Quantcast
Channel: Mavi Boncuk
Viewing all 3433 articles
Browse latest View live

Word Origins | Arena, Stadyum

0
0

Turkish President wants the word "arena" removed from sports facilities.

Mavi Boncuk | 

Arena: Arena[1] EN from FR arène 1. kumluk, kumsal, 2. stadyumun kumluk zemini from L. arena/harena.

arena "kumluk" [ Tıngır & Sinapian, Istılahat Lugati (1892) ]
aren "güreş meydanı" [ c (1937) : Geçen pazar günü Kadıköy stadyumu er meydanı olmaktan çıktı ve eski Bizans Roma (Arena)larına döndü. ]

Stadyum: Stadium EN, stadyom [ İbrahim Alaattin (Gövsa), Yeni Türk Lugatı (1930) ]

[1] arena (n.) 1620s, "place of combat," from Latin harena "place of combat, enclosed space in the middle of Roman amphitheaters," originally "sand, sandy place" (source also of Spanish arena, Italian rena, French arène "sand"), a word of uncertain origin, perhaps from Etruscan. The central stages of Roman amphitheaters were strewn with sand to soak up the blood. Figuratively, "scene of contest of any kind" is by 1814.

[2] stadium (n.) late 14c., "a foot race; an ancient measure of length," from Latin stadium "a measure of length; a course for foot-racers" (commonly one-eighth of a Roman mile or a little over 600 English feet; translated in early English Bibles by furlong), from Greek stadion "a measure of length; a race-course, a running track," especially the track at Olympia, which was one stadion in length. The meaning "running track," recorded in English from c. 1600, was extended to mean in modern-day context "large, open oval structure with tiers of seats for viewing sporting events" (1834). 

"Originally the distance between successive stations of the shouters and runners employed to estimate distances" [Century Dictionary]. According to Barnhart, the Greek word might literally mean "fixed standard of length" (from stadios "firm, fixed," from PIE root *sta- "to stand"), or it may be from spadion, from span "to draw up, pull," with form influenced by stadios.

Avars in the Middle

0
0
Mavi Boncuk | East Roman Empire, 6th century CE, showing the territories of the Avars, Goths, Franks, Lombards, Saxons, Thuringians, Slavs.

Topkapı to Undergo Most Extensive Renovation to Date

0
0
Mavi Boncuk | Turkey's Culture and Tourism Minister Nabi Avcı has said that the ongoing restoration and renovation projects at the Topkapı Palace Museum will be the most extensive in the palace's history.

Avcı, speaking to the culture and arts editors of various newspapers, said the 24 current projects, which include extensive restoration, conservation, display and adjustments, will cost more than TL 220 million ($59 million) in total.


Currently, restoration works were ongoing at the Seferli Ward, the Fatih Mansion, the Kilerli Ward, Ahmet III's Library, Harem 1-2-3, the Beşirağa Mosque, Matbah-ı Amire Ward, Gülhane hospitals, military warehouses and the retaining walls and Sur-ı Sultani.

All palace structures were being prepared under integrated projects. A security system is also being set up and landscaping works were being performed in the backyards and gardens.

Topkapı Palace was attached to the Istanbul Asar-ı Atika Museum Directorate after being turned into a museum with the order of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk on April 3, 1924. After minor repairs, it was opened the same year.

The TL 60,000 grant provided from 1923 to 1939, allowed for the repairs of broken glass and frames in the Harem, as well as treatment of lead and roof repairs.

With a grant of TL 1 million, provided between 1940 and 1944, major repairs were made in various parts of the palace. As of 1961, the focus shifted to the archives and warehouses, including the engravings warehouse.

To preserve books in the palace library as well as royal clothing, fabrics and devices, humidity-control systems were installed in some of the sections.

A binding repair workshop, mother-of-pearl repair workshop and a carpenter's shop was also established.

Renovations also took place at the exhibition halls, and new exhibition halls, namely the "Sacred Works,""Clocks" and "Engravings" were established.

Some parts of the Harem, which were repaired over a period of almost 12 years, were opened to the public in 1971.

Sections including the supply room, the treasury, miniatures; royal portraits and sultanate vehicles, were opened to visit a year later in 1972. Restoration and arrangement works have continued as yet, in line with the requirements and possibilities at hand.

Article | Did Trump Give Erdogan License to Kill PKK Militants Inside Iraq?

0
0
Mavi Boncuk |EXPERT COMMENTARY
Did Trump Give Erdogan License to Kill PKK Militants Inside Iraq?

MAY 24, 2017 | SONER CAGAPTAY

Soner Cagaptay is the Beyer Family fellow and director of the Turkish Research Program at The Washington Institute. He has written extensively on U.S.-Turkish relations, Turkish domestic politics, and Turkish nationalism. His most recent book is "The New Sultan: Erdogan and the Crisis of Modern Turkey."

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited Washington last week to meet with U.S. President Donald Trump. Despite budding tensions over the Trump administration’s decision to arm the Kurdish YPG (Peoples’ Protection Units) militia in Syria, which Erdogan considers to be a terrorist organization, the meeting largely went off without a hitch. The Cipher Brief’s Fritz Lodge spoke with Soner Cagaptay, Director of the Turkish Research Program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and author of “The New Sultan,” about how we should read the result of this first meeting between the two leaders.

The Cipher Brief: What was your reaction to the to the meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan during his visit to Washington last week?

Soner Cagaptay: I was anticipating that the meeting would not produce much breaking news, because Erdogan has already gotten more than half of what he wanted to get from this visit, and he was just very happy to invited. This goes back to the Turkish constitutional referendum in April, which was a very contested race full of irregularities that he won by a very narrow margin. We will probably never know whether the irregularities were large enough to flip the outcome of the vote, which Erdogan won by just 1.5 percent, but in his victory night speech – which to me looked more like a concession speech than a victory speech – he said something really interesting. He said that he would like foreign governments to recognize the outcome of this election as free and fair. If you know Turkish politics, that’s incredibly unusual. Turkey has had free and fair elections since 1950, and there has never really been a concern that elections are not free and not fair. So to me, this was like a Freudian slip. That he was looking for affirmation from outside powers that his victory was fair and square.

Not only did Erdogan love the fact that President Trump called him right after the referendum, but also the fact that he was invited here. So he was more than happy, and he was not interested in creating problems with Trump. He went into the meeting to just soak in the bad news about the U.S. arming the Syrian Kurdish YPG [Peoples’ Protection Units], a blow which Trump had already softened by informing the Turkish delegation of his decision a week before Erdogan’s visit. This saved Erdogan from a major potential embarrassment.

The U.S. arming the YPG, which Turkey considers an enemy, is an issue of serious concern, but I think that, because of the way it was set up, this meeting produced no major crisis, except of course for Erdogan’s guards beating up protesters outside the residence of the Turkish ambassador.

TCB: What do you think the two leaders discussed about the YPG issue?

SC: First of all, the U.S. is likely providing Turkey with guarantees that any heavy weapons given to the YPG will return to the U.S., and that once it liberates Raqqa, the YPG will not stay there. I think that on the first issue, the YPG will deliver. They will return the weapons to the U.S. because these are measured and tracked by Washington, but, on the promise to leave Raqqa, I’m not holding my breath. Especially judging from the group’s previous record in Manbij, a majority Arab city, which they promised to return to its Arab inhabitants but did not. It’s the YPG staying in Manbij that triggered the entry of Turkish troops into Syria for the first time since the war began in that country.

Looking at the YPG’s broader goals, I’m tempted to believe that they will not pull out of Raqqa, and that, even if they did, they might bring in YPG-friendly Arabs as they did in Manbij. Or they might leverage Raqqa and negotiate its handover to the Syrian regime and the Russians in return for continued Russian, regime, and Iranian support to their autonomy economy.

This would be undesirable to Erdogan for two reasons. First, the YPG will be staying in Raqqa and second, the YPG might bring in Arabs who are friendly to the regime. Erdogan hates both the YPG and the regime, so this is where you might see a crisis down the road.

The other part of this is that the U.S. is trying to compartmentalize its relations with the YPG in Syria and the PKK in Turkey and Iraq. It is telling the Turks that if they look the other way in Syria, the U.S. will look the other way in Iraq where Turkey wants to fight the PKK. But the U.S. is also asking them not to do this right now, to wait until after Raqqa and Mosul are liberated. After that, the U.S. is signaling that it could even help the Turks to fight the PKK in Sinjar, Iraq.

The PKK’s current headquarters is in Iraqi Kurdistan in the Qandil mountains along the Iranian-Iraqi border, but this is far from the PKK’s operations in Syria. Sinjar not only lies at the Iraqi-Syrian border but it actually spills into Syria. So this provides the PKK with a perfect center for operations inside Iraq, but more importantly also spilling into Syria, and also for operations in Turkey. Thus, the PKK has been moving material and infrastructure into Sinjar. Turkey will do everything it can to prevent this fait accompli, and to me, that’s the third step of this deal, where, after Raqqa and Mosul are liberated, the U.S. is signaling that it could help Turkey launch an operation in Sinjar. In this regard, Turkey would actually be helped by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq and its leader Masoud Barzani, who also don’t want the PKK in Sinjar. The KRG actually wants the PKK out even more than does Turkey does. Finally, the U.S. is also promising assistance against the PKK in Europe, where the group has significant fundraising, extortion, and drug trafficking networks.

That’s the kind of deal that I saw likely coming out of the meeting. Compartmentalizing Iraq and Syria and offering Turkey help against the PKK in Europe.

TCB: How about the beating of the protesters outside the Turkish embassy residence? What was significant about that incident to you?

SC: The reason why this is important is because it signals, to me, it is Turkey’s deep and increasingly violent polarization, which I explain in The New Sultan, spilling into the streets of Washington. Turkey is an extremely polarized place right now, and that seems to be moving towards is becoming a violent sort of polarization. There have been a very large number of terror attacks recently, and the government has been cracking down hard on dissent and opposition. It looks to me that beating demonstrators has become such a modus operandi in Turkey that Erdogan or his guards saw nothing wrong with doing that in the U.S., because this is how they seem to function sadly, and this is how they operate. It also shows how fast Turkey’s polarization can turn violent, because even in the context of being at the heart of the world’s largest democracy did not seem to have put any reason in the minds of Erdogan’s guards.

2016 | Turkish EVOO

0
0
The European Union (EU) is the largest producer (accounting almost three quarters) and consumer (accounting two thirds) of the olive oil in the world. Olive growing is a feature of sociocultural life in many Mediterranean regions. Olive trees are grown in Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal, France, Cyprus, Slovenia and Malta. About 95% of the olive production in the EU is concentrated in Spain, Italy and Greece. Edible olives are exported to 65 countries on average, including pre-eminently Romania, Bulgaria, USA, Germany, Iraq.


Turkish Olive Oil Industry is the second largest olive cultivator in the world and is also is among the top five countries in olive oil production. Turkey is one of the producing countries that have embarked on an aggressive marketing campaign in the Asian region for the promotion of its unique olive oil.
170 million olive trees,
220.000 metric tons olive oil production in “on years”
450.000 metric tons table olive production in “on years”
400.000 Turkish families work in olive and olive oil production
More than 500 continuous olive oil extraction mills
Sufficient refinery and retail packing plants using the most modern Technologies,
State and private laboratories for the quality controls, which assure consistency with the international standards
Table olives exports: 72 thousand metric tons per annum
Olive oil exports: 20 thousand metric tons per annum (in “on” years)
Today, Turkey exports olive oil to the more than 90 countries such as USA, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, U.A.E. and very few countries are left that have not experienced the excellent taste and fragrance of Turkish olive oil.

Mavi Boncuk |

Report 2016

Turkey[1] won 19 awards in 8 contest That participated during 2016, earning 788.75 points for EVOO World Ranking 2016.

Obtaining 1 EVOO of the Year (It takes more than 160 points to get this distinction.).

The Best Society for EVOOWR 2016 of Turkey is Gidatay Gida Ve Tarim Sanayi Ticaret A.S. with 5 awards in 3 contest, reaching the score of 188.50 points.

The Best EVOO for EVOOWR 2016 of Turkey is Tuay Olive Oil from Turgut Anadolu Yatirim (Tuay) Ltd. with 3 awards in 3 contest, reaching the score of 172.75 p

[1] RANKING OF EVOO´S OF TURKEY 2016

#Society                                       EVOO          VarietyAwardsPoints
1Turgut Anadolu Yatirim (Tuay) Ltd.Tuay Olive OilMemecik3172.75
2Meray Zeytincilik Tarim Gida San. Ve Tic. Ltd. Sti.OlameaMemecik2100.75
3Selatin EVOOSelatin Earley Harvest - Cold PressEdremit Yaglik284.50
4Gidatay Gida Ve Tarim Sanayi Ticaret A.S.Attika AyvalikEdremit Yaglik281.25
5Gidatay Gida Ve Tarim Sanayi Ticaret A.S.Attika MemecikMemecik274.75
6Laleli Olive Oils Biyolojik Bilimler Arastirma Gelistirme Ve UretimLaleli Extra Virgin Olive OilBlend148.75
7Laleli Olive Oils Biyolojik Bilimler Arastirma Gelistirme Ve UretimLaleli Flavored LaurelCondimento-Flavored Olive Oil137.50
8Silisya Naturel ZeytinyagiSilisya GurmeBlend132.50
9Anfo Madencilik Patlayici Madde Mak. Tar. Nak. San. Ve Tic. Ltd. Sti.YavaMemecik132.50
10Gidatay Gida Ve Tarim Sanayi Ticaret A.S.SavrandereBlend132.50
11Oliva Food Industry And Trade Ltd. Co.SerolivaBlend132.50
12Oliva Food Industry And Trade Ltd. Co.Seroliva / Elixir OrganicBlend132.50
13Yudum Gida San.ve Tic A.SYudum Extra Virgin Olive OilBlend126.00




Table olive production in Turkey
Turkey, playing an important role in world table olive production, processes 70% of its
production for olive oil production while leaving the rest 30% for table olive processing. 85% of
the olives are processed as black table olives and the rest 15% is processed as green table
olives. Table olives are a culturally important part of Turkish style breakfast. Despite the
increase in the production of Spanish style green and olives darkened by oxidation. Turkish
consumer preferences are still in favor of natural green and black olives.
1. Natural black olive production

Olives, harvested when the flesh of the fruit turns purple 2 mm deep to the stone, are
transferred to the processing facility. After size-grading and sorting, the olives are widely put in
concrete pools or polyethylene, polyester or fiberglass tanks. Certain amount of pressure -20-
25% of the original weight of the olives- is applied on the olives and they are put in brine. The
goal of this application is to attain the shape that is called "yanaklı" which is specially preferred
by the consumer.

Brine salt concentration is around 10-12% and this ration can be around 14-15% at times. The
high salt content may slow down the fermentation process and it may take 6 to 10 months.
During the fermentation, circulating the brine, salt and pH controls are done. The bitterness
does not disappear completely from final product and residual reducing sugars may also remain
at a high level after fermentation period which may cause secondary fermentation during the
preservation of the olives. After fermentation, the olives are packed, with or without brine, for the market, according to the preference.

The olives produced by traditional methods are consumed locally or exported to ethnic markets
because of high salt concentration. The disadvantages of this production method are the stock
cost due to the long fermentation period, the loss of weight around 20% and the lack of
exportability except ethnic markets (Fındık, 2011).

The aerated fermentation has been widely used to speed up the fermentation process,
shortening the fermentation period. Through this, the fermentation period takes around 5
months.

Lately, natural black olives with low salt content has become popular in Turkish markets,
gaining the appreciation of Turkish consumers who especially want to consume diet products.
Besides black olive processing, dehydrated in dry salt, without brine is also popular. Most widely
consumed variety is Gemlik, yet Edremit (Ayvalık), Memecik and Uslu varieties are also
widespread.

2. Natural green olive production
Scratched and cracked green olives are highly appreciated by the Turkish consumers. Edremit
(Ayvalık) variety is widely preferred for scratched green olives. It can be processed whether pink or green. Domat, Memecik and Yamalak varieties are considered to be processed as scratched  Options Méditerranéennes, A, no. 106, 2013 74 as well. Soon after the olives are transported to the plant, they are size-graded, sorted and scratched on 2 or 3 sides and put into water. The water is changed every other day to obtain the deserved taste.

The olives transferred to the fermentation tanks. The brine’s salt ratio is increased progressively
and reaches to 5-6%. After the fermentation, the olives, being ready for consumption, are
packed. Although, cracked olives are highly preferred by the Turkish customers, they find
limited place in the market due to the short shelf life. The production method for cracked olives
is the same as scratched ones, yet the olive is cracked instead of being scratched. Because of
the possible storage problems, the product is processed as Spanish style green olives and then
cracked to be packed. 

Fındık M., 2011. Doğal Fermente Zeytin Nedir ve Nasıl Üretilir. 2. Zeytinyağı ve Sofralık Zeytin Sempozyumu, Yaşar Üniversitesi, İzmir

Tunalıoğlu R., 2003. Sofralık Zeytin. In: T.E.A.E. Bakış. 4,ISSN: 1303-8346, Ankara. 



oints.

In Memoriam | Karel Dibbets (1947-2017)

0
0
Mavi Boncuk |

Film and the First World War (Film Culture in Transition) Paperback 
February, 1995
by Karel Dibbets[1] (Editor), Bert Hogenkamp (Editor)

Paperback

The years between 1914 and 1918 form a crucial period in world history as well as in film history. For some time, it was believed that a serious debate about World War I had been made redundant by the events that followed later. Today, however, it is clear that the Great War has become the focus of critical attention once again and it is no accident that this renewed interest coincided with the collapse of the Berlin Wall. This book emphasises culture as an important factor: cultural historians have taken the lead in rewriting the traditional view of World War I and its impact on the 20th-century. At about the same time, film historians were preparing a radical revision of the early history of moving pictures. This volume brings together the two strands of scholarly research. Historians of different backgrounds and nationalities open up new fields of inquiry, asking unexpected questions, disclosing unusual sources and developing sophisticated methods of research. The topic has many sides to it, ranging from changes in film style to the reactions of audiences, from the function of film stars to the definition of genres, from national cinema to international stereotypes, from historical representations to state interference. The Great War marked a critical period in the history of cinema that has come under scrutiny only recently. Patterns of film distribution were disrupted and governments began to regard the new medium as part of the war effort, playing an active role in film making. While the trenches were bombed, film attendence boomed and new cinemas mushroomed. Charlie Chaplin attracted huge crowds in Europe, but the images of war did not. These and other aspects of a film culture in transition are analysed in more than 20 contributions.

Series: Film Culture in Transition
Paperback: 200 pages
Publisher: Amsterdam Univ Pr; n edition (February 1995)
Language: English
ISBN-10: 9053560645
ISBN-13: 978-9053560648


[1] Karel Dibbets, born in Weert, the Netherlands, in 1947. Ph.D. from the University of Amsterdam. Assistant Professor of Film and Television Studies at the University of Amsterdam Fellow (1 September 1999 - 30 June 2000) 

"Most of my time at NIAS was devoted to writing the last chapters of my book on early cinema in the Netherlands. My stay also allowed me to explore new directions while indulging in generous library services and enjoying the seaside surroundings thoroughly. A most interesting experience was my collaboration with composer Dick Raaijmakers in an artistic project on sound and image where I could make a scholarly contribution. In addition, NIAS gave me an opportunity to develop and manage a website about movie theatres of the past; although this site merely publishes essential historical information, it appears to attract thousands of visitors each month. Together with a colleague from Belgium I worked on a historical comparison of cinema culture in Amsterdam and Brussels, trying to explain the enormous differences between the two cities. The results will be presented at a conference in Berlin, and published as an article next year. I also wrote an article on cinema orchestras during the silent-film period that will be published in a forthcoming history of music. Finally, I was able to lay the foundations for a new project that will focus on long-term developments in cinema culture'"... "I am a historian of cinema in the Netherlands. My current job is Curator of Cinema Context, an online encyclopedia of film culture in the Netherlands from 1896 to the present. Previously I was Assistant Professor in media history at the University of Amsterdam (1983-2011) as well as co-editor of Jaarboek Mediageschiedenis / Media History Yearbook (1989-1997) and prior to that Editor of Skrien monthly filmreview (1981-1983). I graduated from the Netherlands Film Academy in Amsterdam (1971) and I received an MA in Economic and Social History (1982) as well as a PhD (1993) from the University of Amsterdam." Karel Dibbets

Cinema Context (www.cinemacontext.nl) is a website and tool for researching the history of film culture in the Netherlands. It provides basic information about the Who, What, Where and When of film exhibition and distribution, from its origins to the present. At the same time the site allows researchers to analyse the available data and to study patterns and networks, the DNA of film culture. This paper reports on the purpose and structure of this instrument, and demonstrates its analytical powers with a few examples. It will comment on the impact of digitization on film history and how this can contribute to the sharing of knowledge. 

Article: 
Cinema Context and the genes of film history
Karel Dibbets 
Pages 331-342 | Published online: 11 Aug 2010
Download citation http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17400309.2010.499784
New Review of Film and Television Studies 
Volume 8, 2010 - Issue 3: Researching Film and Cinema History


Article | Rojava's Future: Four Models Explained

0
0
Claimed territory of Rojava ( Turkish supported control in orange) not currently under control and the de facto territory controlled by the pre-dominantly Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (in green).

Mavi Boncuk |


Rojava's[1] Future: Four Models Explained

By Soner Cagaptay

PolicyWatch 2814 | June 5, 2017

Soner Cagaptay is the Beyer Family Fellow and director of the Turkish Research Program at The Washington Institute, and author of The New Sultan: Erdogan and the Crisis of Modern Turkey.

Source

As Washington considers its next steps in northern Syria, it will need to weigh the geostrategic consequences of backing local Kurdish forces whose objectives may align or conflict with those of Russia, Iran, and various other actors.

In July 2012, as Syria's war intensified, the Assad regime largely pulled out of Kurdish-majority areas in the north. To fill the vacuum, the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its militia, the People's Defense Units (YPG), took control of these areas, marginalizing other Kurdish factions. They eventually established Rojava, a self-declared autonomous entity stretching across most of the northern frontier. Today, no foreign government recognizes Rojava, and the territories it controls lack the contiguity needed for good governance and economic viability. Nevertheless, the PYD seeks to boost its de facto autonomy. 

What are the prospects for Rojava? The following analysis looks at the Kurdish zone's ties with neighboring countries and key military actors inside Syria, outlining four potential scenarios for its future.

ALLIES AND ADVERSARIES

The United States sees the YPG as a tactical ally against the Islamic State (IS), but the Kurds also have good ties with Russia, which recently deployed troops to Rojava's westernmost canton of Afrin. Whereas Washington cooperates with the YPG only where IS forces are present, Moscow seems most interested in Rojava's proximity to Turkey, suggesting a more strategic Russian view of the Kurds as an asset against Ankara. 

Further complications arise from the fact that the YPG is an offshoot of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a U.S.-designated terrorist group that has been battling the Turkish government for decades. Ankara is therefore hostile toward Rojava, conducting airstrikes against YPG positions there as recently as April. 

In Iraq, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and its dominant faction, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), have a similarly hostile view of Rojava, mainly because the YPG has persecuted other Syrian Kurdish factions, including some that are close to the KDP. The Iraqi Kurds also take issue with the YPG's encroachment on their turf; for example, the group recently established the PKK-friendly Sinjar Resistance Units (YBS) among local Yazidis in Iraq's Sinjar Mountains. The KDP's increasingly good ties with Turkey have only strengthened these sentiments, spurring it to restrict the movement of people and goods into and out of Rojava.

In contrast, Iran welcomes Rojava's recent linkage with Shiite-militia-controlled areas in Iraq, viewing the Syrian Kurdish zone as part of a potential land bridge to Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. The Iraqi government, an ally of Iran, shares this favorable disposition toward Rojava, as exemplified by reports that Baghdad has paid the salaries of YBS fighters. Moreover, the PKK's Iranian offshoot, the Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK), has ceased hostilities against Tehran since Syria's war got into full swing -- another sign of their converging interests.

As for Bashar al-Assad, Rojava retains tight economic links with the regime-held portion of Syria and has allowed the army to continue controlling a key airport in the middle of PYD territory. Despite the occasional flare-up, this arrangement gives the Kurds a crucial lifeline to the outside world. Elsewhere, Assad's forces have not moved against Rojava; in fact, Sunni Arab rebel groups allege that the YPG and regime elements have coordinated against them.

Given these overlapping layers of conflicting and converging interests, Rojava will likely follow one of four paths going forward -- and Washington may play a role in determining which one depending on its own actions.

TRANSNISTRIA MODEL: RUSSIAN VASSAL STATUS

This is the most plausible scenario for Rojava, and close to its current status. Moldova's breakaway Transnistria region is not recognized by any foreign government but enjoys strong protection from Moscow, including the presence of Russian troops that give the Kremlin leverage in Moldovan politics. Likewise, Rojava enjoys strong protection from powerful outside states, and it gives Moscow leverage to create instability in Turkey. 

The PYD will not be satisfied with the Transnistria model indefinitely, however. This arrangement may be practical for now, but it also suggests pariah status in international law and subservience to Russia. The PYD aims for wider support and de jure international recognition of Rojava's autonomy.

KOSOVO MODEL: PARTIAL RECOGNITION

This is Rojava's dream scenario, but also the least plausible. Kosovo broke away from Serbia thanks to a 1999 UN Security Council resolution that allowed U.S. and international troops to be stationed on Kosovar territory, eventually paving the way for a declaration of independence in 2008. It has since gained recognition from 111 of the 193 UN member states -- most notably excluding Russia.

Implementing this model in Rojava would require a complete rupture between Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the United States, whose vote would be needed for any Security Council resolution on the matter. To be sure, such a rupture is more possible than ever given the increasingly anti-American posture of Erdogan's base. Yet it still seems unlikely because he needs security ties with Washington to counter Russia.

Whatever the case, U.S.-Turkish ties could face further challenges after the IS "capital" of Raqqa is liberated in Syria. Potential flashpoints include a YPG refusal to return U.S.-supplied heavy weapons following that campaign. The Kurds might also decide to sideline local Arab leaders in Raqqa, instead turning the city over to figures who are friendly with the YPG or Assad -- both undesirable outcomes for Ankara. In that scenario, Erdogan may find himself overwhelmed by the same anti-American forces he has unleashed in Turkish society, with various Islamist and anti-Kurdish constituencies potentially pushing him to downgrade ties with Washington. 

Even if Rojava overcomes all of these challenges, it would still need a great deal of outside help to achieve Kosovo-like status, including at least one Security Council resolution, an activist international community to champion its cause in Syria, and foreign troops to protect it from Turkey. Gaining Russian support for this model at the UN would be especially difficult because the Assad regime still wants to retake as much of the country as possible. Moscow is unlikely to pick the Kurds over Damascus if Assad balks at giving the north fuller autonomy. 

KRG MODEL: TURKISH PROTECTION

This is nearly the opposite of the Kosovo trajectory, at least in terms of helping rather than hurting Ankara's interests. Since the Iraq war, the KRG has increased its autonomy from the central government, and the KDP has formed good ties with Ankara as a counterbalance against Baghdad. Although Turkey and the PYD's mother organization, the PKK, are currently fighting, it should be remembered that they were holding substantive peace talks as recently as 2015, and that PYD delegations were making regular visits to Ankara. A return to such talks would automatically normalize Turkish relations with the Syrian Kurds, and Rojava investment opportunities for Turkish businesses would further sweeten the deal. 

Yet implementing the KRG model would require an end to the fighting between Turkey and the PKK, and both sides currently seem committed to a military victory. The PKK is animated by the YPG's success in capturing Syrian territory and establishing ties with Russia and the United States simultaneously, so it seems uninterested in resuming talks with Ankara. Likewise, Erdogan is already gearing up for parliamentary elections in 2019 by seeking to boost the popularity of his party among Turkish nationalist voters, most of whom likely prefer defeating the PKK on the battlefield to meeting them at the negotiating table. 

Accordingly, the KRG model does not seem plausible in the short term, despite being perhaps the best outcome for the United States. In all likelihood, it cannot take shape until after Erdogan secures his electoral victory in two years, and after the deep Turkish hostility toward the PKK wanes somewhat. In the meantime, the presumed YPG-led liberation of Raqqa may further embolden the PKK to continue fighting Turkey.

1975 ALGERIA MODEL: FORCEFUL REINTEGRATION

In the 1970 peace accord between Baghdad and the Kurds, a hard-pressed Saddam Hussein agreed to give them ample autonomy, and he more or less honored that deal for a few years while he consolidated his position in post-coup Iraq. In 1975, however, Iraq and Iran ended their border disputes and signed the Algeria Agreement, leading Tehran to halt its support for Iraqi Kurdish groups. Saddam soon moved to forcefully end Kurdish autonomy, unleashing harsh repression and eventually genocide. 

This precedent from a fellow Baathist regime suggests that Assad might tolerate Rojava's autonomy so long as he is weak, but then seek to end it as soon as he can, in line with his frequent pledge to reestablish control over all of Syria. If so, he would find a helping hand from Turkey, which has repeatedly called for him to step down since the war broke out but is even more concerned about countering the YPG and PKK. Even Tehran might give its blessing for the regime to retake Rojava given its own worries about growing Kurdish nationalism inside Iran, where local Kurds have become more restive despite PJAK's ceasefire. And Moscow might acquiesce as well if it decides that closer relations with Assad are more important than its historical ties with the PYD and PKK. 

Washington's political will to oppose such a strategy would likely be limited. In that case, the end result would be Assad, Iran, and Russia spinning Rojava's fall as a victory over America, loudly proclaiming that they defeated all those who took U.S. aid, including the PYD/YPG. 

[1] Rojava (/ˌroʊʒəˈvɑː/ ROH-zhə-VAH; Kurdish: [roʒɑˈvɑ] "the West") is a de facto autonomous region originating in and consisting of three self-governing cantons in northern Syria, namely Afrin Canton, Jazira Canton and Kobanî Canton, as well as adjacent areas of northern Syria like Shahba region.The region gained its de facto autonomy as part of the ongoing Rojava conflict and the wider Syrian Civil War, establishing and gradually expanding a secular polity based on the democratic confederalism principles of democratic socialism, gender equality, and sustainability.

Also known as Syrian Kurdistan or Western Kurdistan (Kurdish: ‎Rojavayê Kurdistanê), Rojava is regarded by Kurdish nationalists as one of the four parts of Greater Kurdistan, which also includes parts of southeastern Turkey (Northern Kurdistan), northern Iraq (Southern Kurdistan), and northwestern Iran (Eastern Kurdistan). However, Rojava is polyethnic and home to sizable ethnic Kurdish, Arab, Assyrian and Turkmen populations, with smaller communities of ethnic Armenians, Circassians and Chechens. This diversity is mirrored in its constitution, society and politics.

Since the Constitutional update in December of 2016, the official name of the polity governing throughout Rojava has been the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria. While entertaining some foreign relations, the cantons within Rojava are not officially recognized as autonomous by the government of Syria or any international state or organization. For their part, supporters of its constitution consider their system a model for a federalized Syria as a whole.



Hungarian and Turkish

0
0
Mavi Boncuk | 

A lot of old Turkish words in Hungarian are difficult to spot because they are from the Csuvash branch of Turkish languages, for instance r corresponds to Ottoman Turkish z: tenger "sea" = deniz.[1] 

Hungarian has two words for "red". Piros and vörös. The difference is historical and today there is no rule for which to use, you just have to learn it. Most of the time, "vörös" is a darker shade of red than "piros". Basically "vörös" derives from the word "vér" which means blood (kan kirmizi TR), but you can use both words for blood in fact. The difference is that blood that flows in our veins is usually considered "piros" and blood that has been spilt and has coagulated is considered "vörös". 

Like Turkish, Hungarian is also agglutinative. That means that instead of saying "IN the school" they say "iskoláBAN", that said, Hungarians stick suffixes to the end of their words. What's more, it is even possible to put more than one suffices to a word like this: "iskoláKBAN", in which "iskola" is school, "-k" is the pluralizer suffix and "-ban" means "in". Japanese, Finnish and Turkish are similar in this manner.

Among the first to arrive were the Huns, who built up a powerful empire under Attila. It is presently believed that the origin of the name "Hungary" does not come from the Central Asian nomadic invaders called the Huns, but rather originated from a later, 7th century Turkic alliance called On-Ogour, which in Old Turkish meant "(the) Ten Arrows.The Magyars migrated to Hungary in the late 9th century."

Origin of the word "Hungarian" (Magyar) is thought to be derived from the Bulgaro-Turkic Onogur, possibly because the Magyars were neighbours (or confederates) of the Empire of the Onogurs in the 6th century, whose leading tribal union was called the "Onogurs" (meaning "ten tribes" in Old Turkic).The H- in many languages (Hungarians, Hongrois, Hungarus etc.) is a later addition. It was taken over from the word "Huns"(turkish tribe), which was a similar semi-nomadic tribe living some 400 years earlier in present-day Hungary and having a similar way of life (or according to the older theories the people from which the Magyars arose). In ancient times, through the Middle Ages, and even today, the identification of Hungarians with the Huns has often occurred in history and literature, however this identification began to be disputed around the late 19th century, and is still a source of major controversy among scholars who insist that there could be no direct connection between the two.The origin of the Hungarians is partly disputed. The most widely accepted Finno-Ugric theory from the late 19th century is based primarily on linguistic and ethnographical arguments, while it is criticised by some as relying too much on linguistics. There are also other theories stating that the Magyars are descendants of Scythians, Huns, Turks, Avars, and/or Sumerians.

Many historical references related both the Magyars (Hungarians) and the Bashkirs as two branches of the same nation. However, modern Bashkirs are quite different from their original stock, largely decimated during the Mongol invasion (13th century), and assimilated into Turkic peoples."

Both the Kabars[2] and earlier the Bulgars may have taught the Magyars their Turkic languages; according to the Finno-Ugric theory, this is used to account for at least 300 Turkic words and names still in modern Hungarian"


[1] "I ONCE attended a lecture, delivered in German by a Romanian whose native language was Hungarian, and who also spoke Finnish. When the inevitable question as to the similarity of the two languages arose, he answered "Yes, they are quite similar. About as similar as French and Russian." I don't think he was being facetious: French and Russian (or for that matter English and Albanian) are similar, since they are related Indo-European languages. But the Romanian's answer is a salutary warning against over-emphasising the similarities. Finnish and Hungarian both belong to the Finno-Ugrian group of languages (Estonian also, which is very similar to Finnish). Hungarian history is well documented, since they came early into contact with the German (Holy Roman) Empire and had to be confined within their boundaries by the German king Henry I in the 10th century. They (and presumably also the Finns) are the descendants of probably the last wave of foreign invaders from the East, of whom the Huns and the Avars are perhaps the best known. To say more would be speculation. As to the question "Where do the Hungarians and the Finns come from?" - where do any of us come from? It's just that their languages stick out like erratic blocks in an otherwise homogeneous Indo-European landscape that makes us wonder about their origins. They are just people like the rest of us." Frank Shaw, Department of German, University of Bristol.

"The words shared with Turkish are cultural items, which are most subject to borrowing. The words that Hungarian shares with Finnish, however, belong to the stable core of the language, such as personal pronouns, basic natural phenomena, body parts, etc. The Finno-Ugric hypothesis was denied by Hungarians throughout the last century - in the face of over-whelming evidence - on the irrelevant grounds that the Hungarians were conquerors on horseback whereas the Saami and the Udmurts, etc, were hunter-gatherers who had never conquered anyone." Paul Whitehouse, London N1

"THE HYPOTHESIS which asserts a common origin for the Hungarian and Finnish languages is based on the fact that there are about 600 words shared by Hungarian and Finnish. This "official" version is generally the only one taught in schools and universities. However, it is also true that there is an equal or greater number of words shared by Hungarian with Turkish and many other languages. Moreover, the anthropology, the mythology and the traditional music of Hungarians shows a much closer kinship with the Turkic peoples than with the Finns and the other related Uralic peoples. The earliest sources relating to Hungarians generally describe them as Turks, Huns, Sabirs, Onogurs, etc, but never as Finns. If the questioner wishes to know more about the "official" story of Hungarian origins, he only has to consult any textbook anywhere in the Western world. But most Hungarian people no longer believe in this version. If he wishes to know something about the research concerned with the alternative views, he could contact us." I Halasz, Hungarian Historical Society, 115 Auburn Road, Auburn 2144, Australia

"First, the question is where the languages come from, not whether they are related. Finns' ancestors left Siberia and headed north-west. If the Hungarians left from the same area they headed south-west, and besides, this took place thousands of years ago.
Second, languages are not categorised solely by shared words. Finnish has more words derived from Swedish than the 600 common words with Hungarian, but nobody is claiming that Finnish has suddenly become an Indo-European language. These 600 words shared by Hungarian and Finnish are not "common" but they obviously are of same origin. Categorisation includes such features as stress of words and sentences, grammatical system, e.g. case system, syntax and morphology. These features happen to be closely related in both Finnish and Hungarian.
Finally, I couldn't care less if Hungarians prefer being related to Turks, but people who claim something should take all facts into consideration and not just those which suit to them." Salla Koivisto, Guildford, Surrey, (li65sk@surrey.ac.uk)

"Regarding Turkish and Hungarian one should read the paper "Turkish material in Hungarian" by John Dyneley Prince, Columbia University. Not all the so called Turkish "loan words" can be considered borrowed. Some fundamentals are never borrowed and point to a common, cognate linguistic connection . Example the followings are not loan material: Turkish "Çok var", Hungarian "Sok van", "There are many". The cognates Çok, Sok; var, van are clear. Furthermore the relationship between Turkish ol (to be) and Hungarian volt is obvious. Same can be said about Hungarian oly, olyan and Turkish öile "Thus so"; Hungarian jó , Turkish iyi, eyi ("good"), Hungarian and Turkish öl ("kill and die"). Same is true for the Hungarian verbal suffixes 1.p -m 2.p -sz and Turkish -m, s(en), personal pronouns Hungarian én, Turkish ben "I", Hungarian ő, Turkish o "He/She" , Hungarian te, Turkish sen "You", Hungarian Ki, Turkish Kim "Who". The first person possessive affix -m in Turkish and Hungarian çocuku gyerek child çocuğum gyerekem my child çocuklarım gyerekeim my children One can point from the basic Hungarian vocabulary to family words. Hungarian words like anya ("mother") , apa, atya ("father") Turkish ana, anne and ata. These were just some from the many simmilarities between Hungarian and Turkish. I end with a sentence in Turkish and Hungarian: Cebimde çok küçük elma var. Zsebemben sok kicsi alma van. I have many little apples in my pocket. As a native Hungarian my point is that Hungarian is distantly related to Turkish, but I would not deny any distant relationship with Finnish either." Erik Vail, Cluj, Romania

THREAD SOURCE

[2] The Kabars (Greek: Κάβαροι) or Khavars were Khalyzians, Turkic Khazar people who joined the Magyar confederation in the 9th century.

The Kabars consisted of three Khazar tribes who rebelled against the Khazar Khaganate some time in the ninth century; the rebellion was notable enough to be described in Constantine Porphyrogenitus's work De Administrando Imperio. Subsequently the Kabars were expelled from the Khazar Khaganate and sought refuge by joining the Magyar tribal confederacy called Hét-Magyar (meaning "seven Hungarians"). The three Kabar tribes accompanied the Magyar invasion of Pannonia and the subsequent formation of the Principality of Hungary in the late 9th century.

Around 833 the Hungarian tribal confederacy was living in Levedia, between the Don and the Dnieper rivers, within the orbit of the Khazar empire. Toward 850 or 860, driven from Levedia by the Pechenegs, they entered Atelkuzu (Etelköz). The Magyars reached the Danube river basin around 880. Shortly afterward, the Byzantine emperor Leo VI, then at war with Simeon, the Bulgarian czar, called the Hungarians to his aid. The Magyars, led by Árpád, crossed the Danube and attacked Bulgaria. The Bulgarians, in turn, appealed to the Pechenegs, now masters of the steppe, who attacked the Hungarians in the rear and forced them to take refuge in the mountains of Transylvania. At that moment, Arnulf, duke of Carinthia, at war with the Slav ruler Svatopluk, prince of Great Moravia,[citation needed] decided like the Byzantines to appeal to the Hungarians. The Hungarians overcame Svatopluk, who disappeared in the conflict (895). Great Moravia collapsed, and the Hungarians took up permanent abode in Hungary (907).

The origin of the name Hungary is believed to originate from the Bulgar tribal confederacy named On-Ogur, (meaning "ten" Ogurs) (comparable to Tokuz-Oguz (meaning "nine" Oguz)), who ruled the territory of Hungary prior to the arrival of the Magyars.

Many Kabars settled in the Bihar region of the later Kingdom of Hungary and Transylvania now in Romania. Some historians believe the character recorded by Gesta Hungarorum as lord Marot and his grandson Menumorut, dux of Biharia, were of Kabar descent.[citation needed] One of the names on the Kievian Letter is "Kiabar", which may suggest that Kabars settled in Kiev as well. At least some Kabars were of Jewish faith; others may have been Christians, Muslims or shamanists.

The presence of a Turkic aristocracy among the Hungarians could explain the Byzantine protocol by which, in the exchange of ambassadors under Constantine Porphyrogenitus, Hungarian rulers were always referred to as "Princes of the Turks".

The Kabars eventually assimilated into the general Hungarian population, leaving scattered remains and some cultural and linguistic imprints. Some scholars[citation needed] believe that the Székely are their descendants.

A Kabar inscription: The Mihai Viteazu inscription (Alsószentmihály inscription), discovered in the 20th century in present-day Romania, is one of few surviving relics of the Kabars. It was transcribed by the archaeologist-historian Gábor Vékony. According to the transcription, the meaning of the two-row inscription is the following: (first row) "His mansion is famous." and (second row) "Jüedi Kür Karaite." or "Jüedi Kür the Karaite."

The Karaim language (Crimean dialect: къарай тили, Trakai dialect: karaj tili, Turkish dialect: karay dili, traditional Hebrew name lashon kedar לשון קדר "language of the nomads")[6] is a Turkic language with Hebrew influences, in a similar manner to Yiddish or Ladino. It is spoken by only a few dozen Karaims (Qrimqaraylar

in LithuaniaPoland and Crimea and Galicia in Ukraine. The three main dialects are those of Crimea, Trakai-Vilnius and Lutsk-Halych all of which are critically endangered. The Lithuanian dialect of Karaim is spoken mainly in the town of Trakai (also known as Troki) by a small community living there since the 14th century. There is a chance the language will survive in Trakai as a result of official support and because of its appeal to tourists coming to the Trakai Island Castle, where Karaims are presented as the castle's ancient defenders. 



Book | Russian Travelers to Constantinople in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries

0
0
Mavi Boncuk | Russian Travelers to Constantinople in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries Russian Travelers to Constantinople in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries George P. Majeska[1] 

Dumbarton Oaks Studies BYZANTINE STUDIES, BYZANTINE HISTORY 

ISBN: 978-0-88402-101-8, Hardcover, 1984 

Russian pilgrim depictions of Constantinople have long been recognized as among the best sources for the topography of the Byzantine capital. In this volume Professor Majeska has produced the first scholarly edition of the five Russian travel narratives which deal with Constantinople in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries; the accompanying English translations make this material available to scholars who do not read Old Russian. The substantial commentary, which makes up part two of this study, relates the Russian material to other sources for Byzantine and medieval Russian history as well as to modern archaeological and historical scholarship.

[1] George P. Majeska | Associate Professor Emeritus |3111 Francis Scott Key Hall | 301-405-4288 | gmajeska(at)umd(dot)edu

Majeska, George P. was born on April 28, 1936 in Brooklyn. Son of John Alexander and Marguerite (Fagan) Majeska.

Education: AB, Brooklyn College, 1961. Master of Arts in History, Indiana University, 1964. Doctor of Philosophy in History, Indiana University, 1968.

Career: Assistant professor State University of New York, Buffalo, 1967-1972. Associate professor University Maryland, College Park, since 1972, director Russian area studies program Buffalo, since 1987.

Profile | Ernest Mamboury (1878 - 1953)

0
0
Mavi Boncuk |

Ernest Mamboury [1](1 April 1878 - 23 September 1953) was a Swiss scholar renowned for his works on the historic structures in Turkish cities, particularly on Byzantine art and architecture in Istanbul.

Mamboury was born 1878 in Signy-Avenex, Switzerland. He studied in the École Normale of Lausanne (1894-1898), in Geneva (1898-1903) and the Académie Julian in Paris (1904-1905).

In 1909 he became a professor of French language and literature at Galatasaray High School in Constantinople (Istanbul), Ottoman Empire.

Throughout his life in Istanbul, which lasted for more than forty years until his death in 1953, Mamboury dedicated most of his literary works on the Byzantine structures of this city, as well as other significant historic monuments in Istanbul and Ankara.

Ernest Mamboury died in Istanbul on September 23, 1953, and was buried at the Feriköy Protestant Cemetery, Istanbul in the Feriköy district on the Golden Horn.


[1] MAMBOURY, Ernest SOURCE

(1878-1953)

Türkiye hakkında çeşitli eserler yazan İsviçreli ilim adamı, ressam.

İsviçre’nin Nyon şehrinde doğdu. Cenevre’deki Ecole des Arts Industriels’den mezun olduktan sonra Paris’e giderek Güzel Sanatlar Akademisi’nin seramik bölümüne devam etti. 1906’da yurduna döndüğünde resim öğretmenliğine tayin edildi. 1909’da izin alarak gittiği İstanbul’da bir taraftan tarihî eserleri incelemeye, bir taraftan da şehrin çeşitli yerlerinin yağlı boya tablolarını yapmaya başladı. İzni sona erince uzatma isteği kabul edilmediğinden istifasını vererek İstanbul’da kaldı ve buraya yerleşti.

Mamboury ressam ve resim öğretmeni olarak yetişmişti. Önce Mekteb-i Sanâyi’de, arkasından 1921’den itibaren Galatasaray Lisesi’nde geometrik desen ve Fransızca öğretmenliği yaptı. Bu arada İstanbul’daki bazı yabancı ve azınlık okullarında çalıştı. Bir yandan da Türkiye’de araştırmalar yapan Batılı arkeologlara yardım ediyordu. Kapadokya kaya kiliselerinde incelemeler yapan Fransız misyoneri Guillaume de Jerphanion’un yanında bu tür çalışmalara başlayan Mamboury, I. Dünya Savaşı yıllarında Alman arkeologu Theodor Wiegand’ın İstanbul’daki Bizans imparatorluk sarayı araştırmalarına katıldı. 1912’de İshak Paşa mahallesi yangınından sonra Sultanahmet ile Marmara kıyısı arasındaki bölgede ortaya çıkan kalıntıların plan, kesit ve rölövelerini hazırlayarak topografik haritalar üzerine işledi. İsviçre vatandaşı olduğu için I. Dünya Savaşı, Mütareke ve işgal yıllarında İstanbul’da kalmaya devam edebildi. Fransız işgal kuvvetleri tarafından 1921-1923 yıllarında, arkeolog R. Demangel idaresinde Sarayburnu ile Ahırkapı arasındaki alanda yaptırılan araştırmalara katıldı ve burada bulunan yapı kalıntılarının plan ve kesitlerini çizdi. Mamboury, 1925’ten sonra İstanbul Arkeoloji Müzeleri Müdürlüğü’nün yaptığı bazı araştırmalara da katılarak ortaya çıkarılan eserlerin planlarını çizdi. Bu arada Topkapı Sarayı’nda kütüphane okuma salonu haline getirilen eski Ağalar Camii’nin restorasyonuna yardımcı oldu; Halil Ethem Eldem’in Yedikule hakkındaki kitabına bir kısmı Bizans, büyük kısmı Fâtih Sultan Mehmed devri Türk yapısı olan hisarın planını çizmek suretiyle katkıda bulundu. Bunun dışında, İstanbul Arkeoloji Müzeleri’nin 1937’de Küçükçekmece ve 1942’de Mudanya’nın Alçakbayır mevkiinde yaptığı araştırmalara da katıldı.


Daha çok Bizans eserleriyle ilgilenmesine karşılık Mamboury Türk sanatı üzerine de neşriyatta bulundu. 1930’da Topkapı Sarayı Harem Dairesi’nin ziyarete açılması münasebetiyle bol resimli bir makalesiyle (“Le Harem des Sultans”, L’Illustration, yıl 88, sy. 4553 [Paris 1930], s. 226-232) Ağalar Camii’ne dair bir yazısı (“Die Moschee Mehmeds des Eroberers und die neue Bibliothek im Serail des Sultans von Stambul”, Die Denkmalpflege, sy. 5 [Berlin-Wien 1931], s. 161-167) basıldı. Halil Ethem Eldem’in 1933’te çıkan Camilerimiz başlıklı küçük kitabını genel bazı bilgilerle resimler ekleyip Fransızca olarak yayımladı (Nos mosquées de Stamboul, İstanbul 1934). Romanya’daki dinî yapılarda Türk sanatı etkileri (“L’influence de l’art turc dans les constructions religieuses roumaines”, Les annales de Turquie, yıl 6, sy. 3 [İstanbul 1936], s. 17-29), fetihten bugüne İstanbul’un gelişmesi (“Le développement d’Istanbul depuis la conquête jusqu’à nos jours”, Türkiye Turing ve Otomobil Kurumu Belleteni,yıl 7, sy. 16/89 [1937], s. 19-25), Eminönü’de Yenicami çevresinin istimlâki (“La place d’Eminönü et les parages de Sirkeci”, Ankara, 16 ve 19 Aralık 1936) ve Yenicami Hünkâr Kasrı’nın yeni açılan meydanın biçimini bozduğu gerekçesiyle yıktırılmak istenmesi (“A travers le vieil Istanbul: La Yeni Cami et sa voûte”, Ankara, 31 Mart 1938) hakkında makaleleri dışında yabancı ve yerli gazetelerle dergilerde de (Revue de Turquie, Gazette de Lausanne, Journal de Genève, Ulus, İlk Öğretim, La Turquie Kemaliste) Türkiye veya Türk sanatıyla ilgili yazıları çıktı.

Mamboury’nin en önemli yayınları bilimsel ağırlıklı turistik rehberleridir. Çok iyi düzenlenmiş bir plana göre hazırlanan bu rehberlerin ilki İstanbul’a dair olanıdır. 565 sayfalık eserde şehrin coğrafyası, Bizans ve Türk devirlerindeki tarihçesi, sanatı ve etnografyası gibi turistleri ilgilendiren yönlerinden başka eski eserleri düzenli bir sırayla tarihleri ve sanat özellikleriyle kısa biçimde tanıtılmış, ayrıca her eserin resminin veya planının verilmesine özen gösterilmiştir. Önce Fransızca olarak basılan kitabın (Constantinople, guide touristique, İstanbul 1925) Türkçe’si de çıkmıştır (İstanbul, Rehber-i Seyyahîn, İstanbul 1925). 1929’da ikinci baskısı yapılan ve dünya çapında bir şöhrete erişen kitabın J. Ahlers tarafından Almanca (Stambul-Reiseführer, İstanbul 1930) ve İngilizce (Constantinople, İstanbul 1930) çevirileri de yayımlanmış, 1934’te Fransızca’sı üçüncü defa basılmıştır. Uzun yıllar sonra Mamboury, İstanbul rehberi konusunu tekrar ele alarak yeni buluntu ve yayınlara göre tamamlayıp önce Fransızca’sını (İstanbul touristique, İstanbul 1951), iki yıl sonra da M. Burr tarafından yapılan İngilizce tercümesini (The Tourist’s Istanbul, İstanbul 1953) çıkarmıştır. İçişleri Bakanlığı ve Ankara Belediyesi’nin yardımlarıyla hazırladığı Ankara ve çevresine ait rehber ise 1933’te basılmıştır (Ankara Guide touristique, Haïdar Pacha-Ankara, Bogaz-Keue, Euyuk, Sivri-Hisar et environs, Tchangri, Yozgat etc..., Ankara 1933, 1934). II. Dünya Savaşı’ndan az önce Basın-Yayın ve Turizm Genel Müdürlüğü Mamboury’ye büyük bir Türkiye rehberi sipariş etmişti. Fakat bu önemli projenin sadece İstanbul adalarına dair olanı bir kitap halinde basılabilmiş (Les îles des Princes, Banlieue Maritime d’Istanbul, İstanbul 1943), teslim ettiği bilinen Yalova ve çevresiyle Batı Anadolu şehirlerine dair yazdıkları basılmadan kalmıştır. Son yıllarında tamamlandığını bildirdiği Bursa, İznik, Uludağ ve Galata hakkındaki rehberlerin ne olduğu ise bilinmemektedir. Ölümünden bir süre önce Mamboury iki rehber siparişini daha üstlenmişti. Bunlardan biri, iki cilt olması düşünülen Baedeker seyyah rehberleri gibi büyük bir Türkiye rehberinin bazı bölümleri, diğeri 1953 yılı içinde teslim edilmesi gereken, Paris’te Hachette Yayınevi’nin Guides Bleues dizisinde bastıracağı bir Türkiye rehberi idi. Bunların ikincisi sonradan Robert Boulanger tarafından yazılarak 1958’de yayımlanmıştır.

Mamboury, Türkiye’de yaşadığı uzun yıllar boyunca topladığı pek çok değerli kitap, antika eşya ve özellikle İstanbul hakkında sayısız not, resim ve krokiye sahip bulunuyordu. Bunlar, vasiyeti gereği Amerika Birleşik Devletleri’ndeki Dumbarton Oaks Araştırma Enstitüsü’ne taşınmış, kitaplarından pek azı ise İstanbul’da kurulan Amerikan Enstitüsü’nün kütüphanesine bırakılmıştır.

BİBLİYOGRAFYA:

“Le jubilé d’Ernest Mamboury”, TTOK Belleteni, sy. 76 (1948), s. 28-30; Ph. Schweinfurth, “Nachruf anf einen Schweizer Byzantinisten”, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Zürich 19.11.1953; “Ernst Mamboury, professeur et savant archéologue n’est plus”, Courrier de la Côte, Dijon 10-11.11.1953; Semavi Eyice, “Ernest Mamboury (1878-1953)”, TTK Belleten, XVII/67 (1953), s. 393-411; a.mlf., “Ernest Mamboury”, DBİst.A, V, 283-285.


Semavi Eyice   

Works

Guides


Constantinople: guide touristique. Constantinople, Rizzo 1925
Istanbul. Rehber-i Seyyahîn. Istanbul, Rizzo 1924
Constantinople: tourists' guide. Constantinople, Rizzo & Son 1926
Constantinople: guide touristique. 2. éd. française. Constantinople, Rizzo 1929
Stambul. Reiseführer. Übersetzt v. Johs. Ahlers. Erste deutsche Ausgabe. Vervollständigt bis 1930. Stambul, John A. Rizzo 1930.
Byzance - Constantinople - Istanbul: guide touristique. 3. éd.. Galata [u.a.], Milli Neşriyat Yurdu 1934
Istanbul touristique. Ed. française mise à jour à fin mars 1951. Galata, Istanbul, Çituri Biraderler Basımevi 1951
The tourists' Istanbul. English ed. translated by Malcolm Burr. Istanbul, Çituri Biraderler Basımevi 1953
Ankara: guide touristique, Haidar-Pacha - Ankara; Bogaz-Keuy, Euyuk, Sivri-Hissar et environs, Tchangiri, Yozgat, etc. Ankara, Ministère Turc de l'Intérieur 1933
Ankara: guide touristique. 2. éd. française. Ankara, Ministère Turc de l'Intérieur 1934
Les Îles des Princes. Banlieue maritime d'Istanbul ... Guide touristique [Publications touristiques. vol. 2B.] Istanbul, Maarif Matbaası 1943
Turquie, Les guides bleus. Ed. établie par Ernest Mamboury et Robert Boulanger. Paris, Hachette 1958.

Other works

Ruines Byzantines autour d'Odalar-Djamisi à Stambul, Echos d'Orient 19, 1920, 69-73.
Le couvent byzantin de femmes à Prinkipo, Echos d'Orient 19, 1920, 200-208.
Ruines Byzantines de Mara, entre Maltépé et Bostandjik, Echos d'Orient 19, 1920, 322-330.
Le Harem des Sultans, in: L'Illustration 88, 4553, 7. Juni 1930, 226-232.
Die Moschee Mehmeds des Eroberers und die neue Bibliothek im Serail des Sultans von Stambul, Die Denkmalpflege 1931, 161-167.
Die Kaiserpaläste von Konstantinopel zwischen Hippodrom und Marmara-Meer, (with Theodor Wiegand) Berlin, Leipzig, de Gruyter 1934
Un nouvelle élément pour la topographie de l'antique Byzance, Archäologischer Anzeiger 1934, 50-61.
Şile, Türkiye Turing ve Otomobil Kurumu Bülteni 5, 13-76, 1934, 23-24.
Nos mosquées de Stamboul,(translated from Halil Edhem) Istanbul, Librairie Kanaat 1934
Les fouilles Byzantines à Istanbul et dans sa banlieue immédiate aux XIX et XXe siècles. Byzantion 11, 1936, 229-283.
Le nouvelle citerne Byzantine de Tchifté Sérail (Istanbul), Byzantion 11, 1936, 167-190.
Une inscription datée sur une tour Byzantine de Constantinople (withRobert Demangel) Bulletin Correspondence Hellenique 60, 1936, 208-213.
L'influence de l'art Turc dans les constructions religieuses roumaines, Annales de Turquie 6, 1936, No 3, 17-29.
Le developpement d'Istanbul depuis la conquête jusqu'à nos jours, Türkiye Turing ve Otomobil Kurumu Bülteni 7, 16-89, 1937, 19-25.
Le développement d'Istanbul depuis la conquête jusqu'à nos jours, Bulletin de l'Union française, Istanbul No 4, juillet 1937, 8-18.
L'art Turc du XVIIIème siècle, La Turquie Kémaliste 19, 1937, 2-11.
Les fouilles Byzantines à Istanbul et dans sa banlieue immédiate en 1936-1937. Byzantion 13, 1938, 301 310.
Bursa la verdoynte, Les annales de Turquie 8, Juni 1938
Le quartier des Manganes et la première région de Constantinople (with Robert Demangel), Paris, de Boccard 1939.
Une des plus beaux coins de la Turquie republicaine: la fôret de pins à pignons de Kozak, La Turquie Kémaliste 31, 1939, 34-38.
Topographic de Sainte-Sophie, le sanctuaire et la solea, le mitatorion, le puits Sacré, le passage de St Nicolas etc., Atti del V Congresso di studi bizantini 2, Rom 1940, 197-209.
Istanbul'un ilk Ahalisi, Geçit - Review Januar-Februar 1940, 53-55 = Türkiye Turing ve Otomobil Kurumu Bülteni 54, 1946, 53-55.
1939-1940 Yıllarında Istanbul'da Müşahede Edilen Original bir Tabiat Hâdisesi, Ilk Öğretim 57, 14. April 1940, 634.
Préface, in: Benedetto Palazzo: L'Arap Djami ou église Saint Paul à Galata, Istanbul 1946, IX-XI.
Les guerres entre les Scythes et les Mèdes et leur incidence sur l'historie de Byzance, Türkiye Turing ve Otomobil Kurumu Bülteni 66, 1947, S. 27-28.
Les necropoles de Byzance, Türkiye Turing ve Otomobil Kurumu Bülteni 79, 1948, 27-30 = Bizans Mezarlıkları, in: Cumhuriyet, 28. Juni 1948
Bursa. Ankara, Direction générale de la presse, de la radiodifussion et du tourisme 1949.
Les briques Byzantines marquées du chrisme, Annuaire de l’Institut de Philologie et d’Histoire Orientales 9, 1949, 449–462.
Une nouvelle lecture raisonnée des inscriptions de briques Byzantines et l'emploi de ces dernières dans la datation des monuments des Ve et VIe siècles, Byzantion 19, 1949, 113-125.
Les parages du temple de Rome et d'Auguste à Ankara, Türk Tarih, Arkeologya ve Etnografya Dergisi 5, 1949, 96-102.
L'art chrétien en Anatolie, Türkiye Turing ve Otomobil Kurumu Bülteni 98, 1950, 20-22.
Nouvelles fouilles archéologiques sur l'emplacement de l'Hippodrome, Türkiye Turing ve Otomobil Kurumu Bülteni 107, 1950, 24-28 = Adalet Sarayının Arsasındaki Eserler, Türkiye Turing ve Otomobil Kurumu Bülteni 108, 1951, 17-19.
Les fouilles Byzantine à Istanbul et ses environs et les trouvailles archéologiques faites au cours de constructions au de travaux officials et privés depuis 1936, Byzantion 21, 1951, 425-459.
Contribution à la topographie générale de Constantinople, in: Actes du VIe Congress Internationale d'Études Byzantines Paris 1948, Bd. II, Paris 1951, 243-253.
Le Forum de Constantin; la chapelle de St. Constantin et les mystères de la Colonne Brulée. Resultats des sondages opérés en 1929 et 1930, in: Pepragmena tu Diethnus Byzantinologiku Synedriu Thessaloniki 1953, Thessaloniki 1955, 275-288.
La Suisse nouvelle province d'art byzantin, in: Pepragmena tu Diethnus Byzantinologiku Synedriu Thessaloniki 1953, Thessaloniki 1955, 281-285.
Appendix IV, In: Cyril Mango: The Brazen House: a study of the vestibule of the Imperial Palace of Constantinople. Kopenhagen 1959, 182-188.




Book | Byzantine Magic by Henry Maguire

0
0
Mavi Boncuk |

Book | Byzantine Magic
Henry Maguire[1]

Dumbarton Oaks Other Titles in Byzantine Studies
BYZANTINE STUDIES, BYZANTINE HISTORY
ISBN: 978-0-88402-340-1, Paperback, 2009, Buy here

ISBN: 978-0-88402-230-5, Hardcover, 1995, Out of print

In recent years considerable attention has been given to magic in the societies of ancient Greece and Rome, of late antiquity, and of the medieval West. Much less attention, however, has been given to the phenomenon of magic in eastern Christendom during the middle ages.

The papers in this volume, written by specialists in several disciplines, explore the parameters and significance of magic in Byzantine society, from the fourth century to after the empire's fall. The authors address a wide variety of questions, some of which are common to all historical research into magic, and some of which are peculiar to the Byzantine context.

Among the topics discussed are the attitudes of the early church fathers toward the evil eye and their efforts to reconcile that belief with orthodox Christian theology, the physical evidence provided by archaeology for magical practices during the early Byzantine period, the concerns raised by the magical use of Christian images and the consequences for the design and presentation of icons, the ambiguous distinctions between holy and unholy miracles found in saints' lives and histories, the reactions of Byzantine intellectuals to the theory and practice of magic, and the changing attitudes toward magic between the late antique and medieval periods as revealed by imperial legislation and canon law. The last two chapters discuss the rich evidence for the continued importance of magic in the late Byzantine period, seen in texts such as practical manuals for magicians and proceedings of trials, and, finally, the transmission of much magical lore as a Byzantine legacy to the Slavs.

The authors reveal the scope, the forms, and the functioning of magic in Byzantine society, throwing light on a hitherto relatively little-known aspect of Byzantine culture, and, at the same time, expanding upon the contemporary debates concerning magic and its roles in pre-modern societies.

[1] Henry Maguire is a former Director of Byzantine Studies at Dumbarton Oaks and Professor of Art History at Johns Hopkins University. Henry Maguire (b. Bath, England, 1943.)  was a Junior Fellow (1971–1972), a Senior Fellow (1986–1990 and 1991–1996 ex officio), and Visiting Senior Research Associate (1989–1990) of Byzantine Studies; he was Director of Byzantine Studies (1991–1996). 

See also: 
Byzantine Court Culture from 829 to 1204
Edited by Henry Maguire

Published in Turkish:Bizans Saray Kültürü 829-1204

The imperial court in Constantinople has been central to the outsider’s vision of Byzantium. However, in spite of its fame in literature and scholarship, there have been few attempts to analyze the Byzantine court in its entirety as a phenomenon. The studies in this volume aim to provide a unified composition by presenting Byzantine courtly life in all its interconnected facets.

One important theme that unites these studies is the attention paid to describing the effects of a change in the social makeup of the court during this period and the reflection of these changes in art and architecture. These changes in social composition, mentality, and material culture of the court demonstrate that, as in so many other aspects of Byzantine civilization, the image of permanence and immutability projected by the forms of palace life was more apparent than real. As this new work shows, behind the golden facade of ceremony, rhetoric, and art, there was constant development and renewal.

Imperial Spaces
The Emperor in His Church: Imperial Ritual in the Church of St. Sophia [George P. Majeska]
Gardens of the Palaces [A. R. Littlewood]
Imperial Costumes and Cult Objects
Middle Byzantine Court Costume [Elisabeth Piltz]
Helping Hands for the Empire: Imperial Ceremonies and the Cult of Relics at the Byzantine Court [Ioli Kalavrezou]
Court Culture and Cult Icons in Middle Byzantine Constantinople [Annemarie Weyl Carr]
Interchanges with Foreign Courts
Byzantine Court Culture from the Point of View of Norman Sicily: The Case of the Cappella Palatina in Palermo [William Tronzo]
The Shared Culture of Objects [Oleg Grabar]
Court Intellectuals and Rhetoric
Imperial Panegyric: Rhetoric and Reality [George T. Dennis]
In Search of the Byzantine Courtier: Leo Choirosphaktes and Constantine Manasses [Paul Magdalino]
Social Composition of the Byzantine Court
The Social World of the Byzantine Court [Alexander P. Kazhdan and Michael McCormick]
Title and Income at the Byzantine Court [Nicolas Oikonomides]
Art of the Byzantine Court
Daedalus and the Nightingale: Art and Technology in the Myth of the Byzantine Court [James Trilling]
Présence et figures du souverain à Sainte-Sophie de Constantinople et à l’église de la Sainte-Croix d’Aghtamar [Catherine Jolivet-Levy]
The Heavenly Court [Henry Maguire]

Byzantium, A World Civilization Edited by Angeliki E. Laiou Henry Maguire 

 ISBN 9780884022152

These seven chapters, originally given as lectures honoring the fiftieth anniversary of Dumbarton Oaks, cover a wide range of topics, from the relationship of Byzantium with its Islamic, Slavic, and Western European neighbors to the modern reception of Byzantine art. 


Byzantine Garden Culture Antony Littlewood Henry Maguire Joachim Wolschke-Bulmahn 

ISBN 9780884022800 

Only in the last decade has much serious attention been paid to the Byzantine garden, so indirect is the mass of information, both in literature and the visual arts, that is available for scholars. Byzantine Garden Culture, based on papers delivered at a colloquium at Dumbarton Oaks, is the first book devoted to the subject. Individual essays discuss Byzantine conceptions of paradise, the textual evidence for monastic horticulture, animal and game parks, herbs in medicinal pharmacy, and the famous illustrated copy of Dioskorides’s herbal manual in Vienna. An opening chapter explores questions and observations from the point of view of a non-Byzantine garden historian, and the closing chapter suggests possible directions for future scholarship in the field. 

The Study of Byzantine Gardens: Some Questions and Observations from a Garden Historian [Joachim Wolschke-Bulmahn]
The Scholarship of Byzantine Gardens [Antony Littlewood]
Paradise Withdrawn [Henry Maguire]
Byzantine Monastic Horticulture: The Textual Evidence [Alice-Mary Talbot]
Wild Animals in the Byzantine Park [Nancy P. Ševčenko]
Byzantine Gardens and Horticulture in the Late Byzantine Period, 1204–1453: The Secular Sources [Costas N. Constantinides]
Theodore Hyrtakenos’ Description of the Garden of St. Anna and the Ekphrasis of Gardens [Mary-Lyon Dolezal and Maria Mavroudi]
Κηποποιϊα [Kepopoiïa]: Garden Making and Garden Culture in the Geoponika [Robert Rodgers]
Herbs of the Field and Herbs of the Garden in Byzantine Medicinal Pharmacy [John Scarborough]
The Vienna Dioskorides and Anicia Juliana [Leslie Brubaker]
Possible Future Directions [Antony Littlewood] 

EU Watch | Katar or not Katar...That is the Problem

0
0
Mavi Boncuk |

EU Watch | Katar or not Katar...That is the Problem

NOTOS | 40 Turkish Films of the Century

Turkish Cinema Catalogs | 2011-2017

The World’s Top 20 Airlines 2017

0
0
Mavi Boncuk |

Qatar Airways has been named the best airline in the world for 2017 by the leading consumer-aviation website Skytrax.

The Doha, Qatar-based airline was presented with the award on Tuesday at a ceremony during the 2017 Paris Air Show. This is the fourth time Qatar has garnered this honor with wins in 2011, 2012, and 2015.

The World’s Top 20 Airlines 2017
Qatar Airways
Singapore Airlines
ANA All Nippon Airways
Emirates
Cathay Pacific
EVA Air
Lufthansa
Etihad Airways
Hainan Airlines
Garuda Indonesia
Thai Airways
12. Turkish Airlines
Virgin Australia
Swiss Int’l Air Lines
Qantas Airways
Japan Airlines
Austrian
Air France
Air New Zealand
Asiana Airlines

The World’s Top 20 Airlines 2016
Emirates
Qatar Airways
Singapore Airlines
Cathay Pacific
ANAs
Etihad Airways
7. Turkish Airlines
EVA Air
Qantas Airways
Lufthansa
Garuda Indonesia
Hainan Airlines
Thai Airways
Air France
Swiss Int’l Air Lines
Asiana Airlines
Air New Zealand
Virgin Australia
Austrian
Bangkok Airways

The World’s Top 20 Airlines 2016
Qatar Airways
Singapore Airlines
Cathay Pacific
4.Turkish Airlines
Emirates
Etihad Airways
ANA All Nippon Airways
Garuda Indonesia
EVA Air
Qantas Airways
Asiana Airlines
Lufthansa
Austrian
Swiss
Air France
Virgin Australia
Air New Zealand
Dragonair
Thai Airways
British Airways


The World’s Top 20 Airlines 2014 (2013 Rating)

1Cathay Pacific Airways6
2Qatar Airways2
3Singapore Airlines3
4Emirates1
5Turkish Airlines9
6ANA All Nippon Airways4
7Garuda Indonesia8
8Asiana Airlines5
9Etihad Airways7
10Lufthansa11
11Qantas Airways10
12EVA Air12
13Swiss16
14Thai Airways15
15Virgin Australia13
16Air New Zealand18
17British Airways27
18Malaysia Airlines14
19Hainan Airlines19

20Bangkok Airways31

Échelle de Top-Hana by Flandin Eugène

0
0
Mavi Boncuk |Eugène Flandin[1]. L’Orient par Eugène Flandin, Paris, Gide et J. Baudry, 1853.  SOURCE

 [1] Jean-Baptiste Eugène Napoléon Flandin (1809-1889) was a French Orientalist painter, pupil of Horace Vernet. Better known as Eugène Flandin, he was born in Naples and died in Tours. In 1837 Flandin accompanied the French expeditionary force to Algeria. In 1840, together with architect-archaeologist Pascal Coste, he participated in a mission to Persia, ostensibly aimed at strengthening political and economic ties between Paris and Teheran. The objectives of this mission were to collect as much information as possible on the country’s situation during the reign of Shah Mohammad Qajar and to record ancient monuments. Eventually the head of the mission, Édouard de Sercey, was called back to France, as he proved unable to deal with ongoing diplomatic intrigues. Flandin with his companion and their entourage continued their journey, in spite of adverse climatic conditions and well-nigh insurmountable difficulties in communicating with the local population and understanding their customs. The expedition returned to France two years later, having visited, "inter alia", the cities of Hamadan, Kermanshah, Isfahan, Chiraz, Persepolis, Mosul, Aleppo and also Constantinople. 

In 1842 Flandin was decorated with the "Légion d'honneur" for his artistic and scientific work. In 1844 he returned to Mesopotamia, together with archaeologist Emile Botta, to search for the ancient Assyrian capital of Nineveh. For six months, Flandin drew sculptures and reliefs in the region, under very difficult circumstances. In 1851, he co-signed with E. Coste the six-volume "Voyage en Perse", and composed the two-volume account of his journey. He also published "L’Orient" (1853) and "The History of the Knights of Rhodes" (1864). In the latter years of his life he was mayor (1850-1866) in the region of Touraine and held various offices in the Prefecture of Tours.

Flandin’s artistic oeuvre began with the paintings he made in Italy. It includes historical subjects, depictions of ancient monuments, portraits and landscapes, expressed above all in the Orientalist spirit. From 1857 onwards he exhibited his works in the yearly Paris "Salons". Today, many of his paintings are to be found in museums in France, Belgium and elsewhere. 

This edition includes forty lithographs with views and monuments of Constantinople, especially Galata and the Bosporus, as well as explanatory texts on the first thirty-one of these plates. Of special interest are the views of the Sea Walls of the Golden Horn, before the railway – terminus of the famed Orient Express – was constructed, and the wooden bridge at Galata, which was later replaced by the floating bridge, as well as the ruins of the Palace of Porphyrogennetos with other buildings that no longer exist. 

Written by Ioli Vingopoulou




4th of July | "Cahiller."

0
0
Prof. Ilber Ortayli would say "Cahiller."

Year after year Turkish American organizations use just one stamp out of this 1939 series in their 4th of July messages.

US Declaration of Independence is 1776. Add 150 you get 1926. This Stamp honored another event. The Government under the U.S. Constitution beginning - Mar 04, 1789. 

The Turkish text wrongly attributes this date to "Independence | Istiklal."

Do I think Turkish Americans can discover this mistake next year. Perhaps not.
I corrected this for so many years by writing directly to their web masters. My only hope is now shaming the "ignorants | cahiller" in Blogospere. 

It might work.

Mavi Boncuk |

In Memoriam | Galip Tekin (1958-2017)

0
0
Galip Tekin found dead in his house in Arnavutkoy, Istanbul 6 July 2017

Mavi Boncuk |

Galip Tekin (born 20 April 1958) is a Turkish comic book artist, cartoonist and screenwriter. He is known for his works in fantasy and science genres. His style is often compared to that of Jean "Mœbius" Giraud.[1]

Tekin started his comics career in Gırgır magazine in 1978. Following year, he dropped out Istanbul State Academy of Fine Arts to pursue a career in Gırgır. Throughout the 1980s, he published comics and comic strips in Gırgır and Fırt, as well as in Günaydın newspaper. In May 1989, he became the chief editor of newly founded Dıgıl magazine.[1]

In 1990s, Tekin worked in various humor magazines, including Hıbır, Fırfır, Leman, Limon and L-Manyak. In 1994, he published his best-known comic series, Pı'ya Mektuplar. In 1994 and 2000, he started lecturing as a comic book instructor in Boğaziçi and Istanbul Bilgi University, respectively, pioneering the Comics studies in Turkey.[1]

In 2008, he was arrested for allegedly conspiring to hire a contract killer after a shootout at Kemancı Bar in Taksim, which he was a co-owner of. He was subsequently released after charges against him were dropped.[2] During the 7 months of his detention, Tekin made 850 different illustrations, which were adapted into a textbook.[3]

In 2011, Tekin started compiling his best known works under the series Tuhaf Öyküler.[3] In 2012, some of his comic book stories were adapted into television series under the name Acayip Hikayeler,[4] with Tekin writing the screenplay for 4 episodes.[5] The series were cancelled that year.[6]

Having also previously worked for Penguen, Tekin currently works for Uykusuz.[7]

Selected works
Tuhaf Öyküler 1 (2011)
Tuhaf Öyküler 2 (2011)
Tuhaf Öyküler 3 (2012)

Filmography | Television
Acayip Hikayeler (2012)










References
1 Alpin, Hakan (2006). Çizgiroman Ansiklopedisi (in Turkish). İstanbul: İnkılâp Kitabevi. ISBN 9751024366.
2 Kazancı, Murat (26 December 2008). "Karikatürist Galip Tekin’e takipsizlik". Hürriyet (in Turkish). Retrieved 15 July 2015.
3 Erdoğan, Esra. "Eroinman, alkolik ya da deli olduğumu düşünenlere gülüp geçiyorum". Hürriyet (in Turkish). Retrieved 15 July 2015.
4 Karakuş, Gülbahar (8 April 2012). "Don Kişot’luk yapıyoruz". Hürriyet (in Turkish). Retrieved 15 July 2015.
5 "'Hikayelerimi televizyona koymak delilik!'". NTV (Turkey) (in Turkish). 6 April 2012. Retrieved 15 July 2015.
6 "Galip Tekin". Milliyet (in Turkish). Retrieved 15 July 2015.
7 İzci, İpek (16 May 2012). "Mizahçıya baskı yapamazsın, bir şekilde adamı bitirir". Radikal (in Turkish). Retrieved 15 July 2015.

Word Origin | Hak, Hukuk, Adalet

0
0

Hak, Hukuk, Adalet seems like three different words and can be translated as right, law and justice. However they all mean the same.  Take Law, Old English lagu, from Old Norse lag ‘something laid down or fixed,’ of Germanic origin and related to lay. Exactly as Arabic Hakk. 

Mavi Boncuk |

Hak: Right EN (by law) [1] fromAR ḥaḳḳ حَقّ   «yasaya, hakikate veya erdeme uygun olma», doğruluk, hakikat, yasallık Hebrew ḥuḳḳā חֻקָּה «(taşa veya metale) oyulmuş şey», yasa, ferman, kural Hebrew/Aramaic ḥaḳaḳ חקק  oymak, (taşa ve metale) hakketmek )

Hukuk: Rights EN (by law) [2] "haklar (çoğul)" [ anon., Ferec ba'd eş-şidde, c.1451]
atamuŋ üzerüŋüzde haḳları vardır, ol ḥuḳūḳı yerine getirüŋ[ TDK, Türkçe Sözlük, 1. Baskı, 1945]
hukuk: 1. Kanun ve adetlerin bütünü. 2. Kanunlar bilimi. (...) 5. Ahbaplık, dostluk. 6. Kanunların cezaya değgin olmayıp alacak verecek gibi davaları ilgilendiren kısmı. 7. Haklar.
fromAR ḥuḳūḳ حقوق  [plural] haklar  AR ḥaḳḳ حقّ  [t.]
→ hak1
Pre-1945 dictionaries always used it as a plural of hak.

Adalet: Rights EN (by law), Justice [3] ˁadālet [ Selanikli Mustafa Âli, Tarih-i Selanikî, 1600]
fromAR adāla(t) عدالة  adillik, hak gözetme  AR adala عَدَلَ denk idi, oran ve ölçülü idi, adil idi.

[1] [2] right (n.) Old English riht (West Saxon, Kentish), reht (Anglian), "that which is morally right, duty, obligation," also "rule of conduct; law of a land;" also "what someone deserves; a just claim, what is due; correctness, truth; a legal entitlement, a privilege," from the root of right (adj.1). Meaning "the right" (as opposed to the left) is from mid-13c.; political use from 1825. From early 14c. as "a right action, a good deed." Meaning "a blow with the right fist" is from 1898. The phrase to rights "at once, straightway" is 1660s, from sense "in a proper manner" (Middle English).

right (v.)  Old English rihtan "to straighten, rule, set up, set right, amend; guide, govern; restore, replace," from riht (adj.); see right (adj.1). Compare Old Norse retta "to straighten," Old Saxon rihtian, Old Frisian riuchta, German richten, Gothic garaihtjan. Related: Righted; righting.

right (adj.1) "morally correct," Old English riht "just, good, fair; proper, fitting; straight, not bent, direct, erect," from Proto-Germanic *rekhtaz (source also of Old Frisian riucht "right," Old Saxon reht, Middle Dutch and Dutch recht, Old High German reht, German recht, Old Norse rettr, Gothic raihts), from PIE root *reg- "move in a straight line," also "to rule, to lead straight, to put right" (source also of Greek orektos "stretched out, upright;" Latin rectus "straight, right;" Old Persian rasta- "straight; right," aršta- "rectitude;" Old Irish recht "law;" Welsh rhaith, Breton reiz "just, righteous, wise"). 

Compare slang straight (adj.1) "honest, morally upright," and Latin rectus "right," literally "straight," Lithuanian teisus "right, true," literally "straight." Greek dikaios "just" (in the moral and legal sense) is from dike "custom." As an emphatic, meaning "you are right," it is recorded from 1580s; use as a question meaning "am I not right?" is from 1961. The sense in right whale is "justly entitled to the name." Right stuff "best human ingredients" is from 1848, popularized by Tom Wolfe's 1979 book about the first astronauts. Right of way is attested from 1767. Right angle is from late 14c.

[3] justice (n.) mid-12c., "the exercise of authority in vindication of right by assigning reward or punishment;" also "quality of being fair and just; moral soundness and conformity to truth," from Old French justice "justice, legal rights, jurisdiction" (11c.), from Latin iustitia "righteousness, equity," from iustus "upright, just" (see just (adj.)).

Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society. It ever has been and ever will be pursued until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit. ["The Federalist," No. 51]

Meaning "right order, equity, the rewarding to everyone of that which is his due" in English is from late 14c. The Old French word had widespread senses including also "uprightness, equity, vindication of right, court of justice, judge." In English c. 1400-1700 sometimes also with a vindictive sense "infliction of punishment, legal vengeance." As a title for a judicial officer, c. 1200. Justice of the peace first attested early 14c. To do justice to (someone or something) "deal with as is right or fitting" is from 1670s. In the Mercian hymns, Latin iustitia is glossed by Old English rehtwisnisse.

Article | How Erdoganism Is Killing Turkish Democracy

0
0
Mavi Boncuk |

How Erdoganism Is Killing Turkish Democracy
The End of Political Opposition
By Soner Cagaptay and Oya Rose Aktas

Turkey was undeniably transformed by last July’s failed coup. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, having barely survived an attempt on this life, has become a Turkish Muslim messiah in the eyes of his supporters: he is the unchallenged leader of the nation, charged with reinvigorating the Muslim umma, the global Muslim community. Opposition has become blasphemous. Those who refuse to support him are anti-Turkish and anti-Muslim and therefore enemies of the state. This is terrible news for Turkey’s democracy, which requires a healthy opposition to survive.

Erdogan, a right-wing leader, first came to power as prime minister in 2003 through his Justice and Development Party (AKP). He became president in 2014. In that time, especially during the last decade, he has delivered economic growth, which has helped him increase the AKP’s vote share. More insidiously, he also demonized electorates unlikely to vote for him, including seculars, liberals, social democrats, leftists, and Kurds. This strategy built Erdogan a large base made up of conservatives and political Islamists.

After 2014, Erdogan strove to transform the Turkish political system into an executive style presidency in which he, as president, would consolidate the powers of head of state, head of government, and head of the ruling party. This seemed a tall order; Erdogan needed to win a popular referendum to change the constitution before he could become omnipotent, but his AKP had never received more than 50 percent of the vote.

Erdoganism has set Turkish democracy on a path to self-destruction, and there seems to be no exit.

Almost two years later, Erdogan’s presidential ambitions were reanimated through a crisis that threatened to destroy him entirely: the July 15 coup attempt. Before that, Erdogan had already been one of Turkey’s most powerful leaders. By surviving an attempt on his life and subsequently defeating his enemies, especially the Gulen movement—a former ally that seems to have played a key role in the coup—he only gained in stature, which he then leveraged in a snap constitutional …

(READ MORE IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS)

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

See also: ONE YEAR ON FROM THE FAILED COUP, RECEP TAYYIP ERDOGAN IS MORE AUTOCRATIC THAN EVER by Soner Cagaptay
Guardian | July 8, 2017

The Turkish president is taking steps to end democracy itself in Turkey, further polarizing an already sharply divided country.

This week is the first anniversary of the failed coup against Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, a coup he has used since to further alienate his opponents. Most recently, on 16 April, he won a referendum to become head of state and head of government simultaneously, emerging as the most unassailable Turkish politician since Mustafa Kemal Ataturk established the secular republic in 1923.

In the 1920s and 1930s, Ataturk shaped Turkey in his own image as a western society. In his Turkey, the state banished religion to the private sphere and discriminated against pious citizens. But since 2003, Erdogan has dismantled Ataturk's societal model, flooding political and education systems with rigidly conservative Islam, as well as pivoting Turkey away from Europe and the west.

This is, paradoxically, Erdogan's Ataturk side. Of course, Erdogan does not share his values, just his methods. Just as Ataturk reshaped Turkey, so Erdogan is building a new country, but one that sees itself as profoundly Islamist in politics and foreign policy -- to make it a great power once again.

Erdogan is an anti-Ataturk Ataturk. As I explain in my book The New Sultan, having grown up in secularist Turkey and faced social exclusion at a young age because of his piety, Erdogan is motivated by animosity towards Ataturk's ways. Yet he has dismantled Ataturk's system by using the very tools that the country's founding elites provided: state institutions and top-down social engineering.

Erdogan has used the founder's means and methods to replace even Ataturk himself. The end product is that Turkey now discriminates against citizens who do not first and foremost identify through conservative political Islamism, the branch to which Erdogan belongs. However, Erdogan has a problem: whereas Ataturk came to power as a military general, the president has a democratic mandate to govern. And what is more, Turkey is split almost down the middle -- Erdogan won the April referendum with only 51% popular support.

Despite this, Erdogan wants to change Turkey in his own image in the way that Ataturk did and herein lies the crisis of modern Turkey: half of the country embraces Erdogan's brand of politics, but the other half vehemently opposes it. So long as Turkey is genuinely democratic, Erdogan cannot continue to govern the way he likes to.

This has given birth to Erdogan's dark, illiberal side: in order to push forward with his platform of revolutionary change against a split society, he has been cracking down on his opponents and locking up dissidents. Although he has won elections democratically, Erdogan has gradually become more autocratic, ensuring, once he has won an election, that the political playing field is uneven in order to prevent power from escaping his hands.

Accordingly, although Turkey's elections continue to be free, they are increasingly not fair. Erdogan's electoral strategy has created deeply entrenched polarisation in Turkey: his conservative base, constituting about half of the country, has zealously rallied around him in his defence; the other half resents him.


Last year's failed coup only sharpened Turkey's dilemma. Although the initial post-coup purges and arrests targeted members of the conservative Gulen movement -- erstwhile allies who seem to have turned against him in the coup -- Erdogan has since cast a wide net, arresting anyone who opposes him. He has jailed 40,000 people since the coup, purging another 150,000. His opponents now loathe him.

See also: Transactional or Transcendent? Turkey’s Ties to the European Union May 08, 2017 bySoner Cagaptay Oya Rose Aktas 




But Erdogan does not seem to take notice. On 18 May, he declared that the state of emergency put in place after the 2016 coup would be extended until there is "welfare and peace in the country." He has even threatened to detain Kemal Kilicdaroglu, head of the main opposition Republican People's Party (CHP), who is currently leading a march from Ankara to Istanbul to protest against Erdogan's ongoing crackdown. Erdogan knows that he cannot continue to govern Turkey the way he likes so long as it is a democracy -- which is why he is now taking steps to end democracy. [1] Soner Çağaptay is a Turkish-American political scientist based in the United States. He is director of the Turkish Research Program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He is a historian by training and is an expert on Turkey–United States relations, Turkish politics, and Turkish nationalism. Cagaptay is the Beyer Family Fellow and director of the Turkish Research Program at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP).

Cagaptay has written extensively on Turkey–United States relations; Turkish domestic politics; Turkish nationalism; Turkey's rise as an economic power and Ankara's Middle East policy, publishing in scholarly journals and major international print media. These include the Wall Street Journal, New York Times, Washington Times, International Herald Tribune, Jane's Defense Weekly, and Habertürk. He is a regular columnist for Hürriyet Daily News, Turkey's oldest and most influential English-language paper, and a contributor to CNN's Global Public Square blog. He appears regularly on Fox News, CNN, NPR, al-Jazeera, BBC, and CNN-Turk.

Cagaptay received a Ph.D. in history from Yale University in 2003. He wrote his doctoral dissertation on Turkish nationalism. Besides English and Turkish, his research languages include French, German, Spanish, Bosnian, Hebrew, Azerbaijani, and Ottoman Turkish]

He was a visiting professor at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University.

He has also served on contract as chair of the Turkey Advanced Area Studies Program at the State Department's Foreign Service Institute.
He has taught courses on the Middle East, Mediterranean, and Eastern Europe at Princeton University and Yale University. His spring 2003 course on modern Turkish history was the first offered by Yale in three decades.[2] From 2006 to 2007, he was Ertegun Professor at the Department of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton.

Among his honors are the Smith-Richardson, Mellon, Rice, and Leylan fellowships, as well as the Ertegun chair at Princeton. In 2012, he was named an American Turkish Society Young Society Leader.

Books
Islam, Secularism, and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who Is a Turk? Review, January 2006.
The Rise of Turkey: The Twenty-First Century's First Muslim Power, February 2014.
The New Sultan: Erdogan and the Crisis of Modern Turkey (July 30, 2017) ISBN 978-1784538262

[2] Oya Rose Aktas is the Turkish Research Programme Assistant at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. For her Bachelor of Arts, she studied Humanities and Economics at Washington University in St. Louis, where she researched how images of women were used to shape Turkish national identity throughout the history of the Turkish Republic. Before the Washington Institute, Oya worked on income inequality research at the Washington Center for Equitable Growth, specifically focusing on how economic policies affect women and minorities. Previously, she also worked as a Legislative Intern at the United States House of Representatives. Her mother is a Methodist Christian.

Viewing all 3433 articles
Browse latest View live




Latest Images