The diary kept by the wife of Admiral Limpus[1] during Turkish posting 1912-1914 [2] must be worthwhile. Archive Link to National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, London
Admiral Limpus[1] was also absent from the Galipoli Capaign as noted by Richard Garczynskì: "Now it’s just possible that had Limpus [1] been in command, the Anglo-French expedition might actually have been able to force the straits. After all, he probably knew more about the capabilities of the Turkish Navy[3] and the defenses of the straits than any other Allied officer. So why hadn’t he been given the job?
The silly answer is an odd one, though very, very British. At the highest levels it had been decided that to give Limpus the job of fighting the folks he had so recently been advising might not be considered quite gentlemanly – not “cricket” as it were. And so Limpus was sent to Malta, "having been instructed not to supply any information which could be used against the Turks."
The stark truth is Churchill shunned him. Why? he knew that Rear-Admiral Limpus, like Admirals Fisher, Tudor and Jackson, was opposed to his plan. Limpus believed that the first stage of any attack on the Dardanelles had to be be an amphibious landing. It could not be undertaken by the navy alone.
See also: Chris B. Rooney, "The International Significance of British Naval Missions to the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1914," Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 34, no. 1 (January 1998)
See also Admiral Limpus[1] posting.
Mavi Boncuk |
By way of background, at the outbreak of WWI the major combatant states maintained that with the right sort of 'fighting spirit' the conflict could be settled in 'a few months', the troops 'home by Christmas'. However, by November, 1914, both European Fronts had degenerated into the frightful stale-mated carnage of trench warfare (which as Barbara Tuchman described it) "that murderous insanity that sucked up lives at the rate of 5,000 and sometimes 50, 000 a day". Perhaps not too surprising then, the question of whether there might be easier victories elsewhere. A directly related issue was how more nations could be induced to join the Entente side, Britain's Secretary of State for War, Lord Kitchener arguing that an assault on Constantinople could bring in Greece, Bulgaria and Roumania -- providing they were offered Turkish territory. (MG1, 362; BT, 425-6)
On September 9, 1914, Britain withdrew its Naval Mission to Turkey, Churchill requesting that its head, Admiral Limpus (also titular head of the Turkish Navy) be transferred to command the British naval squadron assigned to watch the mouth of the Dardanelles. But, as Churchill put it, "This project was not, however, pursued, it being thought that it would be unduly provocative to employ on this station the very officer who had just ceased to be the teacher of the Turkish Fleet ..... the Admiral who .... knew the Dardanelles with all its possibilities." (WC1i, 491)
Since 1911 there had been in Turkey a British Naval Mission, the role of which, together with an Armstrongs' and Vickers' subsidiary, 'The Imperial Ottoman Docks, Arsenals and Naval Construction Company', was to modernise, to strengthen that country's naval defences. (N-B, 41, 72, 179, 191, 350; AA, 94-5,135-6, 269) Moreover, on July 28, 1914 (that is, just before the war had begun) two modern battleships, the Reshadieh, and the Sultan Osman, which had just been completed for Turkey at Armstrongs' and Vickers' shipyards in Britain, - indeed, fully paid for and with their Turkish crews ready to board, were requisitioned by Churchill for the Royal Navy.(WC1i, 208-9)
As Churchill records, describing his letter to Prime Minister Asquith of December 31, 1914: "I wanted Gallipoli attacked on the declaration of war." (WC1ii, 92) for, as he explained, early in August, 1914, Greece's Prime Minister, Venizelos had, with his King's consent, "...formally placed at the disposal of the Entente powers all the naval and military resources of Greece..", including some 250,000 troops. Churchill then goes on, "This magnanimous offer ..... greatly attracted me. .... No doubt on the one hand it was a serious risk of adding Turkey to our enemies. On the other hand, the Greek Army and Navy were solid factors; and a combination of the Greek armies and fleet with the British Mediterranean squadron offered a means of settling the difficulties of the Dardanelles in a most prompt and effective manner." (WC1i, 485) And, as Churchill continued, "If we were not going to secure honest Turkish neutrality, then let us, ... get the Christian States of the Balkans on our side." (WC1i, 486)
And fully expecting war against Turkey, Churchill began to prepare for it. Thus writing on September 1, 1914 to Sir Charles Douglas, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Churchill called for "...a plan for the seizure by means of a Greek army of adequate strength of the Gallipoli peninsula with a view to admitting a British Fleet to the Sea of Marmora.", he then further indicating, "...the matter is urgent, .... Turkey may make war on us at any moment." (WC1i, 487-8)
Based on transcript of an ANU Emeritus Faculty talk of April 16, 2008 by Ian Buckley, adapted from his chapter 4 of 'Australia's Foreign Wars'.
[1] Admiral Arthur Henry Limpus (7 June 1863 – 3 November 1931) was a Royal Navy officer who became Admiral Superintendent of Malta Dockyard.
[2] On 11 March 1912, after a frustrating delay while the Admiralty neglected the issue (of replacing Admiral Gamble), Churchill, under pressure from Grey,selected Admiral Arthur Limpus, a young officer with one year's experience as an admiral with the squadron at South Africa. The lessons of the Williams era had been noted and the criteria with which Limpus was to be promoted to the Turks was that he was a `fine fellow' who would make a `good personal impression'. Since the relationship with the Minister of Marine was so vital, these would be factors essential to a successful term in the Ottoman Empire. With his secretary, Stack, Commander Ashby and Lieutenants Elliot and Hallifax, Admiral Limpus arrived in Turkey at the beginning of May 1912.
[3] The Turcophile Limpus felt that from a moral standpoint Britain was `bound to help a sorely stricken nation to regain health and reasonable prosperity', yet when foreign assistance was given Turkish officials were suspicious that external advisers had ulterior motives; there existed considerable doubt over whether the Great Powers were actually trying to help Turkey, or let it collapse. Britain, Germany and France, Limpus warned, would gain nothing from this.