering for the head" (usually extending over the back of the neck and often attached to a garment worn about the body), from Proto-Germanic *hodaz (source also of Old Saxon, Old Frisian hod "hood," Middle Dutch hoet, Dutch hoed "hat," Old High German huot "helmet, hat," German Hut "hat," Old Frisian hode "guard, protection"), from PIE *kadh- "to cover" (see hat). 

Modern spelling is early 1400s to indicate a "long" vowel, which is no longer pronounced as such. Used for hood-like things or animal parts from 17c. Meaning "Foldable or removable cover for a carriage to protect the occupants" is from 1826; meaning "sunshade of a baby-carriage" is by 1866. Meaning "hinged cover for an automobile engine" attested by 1905 (in U.K. generally called a bonnet). Little Red Riding Hood (1729) translates Charles Perrault's Petit Chaperon Rouge ("Contes du Temps Passé" 1697).

In most Romance languages, a diminutive of Late Latin cappa has become the usual word for "head-covering" (such as French chapeau).

Chapeau (n.) 1520s, from Middle French chapeau (Old French capel, 12c.) "hat," from Vulgar Latin *cappellus, from Late Latin capellum (also source of Italian cappello, Spanish capelo, Portuguese chapeo), diminutive of cappa 

Cape (n.1)  garment, late Old English capa, cæppe, from Late Latin cappa "hooded cloak" . The modern word and meaning ("sleeveless cloak") are a mid-16c. reborrowing from French cape, from Spanish, in reference to a Spanish style.

[2] Shapka or Šapka (Шапка in Russian, Ukrainian, Bulgarian and Macedonian languages) means a fur cap or a mountain peak in several Slavic languages.

[3] hat (n.) Old English hæt "hat, head covering" (variously glossing Latin pileus, galerus, mitra, tiara), from Proto-Germanic *hattuz "hood, cowl" (source also of Frisian hat, Old Norse hattr, höttr "a hood or cowl"), from PIE root *kadh- "cover, protect" (source also of Lithuanian kudas "tuft or crest of a bird," Latin cassis "helmet"). 

To throw one's hat in the ring was originally (1847) to take up a challenge in prize-fighting. To eat one's hat (1770), expressing what one will do if something he considers a sure thing turns out not to be, is said to have been originally eat Old Rowley's [Charles II's] hat.




Cabinet Shuffle in Turkey

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A major cabinet reshuffle took place after the unannounced meeting between President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım at the Beştepe Presidential Complex in Ankara Wednesday. Yıldırım held a press conference regarding the changes in the cabinet. Out of the reshuffle involving 11 ministers, six were new names, appointed to ministerial posts for the first time.

Mavi Boncuk | 


Article | Turkey Can Ally with Syria’s Kurds Someday

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Mavi Boncuk |

Turkey Can Ally with Syria’s Kurds Someday SOURCE

Dr. David Pollock of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy analyzes Turkish policy vis-à-vis Syrian Kurds by highlighting the challenges, the current modus vivendi and future prospects.

The July 5 headline in Turkey’s Hürriyet newspaper, quoting Deputy Prime Minister Numan Kurtulmuş reads as follows: “Turkey Says It’s Not Declaring War On YPG [Yekîneyên Parastina Gel‎ or People's Protection Units],” the main Syrian Kurdish militia just across the border. But, Kurtulmuş added, “if Turkey sees a YPG movement in northern Syria that is a threat to it, it will retaliate in kind.”[1]

That typically tough yet carefully conditional quote raises a crucial, if often overlooked, factual point. The YPG has in fact not threatened Turkey, nor even Turkish forces inside Syria, ever since 2012. It was in July of that year, exactly five years ago, when the Syrian Kurdish militia took over much of the border area. And it was then that it promised, in an agreement brokered by Turkey’s ally President Masoud Barzani of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq, to focus on Syria exclusively and refrain from attacking Turkey – or even from supporting attacks against it by the YPG’s parent movement, the PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê or Kurdistan Workers’ Party).

All through the past five years, the YPG and its affiliated political party, the PYD, have fulfilled that promise. To be sure, the Turkish government no longer public acknowledges this fact. But it used to, as recently as late 2015, when Turkey’s own peace dialogue with the PKK collapsed. That experience suggests that such an entente between Ankara and the PYD (Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat or Democratic Union Party) could come again.

Indeed, Turkey’s long-term goal, supported by the U.S. and other friends, should be to nurture a relationship between those two current enemies resembling Ankara’s highly amicable ties with the autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq.  Turkey and the Iraqi Kurds were also outright enemies less than a decade ago. But they went through an historic, and mutually greatly beneficial, transformation to get where they are today: the closest of friends in the region, economically, militarily, and politically. In the long run, that is an achievable goal for Turkey and the Syrian Kurds as well. Even a leading AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi or Justice and Development Party) official, Mehmet Şimşek, has publicly acknowledged that this could eventually become the desired outcome of this currently acute conflict.

The trick will be to further increase the distance between the Syrian Kurds and the PKK, thereby moving toward Turkey’s acquiescence, and eventually even alliance, with friendly Kurdish-controlled territory to the south. If this sounds utopian, it isn’t.  Rather, it parallels what has occurred in the past decade, with quiet but strong U.S. support, along Turkey’s border with the KRG. The exceptionally warm ties between Ankara and Erbil, even in the face of new public tensions over the KRG’s proposed September 25, 2017 referendum on independence, strongly suggest that this particular “age-old ethnic conflict” need not be an insurmountable obstacle to strategic expedience. Someday, believe it or not, Turkey may find an autonomous Kurdish region on its Syrian border every bit as amenable to its interests as the one on its Iraqi border.

Turkish Views of the PYD: Keeping Up with New Realities
True, there are major differences between these two Kurdish cases on Turkey’s borders. The PYD, unlike the KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party) or PUK (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan)  ruling parties in Iraqi Kurdistan, shared a history and an ideological affinity with Abdullah Öcalan and the PKK movement he founded inside Turkey, which that country’s government labels a terrorist group.  Moreover, Öcalan himself was active in Syria from about 1988 to 1998, when he fled only to be captured and imprisoned in Turkey ever since. And the PYD still considers itself an offshoot of the PKK, continuing even now to express sympathy and concern over Öcalan’s plight, as it did in its latest congress in Brussels in September 2016.

Complicating the situation, from Turkey’s perspective, many Syrian Kurds have long had family and other ties with Kurds across the border to the north. The roughly three million Syrian Kurds, unlike the more numerous Kurds in Iraq or Iran, speak the same Kurmanji dialect of Kurdish as do most of Turkey’s 15 million or so ethnically Kurdish citizens. Individual members and fighters from the PYD and the PKK continue to drift between the two. And the PKK leadership holed up in the remote Qandil mountains near the KRG borders with Iran and Turkey continues to have some influence on PYD decisions.

Nevertheless, as the PYD achieved military success, U.S. support, and de facto autonomy for Syrian Kurds – its main constituency – over the past five years, it became more and more distinct from the PKK, forming its own structures and geographically defined self-interests inside Syria, outside Turkey’s borders. The PYD now has its own political and military chain of command, distinct from its PKK roots.  Their leaderships differ not only in personnel but also in policies.

As Salih Muslim, the PYD’s co-president (along with the ideologically obligatory but nominal female counterpart) and other officials have described to the author in convincing detail, local PYD chiefs and councils inside Syria function separately not just from any outside fiat but even from each other. Local PYD rulers may be rough, “but at least they don’t chop heads,” as Muslim memorably wrote to the author. And even if the Qandil crew continues to exert its influence on PYD operations inside Syria, the actual policies they all pursue there are directed at maintaining and expanding their control in Syria, not at attacking Turkey or helping the PKK do that on the other side the border.

Indeed, the PYD-controlled border zones are ones where guns, drugs, and money are not being smuggled into Turkey. This is not just the author’s personal opinion. It is a judgment reflecting the evidence presented by Turkey’s own intelligence analysts at a private briefing I attended last year. And it is also the judgment of Amb. James Jeffrey, former U.S. ambassador to both Turkey and Iraq and Deputy National Security Advisor, as expressed in a presentation to the major pro-AKP SETA foundation this year.

The PYD has kept the deal it made in 2012 to avoid attacking Turkey precisely because that reflects the PYD’s new self-interest: protect its own turf inside Syria, rather than carry the Kurdish struggle across the border. This makes the PYD and YPG potential partners with Turkey, rather than threats to it, in securing their common frontier against the PKK, IS, or other adversaries. In the long run, this is “mission very difficult,” but not mission impossible. To buttress this unconventional wisdom, it is most useful to take a brief look back at a time, not so long ago, when Ankara apparently agreed with this more optimistic assessment.

Recent Background: Turkey-PYD Rapprochement, 2012-2015
For the four years until late 2015, the Turkish government recognized, at least in practice, the new set of facts regarding the Kurds in Syria. It welcomed Salih Muslim for talks in Turkey on several occasions, and accepted PYD control over most of the Syrian border zone. As recently as September 2015, Turkey allowed several thousand Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga fighters to transit its territory enroute to helping the PYD/YPG liberate the Syrian border city of Kobane from ISIS rule. Moreover, at the same time, Ankara did not retaliate against U.S. airstrikes and weapons drops on behalf of the Syrian Democratic Forces, a blend of YPG (80%) and local Arab and other militias (20%), notwithstanding loud and continuing public protests.

By February 2016, even Turkey’s initial redline of “no YPG west of the Euphrates” was tacitly modified to allow a “temporary” and successful YPG assault against IS in Manbij, a strategic crossroads town across the river and just thirty miles south of the Turkish border. In August 2016, just a month after the failed coup attempt inside Turkey, Ankara did send its troops into Syria to capture an enclave, the Azaz-Jarabulus corridor, dividing the western PYD canton of Afrin from the eastern ones of Jazeera and Kobane, thus preventing the Kurds from controlling the entire Syrian-Turkish border area. But Turkey did not attack SDF forces en masse, and the two sides have settled into an uneasy standoff inside Syria.

Turkey-PYD modus vivendi, 2016 to date
At the official level, Turkish-PYD relations broke down exactly as Turkish-PKK talks collapsed in late 2015. As Turkey and the PKK entered into armed conflict after two years of promising peace talks, Ankara and the PYD adopted a hostile tone toward each other, reverting to the rhetoric of “terrorists” and “oppressors.” But all is not lost. The two sides have for the most part avoided direct clashes across their common de facto and de jure border, even though small-scale, scattered skirmishes between them inside Syria persist. When the PYD belatedly withdrew some of its forces from Manbij, at U.S. and Turkish behest, Ankara publicly acknowledged that positive turn.  And it announced that it could conceivably work with Arab SDF troops, though not with their Kurdish YPG commanders.

Even more to the point, despite continuing vocal objections, Turkey has stood by as the SDF, meaning mostly the YPG, moved in force—and with substantial U.S. support, including direct deliveries of some heavy weapons—against the ISIS capital of Raqqah in mid-2017. Turkey did not send more troops south to confront this major development it had gravely warned against; Incirlik air base remained wide open for U.S. use; and Erdoğan visited President Trump in Washington on schedule anyway. Even now, as previewed at the top of this essay, Turkish warnings are consistently couched in the conditional language of “we will respond if the YPG attacks us,” rather than in terms of absolute opposition.

Thus, Turkey’s actions, as distinct from its words, suggest it actually has internalized that the PYD/YPG are not a threat, at least not now.  It realizes that the movement of Syrian Kurdish troops south toward Raqqah is vastly preferable to their movement north toward the Turkish border. And Turkey understsands as well, again despite angry verbal outbursts, that it best not jeopardize its fundamental American alliance over this particular Kurdish bone of contention. With these facts in mind, let us now turn from the complex past and the murky present to the medium-term future, always so easy to predict in the Middle East. 

Future Prospects and Policy Implications
Turkey’s medium-term options in this arena are, as argued above, heavily influenced both by realities on the ground in Syria and by American policies in that theater. Viewed from Washington, the main rationale for supporting the PYD, YPG and allied Arab and other militias is security, period. It is not an attempt to drive a wedge between the U.S. and our very important NATO ally Turkey. It is simply a way of fighting effectively against ISIS, while also directing Syrian Kurdish aspirations not against Turkey, but in favor of Kurdish autonomy inside Syria. As such U.S. support for the PYD and YPG, even assuming it continues after Raqqah is liberated and ISIS is defeated, is not a threat but actually an advantage to Turkey’s national security.  The Turkish government rejects that view today, at least publicly, but I would argue that it is grudgingly prepared to accept it, at least privately. That assessment is shared by a prominent young Turkish scholar and former parliament member, Aykan Erdemir, who recently asserted in a public Washington, DC forum that:
"Although it is a major challenge to the Turkish government domestically – that is, they do have       to keep posturing, they do have to keep up a strong anti-American rhetoric at home – when it comes to global politics, I think they are willing to live with this decision. I think they also see this as tactical because they themselves know what it means to work with PYD and YPG in a tactical manner."
So, at least under the most plausible near-term scenarios, Turkey’s U.S. connection is likely to weigh in favor of continued tacit acquiescence in some form of Kurdish de facto autonomy, under PYD control, in pockets of Syrian territory along the Turkish border. This of course presupposes that the U.S. will keep the PYD firmly on notice that, in return for U.S. military aid and diplomatic support for an eventual “federal” political solution in Syria, the PYD must continue to refrain from any attacks on Turkish forces and any material support for the PKK. Beyond this immediate calculation, Turkey’s behavior will probably reflect two other major variables linked to the Kurds, both inside and outside the country.

First, Turkey would do well to keep in mind that Kurdish political and military interests writ large have diverged geographically, especially in the past five years.  Just as Syria’s Kurds, along with their parties, movements, militias, and institutions, are increasingly distinct from Turkey’s own Kurdish citizens, so too are they even more sharply distinct from their Kurdish cousins in Iraq. Indeed, most Kurds in Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran have chosen to downplay the pan-Kurdish dream in favor of separately seeking their rights inside (or, in the KRG case, perhaps outside) their respective countries. This emerging new reality gives Turkey more room to maneuver on these issues, and in particular to work steadily to separate the PYD from the PKK instead of intermittently lumping them together.

But Kurds are still Kurds, and in particular the closely related Kurds in Syria and in Turkey are probably destined to remain linked at least in some indirect fashion.  Inside Turkey, for the time being, both Ankara and the PKK have tragically abandoned their halting rapprochement of 2013-15 and resumed outright low-intensity war. The gap between the two, apparently narrowing just two years ago, now seems almost impossibly wide. Yet it might someday be bridged—if not perhaps with the PKK then with other authentically Kurdish parties or popular movements. Any progress here, in addition to its intrinsic value, would also clearly mitigate Turkish fears and suspicions about the PYD across the border.

That one more reason why the U.S. should advise its Turkish friends privately to resume an internal peace process with the Kurds, and to offer tangible American assistance with that, if desired. This is one case where the cliché of “no military solution” really does apply. And even more so in regard to the Syrian Kurds, Turkey has no good reason to seek such a solution, and every reason to pursue peaceful coexistence across a common and potentially even cooperative border.

Dr. David Pollock is the Kaufman Fellow and director of Project Fikra at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Dr. Pollock previously served as senior advisor for the Broader Middle East at the US State Department. 

[1] "Turkey says it’s not ‘declaring war’ on YPG, but ready to respond," Hürriyet Daily News, July 6, 2017.

Şânizade Ataullah Efendi (1771-1826)

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Mavi Boncuk |


Geç dönem modern Osmanlı tıbbının kurucu siması: Şânizade Ataullah Efendi
Şânizade Ataullah Efendi

Türk alimi, tabibi, tarihçisi. 1771’de İstanbul’da doğdu, 1826’da Tire’de vefat etti. Ailesi çok varlıklıydı, ailesinin Ortaköy’deki yalısında dünyaya geldi. Dedesinin mesleği olan tarakçılığa nispetle Şanizade lakabıyla anılır. Medine mollası Elhac Mehmet Sadık Efendinin oğludur. Hem asırlardır bu topraklarda yapılan klasik medrese eğitimini ve hem de bunlarla yetinmeyerek modern batı tarzı bir eğitimi alması formasyonunu tayin etmiştir. Eğitiminin daha ilk yıllarında pozitif bilimlere, özellikle de tıbba ve matematiğe karşı büyük ilgi duymaya başladı. Çok yönlü bir alim, gerçek bir hezarfen olan Mehmet Ataullah Efendiden Latince, İtalyanca, Fransızca ve bir miktar da Almanca dersleri aldı. Şanizade Osmanlının gerilemesine çare olarak gördüğü ‘Batılılaşma’ sürecinin prototip aydınıdır. ‘Klasikle, gelenekle olan bağlarını koparmadan moderne, yeniye açık olmak ve bu ikisini makul bir tarzda sentezlemek şeklindeki terkip Cumhuriyet kurulana değin olan süreçte Osmanlının reformist bütün Padişah ve devlet adamlarının izleyecekleri temel formül olagelmiştir. Bu terkipte yaşanan ilk kırılma cumhuriyet döneminde vaki olmuştur. Süleymaniye medresesinde tıp, Halıcıoğlu Mühendishane’sinde matematik, astronomi ve astroloji okudu. 1786’da rüus (diploma) alarak müderris oldu. Bir müddet Ordu kadısı olan babasının yanında çeşitli hizmetlerde bulundu. 1816’da Eyüp kadısı oldu. Yanı sıra, Şanizade’ye Çorlu Medresesi müderrisliği de verildi. Dönemin vakanüvisi olan Mütercim Ayıntablı Asım Efendi, sadece 2. Mahmut’un tahta çıkışından (28 Temmuz 1808) itibaren 4 aylık hadiseleri yazıp Padişah’a sunabilmişti. Asım efendi, takip eden 12 yılın olaylarını kaydetti. Ancak bu müsveddeleri, üzerinde biraz daha çalışarak Padişaha sunulabilecek metinler haline getiremediği için devlet ricalinde sıkıntılar baş gösterdi. Payitahtın ve Osmanlı Sülalesinin resmi tarihinin yazılmasının kesintiye uğradığı bu süreç Mütercim Asım Efendinin vefatıyla noktalandı. 30 Ocak 1819’da vakanüvisliğe atanan Şanizade’ye, yanı sıra sadrazamın denetiminde bulunan Evkaf Müfettişliği de verildi. Şanizade tarih yöntemi üzerine kaleme aldığı bir metni 2. Mahmut’a takdim etti. Yazacağı tarihte metodoloji hatası olmaması, tekrarlara düşülmemesi bakımından Sadrazamdan Asım Efendiden kalan 12 yıllık müsveddeleri istedi ve aldı. Ardından da, 1808 sonlarından 1821 yılına değin olan Osmanlı tarihini yazdı. Bu arada, 1821’de Mekke mevleviyetine atandı.

Halet Efendi'nin Ataullah Efendi'ye ettikleri

Esasen döneminin en kıymetli hekimi olmasına karşın, Padişah üzerinde büyük tesiri olan devlet adamlarından Halet Efendi yüzünden, onun desteklediği Hekimbaşı Mustafa Behçet Efendi engelini aşarak, Hekimbaşılığa gelemedi. Hekimbaşılık için verdiği mücadele sırasında, bir nevi ‘evdeki bulgur’dan da oldu: Başta Halet Efendi olmak üzere, muarızlarının kulisleriyle 28 Eylül 1825’te vakanüvislikten alındı. Ataullah Efendi, vakanüvisliği sırasında Asım Efendiden kalan müsveddeler üzerindeki çalışmalarını ancak bitirebildiği için kendi dönemine dair vakayinameleri tamamlayıp Padişah’a sunamamıştı. 1822 – 1825 arasındaki olaylara dair tuttuğu notlarından oluşan müsveddelerini yerine vakanüvis olan Sahaflarşeyhizade Esad Efendiye devretti. Bir iddiaya göre aktif üyesi olduğu Beşiktaş İlim Cemiyeti İsmail Ferruh Efendi’nin kurduğu ilk mason locasının maskelenmesine hizmet eden bir paravan organizasyondur.  Bu husus, başta Halet Efendi olmak üzere çekemeyenlerine arayıp da bulamadıkları ‘nihai darbe’yi vurma imkanını verdi: Muarızlarına göre O, mezhepsizlik ve Bektaşiliği dinsizlik raddesinde yaşayan bir far-masondu. Bu temelde yapılan kulisler sonunda mason biraderleriyle birlikte sürgüne gönderildi. Bu bahis aşağıda detaylı olarak ele alınacaktır. Şanizade’nin sürgün mahalli arpalığı olan İzmir’in Tire kazasıydı(1826). Aynı yıl, aşağıda ayrıntıları verilen trajik bir hata yüzünden burada öldü. 

Döneminin panoraması.

İslam’ın ilm ve sanatta yaptığı büyük atılım döneminin (9-13.yy) ardından, Batı Rönesansla ‘ilerleme’ bayrağını devraldı. 14. yüzyılda İtalya`da başlayan Rönesans 15. ve 16. yüzyıllarda bütün Avrupa`ya yayıldı. Tıp gelişmenin en hızlı seyrettiği sahalardandı. Osmanlı`ya gelince, atalarımızın 17. asırda başlayan umumi zafiyeti tababet alanına da yansıdı. Tıp medreseleri muasır bilgilerinden kopmaya ve gerilemeye başladılar. Bu yüzden de telif eserlerin önü tıkanmıştı. Tercümeye gelince…Yabancı dil bilen hekimlerin yok mesabesinde oluşu, matbaanın Osmanlı`ya geç girişi ve kitap basmanın 1729`da başlamasından dolayı tıp kitaplarının tercüme edilemiyordu. Çok az sayıdaki Osmanlı hekim ve bilim adamlarının kendi çabaları ile dil öğrenmeleri, yenilikleri takip etmeleri ve kendi tecrübe ve bilgilerini de katarak kendi kitaplarını yazmaları da telif ve tercüme sürecinin devamını sağlayamamıştı. Tıp medreseleri eski parlak dönemlerinden çok uzaktılar. Bir kısmı ise kapanmıştı. Tıp eğitimi neredeyse çökmüştü. Osmanlı Mülkünde tıp sahasındaki çağdaş gelişmeleri azınlık hekimleri ve  Avrupa`dan gelen yabancı hekimler dışında bilen ve uygulayan neredeyse yoktu. Yeterli tabibin olmayışı sosyal sıkıntılara yol açıyor, ‘mütabbib (tabip olmayan sahte hekim)’ hekimler serbest hekimlik yaparak, hatta orduda dahi görev alarak bir çok insanın ölümüne sebep oluyorlardı. Bunların önlenmesi yönelik fermanlardan ise umulan sonuç elde edilemiyordu.Anlayacağınız, 19. yüzyıla gelindiğinde durum tıp eğitimi açısından berbattı. Başta İtalyanca ve Fransızca olmak üzere, tıp alanında tercih edilen yabancı dillerden en az birini bilen az sayıdaki Osmanlı hekimi çağı yakalamak için insan üstü bir gayretle debelenip duruyorlardı. Şanizade Mehmet Ataullah ve Mustafa Behçet Efendi (1774-1834) bunların en önemlileridir. Behçet Efendi de saygın bir alim olmasına karşın, birçok uzman Şanizade’nin ondan daha yetenekli olduğunu, bu yüzden de sarayın baş hekimliğini aslında Ataullah Efendi’nin hak etiğini belirtirler.

Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun çözülme, gerileme devrinde ilimlerin durumu ve 'Vaka-ı Hayriye'

Bu iki önemli alimin etrafında gelişen olayları, entrikaları doğru anlamlandırmak için onların dönemdaşı olan 3. Selim (1761-1808; saltanatı: 1789-1807), 4. Mustafa (1779-1808; saltanatı: 1807-1808) ve 2. Mahmut (1785-1839; saltanatı: 1808-1839) saltanatlarına kuş bakışı bakmak kafidir. Bahse konu çağ, Osmanlının her bakımdan çözüldüğüne, çürüdüğüne ve çöktüğüne işaret ediyordu. İşte, bu 2 yetenekli alim, tabip, Batı’da telif edilen ‘yeni tıb’bın Osmanlı tıp eğitimine girmesini savundular. Reformist III. Selim zamanında yeni tıp eğitimi veren, bir Tıphane açılması düşünülmüştü. Teşrih (anatomi) yasağından dolayı ulemadan çekinen III. Selim buna cesaret edememiş, öte yandan, Rumlara tıp fakültesi kurmaları için izin vermişti(1805). Dönemin hekimbaşısı 21 yaşındaki Behçet Efendi, uğrunda çok çalıştığı ‘yeni tıp’ eğitimi veren bir Tıphane kurulması için II. Mahmut’un hekimbaşlığını yaptığı 40’lı yaşlarına kadar  mücadele etmek zorunda kalmış, nihayet 1827’de, 43’ünde, bu amacına ulaşabilmiştir. 1826’da cereyan eden bir hadise hem Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun geleceğini tayin eden faktörlerin en önemlilerindendir; hem de Şanizade’nin hayatının finalini tayin etmiştir. Bu, tarihimize ’Vak’a-i Hayriye’ olarak mal olmuş olan Yeniçeri Ocağının yok edilmesidir. Yeniçerilik sadece askeri bir olgu değildi. Yeniçerilik, toplumun içine, gerek ekonomik bağlamda, gerek Bektaşilik üzerinden inanç düzeyinde ve gerekse de diğer sosyolojik vasatlarda çok derinlere değin nüfuz etmişti. Bu bakımdan, yeniçerilerin yok edilişlerinin sosyal etkileri çok önemli, çok ağır ve çok derin olmuştur. Yeniçeriliğin inanç kodlarının üzerinde yükseldiği Bektaşiliğe karşı alınan hasmane tutumlar, etkilerini Alevi-Bektaşi cemaatlerin günümüzdeki yaşantılarına kadar hissettirmesini bilmiştir. İşte bu bağlamda, tam da Bektaşililere karşı genel bir yok etme çizgisi izlendiği sırada, Ataullah Efendinin Bektaşilikle, mezhepsizlikle ve dinsizlikle suçlanması, tabir-i amiyane ile, O’nun ‘ipinin çekilmesi’ne vesile teşkil etmiş, İstanbul’dan sürülmesine neden olmuştur. 

Şanizade’yi ‘bitiren’ tartışma

“Beşiktaş Cemiyet-i İlmiyesi”, “Beşiktaş veya Ortaköy İlmî Cemiyeti”, “Beşiktaş Grubu”, “Beşiktaş Ulemâ Grubu” ve “Cemiyyet-i İlmiyye” olarak adlandırılan cemiyet, XIX. Yüzyılın ilk yarısında kurulmuş; daha çok, fen ve edebîyat konularında faaliyet göstermiştir. İ. Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, ‘ahlâkı güzelleştirme ve din ile felsefe arasında bir uzlaşma sağlamayı amaç edinme’leri bakımından İhvan-ı Safa’ya benzetir. Cemiyetin bazı üyeleri Londra’da büyükelçilik yapmış olan İsmail Ferruh Efendi (ö. 1840), vakanüvis tabip Şanizâde Atâullah Efendi, Melekpaşazâde Abdülkadir Bey (ö.1843) Kethüdâzâde Mehmed Ârif Efendi, Fehim Efendi (ö.1846), Mustafa Şâmil Efendi (ö.1840) ve Bektaşî Şeyhi Mahmud Babadır.Cemiyette fen derslerini Şanizâde, edebîyat derslerini Ferruh Efendi, felsefe derslerini haftada Kethüdâzâde Ârif Efendi, matematik derslerini Tevhid Efendi (ö. 1870) okutmaktaydı. Cemiyet, 1826’da Yeniçeri Ocağı’nın kaldırılmasına paralel olarak Bektaşîlere karşı yönelik yürütülen büyük operasyon sırasında ‘mezhepsizlik, Bektaşîlik ve dinsizlik’le suçlandı, üyeleri sürüldü. Cemiyetin maskeli bir Mason Locası, üyelerinin de gizli masonlar oldukları iddia edilse de bunu destekleyen sağlam kanıtlar ortaya konulamamıştır. 

Ataullah Efendinin Osmanlı İlim ve tıbbı için önemi nedir?

19 asrın ilk yarısının en önemli hezarfenlerindendi. Tarihçiliği ve hekimliğiyle kendisinden sonraki alimlere yol göstermiş, model teşkil etmişti. Arapça, Farsça, Fransızca, İtalyanca ve Latince bilen Şanizade döneminin en parlak alimlerindendi. 3. Selim, 4. Mustafa ve 2. Mahmut dönemlerinde , çoğunlukla Ortaköy’de İsmail Ferruh Efendinin yalısında toplanan ve bizim Royal Society’miz sayılabilecek olan Beşiktaş Cemiyet-i İlmisinin en aktif üyelerindendi. Tıp, biyoloji, cebir, geometri, astronomi ve astroloji Şanizade’nin üstadlık mertebesinde vakıf olduğu alanların arasındaydı. Başyapıtı olan Tarih-i Şanizade esasen 5 kitap olarak tasarlanmışsa da, 4 cilt olarak basılmıştır. Deniz ve kara coğrafyasına, sahra ve kale tahkimatına, deniz harplerine dair birçok eseri çevirdi. Özellikle Vesayaname-i Seferiyye bu alandaki çevirilerinin en önemlisidir. Büyük Friedrich’in subaylarına yazdığı bu kitap Yeniçerilerin yok edilmelerinden sonra girilen Osmanlı ordusunun modernleştirilmesi sürecinde önemli rol oynamıştır. Çevirileri sırasında ilgili bilimin ıstılahlarını (terim) Türkçeye kazandırmakta çok titiz davrandı. Alim olmanın olmazsa olmazı olan hezarfenliğinin doğal bir parçası olarak sanatçı yönü fevkalade kuvvetli idi. Musiki, resim, hat Şanizade’nin olgun eserler verdiği sanat disiplinlerinin bazılarıydı. Şiirlerinde Ata mahlasını kullanan Ataullah Efendinin bir nüsha yazma Divançesi İstanbul Üniversitesi kütüphanesindedir. Tarih kitaplarından dolayı döneminin İbni Sina’sı, musiki sahasındaki faaliyetleri yüzünden zamanının Farabi’si olarak anılmıştır. Büyük alim Cevdet Paşa ise onu ‘ilk ilmi lügati yazan alim’ olarak tavsif etmiştir. Zarif, nazik, mütevazı kişiliğiyle Şanizade kötü niyetli muhterisler dışında herkesin sevdiği birisiydi. Resim yapmak, tambur çalmak, saat tamir etmek, 6 bilim dalında 18 eser vermek gibi vasıfları bu satırların yazarını Şanizade için hezarfen deyimini kullanmaya icbar etmektedir. 

Tıp ve eczacılığa katkıları

Özellikle tıp alanındaki verimi gerçekten öncü çalışmalardan oluşuyordu. Şanizade tıp terimlerini ilk defa Türkçeye çevirmiş, ilk resimli anatomi kitabını basmıştı. Tarihsel kayıtlar bize Şanizade’nin Süleymaniye Tıp Medresesinde dönemin en önemli hekimlerinden Hekimbaşı Numan Naim Efendiden ders aldığını, dışarıdan gelen yabancı hekimlerle sık sık görüşerek mesleki bilgi alışverişinde bulunduğunu,  hem teorik ve hem de pratik tababet uygulamaları içinde olduğunu aktarmakta.

Özellikle de tıp terimleri alanında yaptığı çeviriler çok uzun süre bu disiplini tayin eden dinamiklerden oldu. Kaynaklar, tıp terimlerini ilk olarak O’nun tercüme ettiğine işaret ediyorlar.

Tababetle ilgili başyapıtı Hamse-i Şanizade’dir. Yaptığı çevirilere kendi tecrübelerini de ekleyerek yazdığı tercüme-telif nitelikli bu yapıta, İbn-i Sina’nın anıtsal eseri Kanun’a hürmeten, Kanun-i Şanizade de demiştir.  Basımı 3 yıl süren kitabın devlet ricaline hediye için olan lüks baskısının (anatomik resimler renklidir) yanı sıra, ‘avam’ için bir de ucuz edisyonu yapılmıştı. Haleflerine uzun süre rehber kitap mahiyetindeki eser 3 ana bölümden oluşur:

1-Mir’at-ül-Ebdan fi Teşrih-il-A’za-il-İnsan: İlk resimli anatomi kitabımız. Şanizade’nin Eyüp Kadılığı dönemine denk düşer. Bu yapıt, önsözünde de belirtildiği üzere, döneminin birçok muteber anatomi atlasından faydalanılarak oluşturulmuş bir derleme olmasına karşın yazarın kendi gözlem ve çalışmalarına da içermektedir. Kitap 56 anatomik çizimi havidir. Çizimlerin bir kısmı telif olup Erzurumlu Agop’a aittir. Türkçe ve Latince anatomi terimleriyle bezeli kitap anlaşılır bir Türkçe ile yazılmıştır. Ostolocya(kemik bilimi) ve Sarkolocya(kas bilimi) olmak üzere 2 kısımdır.

2-Usulü’t-Tabia: İlk fizyoloji kitabımız. Kitap ‘yemek, çiğnemek, içmek, sindirmek, üremek, nefes almak, kan dolaşımı, ter, his, uyku, görme’ fonksiyonlarını ve bunların hastalıklarını (sebep ve belirtileriyle) içerir. Önsözü ve başlıkları Arapça, metni anlaşılır bir Türkçedir.

3- Miyar-ül-Etibba: Avusturya İmparatoriçesi Marie Therese’in sertabibi, Avusturya Tıb Fakültesi Dekanı Baron Anton von Stoerck’in aslı Almanca olan Pratik Tıbbi Öğrenim yapıtının İtalyanca çevirisinden çevrilmiştir. Hastalıkların Türkçe karşılıkları verilmiş, belirtileri ve tedavi şekilleri aktarılmış, kullanılması gereken 319 drog kitabın arkasında listelenmiştir. Buradaki en ilginç husus, terkibinde şarap bulunan droglara da aynen yer verilmesidir.

Kavanin-i Cerrahin (Cerrahların Kanunları) kitabında bölüm bölüm cerrahi rahatsızlıklara yer vermiştir. Önce hastalıkların türleri, ardından nedenleri, belirtileri, ilaçları ve nihayet yapılması gereken cerrahi müdahaleleri içeren kitap cerrahlar için bir rehber mahiyetindedir.

Mizan-ül Edviye basit ve bileşik ilaçlar üzerine bilgiler veren Müfredat-ı Ecza-ı Tıbbiye (İlaçların İlkel Maddeleri) ve Mürekkebat-ı Ecza-ı Tıbbiye (İlaçların Bileşimleri) isimli 2 yapıttan mürekkeptir. Bu kitaplarda ilk kez yüksük otu(digitali)nun fizyolojik etkileri anlatılır. 1801’de Jenner’in çiçek aşısı üzerine yaptığı çalışmaları 3 yıl sonra çevirmiştir. 1811’de Jenner ve Mardini’nin bu çalışmalarını inekler üzerinde denediklerini öğrendiğinde, bunu Kağıthane’deki inek çiftliklerinde başarıyla tekrarlamış ve çiçek aşısı elde etmiştir. Burada bir aşı merkezi kurmak istemişse de, ihtiyacı olan desteği bulamamıştır. Sultan Abdülmecit’in çiçek olmasına müteakip bu destek kendiliğinden sağlanmış, İstanbul/Osmanlı bir aşı merkezine kavuşmuş, çiçek aşısı da zorunlu hale gelmiştir. 1812 yılında İstanbul’da baş gösteren veba salgını sırasında onca gayretine karşın karantina uygulamasında başarılı olamamıştır. İstanbul’da ilk modern karantina 20 yıl sonra uygulanmıştır. 

Şanizade Ataullah Efendinin trajik sonu

Muarızlarının iftiralarıyla Tire’ye sürülen Şanizade, bir yandan yerinin doldurulmasının (dile kolay, tam 7 dil bilen bir Rönesans insanından bahsediyoruz) ne denli zor olduğunun yokluğuyla net bir biçimde anlaşılmasıyla, beri yandansa başta Padişah olmak üzere bazı etkili figürlerin alime yapılan isnatların temelsiz olduğuna kani olmaları yüzünden kısa zamanda affedildi. Af fermanını evine getiren görevlinin yaptığı trajedik hata gerçekten antolojik bir ahmaklık olarak tarihteki yerini almıştır. Gece geç vakit Şanizade’nin evine ulaşan görevli, ‘affına’ anlamına gelen ‘ıtlakına’ diyeceğine yanlışlıkla öldürülmesi manasındaki ‘ıtlafına’ deyiverince karşısındakinin idam fermanını taşıdığını zanneden Ataullah Efendinin yorgun zihni ve bedeni bu gerilimi kaldıramamış, Şanizade kalp krizinden vefat etmişti. Habercinin ikinci kez düzelterek yaptığı tebligat sırasında Şanizade ne yazık ki artık yaşamıyordu. Dehası ve çalışkanlığı yüzünden muasırlarınca çok kıskanılan ve sevilmeyen Şanizade, başarılarının bedelini iftiralara uğramakla, hak ettiği makamlara gelememekle, sürülmekle ve bütün bunların bünyesinde yol açtığı derin tesirler yüzünden, daha çok şeyler üretebileceği bir yaş olan 55’inde terk-i dünya ederek ödemiştir. Onun erken ölümünün yol açtığı süreç, bugün hala yaşadığımız kimi sıkıntıların da vasatını oluşturur. 

‘İslam terakkiye mani midir?’ 

Bu soruyu asırlardır sorar dururuz. Şanizade’nin yaşadığı 18. asrın son ve 19. asrın ilk çeyrekleri, Osmanlının yaşadığı derin çöküş yüzünden bu sorunun sık sık gündem edildiği dönemlerdi. Hedef Sağlık’ın 26. sayısında yazdığım Gazali biyografisinde bu hususa değinmiş ve kendimce yanıtlamıştım. Hayır, İslam gelişmeye, ilme, akla mani değildir. İslam Aleminin yaşadığı olumsuzluklar, ‘sultanların, iyi niyetle dahi olsa, düşünce, hikmet, felsefe ve bilim üzerinde kurmaya çalıştıkları kontrol mekanizmaları ile onların etraflarını kuşatan çapsız, derinliksiz ‘düzmece/sahte alimler’in sebep oldukları fikri kuraklık, felsefi çoraklık idi. Fatih’in İstanbul’u fethine müteakip yürürlüğe koyduğu dünyanın, bilhassa da İslam Alemi’nin önde gelen alim ve filozofları için payitahtı cazibe merkezi kılma projesi yarım/akim kaldı. Bu projenin merkezi figürü olan  Ali Kuşçu’nun misyonunu tamamlayamadan 1474’deki terk-i dünya eylemesi bunda rol oynadı. Gerçi, Kuşçu daha uzun süreler yaşasa ve Fatih’in projesi realize olsa dahi 8. - 11 . asırlar arasında Arap kıtasında ve 9. – 14. asırlar arasında Endülüs’e yaşanan fikri canlılığı aşmanın, hatta tekrarlamanın dahi çok zor olduğunu öngörmek mümkündür. Zira, ne kadar iyi niyetli ve ne denli bilge olursa olsun, sultanın patronajında / kontrolünde özgür ve özgün felsefe ve ilim yapmak neredeyse imkansızdır. Fatih’ten sonra gelen sultanların çaplarını, kapasitelerini göz önünde bulundurursanız; buna bir de Kuşçu’dan sonraki dönemlerde ulemayı ‘temsil eden’ Cinci Hoca, Hatipzade, Halet Efendi gibi ‘sözde/sahte  alimler’in yıkıcı tesirlerini eklerseniz, İslami Düşünce, felsefe ve ilimin, özellikle Sünni toplumlarda gerilemesin nedenleri kolaylıkla anlaşılır.

Eserleri.
Hamse-i Şanizade (3 kitaptan oluşur: Mirat-ül-Ebdan fi Teşrih-il-A’za-il-İnsan, İstanbul, 1819 + Usulü’t-Tabia + Miyar-ül-Etibba (Doktorların Ölçüsü, İstanbul, 1819), Tarih-i Şanizade (esasen 5 kitaptan oluşması tasarlanmışken 4 cilt olarak basılmıştır, İstanbul, 1867 – 1875, birçok basımları mevcuttur, 1808 – 1821 arasındaki olayları kapsar); Kavanin-ül-Asakir-il-Cihadiye (Savaş Askerlerinin Kanunları, İstanbul, 1819); Tanzim-i Piyadegan ve Süvariyan (Piyade ve Süvarilerin Düzenlenmesi); Kavanin-i Cerrahin (Cerrahların Kanunları, Mısır, Bulak, 1828); Istılahat-ı-Etibba (Doktorların Terimleri); Müfredat-ı Ecza-ı Tıbbiye (İlaçların İlkel Maddeleri); Mürekkebat-ı Ecza-ı Tıbbiye (İlaçların Bileşimleri); Usul-i Hisap (Matematik); Usul-i Hendese (Geometri); Ta’rifat-ı Sevahil-i Derya (Deniz Kıyılarının Anlatımı); Kavanin-i Asakir-i Cihadiye (Savaş Askerlerinin Kanunları, İstanbul, 1815) ; Usulü’t-Tabia, Vesayaname-i Seferiye (ölümünden sonra, 1832)

(*)Benim nokta-ı nazarımdan, bilim ve ilm birbirlerinin yerine kullanılabilecek, birbirilerinin ikamesi olan kavramlar değildir. Bilim ve ilm farklı manalara nispet ederler ve bu fark da dereceye değil mahiyete dairdir. Bilim modern zamanların kavramıdır ve modern dünyada maddi karşılığını bulur. Bilim adamı (= bilimci?), sınırlı bir alana dair uzman olan teknisyendir, en fazla zanaatkardır. O, çocuk ya da kardiyoloji doktorudur, makro ya da mikro ekonomisttir, yol ya da baraj mühendisidir, peyzaj ya da iç mimarıdır, futbol ya da atletizm yorumcusudur,  muslukçu ya da elektrikçidir ilnh… Bu bakımdan, bilim adamı/insanı sadece alanının bilgisine vakıftır. Öte yandan, uzmanı olduğu alanın, sahibi olduğu ‘malumat’ın diğer alanların bilgisiyle, malumatıyla irtibatlarını kuramaz. Zira, diğer alanlara dair bilgisi ya yoktur ya da çok sınırlıdır. Descartes’çı ‘kartezyen düşünce’ ile kendisine felsefi bir varlık zemini bulan bilim adamının ilm adamına pratik sahada tam manasıyla galebe çalması 1. Dünya Savaşı sonrasına denk düşer. Bilim adamı bilgindir. İlm adamı (bilici?) ise döneminin mevcut bütün bilgisine, kapasitesi nispetinde vakıf kişidir, bilgin değil alimdir. Alim sanatkardır. Alim, modernizm öncesi dönemin hakim paradigması olan klasik anlayıştaki eğitimine üstatlarından, mürşitlerinden aldığı mantık dersiyle başlar. Bunu  retorik, gramer, matematik, müzik, fizik ile ilgili tedrisat izler. Fizik dediğimde bundan doğal bilimlerinin (fizik, kimya, tababet, astronomi vb.) tamamınnı anlaşılmasını murad ederim. Alimin eğitim süreci metafizik Alemle tanışmasıyla mahiyet değiştirir, taçlanır. Metafizik tedris eden alim/alim adayı artık döneminin maddi ve manevi bütün malumatına vakıftır. Bu durumda malumat artık kelimenin hakiki manasıyla ‘bilgi’ seviyesine ‘terfi etmiş’tir. Alim, sadece asrın bütün bilgisini, bütün muasır malumatı kucaklamakla kalmaz, o, aynı zamanda mürşitlerinden elde ettiği bakış açılarıyla,  ölene değin ‘talebe’ kalacağının da şuuruyla davranır. O, daimi suretle ‘Hakikat’ı taleb eder. O, ‘Hakikat’ talebesidir, ‘ferd-i hakir-i fakir-i taliban-ı Hakikat’tır. Öğretirken öğrenir, öğrenirken öğretir. Bilgini bekleyen en önemli handikap bilgiçliğe düşmek, malumatfuruş olmakken; Alim ise, bu bahiste ancak bir kısmına işaret edebildiğim keyfiyet yüzünden, asla bilgiç/malumatfuruş olamaz. Olabilecek ‘Adam’a da zaten ‘Alim’ denmez. Demek ki, ‘Bilen İnsan’ın bilgiçliğe tevessül etme potansiyeline haiz olanına bilgin, asla bilgiçlik taslayamayacak tıynette olanına ise alim diyoruz. Bilgin konjonktürün, çağının insanıdır, tek boyutludur, madde ve insan merkezlidir; Alim zamanla ve mekanla kayıtlı değildir, çok boyutludur, mana ve insanötesi merkezlidir. Bilgin tek fenlidir, dünya odaklıdır; Alim hezarfen (bin fenli)dir, rönesanas adamıdır, Alem merkezlidir. Bilgin (genellikle) soru sormaz, cevap yetiştirir; hiçbir şeye şaşmaz/şaşamaz, o katı bir erişkindir. Alim ise çocuk gibidir; daima hayret ve hayranlık makamındadır. Dedim ya, ben burada aslında ilmin tarihine dair debeleniyorum, bilmin değil. Benim işim Alim’le; her an bilgiçliğin, çok bilmişliğin, malumatfuruşluğun sığ sularına yuvarlanıverecek olan bilginle değil. 

Kaynakça:
İslam Ansiklopedisi, ilgili maddeler, MEB
İslam Ansiklopedisi, ilgili maddeler, Türkiye Diyabet Vakfı
Türk Ansiklopedisi, ilgili maddeler, MEB
Türk ve dünya Ünlüleri Ansiklopedisi, ilgili maddeler, Anadolu Yayıncılık
Meydan Larousse, ilgili maddeler, Meydan Neşriyat
Osmanlı Türklerinde İlim, Adnan Adıvar, Remzi Yayınları www.edebiyatdergisi.hacettepe.edu.tr, İlk Türk Bilim Akademisi, Cahit Bilim www.firat.edu, Kethudazade Arif Efendi ve Felsefi Görüşleri, İsmail Erdoğan
Bu Mülkün Sultanları, Necdet Sakaoğlu, Oğlak Yayınları
Asklepios, sayı 1, GSK
Hedef Sağlık, sayı 26, Bilimin Öncüleri: İmam-ı Gazali, Z. Şencan, Hedef Alliance

* Daha önce Hedef Sağlık dergisinde ve www.ziyaversencan.blogspot.com 'da yayınlandı.

HUBBA HUBBA HUBBA...Istanbul Aims High

In Memoriam | Sezer Sezin (1929-2017)

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I shared National Film Competition Jury duties with Sezer Sezin at the Istanbul Film Festival (12-27 April 2003). Meeting my idol from the 60's was a dream come true for me. 

Tunç Başaran (Jury President), Ercüment Akman, Cahit Berkay, Sandra Hebron and Sezer Sezin. Nuri Bilge Ceylan won best film and director awards with 'Uzak'.


In Memoriam | Sezer Sezin (1929-2017)

Sezer Sezin (b.October 25, 1929 Eyüp, Istanbul, Turkey- d July 18, 2017 Istanbul, Turkey). She was an actress, best known for films like Strike the Whore (1949), Soför Nebahat ve kizi (1964) and Nebahat, the Driver(1960). She was married to Kenan Artun (1952–1963)


Sezer Sezin in Soför Nebahat (1960) Sami Hazinses, Kadir Savun, Semih Sezerli, Sezer Sezin, and Erol Tas in Soför Nebahat (1960)













Mavi Boncuk |


Sezer Sezin, Ayhan Isik, and Küçük Kenan in Üç tekerlekli bisiklet (1962)

Kenan Artun and Sezer Sezin in Tahir ile Zühre (1952)

Sezer Sezin in Vurun kahpeye (1949)

Turan Seyfioglu, Sezer Sezin, and Abdullah Yüce in Meyhanecinin kizi: Mapusane çesmesi (1958)


Sezer Sezin 

Türk sinema sanatçısı. Gerçek adı Mesrure Sezer'dir.     

25 Ekim 1929 tarihinde İstanbul'da doğdu. İlkokul ve ortaokulu Eyüp’de okudu. Ortaokuldan sonra öğrenimine devam etmedi. Küçük yaşta tiyatroya ilgi duymaya başladı. Bale dersleri aldı.   1940 yılında Eminönü Halkevi Tiyatrosu’nda Kral Oidipus adlı oyunda kralın kızını oynadı.   

1944 yılında “Hürriyet Apartmanı” filmiyle sinemaya başladı. 1946 yılında da Vedat Örfi Bengü ile ortak olarak Sezer Tiyatrosu’nu kurdu. Bir yıl süre ile turneye çıkan tiyatro 1947’de kapandı.   1948 yılında başrolü Memduh Ün’le paylaştığı “Damga” filminde oynadı. 1949 yılında ise Ömer Lütfi Akad’ın yönettiği “Vurun Kahpeye” filmiyle tanındı. Yine Lütfi Akad’ın yönettiği 1952 yılında “Tahir ile Zühre” ve “Arzu ile Kamber” adlı filmlerde oynadı. Bu filmlerin çekimleri 6 ay süre ile Bağdat’ta yapılırken başrolü paylaştığı Kenan Artun ile yakınlaştılar ve dönüşte 1952 yılında evlendiler.   

1956 yılında eşi Kenan Artun ve İlham Filmer ile ortaklaşa “Türk Eksport Film” adıyla bir film yapım şirketi kurdu. Bu şirket 3 film üretti. Bunlardan 1959 tarihli “Kıbrıs’ın Belası Kızıl EOKA” Türk sinemasının Kıbrıs sorununa değinen ilk filmi oldu, ancak Yunanistan’la Türkiye arasındaki politik yumuşama filmin erkenden vizyondan kaldırılmasıyla sonuçlandı.   1960 yılında yönetmenliğini Metin Erksan’ın yaptığı “Şoför Nebahat” filminde canlandırdığı karakter çok beğenilince 1964 ve 1965 yıllarında 2 devam filmi yapıldı. 

Uzun bir süre kendisine Sezer Sezin yerine “Şoför Nebahat” dendi.   1962 yılında çekilen “Üç Tekerlekli Bisiklet” filmi ile 1965 yılında “İzmir Film Festivali”‘nde “En Başarılı Kadın Oyuncu” ödülünü kazandı.   Sezer Sezin, 1952 yılında oyuncu ve senarist Kenan Artun ile evlendi. 1963 yılında boşandı. 1965 yılında Üner İlsever ile evlendi. Daha sonra boşandı. İki çocuğu olan Sezer Sezin’in Ayşegül İlsever adında bir kızı var.   1965 yılında ikinci evliliğini yaptığı Üner İlsever’le birlikte Kadıköy İl Tiyatrosu’nu kurdular. 1967 yılında sinemayı bıraktı. 1975 yılında tiyatroyu da bırakarak deri ticaretine atıldı.   Sinemayı bıraktıktan tam 40 yıl sonra 2007 yılında Safa Önal’ın yazıp yönettiği “Hicran Sokağı” adlı yapımda konuk oyuncu olarak yeniden izleyici karşısına çıktı.  

Filmography

2007 Hicran Sokağı (konuk oyuncu) 
1967 Turist Zehra
1966 Asker Anası
1966 Sırat Köprüsü
1965 Kanlı Meydan
1965 Şoför Nebahat Bizde Kabahat
1964 Cehennem Arkadaşları
1964 Şahane Züğürtler
1964 Şoför Nebahat ve Kızı
1963 L’Immortelle (Ölümsüz Kadın) 
1962 Üç Tekerlekli Bisiklet
1961 Rüzgâr Zehra
1960 Dişi Kurt
1960 Şoför Nebahat
1959 Ana Kucağı
1959 Kıbrıs’ın Belası Kızıl EOKA
1959 Vatan Uğruna
1958 Altın Kafes
1958 Meçhul Kahramanlar
1958 Meyhanecinin Kızı
1956 Kalbimin Şarkısı
1956 Ölmüş Bir Kadının Evrakı Metrukesi
1955 Dağları Bekleyen Kız
1954 Kaçak
1952 Arzu ile Kamber
1952 Tahir ile Zühre
1950 Allah Kerim
1950 Lüküs Hayat
1949 Vurun Kahpeye
1948 Damga
1945 Yayla Kartalı
1945 Köroğlu
1944 Hürriyet Apartman


Theater | Tiyatro

Ya Beni Öpersin
Nazırın Karısı
Yanlış Adres
Karımla Olmuyor  

 Awards| Ödülleri

1955 Türk Film Dostları Derneği - En Başarılı Kadın Oyuncu, 
Kaçak 1965 İzmir Film Festivali - En Başarılı Kadın Oyuncu, 
Üç Tekerlekli Bisiklet 1984 Altın Portakal Ödülleri, Onur Ödülü. 
1993 Uluslararası İstanbul Film Festivali, Jüri Onur Ödülü 
2008 Uluslararası Bursa İpek Yolu Film Festivali, Sinema Onur Ödülü

Forum | Turkey and the Failed Coup One Year Later

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Mavi Boncuk |


Turkey and the Failed Coup One Year Later

Featuring Omer Taspinar, Soner Cagaptay, and James F. Jeffrey
PolicyWatch 2835
July 20, 2017

Omer Taspinar
Omer Taspinar is a professor of national security strategy at the National War College, focusing on the political economy of Europe, the Middle East, and Turkey.

Soner Cagaptay
Soner Cagaptay is the Beyer Family fellow and director of the Turkish Research Program at The Washington Institute.

James F. Jeffrey

Ambassador James F. Jeffrey is the Philip Solondz distinguished fellow at The Washington Institute where he focuses on U.S. diplomatic and military strategy in the Middle East, with emphasis on Turkey, Iraq, and Iran.

On July 13, Omer Taspinar, Soner Cagaptay, and James F. Jeffrey addressed a Policy Forum at The Washington Institute. Taspinar is a professor at the National War College and an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies. Cagaptay is the Beyer Family Fellow and director of the Turkish Research Program at the Institute. Jeffrey is the Institute's Philip Solondz Distinguished Fellow and a former U.S. ambassador to Turkey. The following is a rapporteur's summary of their remarks.

OMER TASPINAR

While the authoritarian trend in Turkish politics is well documented in Washington circles, Fethullah Gulen is still very enigmatic for most Americans (despite his longtime exile in Pennsylvania). Some background on the Gulen movement's marriage of convenience with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's Justice and Development Party (AKP), therefore, provides important context.

Gulen's intellectual antecedents can be traced to Said Nursi (1877-1960), a scholar from eastern Anatolia who wrote a six-thousand-page commentary on the Quran emphasizing the compatibility of Islam with rationalism. The Gulen movement, a major Turkish sect, continues Nursi's project of modernizing Islam, integrating an emphasis on science and education.

The Gulen movement also encourages a nationalist brand of Islam, whereas Orthodox Islam emphasizes the transcendental brotherhood of the umma, or Muslim community, and formative political Islamist thinkers such as Sayyid Qutb saw political Islam as a way of uniting all Muslims. Nursi and Gulen were thus generally at peace with the Ottoman and Turkish states.

By comparison, the AKP derives its identity from the Muslim Brotherhood tradition, especially in the figure of Necmettin Erbakan (1926-2011), who founded the Welfare Party, the AKP predecessor. Emphasizing Islamic over Turkish civilization, Erbakan's movement was always political in nature, whereas the Gulen movement evolved into a social and cultural force. Unlike Erbakan's Welfare Party, the Gulen movement never showed an interest in controlling the state—or in a "Muslim revolution." Its leaders instead encouraged Turkish Muslims to make money, pay taxes, and contribute to philanthropic organizations, thereby gradually transforming the state in their image.

The military, for its part, long viewed the Gulen movement to be far more dangerous than Erbakan, regarding its educational, cultural, and social agenda as a clandestine means to infiltrate the state—and an existential threat.

In establishing the AKP to further Erbakan's legacy, Erdogan, too, initially rejected political Islamism, allowing for an alliance with Gulen wherein the movement provided human capital and the AKP furnished a political party. Indeed, Gulen had been grooming intellectuals since the 1970s, and fielding bureaucrats since the 1980s, offering cadres that Erdogan needed to populate his government.

From 2003 until 2011, the AKP and Gulen movement saw a common enemy in the military system—an enemy of which they were deprived in the Ergenekon trials, which began in 2009 and sidelined the generals. These trials had begun as a legitimate attempt to root out a coup plot but morphed into a witch hunt targeting all AKP opponents.

When the Gulenists refused to fold under AKP control, Erdogan went after them by closing down their schools, and Gulenists responded by fueling a corruption scandal around Erdogan and his family in December 2013. In response, Erdogan cracked down more harshly on the Gulenists, who finally resorted to using their influence in the military—acquired in the vacuum left by the Ergenekon trials—to strike back.

SONER CAGAPTAY

Previously, the symbiotic relationship enjoyed by the AKP and the Gulen movement involved human capital provided by the former and a charismatic leader and political party offered by the latter. When they collectively brought down the military in 2011, a raw power struggle ensued between two men, Erdogan and Gulen, whose dramatic fallout has ushered in greater instability in Turkey.

After the failed nefarious coup attempt in July 2016, Erdogan—instead of serving as a unifier—sought to widen rifts with opposition groups. His subsequent purge stretched well beyond the Gulenists, ultimately including liberals, leftists, social democrats, Alevis (liberal Muslims), and Kurdish nationalists. Turkey has become significantly more authoritarian as a result, tied to the emerging notion that the rise of the Turkish nation and the restoration of the Muslim community (umma) are now inextricably linked to Erdogan's personality. When citizens fail to support Erdoganism—based on the triumvirate of anti-Westernism, political Islamism, and Turkish nationalism—they are cast as opposing Turkey and Islam, and as foreign agents, and thus persecuted.

There are two main drivers of Erdogan's authoritarian: The first involves his consolidation of power since 2003, involving crackdowns on demographic groups unlikely to support him. This collective bloc constitutes half of Turkey, and Erdogan thought it could be controlled through authoritarianism alone. The second driver involves the president's working-class roots in Kasimpasa, an Istanbul neighborhood where, in secularist Turkey, his conservative, pious family members were treated as second-class citizens. He and his classmates were taunted at their government-run religious school, and the secularist courts shut down three Islamist political parties that Erdogan joined.

Although eventually becoming the most powerful politician since Turkey's 1950 transition to a multiparty system, Erdogan still feels weak as a citizen. The moment he shows this weakness, as he sees it, he'll be pushed back to the other side of the tracks. Erdoganism thus preaches that authoritarianism is necessary for "making Turkey great again" and restoring the dignity of Muslims—with Erdogan as the leader.

The post-coup scene in Turkey has had elements of the Orwellian. A few months ago, a laudatory biopic on Erdogan's life, promoted by his administration and called The Chief, was released. Last week, the film's producer made another movie marking the anniversary of the thwarted coup. Despite being on the government payroll, he was arrested because his narrative went too far.

The half of Turkey who loves Erdogan welcomes his increased power; the half who loathes him cannot accept it. And the anti-Erdogan constituency is growing. Provinces that voted against him constitute 80 percent of Turkey's GDP. The 18-34 age group voted by the widest margin against Erdogan in the recent referendum changing Turkey from a parliamentary to a presidential system. When, however, the anti-Erdogan crowd despairs of democracy as a tool to oppose him, the potential for radicalism and violence will rise, explaining why it is not actually in Erdogan's interest to end Turkish democracy.

JAMES F. JEFFREY

In 2015-16, before the coup attempt, a tenuous U.S.-Turkey relationship could be defined by two words: the south. Whereas a superficial alignment of U.S. and Turkish interests existed in Syria, these interests differed almost everywhere on the ground. Turkey, for its part, faced three threats from the south: the Democratic Union Party (PYD), a Syrian Kurdish group; the Islamic State (IS); and Syrian president Bashar al-Assad. The PYD, meanwhile—having been boosted by its successful defense against IS, beginning in Kobane in 2014—is a political offshoot of the Turkey-based Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), and when talks between Ankara and the PKK broke down in summer 2015, the Kurdish group became an acute threat to Turkey.

In late 2015, when terrorist attacks in Paris and San Bernardino prompted the United States to take IS very seriously, Turkey was not equally devoted to the cause, while even lending support to IS-aligned groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra. As part of its policy to overthrow Assad, Turkey kept its border open, allowing both anti-Assad and anti-U.S. jihadists to cross. Meanwhile, although the Obama administration agreed in principle with Turkey's "Assad must go" policy, it lacked sufficient enthusiasm for the cause, disappointing Turkey.

The broader U.S.-Turkey relationship is crucial, with Turkish cooperation having played a part in almost all U.S. conflicts. In particular, Turkey was indispensable to the U.S. triumph in the Cold War; likewise, without U.S. support beginning in the 1940s, Turkey could not have remained independent during the Cold War.

A disconnect in communication underlies the current U.S.-Turkey malaise, with Ankara espousing a cynical, realpolitik view of foreign policy, whereas the United States believes it is advancing universal values. Multiple groups lobby against Turkey in Washington—e.g., Armenian, Greek, human rights—and to preserve this important relationship, U.S. officials must oversell the country as the best ally the United States has ever had. When Turkey undermines this image, the U.S. government becomes frustrated.

Washington generally knows about important events in advance, but last year's coup was completely unexpected, and U.S. officials froze in response. The prevailing consensus held that military coups were no longer possible in Turkey. Further, U.S. officials did not realize that the military's Gulenist faction—rather than its traditional secular core—was perpetrating the coup. As Washington awaited more information on the Gulenists, officials held off on making statements evaluating the coup, instead defaulting to U.S. interests, particularly a push to reopen Turkey's Incirlik Air Base for operations against the Islamic State.

Predating the coup, Washington was disappointed by Erdogan's harsh response to the Gezi Park protests of summer 2013 and his treatment of the Kurdish-aligned Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) after the breakdown of the PKK ceasefire. Yet Secretary of State Rex Tillerson's visit gives reason for optimism, and the Trump administration can improve ties from where the Obama administration left them. Such improvements, however, should not strive for some ideal former state: U.S.-Turkey ties have always been complicated.

This summary was prepared by Oya Rose Aktas.


Laïcité | TEVHİDİ TEDRİSAT KANUNU | TEKKE VE ZAVİYELER (TURKISH POSTING)

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"The Sheep of Ankara, shows its hand last." Political cartoon by Sedat Simavi, in Istanbul magazine Güleryüz on October 1922. In the Background: Ankara, In the Foreground: Istanbul 


Abolition of Caliphate (1924) and Millet System

In the secular state or country purports to be officially neutral in matters of religion, supporting neither religion nor irreligion and claims to treat all its citizens equally regardless of religion, and claims to avoid preferential treatment for a citizen from a particular religion/nonreligion over other religions/nonreligion.

Reformers followed the European model (French model) of secularization. In European model of secularizing; states typically involves granting individual religious freedoms, disestablishing state religions, stopping public funds to be used for a religions, freeing the legal system from religious control, freeing up the education system, tolerating citizens who change religion or abstain from religion, and allowing political leadership to come to power regardless of religious beliefs.

In establishing a secular state, the Ottoman Caliphate, held by the Ottomans since 1517, abolished and to mediate the power of religion in the public sphere (including recognized minority religions in the Treaty of Lausanne) left to the Directorate for Religious Affairs. Under the reforms official recognition of the Ottoman millets withdrawn. Shar’iyya wa Awqaf Ministry followed the Office of Caliphate. This office was replaced by the Presidency of Religious Affairs.

The abolishing of the position of Caliphate and Sheikh ul-Islam was followed by a common, secular authority. Many of the religious communities failed to adjust to the new regime. This was exacerbated by the emigration or impoverishment, due to deteriorating economic conditions. Families that hitherto had financially supported religious community institutions such as hospitals and schools stop doing so.

Atatürk's reforms define laïcité (as of 1935) as permeating both the government and the religious sphere. Minority religions, like the Armenian or Greek Orthodoxy are guaranteed protection by the constitution as individual faiths (personal sphere), but this guarantee does not give any rights to any religious communities (social sphere). (This differentiation applies to Islam and Muslims as well. Atatürk's reforms, as of 1935, assume the social sphere is secular.)

The Treaty of Lausanne, the internationally binding agreement of the establishment of the Republic, does not specify any nationality or ethnicity. It simply identifies non-Muslims in general and provides the legal framework which gives certain explicit religious rights to Jews, Greeks, and Armenians without naming them.

Mavi Boncuk |


TEVHİDİ TEDRİSAT KANUNU


Kanun Numarası : 430
Kabul Tarihi  : 3/3/1340
Yayımlandığı R. Gazete
: Tarih: 6/3/1340 Sayı: 63

Yayımlandığı Düstur: Tertip: 3 Cilt: 5 Sayfa: 322


Madde 1 - Türkiye dahilindeki bütün müessesatı ilmiye ve tedrisiye Maarif Vekaletine merbuttur.

Madde 2 - Şer'iye ve Evkaf Vekaleti veyahut hususi vakıflar tarafından idare olunan bilcümle medrese ve mektepler Maarif Vekaletine devir ve raptedilmiştir.

Madde 3 - Şer'iye ve Evkaf Vekaleti bütçesinde mekatip ve medarise tahsis olunan mebaliğ Maarif bütçesine nakledilecektir.

Madde 4 - Maarif Vekaleti yüksek diniyat mütehassısları yetiştirilmek üzere Darülfünunda bir İlahiyat Fakültesi tesis ve imamet ve hitabet gibi hidematı diniyenin ifası vazifesiyle mükellef memurların yetişmesi için de aynı mektepler küşat edecektir.

Madde 5 - Bu kanunun neşri tarihinden itibaren terbiye ve tedrisatı umumiye ile müştegil olup şimdiye kadar Müdafaai Milliyeye merbut olan askeri rüşti ve idadilerle Sıhhiye Vekaletine merbut olan darüleytamlar, bütçeleri ve heyeti talimiyeleri ile beraber Maarif Vekaletine raptolunmuştur. Mezkür rüşti ve idadilerde bulunan heyeti talimiyelerin ciheti irtibatları atiyen ait olduğu Vekaletler arasında tahvil ve tanzim edilecek ve o zamana kadar orduya mensup olan muallimler orduya nispetlerini muhafaza edecektir.

(Ek: 22/4/1341 - 637/1 md.) Mektebi Harbiyeden menşe teşkil eden askeri liseler bütçe ve kadrolariyle Müdafaai Milliye Vekaletine devrolunmuştur.

Madde 6 - İşbu kanun tarihi neşrinden muteberdir.

Madde 7 - İşbu kanunun icrayı ahkamına İcra Vekilleri Heyeti memurdur.


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TEKKE VE ZAVİYELERLE TÜRBELERİN SEDDİNE VE TÜRBEDARLIKLAR İLE BİR TAKIM UNVANLARIN MEN VE İLGASINA DAİR KANUN (1)

Kanun Numarası : 677
Kabul Tarihi : 30/11/1925
Yayımlandığı R. Gazete : Tarih : 13/12/1925 Sayı : 243
Yayımlandığı Düstur : Tertip : 3 Cilt : 7 Sayfa : 113

Madde 1 – Türkiye Cumhuriyeti dahilinde gerek vakıf suretiyle gerek mülk olarak şeyhının tahtı tasarrufunda gerek suveri aharla tesis edilmiş bulunan bilümum tekkeler ve zaviyeler sahiplerinin diğer şekilde hakkı temellük ve tasarrufları baki kalmak üzere kamilen seddedilmiştir. Bunlardan usulü mevzuası dairesinde
filhal cami veya mescit olarak istimal edilenler ipka edilir.

Alelümum tarikatlerle şehlik, dervişlik, müritlik, dedelik, seyitlik, çelebilik, babalık, emirlik, nakiplik, halifelik, falcılık, büyücülük, üfürükçülük ve gayıptan haber vermek ve murada kavuşturmak maksadiyle nüshacılık gibi unvan ve sıfatların istimaliyle bu unvan ve sıfatlara ait hizmet ifa ve kisve iktisası memnudur.

Türkiye Cumhuriyeti dahilinde salatine ait veya bir tarika veyahut cerri menfaate müstenit olanlarla bilümum sair türbeler mesdut ve türbedarlıklar mülgadır. Seddedilmiş olan tekke veya zaviyeleri veya türbeleri açanlar
veyahut bunları yeniden ihdas edenler veya ayını tarikat icrasına mahsus olarak velev muvakkaten olsa bile yer verenler ve yukarıdaki unvanları taşıyanlar veya bunlara mahsus hidematı ifa veya kıyafet iktisa eyleyen
kimseler üç aydan eksik olmamak üzere hapis ve elli liradan aşağı olmamak üzere cezayı nakdiile cezalandırılır.

(Ek: 10/6/1949 - 5438/1 md.) Şeyhlik, Babalık ve Halifelik gibi mensupları arasında baş mevkiinde bulunanlar altı aydan az olmamak üzere hapis ve 500 liradan aşağı olmamak üzere ağır para cezasından başka bir yıldan aşağı olmamak üzere sürgün cezası ile cezalandırılırlar 

(1). (Ek: 1/3/1950 - 5566/1 md.; Değişik: 7/2/1990 - 3612/5 md.) Türbelerden Türk büyüklerine ait olanlarla büyük sanat değeri bulunanlar Kültür Bakanlığınca umuma açılabilir. Bunlara bakım için gerekli memur ve hizmetliler tayin edilir.

Madde 2 – İşbu kanun neşri tarihinden muteberdir.

Madde 3 – İşbu kanunun icrasına İcra Vekilleri Heyeti memurdur.

(1) 13/7/1965 tarih ve 647 sayılı Cezaların İnfazı Hakkında Kanunun geçici 2 nci maddesiyle sürgün cezası kaldırılmıştır.

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1982 | Anayasanın 174. Maddesi (İnkılap kanunlarının korunması)

Anayasanın hiçbir hükmü, Türk toplumunu çağdaş uygarlık seviyesinin üstüne çıkarma ve Türkiye Cumhuriyetinin laiklik niteliğini koruma amacını güden, aşağıda gösterilen inkılap kanunlarının, Anayasanın halkoyu ile kabul edildiği tarihte yürürlükte bulunan hükümlerinin, Anayasaya aykırı olduğu şeklinde anlaşılamaz ve yorumlanamaz:

3 Mart 1340 tarihli ve 430 sayılı Tevhidi Tedrisat Kanunu;

25 Teşrinisani 1341 tarihli ve 671 sayılı Şapka İktisası Hakkında Kanun;

30 Teşrinisani 1341 tarihli ve 677 sayılı Tekke ve Zaviyelerle Türbelerin Seddine ve Türbedarlıklar ile Bir Takım Unvanların Men ve İlgasına Dair Kanun;

17 Şubat 1926 tarihli ve 743 sayılı Türk Kanunu Medenisiyle kabul edilen, evlenme akdinin evlendirme memuru önünde yapılacağına dair medeni nikah esası ile aynı kanunun 110 uncu maddesi hükmü;

20 Mayıs 1928 tarihli ve 1288 sayılı Beynelmilel Erkamın Kabulü Hakkında Kanun;

1 Teşrinisani 1928 tarihli ve 1353 sayılı Türk Harflerinin Kabul ve Tatbiki hakkında Kanun;

26 Teşrinisani 1934 tarihli ve 2590 sayılı Efendi, Bey, Paşa gibi Lakap ve Unvanların Kaldırıldığına dair Kanun;


3 Kanunuevvel 1934 tarihli ve 2596 sayılı Bazı Kisvelerin Giyilemeyeceğine Dair Kanun.



Les Désenchantées

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Mavi Boncuk |

Les Désenchantées — Roman des harems Turcs contemporains by Pierre Loti.

Les Désenchantées par Pierre Loti. READ (in French)IN HTML o in PDF

A la chère et vénérée et angoissante mémoire de LEYLA-AZIZÉ-AÏCHÉ Hanum, fille de Mehmed Bey J… Z… et de Esma Hanum D…, née le 16 Rébi-ul- ahir 1297 à T… (Asie-Mineure), morte le 28 Chebâl 1323 (17 décembre 1905) à Ch… Z… (Stamboul).

"...O Djénane-Feridé-Azâdé, que le rahmet d'Allah descende sur toi! Que la paix soit à ton âme fière et blanche! Et puissent tes soeurs de Turquie, à mon appel, pendant quelques années encore avant l'oubli, redire ton cher nom, le soir dans leurs prières!…"

Loti’s attempt to disguise the identity of his protagonists was soon uncovered. Before the publication of Disenchanted, fearing the imperial axe, the two Turkish sisters Melek and Zeyneb flee to Europe from their harem with the hope of finding ‘freedom’ in the West. 4 “What prompted their escape to Europe was the sister’s engagement”5 with a lady. This third woman is known to be a French journalist and translator who was visiting Turkey when Loti arrived in Constantinople. Her name was Madame Léra.[2]

SEE ALSO: GRACE ELLISON: AN ENGLISHWOMAN IN A TURKISH HAREM BY Füsun ÇOBAN DÖŞKAYA

Abstract : Though to varying degrees prominent and successful in her day, today, Grace Ellison, is largely unknown to Western readers and she is not too familiar to readers in Turkey and little is known about the details of her life. The idea/possibility of English journalist/writer Grace Ellison’s being French journalist Madame Léra (Marie Léra, who wrote under the name of Marc Hélys) is the main argument of this article. In addition to this, this study concentrates on Grace Ellison and one of her neglected historical records called, “An Englishwoman in a Turkish Harem (1915)” to explore the literary forgery in which she is involved. 

Pierre Loti.

Pierre Loti was one of the most popular French writers of his time. Born on this day in 1850 as Julien Viaud (the pseudonym came later), Loti travelled extensively both as a naval officer and as a civilian, his wanderings and romantic episodes frequently turning up thinly disguised in his novels.

One such work was Les Désenchantées, written in 1906. In the foreword, Loti claims “this is an entirely imagined story. It would be a waste of time trying to give real names to Djénane, to Zeyneb[1], to Mélek or to André, because they never existed.” 

Its origins lay in one of the stranger episodes in Loti’s eventful life, which took place while he was in command of a French ship based in Constantinople. In 1904 the author received what was essentially a fan letter from a Turkish woman, in which she daringly suggested — in defiance of all social convention — a meeting, to which she wished to bring two other equally unaccompanied female friends.

The meeting took place, the women heavily veiled, the author cautious yet intrigued. There were subsequent encounters, ever bolder, in which the women unburdened their hearts, bemoaning the fate of woman in Ottoman Turkey, entombed in the harem, their passions denied. Similarly disarmed, Loti took them to the grave of his great love Hakidjé, who as Aziyadé had been the subject of his first novel.

Relations deepened. One of the trio, Leyla, took a keen, romantic interest in Loti but her suspicious family sent her away to their country house, where, distraught, she took her own life. Loti was devastated.Returning to France in 1905, Loti was surprised when the remaining two of the trio, having escaped their harem, turned up at his sumptuous Orientalist fantasia of a house in Rochefort, begging to be taken in. They proved to be less than ideal house guests, “sluttish, lazy and mischief-making” according to Lesley Blanch in her biography of Loti. But the author was sufficiently inspired by their presence to write Les Désenchantées, in which he recalled the Constantinople encounters, styling himself André and Leyla as Djénane. 

The book was a huge success. SOURCE


[1] Zeyneb Hanım

She was born in 1883. Her real name is Hatice Zennur. Her father, Nuri Bey had an important position at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the reign of Abdülhamit II. Her grandfather, Reşat Bey was the French Nobleman Marquis de Blosset Chateauneuf, who had come to the country during the Crimean War as an officer of the Sultan and fallen in love with an Ottoman woman of Circassian origin and converted to Islam. Similar to the elite Ottoman women of the time, Zeyneb Hanım and her sister Nuriye Hanım, who was using the pen name Melek Hanım, received both an eastern and a western education. They were trained to be in command of five languages. The generation of their mother preceding them is one that had begun thinking about how the eastern women could improve their own conditions. Covering themselves head to foot at the age of twelve, something that their grandmother had accepted with submission, was not a ritual of transforming from being a child to being a woman, but a traumatising experience for them.


Despite Abdülhamit’s curfew laws, they would meet up with their friends at home and discuss how to improve their conditions at their “white night meetings.” Even though their mother and father had provided their daughters a western education, essentially, they expected of them to be good wives and mothers. In fact, Nuri Bey married Zeyneb to his secretary and protege, Abdüllatif Safa Bey, who will later become a Minister of Foreign Affairs, without her consent. This forced marriage made the two sisters take action regarding both their own condition and the condition of all their friends.


Zeyneb and Melek contacted Marc Hélys, whose pen name was Marie Léra[2] [3] and who was staying at their place, and Pierre Loti, who had been quite famous with his novel Aziyadé, in order to draw attention to the eastern women who were under oppression. Through the secret correspondence and meetings with Loti, they put together the novel, Les Desenchanées. This novel was published in 1906 in Paris and became a great success. As a result of the novels they had been reading and the education they had received, Zeyneb Hanım believed that women in Europe lived in very good conditions. As she thought that the publication of the novel would be a scandal and wanted to free herself from the regime and the traditions that she was living within, she and her sister secretly ran away to Europe on a train at night with the help of their European woman friends. Melek Hanım married an aristocratic Polish musician and stayed in Europe. Zeyneb Hanım, however, not being able to find the freedom she sought after, returned to her country unhappier after six years of an immigrant's life. She died of tuberculosis on 14 April 1923.


This journey of the novelist and her impressions of Europe became known, when her English feminist journalist friend Grace Ellison edited and published the letters she had sent her from various cities. Grace Ellison published the letters when Zeyneb Hanım returned Istanbul in 1913 in London with Seely Service and Co. Publishers. These letters were translated into Turkish in 2001. The most detailed research on Zeyneb Hanım’s letters were conducted by Reina Lewis in her Rethinking Orientalism. In 2005, the facsimile copies of the letters were published with an introduction by Reina Lewis.


Works


Les Desenchanées (1906)

A Turkish Woman’s European Impressions. Ed. Grace Ellison (1913) (Tr. Özgürlük Peşinde Bir Osmanlı Kadını - 2001)
Bibliography

Lewis, Reina. Oryantalizmi Yeniden Düşünmek. Istanbul: Kapı, 2006.

_________. Rethinking Orientalism: Women, Travel, and the Ottoman Harem. I.B. Tauris, 2004.
Toros, Taha. Pierre Loti’yi Anarken. http://ekitap.kulturturizm.gov.tr/belge/1-35162/taha-toros.html


[2]  Hortense Marie Héliard dite Marie Léra, née le 2 juin 1864 à Saint-Nazaire et décédée en 1956 à Lyon, est une journaliste et une romancière française. Marie Léra est surtout connue pour son ouvrage Le secret des désenchantées publié sous le pseudonyme de Marc Hélys, qui raconte comment le succès littéraire de Pierre Loti Les désenchantées résulte d'une supercherie dont elle fut l'auteur.

Elle s'intéressa au féminisme dans plusieurs pays étrangers. En 1906, elle publia À travers le féminisme en Suède (Paris, Plon-Nourrit). L'un de ses romans traite de la condition féminine en Turquie. Egalement traductrice (de l'italien, anglais, suédois et polonais), elle a aussi utilisé le pseudonyme Jean d'Anin.

Ecrivaine, journaliste, voyageuse intrépide, Marie Léra publie en 1908 sous le pseudonyme de Marc Hélys, Le Jardin fermé, recueil de nouvelles sur les harems d'Istanbul. Un livre passionnant, fourmillant d'anecdotes drôles ou poignantes, qui remet en question, avec humour ou compassion, nombre de préjugés sur le harem et la condition des femmes turques dans les dernières années de l'Empire ottoman. En effet, contrairement à beaucoup de voyageurs qui parlent des harems sans jamais y avoir pénétré, Marc Hélys, lors de ses trois séjours à Istanbul en 1901, 1904 et 1905, partage le quotidien de deux jeunes femmes, Nouryé et Zennour et s'introduit par leur entremise dans toutes les demeures de leur entourage. Elle observe, s'extasie ou s'indigne selon les jours, converse avec les femmes ottomanes et met sa plume au service des débats idéologiques qui les animent. Marc Hélys, qui s'était déjà fait l'écho des revendications féminines en fournissant à Pierre Loti le matériau de son roman Les Désenchantées (1906) nous livre, avec Le Jardin fermé, un témoignage exceptionnel sur les "Scènes de la vie féminine en Turquie".

[3] Only after Loti’s death in 1923 did the truth emerge, and from an unlikely source. “Leyla” was not in fact dead, nor even Turkish; she was a French journalist named Marie Léra who published under the pseudonym Marc Hélys. Her book Le secret des “Désenchantées” told the whole sad, sorry tale, of how she and the two other women, daughters of a senior Ottoman official, toyed with Loti for their own amusement, correctly believing that the author, so susceptible to romance and adventure, would find the situation irresistible. Loti never found out the truth. 

Story of "Kâtibim" Song | Üsküdar'a gider iken

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Reşat Ekrem Koçu;”Bu türkü, bir güzel katibi övmekten ziyade, genç ve güzel katibi tenzil manası taşıyor. Ve bir kız tarafından söylenmiş olmaktan ziyade bir İstanbul külhanisinin karihasına yakışmıştır.”

Rahmetli Reşat Ekrem Bey’in anlattığına göre, bu türkü Kırım harbi sırasında, Abdülmecid devrinde çıkmış. Abdülmecid, İkinci Mahmud’un “Avrupalı kıyafet” mecburiyetini bütün sivil  memurlara tatbik etmiş. Fıkara halkın çocukları, bilmecbure cübbe, şalvarı bırakıp setre ve pantolon giymişler. Halk bu vaziyeti pek hoş karşılamamış. Giyenler, sokağa çıplak çıktıkları zehabına kapılmışlar. Hele hele genç katipler, alay konusu olup bütün bütün dile düşmüşler.

”Kırım harbinde müttefiklerimiz olan İngilizler, Fransızlar ve Sardunyalıların orduları İstanbul’dan geçmişti. Selimiye kışlası da bu Avrupalı müttefiklerimizin emrine hastane olarak verilmişti. İngiliz ordusunda bir de İskoç alayı vardı: meşhur gaydaları ve pantolon yerine kısa etek giyen İskoçyalılar, İstanbulluların pek tuhafına gitmişti. Ve halk bu garip kıyafetli yabancılara,”donsuz asker“ lakabını takmıştı. İskoç alayı şarka hareket ederken, bir İskoçyalı bestekar, bu alay için hususi bir marş bestelemişti. Bu marşın bestesi bizim Katibim türküsünün nağmeleridir. İşte, biraz dalgacı bir İstanbul külhanisi, yeni yetme katipler için şu meşhur Üsküdar türküsünü yazmış, ona beste olarak da donsuz askerlerin marşını alıvermiştir...bu saatler Türkiye’ye evvela İskoçya’dan geldi. Fabrika, bu güzel marşı da saatin nağmeleri arasına yerleştirmişti.”Katibim türkülü saat” diye İstanbul  halkından bu saatleri almayan kalmadı.”

"evet bu sarki bir istanbul turkusu sanilir ama degilir. kirim savasi sirasinda,1850'li yillar, ingiliz ve fransiz askerleri istanbul'a gelirler. florence nigthingale de o donemde gelir.su anda selimiye kislasi olan binada hemsireligin temellerini atar. bu arada, uskudar semtinde gundelik hayatla ilgili ilk gozlemleri yazan da florence nigthingale'dir. uskudar'i gezer, esine dostuna yazdigi mektuplarda uskudar'i anlatir. onun bu yonu pek bilinmez.iste o yillarda iskoc askerleri, malum gayda caliyorlar, etek giyiyorlar, istanbullulara alay konusu oluyorlar. bunlarin bir sarkilarina, uskudarli bir halk ozani soz yazar.o yillarda hep bu sarki soylenir.sonra unutulur.ta ki 1900 yillarinin basina kadar. o yillarda karakoy limanina bir ingiliz gemisi gelir ve gemiden koca koca sandiklar indirilir, icinde masa saatleri vardir. bu saatler her saatbasi bir sarki calmaktadir.iste o sarkilardan biri de kirim savasi sirasinda buraya gelen iskoc askerlerin marsi olan ve hepimizin cok iyi bildigi uskudar'a giderken sarkisidir."

Sunay Akin,Kenti Dinlemek,Buyulu Kent Istanbul'dan Oykuler,2002

Mavi Boncuk |"Kâtibim" ("my clerk" or "my secretary"), or "Üsküdar'a Gider İken" ("while going to Üsküdar"; Greek: Ήχασα μαντήλι, Από ξένο τόπο,Ανάμεσα Τσιρίγο)) is a Turkish folk song about a woman and her clerk (kâtip) traveling to Üsküdar. The tune is a famous Istanbul türkü.[1]

Turkish/English translation

Üsküdar'a gider iken aldı da bir yağmur.
Kâtibimin setresi uzun, eteği çamur.
Kâtip uykudan uyanmış, gözleri mahmur.
Kâtip benim, ben kâtibin, el ne karışır?
Kâtibime kolalı da gömlek ne güzel yaraşır!

Üsküdar'a gider iken bir mendil buldum.
Mendilimin içine (de) lokum doldurdum.
Kâtibimi arar iken yanımda buldum.
Kâtip benim, ben kâtibin, el ne karışır?
Kâtibime kolalı da gömlek ne güzel yaraşır!




On the way to Üsküdar, rain poured down.
My clerk's frock coat is long, with its skirt muddied.
It seems the clerk just woke up, his eyes are languid.
The clerk belongs to me, I belong to the clerk, what is it to others?
How handsome my clerk looks with starched shirts!
On the way to Üsküdar, I found a handkerchief.
I filled the handkerchief with Turkish delight.
As I was looking for my clerk, I found him next to me.
The clerk belongs to me, I belong to the clerk, what is it to others?
How handsome my clerk looks with starched shirts!

Complete Version


 Üsküdar'a gider iken aldı da bir yağmur

 Kâtibimin setresi uzun, eteği çamur

 Kâtip benim ben kâtibin el ne karışır

 Kâtibime sırmalı ceket ne güzel yaraşır


Üsküdar'a gider iken köşe başı bakkalı

Elinde kalem döker rakamı

Kâtip benim ben kâtibin el ne karışır

Kâtibime kolalı da gömlek ne güzel yaraşır


Kâtibimin elinde kanarya kafesi

Dar kalıba vurmuş kâtibin fesi

Kâtip evlenecek çoktur hevesi

Kâtip benim ben kâtibin el ne karışır

Kâtibime kolalı da gömlek ne güzel yaraşır


Üsküdar'a gider iken bir mendil buldum

Mendilin içine lokum doldurdum

Kâtibimi arar iken yanımda buldum

Kâtip benim ben kâtibin el ne karışır

Kâtibime kokulu da gömlek ne güzel yaraşır


Kâtip kol kol olmuş çayırda gezer

Kâtibimin sözleri bağrımı ezer

Kâtibimin mektupları cebimde gezer

Kâtip benim ben kâtibin el ne karışır

Kâtibime kolalı da gömlek ne güzel yaraşır


Üsküdar'a gider iken bohçam tutuştu

Kordonum kesildi, saatim düştü

Üsküdar çapkınları peşime düştü

Kâtip benim ben kâtibin el ne karışır

Kâtibime kolalı da gömlek ne güzel yaraşır


Üsküdar'dan istanbul'a geçen kayıklar

Kâtibim oturmuş fındık ayıklar

Kâtip rüyasında beni sayıklar

Kâtip benim ben kâtibin el ne karışır

Kâtibime kolalı da gömlek ne güzel yaraşır




Complete Version  (French Translation)[2]
Chanson turque de l‘époque de la guerre de Crimée, d’après une mélodie écossaise

Lorsque m'en allant à Uskudar, survient une pluie
La redingote de mon clerc est longue, ses basques sont couvertes de boue
Le clerc m'appartient et je suis à lui, de quoi se mêlent les autres
Une veste lamée ira à ravir à mon clerc
Lorsque m'en allant à Uskudar, l'épicier du coin de la rue
crayon en main, faisait ses comptes
Le clerc m'appartient et je suis à lui, de quoi se mêlent les autres
Une chemise amidonnée ira aussi à ravir à mon clerc
Dans les mains de mon clerc, une cage de canari
Le fez de mon clerc est trop petit pour lui
Le clerc est plein d'ardeur, il va se marier
Le clerc m'appartient et je suis à lui, de quoi se mêlent les autres
Une chemise amidonnée ira aussi à ravir à mon clerc
Lorsque m'en allant à Uskudar, j'ai trouvé un mouchoir
J'ai rempli le mouchoir de loukoums
Lorsque cherchant mon clerc, je l'ai trouvé à mes côtés
Le clerc m'appartient et je suis à lui, de quoi se mêlent les autres
Une chemise parfumée ira aussi à ravir à mon clerc
Le clerc se promène bras dessus bras dessous
Les paroles de mon clerc m'émeuvent
Les lettres de mon clerc se trouvent dans mes poches
Le clerc m'appartient et je suis à lui, de quoi se mêlent les autres
Une chemise amidonnée ira aussi à ravir à mon clerc
Lorsque m'en allant à Uskudar, mon balluchon a pris feu
Mon cordon s'est arraché, ma montre est tombé
Les coureurs de jupons d'Uskudar sont à mes trousses
Le clerc m'appartient et je suis à lui, de quoi se mêlent les autres
Une chemise amidonnée ira aussi à ravir à mon clerc
Les barques passant d'Uskudar à Istanbul
Mon clerc est assis, il décortique des noisettes
Dans son rêve, le clerc parle de moi à haute voix
Le clerc m'appartient et je suis à lui, de quoi se mêlent les autres
Une chemise amidonnée ira aussi à ravir à mon clerc

La chanson ‘Üsküdar’a gider iken » [En allant à Scutari], qui a servi durant de nombreuses années de jingle musical à la radio d’Istanbul, a vu le jour à l’époque de la guerre de Crimée, sous le Sultan Abdülmecid.

[1] Many versions of the song can be found in countries neighboring Turkey, usually with entirely different lyrics. A documentary film entitled Whose is this song?[4] and an international youth project called Everybody's Song documented many of these versions. 

The melody was first recorded in the USA as "Der Terk in America" in 1924 by klezmer clarinetist Naftule Brandwein. With lyrics, and incorporating an English adaptation by Stella Lee, the song was recorded in the USA as "Uska Dara" in 1953 by Eydie Gormé and Eartha Kitt.

Boney M's "Rasputin" features a melody similar to the tune, which is also found in Serbian ("Ај, русе косе цуро имаш"). The tune appears in the film Ali Baba Bujang Lapok as "Alangkah Indah di Waktu Pagi (A Beautiful Morning)." Loreena McKennitt's studio album An Ancient Muse (2006) has a track named "Sacred Shabbat", which has the same tune as "Katibim". Sábado Sagrado /Judería De La Región Otomana.

Sephardic Version

Selanik entero yo lo camini 
Como ti hijica hermoza ainda no topi. 
O que aire hermozo viene de Selanik, 
Ahi hay hijica hermoza a dos un metalik. 
Dime si me keres y de corazon, 
Mandaré telegrafo a toda mi nasion. 

Je chemine dans Salonique toute entière (j'ai fait le tour de Salonique) 
Une belle jeune fille comme toi, je n'ai pas encore trouvé. 
Oh quel bel air vient de Salonique, 
Là-bas, belle jeune fille, il y a une piastre pour (nous ?) deux. 
Dis-moi si tu m'aimes de tout ton cœur, 
J'enverrai un télégraphe (télégramme) à toute ma nation.

[2] A l’époque du Sultan Mahmut II, les militaires avaient été mis en demeure de revêtir le costume occidental, mais les fonctionnaires civils étaient libres de faire ce qu’ils voulaient en la matière. 

Mais le Sultan Abdülmecid contraignit tous les fonctionnaires résidents à Istanbul de revêtir le complet veston. Certains d’entre eux, conservateurs, s’insurgeaient contre cette mesure, qu’ils qualifiaient de « singerie des infidèles (Gavur) » et ils se mirent à sortir dans la rue en pantalon, mais en gardant leur caleçon (en particulier les plus jeunes, d’ailleurs), si bien que les secrétaires vraiment en règle devinrent la risée de tous.

Durant la guerre de Crimée, l’hôpital militaire de la caserne de Selimiye, (sur la rive asiatique d’Istanbul) fut réservé à nos alliés Anglais. Voyant les hommes de la brigade écossaise de l’armée anglaise, qui portaient le kilt, les Stambouliotes les surnommèrent « donsuz asker » [les soldats sans culotte]. Lorsque cette brigade se mit en route vers l’Est, un musicien écossais composa une marche militaire. 

Un titi d’Istanbul, s’inspirant du fait que la Caserne de Semiliye se trouve sur la route conduisant à Üsküdar et désirant se défouler sur les fonctionnaires en détournant la marche militaire composée à l’intention des « soldats sans culotte », composa la chanson « Üsküdar’a giderken »… [« En allant à Üsküdar… »]

Quelques années après, de petites horloges musicales firent leur apparition sur le marché. Les premiers cartels de ce type étaient importés d’Ecosse et leur sonnerie jouait, précisément, la marche militaire en question. Très vite, ces horloges furent vendues à Istanbul sous le nom d’ « Horloges à l’air de ‘Mon secrétaire’ » [Katibim Türkülü Saat] (‘Mon secrétaire’, Katibim, étant un autre intitulé de cette même chanson). Elles eurent un succès inouï : tout le monde voulait avoir la sienne… 

IMF on Turkey | World Economic Outlook Update, July 2017

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IMF
World Economic Outlook Update, July 2017 

SOURCE


Mavi Boncuk |

In Emerging and Developing Europe, growth is projected to pick up in 2017, primarily driven by a higher growth forecast for Turkey, where exports recovered strongly in the last quarter of 2016 and the first quarter of 2017 following four quarters of moderate contraction, and external demand is projected to be stronger with improved prospects for euro area trading partners. The Russian economy is projected to recover gradually in 2017 and 2018, in line with the April forecast.

SOURCE

Ergüven's "Kings" TIFF Bound

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(Pictured Deniz Gamze Erguven)

The Orchard has acquired (Cannes 2017) all North American rights to drama Kings, which is set against the backdrop of the 1992 L.A. riots and stars Halle Berry and Daniel Craig. 

The film was written and directed by Academy Award nominee Deniz Gamze Erguven (Mustang), marking her first English-language feature.

Maven Pictures co-founders Trudie Styler, Celine Rattray and Charlotte Ubben executive produced alongside Wei Han of Bliss Media. Maven and Bliss also co-financed the film. It is produced and co-financed by Charles Gillibert of CG Cinema. Vincent Maraval’s Insiders is handling international sales, with Maraval also serving as an executive producer. The Orchard is planning a fall release for the film. 

Mavi Boncuk |

This year, TIFF offers a refreshed, more tightly curated Festival, with a renewed commitment to bold, director-driven programming, continued support of female filmmakers, and enough star power to fuel 400,000 festival-goers.

Today’s announcement cements that the future is female (and so is TIFF’s programming), with Gala films from emerging and established filmmakers that include Kings[1] set against the backdrop of the 1992 L.A. riots and starring Halle Berry and Daniel Craig by Deniz Gamze Ergüven, whose 2015 Festival feature Mustang earned an Oscar nod for Best Foreign Film; Mary Shelley by Haifaa Al Mansour, the first female Saudi director; Dee Rees’ Mudbound, an adaptation of Hillary Jordan’s novel about racial tensions in the Jim Crow South; Susanna White’s Woman Walks Ahead, starring forever-favourite Jessica Chastain; and a big must-watch for every Canadian: Long Time Running, Jennifer Baichwal and Nicholas de Pencier’s documentary on The Tragically Hip’s emotional and powerful 2016 final tour.

The sprawling Toronto Film Festival knows it has an annoying problem: It's gotten too big for its own good.

And that's overwhelming film buyers and sellers, publicists, journalists and some among the 400,000 ordinary filmgoers that attend the annual September event. So fest organizers plan to take the high road and cut the 2017 lineup by 20 percent, or around 60 movies.

A leaner TIFF will shed its Vanguard and City to City sections to retain in all 14 programs, and no longer screen movies at the Isabel Bader and Hot Docs cinemas to better concentrate the festival downtown around its year-round Bell Lightbox venue.

Toronto is also taking note of Oscar picture winners increasingly launching in Venice and Telluride, where breakout movies are quickly talked about on social media, leaving Toronto as less of the great discoverer it once was. TIFF's traditional axis of convenience, which allows studio and other star-driven American movies to build buzz in Venice or Telluride before arriving here, in recent years has undermined its reputation as the official award season launchpad.

It's not lost on TIFF programmers that recent Oscar picture winners like Gravity, Birdman and Spotlight world premiered on the Lido, as did this year's Oscar frontrunner, La La Land. So TIFF now boasts having the most must-see movies and red-carpet moments for its industry and public audiences, rather than the first crack at seeing Oscar best picture contenders as a key selling point.

All of your favourite filmmakers' new films are playing at TIFF this year, including Darren Aronofsky’s mother!; Alexander Payne’s Downsizing; Greta Gerwig's Lady Bird; Mahamat Saleh-Haroun's A Season in France; George Clooney’s Surburbicon; Angelina Jolie’s First They Killed My Father; Anurag Kashyap's The Brawler; Andy Serkis’ Breathe; Joe Wright’s Darkest Hour; Martin McDonagh’s Three Billboards Outside Ebbing, Missouri; Wim Wenders’ Submergence; and  Guillermo del Toro’s The Shape of Water.



[1] Erguven’s English-language Debut "Kings"


Depending on who eventually gets the US rights should determine the theatrical release date, as the presence of Berry and Craig will most likely demand an awards consideration push. Erguven’s [*]English language debut is a passion project for the director, which may push this into a 2018 release if she’s not ready for the Fall festival cycle.


[*] She was born in Ankara (Turkey) in 1978, and received her cosmopolitan education in France, Turkey and the United States. She is a film buff and studied filmmaking at La Fémis in Paris after finishing her higher education of Literature and African History in Johannesburg. Her short film for graduation, 'Bir Damla Su', which she starred in, was shown at the Cinéfondation of the Cannes Festival and won a Leopardo del Mañana Award at the Locarno Festival. After graduating from La Fémis, she starting preparing for her debut with a feature film set in South Central Los Angeles and the riots in 1992. The project, entitled 'Kings', was selected by 'Emergence', the Cinéfondation workshop, and by the Sundance Script Laboratory, although it is was beaten by 'Mustang', a film whose script was created by this Turkish director herself and Alice Winocour during the summer of 2012. Filmography. 2006: "Bir damla su" (short), "Mon trajet préféré" (short). 2015: "Mustang". (Catalogue Valladolid International Film Festival 2015)

Mavi Boncuk |


Oscar-nominated (Mustang) French-Turkish director Deniz Gamze Erguven’s English-language debut "Kings", set against the Los Angeies riots[1] and starring Halle Berry and Daniel Craig, could be ready in time, although it would be a fast turnaround from its announcement last Cannes. This has been a passion project for Ergüven for years, dating back to her graduation from the French Fémis film school. She almost made it as her debut, but instead put it on hold to focus on Mustang. 

At first, Turkish-born, Paris-based director Deniz Gamze Erguven feared that she wouldn’t be able to make “Mustang,” simply because the material felt too close (the girls were inspired by one of her cousins back in Turkey). She actually started with an equal rowdy, but far less personal feature. Shortly after graduating from France’s La Femis film school, she traveled to Los Angeles to research the L.A. riots. She spoke to citizens, rode in police helicopters, and poured all she had into the script, which she called “Kings.” The project was invited to Cannes’ Cinefondation workshop, where she met future co-writer Alice Winocour, but baffled investors, who couldn’t understand why a French-Turkish helmer might be pitching such a story. “It was so obvious to me,” she says. “I was drawn to the tragedy, and the fact that it was five days in L.A. without laws.” 


When the project cratered, Erguven’s confidence was shot. “I was ready to move to Australia and sell ice cream, and Alice was the one who lifted me back up when I was really flat on the ground,” she says. “She made me write 20 hours a day.” Miraculously, some of the more anarchic moments from “Kings” found their way into “Mustang”: The scene where the woman breaks the electrical transformer, for example, or throwing burning pots out the window came from “Kings.” “One reason I was attracted to the L.A. riots, there was an amazing amount of raw energy, and also being a very dark story with a lot of potential for comedy,” she says.



Erguven began working on the screenplay in 2004 and has spent years working with the South Central neighborhood. After the success of Mustang, Erguven was able to revisit the project and snagged Halle Berry and Daniel Craig in lead roles. -



China’s Bliss Media and Maven Pictures[2] have come on board to finance “Kings,” the independent drama set against the backdrop of the 1992 Los Angeles riots. Principle photography began on December 27, 2016 in Los Angeles. Filming lasted until mid February 2017. 


The film has sold to the UK (Studiocanal), France (Ad Vitam), Italy (BIM), Spain (Vertigo)., Turkey (Fabula) and ex-Yugoslavia (Blitz). Charles Gillibert who produced Mustang as well as Olivier Assayas’s Personal Shopper was producing.


[1] A South Central recluse helps a woman's working-class mother during the 1992 civil unrest in Los Angeles. Craig portrays the loner who lives in South Central Los Angeles and falls in love with Berry’s character. When the riots erupt, he will help Berry in protecting her children from the violence.
[2] Bliss Media most recently wrapped production in Shanghai on “S.M.A.R.T. Chase,” starring Orlando Bloom. Bliss co-financed and executive produced Pablo Larraín’s “Jackie,” starring Natalie Portman, and acquired the Chinese distribution rights to Mel Gibson’s “Hacksaw Ridge,” which was released in China on Dec. 8 and set a box office record for imported war films in China. “Maven Pictures’ mission is to support films with women in front and behind the camera,” said Maven Pictures’ Celine Rattray and Trudie Styler. “Deniz is an extraordinary talent, and we look forward to being part of such an incredible project.” Maven’s credits include “The Kids Are All Right” and “American Honey.” Maven is partnered with Jessica Chastain in her production company Freckle Films, and is heading to Sundance with “Novitiate,” starring Margaret Qualley and Melissa Leo. CG Cinema’s credits include “Clouds of Sils Maria” by Olivier Assayas; “Eden” by Mia Hansen-Love”; “Personal Shopper,” which won the best director award at the 2016 Cannes festival for Assayas; and “Mustang” which won four awards at the French Cesars and was nominated for an Academy Award for best foreign film. Post settings Labels art. profile, film, France, USA Published on 3/14/17, 8:36 AM Eastern Standard Time Links Location Options

Colonial Hearts and Minds | Partant pour la Syrie

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It is interesting to note that Syria was later to become a League of Nations Mandate under French administration following World War I.


Colonial Hearts and Minds | Partant pour la Syrie 

Mavi Boncuk |
Partant pour la Syrie

Second French Empire Anthem (Instrumental) Hymne National sous le Second Empire. 

"Partant pour la Syrie" Departing for Syria is a French song, the music of which was written by Hortense de Beauharnais and the text by Alexandre de Laborde in or about 1807.

The song was inspired by Napoleon's Egypt campaign. It represents a chivalric composition of the aspirations of a crusader knight in a style typical for the First French Empire. Hortense indicated in her Memoires that she wrote the music when she lived at Malmaison. During its popularity in the nineteenth century the song was arranged for numerous instruments by various composers.
The poem by Laborde was originally titled Le beau Dunois telling the story of the handsome crusader Dunois. Prior to his departure to Syria he prays to the Virgin Mary that he will love the most beautiful woman and that he himself may be the bravest. His prayers are answered. On his return the brave warrior wins the hand of Isabelle. Love and honor prevail.

The song was popular during the remainder of the First Empire, popular with Hortense in her exile, and with the Bonapartists during the Bourbon Restoration. During the Second Empire Partant pour la Syrie was the unofficial national anthem, while La Marseillaise was forbidden but for the very end. With the collapse of Napoleon III’s rule, the popularity of the song waned. The song was played to the Emperor Napoleon III as he departed from Schloss Wilhelmshöhe to his exile in England in 1871. It remains part of the repertoire of French military music.

Partant pour la Syrie,
Le jeune et beau Dunois,
Venait prier Marie
De bénir ses exploits :
Faites, Reine immortelle,
Lui dit-il en partant,
Que j'aime la plus belle
Et sois le plus vaillant.
Il trace sur la pierre
Le serment de l'honneur,
Et va suivre à la guerre
Le Comte son seigneur ;
Au noble vœu fidèle,
Il dit en combattant :
Amour à la plus belle,
Honneur au plus vaillant.
On lui doit la Victoire.
Vraiment, dit le seigneur ;
Puisque tu fais ma gloire
Je ferai ton bonheur.
De ma fille Isabelle,
Sois l'Epoux à l'instant,
Car elle est la plus belle,
Et toi le plus vaillant.
A l'Autel de Marie,
Ils contractent tous deux
Cette union Chérie
Qui seule rend heureux.
Chacun dans la chapelle
Disait en les voyant :
Amour à la plus belle,
Honneur au plus vaillant.

English Translation

Going to Syria
The young and handsome Dunois
Went to ask the Virgin Mary,
His heroic deeds to bless,
Make it so, immortal Queen
He said on his leaving,
That I love the most beautiful woman
And be the bravest
He writes on stone
The oath of honor
And follows into war
The earl, his lord.
The noble desire faithfulness
He said to his fighter:
Love to the most beautiful woman
Honor to the brave
Love to the most beautiful woman
Honor to the brave
We owe you the victory
Verily! says the lord,
Since you have established my glory,
I will make you happy!
My daughter Isabella
Will be your wife
For she is the most beautiful woman
And you the bravest
For she is the most beautiful woman
And you the bravest
At the altar of Mary,
They pledged both
This dear union
Which makes the lonely happy.
Everyone in the chapel
Said seeing them:
Love to most beautiful woman
Honor to the bravest
Love to the most beautiful woman
Honor to the bravest.
Trivia[edit]
It is interesting to note that Syria was later

EU Watch | MAM Finds a HERO

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The Turk looks for a true hero while the Bogeyman (foreign interests) and Mr. Ikitelli (Press barons) wear HERO t shirts.

Mavi Boncuk |

Turkish police have over the last week detained at least 15 people for wearing a T-shirt with a slogan the authorities argue is a veiled message backing the alleged mastermind of last year's failed coup.

Police across the country have been detaining people wearing T-shirts with the word "Hero" in English in white capital letters against a black background, with the slogan underneath "Heroes are Immortal".

The authorities say the slogan is a veiled message of support for Fethullah Gulen, the US-based Islamic preacher blamed by the Turkish authorities for the July 15 failed coup aimed at ousting President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

The controversy erupted on July 13 when a suspect tried over an alleged plot to assassinate Erdogan on the coup night was photographed going into court wearing the white "Hero" T-shirt.


This prompted outrage on social media, with users saying it was an insult to the 249 people killed at the hands of the coup plotters. Erdogan said that coup suspects should in future wear Guantanamo-style prison jumpsuits.

Profile | Deniz Gamze Ergüven

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Mavi Boncuk |

Deniz Gamze Ergüven (born 4 June 1978) is a Turkish-French film director best known for her debut film Mustang.

Ergüven was born in Ankara, Turkey but moved to France in the 1980s. She grew up and went to school in France. She attended La Fémis and graduated in 2008.

In 2011 Ergüven was invited to attend the Cannes Film Festivals Atelier to help develop her project, The Kings. While there she met fellow director Alice Winocour who was there to develop her first feature film Augustine. After Ergüven was unable to find financing for her film Winocour suggested she write a more intimate piece leading the two to begin work on the script for Mustang.

Her debut film Mustang premiered in the Directors' Fortnight section at the 2015 Cannes Film Festival where it won the Europa Cinemas Label Award. It later played in the Special Presentations section of the 2015 Toronto International Film Festival. The film was selected as the French entry for the Best Foreign Language Film at the 88th Academy Awards.It was later shortlisted for the Academy Award for Best Foreign Language Film.

Ergüven was also nominated for multiple César Awards, winning the César Award for Best First Feature Film as well as the César Award for Best Original Screenplay.

Ergüven was surprised by the film's overwhelmingly positive welcome. "During Cannes I was telling this joke: Tuesday we’ll show the movie, Wednesday we’ll talk to the press, Thursday we’ll be old news. But that Thursday never came! We’re still Wednesday and it’s just getting more intense", she said.

In May 2016 Ergüven announced plans to film Kings, which would star Halle Berry in a lead role and be set during the 1992 Los Angeles riots.

Personal life[edit]
Ergüven was pregnant while filming Mustang and gave birth to her son on 11 February 2015.

Antalya Goes Downey for the 54th Edition

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(Pictured Mike Downey, left, with Antalya mayor Menderes Turel, Zeynep Atakan and Mirsad Purivatra.)

Mavi Boncuk |

Turkey’s Antalya Film Festival, whose next edition runs Oct. 21-27, is upping its profile as an international film hub with the appointment of British-Irish producer Mike Downey[1] as artistic director and Sarajevo Film Festival chief Mirsad Purivatra as strategic consultant.

Downey, who serves as the deputy chairman of the European Film Academy, is CEO of Film and Music Entertainment. He has produced or co-produced more than 60 movies. Recent credits include Mariam Khatchvani’s “Dede,” which won the East of the West Special Jury Prize at this month’s Karlovy Vary Film Festival. Downey has previously served in senior leadership roles at the Motovun and Pula film festivals.



This year’s Antalya festival will see the merger of the international and national competition sections. Other sections include Gala Screenings, playing “some of the most anticipated world cinema releases,” the Children and Family section, Retrospectives and the Culinary section.

The festival also hosts the Antalya Film Forum, which presents film projects to some 200 international industry professionals. The section is led by Zeynep Atakan, producer of Palme d’Or-winning film “Winter Sleep,” directed by Nuri Bilge Ceylan.

In a statement, Downey said: “In the next edition of [the festival] we would like to reach out to world cinema and international authors of scope and stature to join with the public of Antalya in a program that not merely entertains, but inspires, engages and elevates.”

He added that the festival would not only grant “access to the best in cinematic art from all over the world, but allow an intimate portrait of that work to be described personally by the artists involved – and for the audience to have a direct personal engagement with these creative people.”

Downey said he, Purivatra and Atakan would “like to curate a festival, which as far as possible, mediates the best in world cinema through the artists themselves” for the “avid cinemagoers of Antalya.” 


SOURCE | VARIETY

[1]  Mike Downey is a producer of feature fiction and documentary films. As the founder and CEO of Film and Music Entertainment (F&ME), he launched this independent UK production powerhouse on the Frankfurt DAX stock market 15 years ago as FAME A.G. .In this very short space of time he has produced, more than 50 feature films, with producing partner Sam Taylor and company chairman four time Academy Award nominee (for best director) Stephen Daldry. Prior to working in film production, Mike had a successful career working as a as a theatre director in the UK, the former Yugoslavia and Germany, as well as having been one of Europe's cutting edge publishers in the field of cinema as the brains behind the Moving Pictures Group of publications his interests in which he sold a decade and a half ago.

F&ME's extraordinarily eclectic catalogue has become synonymous over the years with the production of quality international feature films from a wide variety of British, European, American, South African and Antipodean authors including his partnership with the VICE group: White Lightnin', Saul Metzstein's, Jason Biggs starrer Guy X, Deathwatch (Jamie Bell and Andy Serkis), U.S. Academy Award nominated and Venice Golden Lion winning Before the Rain and a slew of international co-productions written by Nobel Prize Winner Günter Grass, Schindler's List author Thomas Keneally, the "Demon Dog" that is James Ellroy and Clifford (Hoax) Irving. His award winning South African production Son of Man, premiered at Sundance, as did White Lightnin' while Loving Glances, opened the Venice Film Festival. His production of Mohsen Makhmalbaf's The President also opened the 2014 Venice Film Festival.

In addition to his production work, Downey also represents his country and industry on a wide range of domestic and international boards: he is currently serving his tenth year as European Film Academy Board Member, he took over from this year as Deputy Chairman of the Academy from Volker Schloendorff and will serve for another 2 years in that post. As an author on film subjects, outside of his work as a commentator and critic for Screen International, Variety, Moving Pictures, Cineaste, and countless other film journals, Downey's books The Film Finance Handbooks - a Guide for European Producers are published by the EU's MEDIA Business School as is his The Self Managing Screen by the Bristish Film Institute.

Educated in theatre: University of Warwick, with postgraduate studies at the University of Paris - III (Sorbonne), and Paris - X (Nanterre), he has long taught on the MEGA European Masters programme. Quondam Thomas Ewing Professor of Film (Ohio University) and on the Film Board Oklahoma University and he is also founder and President of the Motovun Film Festival in Croatia, Artistic Advisor to the Zagreb Film Festival, Artistic Director of the Pula Film Festival and works closely with Amnesty International establishing Amnesty Human Rights Awards at international film festivals as well as being a consultant for USAID, the American government programme rebuilding infrastructure (film) in the Balkans and Southern Europe. He regular acts as an expert on major funding panels for the European Union's Creative Europe programme.

Downey has served three terms as member of the Council of the British Academy of Film and Television Arts as well as a term on the BAFTA Film Committee. He is a member of the board of the Berlin Golden Bear winning (Carmen) South African Theatre Company Isango along with Sir Ian McKellan, Sir Simon Rattle and Alan Rickman. Mike is particularly proud to be a trustee on the board of the White Ribbon Foundation - an international charity which works to eradicate women dying in childbirth in the developing world. In addition he has served on international film juries as wide ranging as Rio de Janeiro, Sofia, Transylvania, Cottbus, Montreal, Zagreb, Motovun, Rotterdam, Krakow, Tbilisi, Warsaw.

Films just delivered in 2014 include: Lost in Karastan, written by Pawel Pawlikowski and directed by Ben Hopkins and starring Matthew Macfadyen, Julien Temple's Rio 50 Degrees , Imagine by Andrzej Jakimowski , Goltzius and the Pelican Company by Peter Greenaway, Lilet Never Happened by Jacco Groen and the portmanteau film Zagreb Stories 2. Films currently in production or about to be delivered are Mark Dornford May's Breathe Umphefumlo by the Isango Company, Srdjan Dragojevic's The Porcupine, Amsterdam Express directed by Fatmir Koci, Streetkids United II - The Girls from Rio by Maria Clara Costa.

Projects for 2015 include two films with Konstantin Bojanov: In Search of a Miracle (adapted from the book by William Dalrymple) and I Want to be Like You, Marc Evans' romantic comedy Cassy and Jude, Srdjan Drajojevic's Cum in the Rye, Rudoph Herzog's How to Sell a War in collaboration with the VICE Group, Jonathan Preece's Elvis Walks Home and his own adaptation of Thomas Hardy's Under the Greenwood Tree entitled The Mellstock Quire. In between gigs he has just completed a collection of essays The Fool on the Hill - Low Altitude Thinking, to be published during 2015, an untitled poetry collection, and a cookbook: Casonova's Cuisine - A Guide to the Senses and Sensuality of Food. Represented by some of the best names in international and domestic distribution, Downey's titles have been released in all major markets in the world, and represent a vast production output with budgets totalling in excess of $300 million, encompassing a wide variety of, genres, nationalities and age groups.

- IMDb Mini Biography By: Mike Downey, The Film Finance Handbook

600 MP's Allocated by the High Council of Elections

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Mavi Boncuk |

BASED ON 600 MP’S
(GAINS IN BOLD 48 SEATS)

PROVINCE  | NEW | OLD

ADANA1514
ADIYAMAN55
AFYON65
AĞRI54
AMASYA33
ANKARA3632
ANTALYA1614
ARTVİN22
AYDIN87
BALIKESİR98
BİLECİK22
BİNGÖL33
BİTLİS33
BOLU33
BURDUR33
BURSA2018
ÇANAKKALE44
ÇANKIRI22
ÇORUM44
DENİZLİ87
DİYARBAKIR1211
EDİRNE43
ELAZIĞ54
ERZİNCAN22
ERZURUM66
ESKİŞEHİR66
GAZİANTEP1412
GİRESUN44
GÜMÜŞHANE22
HAKKARİ33
HATAY1110
İSPARTA44
MERSİN1311
İSTANBUL9788
İZMİR2826
KARS33
KASTAMONU33
KAYSERİ109
KIRKLARELİ33
KIRŞEHİR22
KOCAELİ1311
KONYA1514
KÜTAHYA54
MALATYA66
MANİSA109
K.MARAŞ88
MARDİN66
MUĞLA76
MUŞ43
NEVŞEHİR33
NİĞDE33
ORDU65
RİZE33
SAKARYA77
SAMSUN99
SİİRT33
SİNOP22
SİVAS55
TEKİRDAĞ76
TOKAT55
TRABZON66
TUNCELİ22
ŞANLIURFA1412
UŞAK33
VAN88
YOZGAT44
ZONGULDAK55
AKSARAY43
BAYBURT22
KARAMAN32
KIRIKKALE33
BATMAN54
ŞIRNAK44
BARTIN22
ARDAHAN22
IĞDIR22
YALOVA32
KARABÜK32
KİLİS22
OSMANİYE44
DÜZCE33

Lozan |Treaty of Lausanne, October, 1912

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Mavi Boncuk |Sealed and signed by İsmet Paşa, Dr. Rıza Nur and Hasan Bey (Hasan Saka). | The Treaty of Lausanne (French: Traité de Lausanne) was a peace treaty signed in Palais de Rumine, Lausanne, Switzerland, on 24 July 1923. The issue of the Dodecanese islands was an item in the 1012 Treaty.


Treaty of Lausanne, October, 1912.

1. INTRODUCTION.

Italy declared war on Turkey September 29, 1911, because the latter had failed to accept the Italian 24-hour ultimatum to allow Italy to occupy Tripoli and Cyrenaica. By formal royal decree, November 5, 1911, confirmed by an act of Parliament, February 25, 1912, these two provinces were declared to be under the full and entire sovereignty of the Italian Kingdom.

2. NEGOTIATION.

Russia suggested mediation, February, 1912, but the reply of the Marquis de San Giuliano, March 15, and the statement of the Porte, April 23, furnished the powers no opportunity for such action. Informal diplomatic conversations were opened at Caux, Switzerland, in July, and later these were continued at Ouchy. Agreement was impossible, since the Turkish representatives insisted that any action on the part of the delegates must be sanctioned by their respective Parliaments. Italy saw in this demand the familiar Turkish play for delay. Finally an Italian ultimatum gave Turkey three days, October 12 to 15, in which to accept the Italian proposals. As Montenegro ha declared war on Turkey, October 9, and the other States of the Balkan League were preparing to follow, the Turkish delegates were authorized to conclude a treaty. Terms of the protocol were accepted on the 15th, but the final draft was signed on the 19th. In the interim, the Ottoman Government by a firman, October 16, granted autonomy to Tripoli and Cyrenaica and the Sultan appointed a spiritual representative for the provinces. An irade of the Sultan guaranteed administrative and juridical reforms for the Aegean Islands. By royal proclamation the Italian Government granted amnesty and guaranteed religious freedom to the two provinces. A commission was appointed, consisting in part of natives, to make civil regulations respecting local customs.

3. TERMS OF THE TREATY.

The final draft of the Treaty of Lausanne was signed October 18, 1912, by Pietro-Bertolini, Guido Fusinnato, and Giuseppe Volpe, plenipotentiaries for Italy, and Mehemmed Naby Bey and Roumboyoglon Fahreddin Bey, plenipotentiaries for Turkey. It provided for:

Article 1, immediate and simultaneous cessation of hostilities. 

Article 2, Turkey's immediate recall of officers, troops, and civil functionaries from Tripoli and Cyrenaica, this to be followed immediately by Italy's withdrawal from the Aegean Islands (the Dodecanese). (It is to be noted, that there is no formal recognition of any change in territorial sovereignty and that Italy has not withdrawn from the Islands.) 

Article 3, immediate exchange of prisoners and hostages. 

Article 4, mutual and full amnesty for all hostile acts, crimes at common law excepted. 

Article 5, resumption of all treaties as before the war. 

Article 6, an Italian engagement to conclude a treaty of commerce without the "capitulation" servitudes whenever the other powers do so. 

Article 7, an Italian engagement to suppress Italian post offices in the Ottoman Empire whenever other powers do so. 

Article 8, the signification of willingness on the part of Italy to lend support to the powers for the general suppression of the "capitulations" in the Ottoman Empire. 

Article 9, a Turkish engagement to restore dismissed subjects of Italy to their administrative positions in the Empire without loss of retirement pension rights and a promise by Turkey to use her influence with nongovernmental institutions to act in a similar manner. 

Article 10, an Italian pledge to pay into the Turkish treasury an annual sum equivalent to the average sums which for the three years previous to the war had been allocated for the use of the public debt to the two provinces; the amount to be determined by a commission of three -- one Turkish, one Italian, and a third chosen by the two. In case of failure to agree each State was to choose a power as mediator and the two powers thus designated were to select a, chief arbitrator. Italy was given the right to substitute for the annuity a sum corresponding to the amount capitalized at the rate of 4 per cent. (The commission fixed on 2,000,000 lire annually.)

4. CONCLUSION.

The vagueness of the treaty as regards the questions at issue is taken to mean that the provisions of the ultimatum, the acts of annexation, the proclamation of amnesty and religious freedom, the firman and the irade had already accomplished the settlement of these matters.

Source: Anderson, Frank Maloy and Amos Shartle Hershey, Handbook for the Diplomatic History of Europe, Asia, and Africa 1870-1914. Prepared for the National Board for Historical Service. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1918.

Körfez | The Gulf by Emre Yeksan

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The Venice Film Festival’s Critics’ Week on Monday unveiled its lineup of eight international first works, all of them world premieres

Turkish cinema has another no show at another major festival. There is only one film The Gulf by Emre Yeksan[1] is in an alternate side bar.

The line-up for the 2017 edition of the Venice Film Festival’s independent parallel strand Critics’ Week (Aug 30 – Sept 9) including "The Gulf" by Emre Yeksan has been revealed. 

Organised by the National Union of Italian Film Critics, the selection is curated by the general delegate of the Venice Critics’ Week Giona A. Nazzaro with the selection committee comprised of Luigi Abiusi, Alberto Anile, Beatrice Fiorentino and Massimo Tria. All Venice Critics’ Week entries will compete alongside titles in the official selection for the fest’s Lion of the Future prize, worth $100,000. As usual, Critics’ Week films will be voted on by festival-goers rather than a jury.


Mavi Boncuk | 

Emre Yeksan, who has already worked as a producer, directed a short film called Aziz (2014) and formed part of the directing team for the short documentary Welcome Lenin! (2016), has spent almost four years sculpting and bringing to life the idea behind his debut feature film, entitled The Gulf. After appearing at multiple acclaimed development workshops and co-production markets — Meetings on the Bridge, CineLink, Ekran+, Les Arcs— the project is now almost complete and is currently in post-production.

The screenplay, written by the director and Ahmet Büke, revolves around an apathetic man, 32-year-old Selim (Ulaş Tuna Astepe), who returns to his home town Izmir at a moment when his personal life and professional career are in ruins. Selim, who doesn’t want to plan his future, decides to reconnect with his past friends, his family and the energy that his old town offers him. However, this new adventure takes an unexpected turn when an unbearable smell spreads over the city.



Regarding the idea behind the story of The Gulf, Yeksan explains that he tried to capture the increasing sense that we are living on the edge of a manmade disaster or another world war. While some of us still have the strength to stand against this catastrophe and overcome the fear, there are moments when we may feel perplexed and immobilised, and this is the case with the main protagonist.

The €500,000 project was shot last summer in Izmir, which also happens to be Yeksan’s home town. The Gulf is also the first feature film produced by Anna Maria Aslanoğlu of Istanbul-based Istos Film, which, in recent years, has been an active participant in the short films’ sections of major film festivals and is currently developing three new feature films (Idle Moments by Cem Öztüfekçi, Zuhal by Nazli E. Durlu and Ela and Hilmi by Ziya Demirel). According to the producer’s notes, the film is expected to be completed this summer.

The Gulf is a Turkish-German-Greek co-production by Anna Maria Aslanoğlu (Istos Film), Asli Filiz (Bir Film), Dirk Engelhardt (Kundschafter Filmproduktion) and Maria Drandaki (Homemade Films). The film is supported by the Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism, the Berlinale’s World Cinema Fund, the Greek Film Centre and Swiss fund Visions Sud Est.

CREDITS

Directed by
Emre Yeksan

Writing credits
(in alphabetical order)
Ahmet Büke
Emre Yeksan

Produced by
Anna Maria Aslanoglu....producer
Maria Drandaki....co-producer
Dirk G. Engelhardt....co-producer
C. Asli Filiz....co-producer
Ozan Sapaz....assistant producer

Original Music by
Ekin Uzeltuzenci(as Ekin Fil)

Cinematography by
Jakub Giza

Film Editing by
Selda Taskin

Casting by
Kutay Sandikçi

Art Direction by
Serdar Yilmaz

Costume Design by
Ayse Yildiz

Makeup Department
Esma Keskin....makeup artist

CAST
Ulas Tuna Astepe...Selim
Müfit Kayacan...Bülent
Merve Dizdar...Pinar
Serpil Gül...Nihal
Cem Zeynel Kiliç...Necati
Ahmet Melih Yilmaz...Cihan

Damla Ardal...Meral



OFFICIAL SITE 



[1] Emre Yeksan (b. 1981, İzmir, Turkey) 

Emre Yeksan Obtained a BA and MA in Film Studies from Mimar Sinan University and Paris Sorbonne University respectively. He spent a while working working as a freelance producer in Paris. Since then, he has produced films with directors such as Semih Kaplanoglu, Kamen Kalev and Huseyin Karabey. He also directed a short film titled Aziz. The Gulf, co-written with Ahmet Buke, will be his first feature as a director.  
Movies: Do Not Forget Me Istanbul (producer), Come to My Voice (producer), The Gulf
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