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EU Watch | MAM Has Deep Thoughts and a Forced Perspective

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Mavi Boncuk |

“Today, I return to the party that I founded: my home, my passion, my love,” he said.

Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has rejoined the ruling party that he co-founded, after a tight referendum victory that granted him new powers when Turkish voters approved a raft of constitutional amendments

that will transform the country from a parliamentary democracy into a presidential republic.

Erdoğan signed his membership form at a ceremony in the Justice and Development party (AKP) headquarters in the capital, Ankara, and is expected to be elected chair at an extraordinary congress later this month.





Article | A Kurdish Referendum: Unforeseen Benefits

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COMMENT: SONER CAGAPTAY


The Kurdish political landscape is divided across countries and political lines. On one hand, the PKK and PYD fall under the same Group of Communities in Kurdistan (KCK), an umbrella organization established by the PKK. On the other hand, things are looking good for Ankara in Iraq's Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), where Turkey has built close ties through economic, military, and security cooperation. Even there, however, power is contested between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), which favors Turkey and stands against the PKK/PYD, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), which favors Iran and shares its sympathies for the PKK/PYD.

Current U.S.-Turkish relations regarding the PYD can be defined as a working detente. Ankara is fine with Washington helping the group in operations east of the Euphrates River, but not west of it. And Washington is fine with Turkey hitting the PYD from areas near the border, even as the United States works with the group near Raqqa, deeper inside Syria. This compartmentalization has worked so far, but it could run into pitfalls if the weapons Washington is giving the PYD end up in the PKK's hands, or if Turkey accidentally hits embedded U.S. personnel while targeting PYD positions near the border.



The biggest threat to this working detente, though, is Russia's entry into the conflict. The PYD's self-declared autonomous region along portions of Syria's border with Turkey (called "Rojava") gives Moscow a permanent lever in Syrian domestic politics, another potential foothold in the Middle East, and a lever against Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Russia's desire to undermine Erdogan after Turkey shot down a Russian military jet in November is well known, so the United States should work with Ankara to prevent Rojava from becoming the Kremlin's security client.

Moreover, the PYD has yet to show that it can coexist with Arabs, Turkmens, and other ethnic groups when it takes over territory. Until it passes this litmus test, its appeal will remain largely limited to Kurds, and its forces will risk being seen as occupiers in Arab lands when they score victories against IS.

For its part, the PKK has been unrealistic in its goals, attempting to take over cities in Turkey and declare autonomy as the PYD did in Kobane, Syria. Not only has this strategy failed, it has also decimated the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP), a major pro-Kurdish political faction in Turkey. The party's popularity has imploded since the PKK resumed violent operations, diminishing hopes that Turks might soon embrace Kurdish demands for political and cultural rights. The PKK may also have inadvertently rewarded Erdogan -- the Turkish president is hoping to boost his image as a right-wing strongman, and renewed war with the PKK is helping him do exactly that. He might even be able to peel off enough votes from the right-wing Nationalist Action Party (MHP) to build a popular majority, which would allow him to amend the constitution via referendum and transform Turkey into an executive-style democracy with him at the top.

Accordingly, the United States should encourage rapprochement between Turkey and the PYD. This would give Ankara a cordon sanitaire against the Syria war, bolster the PYD as a U.S. ally against IS, and prevent Russia from establishing a deep security relationship with the Syrian Kurds. Such a goal would be more realistic if Turkey and the PKK reached a ceasefire. Washington could also use its leverage with the KDP to encourage the PYD to break off from the PKK, especially since the Iraqi Kurds control the only access route to Rojava other than Turkey.

In sum, there are two trajectories for the PYD going forward: establishing a contiguous Russian-backed Kurdish zone in northern Syria, or working with the United States while breaking away from the PKK. To facilitate the latter scenario, Washington should point out that if Ankara does not take the PYD's hand, the Syrian Kurds and even the PKK could become Moscow's security clients, with grave security ramifications for Turkey.


SEE ALSO : POLICYWATCH 2680

Rojava's Sustainability and the PKK's Regional Strategy








Mavi Boncuk |

PolicyWatch 2798


A Kurdish Referendum: Unforeseen Benefits

By Bilal Wahab and Rebwar Karim Mahmood

May 3, 2017

SOURCE

The KRG's independence referendum should be treated as a tactical bid to unify the Iraqi Kurds and strengthen their position toward Baghdad, but without jettisoning their gradualist approach.

This fall, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) plans to hold a referendum on independence that it says will start a process of secession from Iraq. Despite this clear declaration of intent, however, the vote will not constitute a decision to secede. In fact, if handled correctly it could postpone any real action toward separation from Iraq, put the KRG back on a democratic trajectory, and soothe regional fears about disputed territories and other issues. U.S. engagement before the referendum and throughout the subsequent negotiations between Erbil and Baghdad would likewise alleviate regional concerns, and officials on both sides welcome such a role. 

PAST PRECEDENT

Iraqi Kurds first went to the polls to choose between declaring independence and staying with Iraq in an informal January 2005 referendum. While the nearly unanimous yes vote did not result in any actual secession moves, it gave Kurdish negotiators a strong hand in Baghdad, which they used to secure rights and powers that are now enshrined in Iraq's constitution. 

As KRG president Masoud Barzani pushes for a formal referendum later this year, the Kurdish house is decidedly not in order. A longstanding dispute over extending his presidential term led to a standoff with rivals, mainly the Gorran (Change) Party, the second largest bloc in the KRG legislature. The resulting gridlock has kept parliament shuttered since October 2015. Moreover, the Kurdish economy continues to suffer, exacerbating public grievances. Unlike the referendum, the KRG's parliamentary and presidential elections may not move forward as scheduled this fall. Meanwhile, Iraq is bracing for a crucial national election in spring 2018, which, among other things, will likely decide the fate of Erbil-Baghdad relations. 

GEARING UP FOR THE ISLAMIC STATE'S DEFEAT

Despite these obstacles, if there were ever an ideal time to reap the benefits of a referendum, it is now. The downfall of the Islamic State (IS) caliphate is in sight, the KRG's Peshmerga forces have gained control over territories that Kurds historically claimed, and the White House has a new occupant whom the Kurds perceive as less adamant about the sanctity of Iraq's borders. 

To be sure, KRG relations with Baghdad have stagnated as conflicts over power sharing and revenues fester. The Kurds are also alarmed by the growing political role of Shiite militias, the push for majoritarian rather than consensus-based rule in Baghdad, and Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi's perceived inability to address their rift. On the ground, however, Erbil's relations with the central government are improving due to military cooperation in Mosul, oil-sharing agreements in the disputed Kirkuk region, and the KRG's willingness to put its Central Bank branches under Baghdad's control. And for Barzani, the referendum would be a sweeping solution to the KRG's broader problems: the nationalist quest for independence, even if only symbolic for now, would nudge the Kurds to transcend partisanship, which in turn would bolster their position with Baghdad. For example, even something as simple as flying the Kurdish flag in Kirkuk last month helped galvanize Kurdish unity, though continuing to make such gestures in disputed territories could cause tensions with other actors, as discussed below. 

RECOGNIZING THE REFERENDUM'S LIMITS

Although the final form of the planned initiative is far from settled, one can already delineate what the referendum is and isn't. A yes vote is inevitable but will not result in an immediate declaration of independence, as KRG prime minister Nechirvan Barzani and other officials have made clear. The Kurds realize that neither they nor the region are ready to accept a new Kurdish state. Rather, the vote will give Kurdish negotiators a public mandate to recalibrate relations with Baghdad, take another small step toward autonomy, and get some closure on disputed territories. 

On the latter point, it remains uncertain whether disputed areas outside the KRG's current borders (namely in Kirkuk, Ninawa, and Diyala provinces) will participate in the vote. Local governments there could ask to join the KRG in a joint or separate referendum. Clearly, though, limiting the vote to the KRG proper would be far less irksome to Baghdad and other regional capitals. 

TRANSCENDING INTERNAL DIVISIONS

No Kurdish party can afford to stand against the referendum, and some believe it is the only way the KRG can prepare for the tectonic changes seemingly poised to shake the region. But others believe the bout of Kurdish nationalism is a smokescreen for delegitimizing the KRG's democratic institutions and establishing a personal legacy for Masoud Barzani. He and his Kurdistan Democratic Party are the strongest proponents of the referendum, insisting that it should move forward even without a mandate from the dormant parliament. In the KDP's view, the quest for independence transcends the legislature and the KRG's myriad political and economic problems. 

Barzani's rivals agree on the goal but not the process. Gorran asserts that the referendum mandate must emerge from parliament; the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan is torn between its fear of Gorran's popular sway and its desire to maintain relations with the KDP; and the Islamic parties insist on reactivating parliament but fall short of making it a precondition for the referendum. More broadly, the opposition fears that Barzani wants the referendum to replace the November parliamentary and presidential elections. 

For their long-term statehood quest to be taken seriously, the Kurds need to remain committed to the democratic process and invest in state institutions. Hence, political reconciliation and the referendum need not be sequential or mutually exclusive. On the contrary, leading the referendum initiative in an inclusive and law-based fashion would boost Barzani's legacy, whether or not he respects his expired term limit and steps down as president. 

REGIONAL UNEASE

In addition to getting their own house in order, the Kurds acknowledge that the path to eventual independence necessarily goes through Baghdad. Although the Trump administration has upped their expectations by manning key positions with KRG-friendly military commanders, they realize that Iraq and its neighbors are not yet ready for a Kurdish state. Another deal with Baghdad for greater Kurdish autonomy is a more realistic objective, one that could stave off pressure from Turkey, Iran, and the United States. 

In that regard, excluding disputed territories from the referendum would make it more agreeable to Baghdad. Prime Minister Abadi has voiced sympathy for Kurdish aspirations, but he also noted that the timing is not right for an independence vote. Some Shiite leaders have echoed Abadi, while others warned the Kurds against taking unilateral steps or holding Iraq hostage with persistent threats of secession. In response, Kurdish leaders have been quick to strike a conciliatory tone, assuring Baghdad that the referendum will not be a declaration of independence and promising that they will keep the channels of dialogue open. 

Going forward, Abadi's opposition to the Kurdish move may remain mild, since his own reelection bid will depend more on defeating IS and rebuilding Iraq's armed forces than on Kurdish support. Yet he could be forced to get tougher on the Kurds if his rivals exploit an Arab nationalist backlash against him.

Regionally, Tehran is the main opponent to secession, believing that an independent Kurdistan on its borders could weaken Shiite-led Iraq, kindle Iran's own Kurdish opposition, and become a hotbed for American and Israeli activities against the Islamic Republic. Like Baghdad, however, Tehran might be more amenable to a referendum that excludes the disputed territories. Such exclusion could also give Shiite militias one less excuse to take action against the KRG. 

To the north, Turkey's rhetoric against Kurdish nationalist ambitions spiked recently, including vociferous calls to remove the Kurdish flag in Kirkuk. The Kurds put these tough words in context, however, realizing that President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and other Turkish leaders were largely posturing in order to win anti-Kurdish nationalist votes during their own constitutional referendum last month. Ankara and the KRG have strong economic, energy, and security ties that make Kurdish autonomy less threatening. Yet Turkey's April 25 airstrikes in Sinjar -- a northern Iraqi town in the heart of the disputed Ninawa province -- show the potential for ongoing complications over the summer.

TESTING THE "ONE IRAQ" POLICY

By rationalizing and watering down their planned referendum, the Kurds can serve their interests without unduly disrupting Iraq's wider bid for stability. Similarly, Barzani can boost his standing by using the referendum not as a replacement for the November elections, but as an opportunity to reactivate the parliament, commit to good governance, and implement reforms that assuage the KRG populace. The process would also induce the Kurdish parties to iron out their differences, while buying Baghdad and Erbil more time to negotiate their post-IS relations and the fate of disputed areas. 

These outcomes align with U.S. interests in Iraq. In contrast, mismanaging the rising nationalist expectations in Iraq and the KRG could backfire. Washington should therefore tread carefully, perhaps limiting itself to the "honest broker" role that Iraqi politics desperately needs. This may mean facilitating whatever negotiations precede or follow a Kurdish referendum. Such an approach would encourage Erbil and Baghdad alike to invest in state institutions and steer clear of regional meddling. 

Bilal Wahab is a Soref Fellow at The Washington Institute. Rebwar Karim Mahmood is an assistant professor at the University of Sulaimani in Iraqi Kurdistan. 

The loquat | Yeni Dunya

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Mavi Boncuk |


In Malta it is known as Naspli or Naspoli Fruit. hence the Turks call it Malta Plum (Erigi). 

The loquat (Eriobotrya japonica) (Chinese:枇杷; pinyin: pi pa) is a species of flowering plant in the family Rosaceae, a native to the cooler hill regions of China to south-central China. It is also quite common in Japan, Korea, and some can be found in some Northern part of the Philippines, and hill country in Sri Lanka.

It is a large evergreen shrub or tree, grown commercially for its yellow fruit, and also cultivated[1] as an ornamental plant. it is a common ornamental in Adelaide South Australia

Eriobotrya japonica was formerly thought to be closely related to the genus Mespilus, and is still sometimes known as the Japanese medlar. It is also known as Japanese plum and Chinese plum, also known as pipa in China.

[1] According to the Texas A&M University Extension, nespoli trees propagated from seeds are often self-infertile and may not resemble the parent plant, producing inferior fruit. The extension suggest air-layering as an alternate method for propagation that preserves the genetics of the parent tree, producing a clone that will have similar growth and fruiting characteristics

LOQUAT (NASPLI) JAM WITH ROSEWATER

Author: www.amaltesemouthful.com (Marlene Zammit)


TOTAL TIME
2 hours

I have lifted this loquat jam by adding some rosewater and lemon juice but you could also add vanilla essence and cinnamon instead if you wanted. Great served on bread, scones or similar. This jam also goes great with vanilla custard and meringue.

Cuisine: Maltese
INGREDIENTS
1 kg loquats trimmed and seeds removed
500 grams sugar
2 tablespoons rosewater
½ zest and juice of a lemon
INSTRUCTIONS
Place all ingredients into a saucepan and bring to a boil.
Reduce temperature immediately and simmer for two hours.
Stir often.
Place in a small sterilised jar and leave in the fridge.

EU Watch | MAM Goes Galactic

Canes 2017 | Yılmaz Güney’s YOL – The Full Version

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Cannes Classics: YOL - THE FULL VERSION by Şerif Gören and Yılmaz Güney









Cannes Classics 2017

The program of Cannes Classics 2017 will be dedicated for its most part to the
history of the Festival includes Yılmaz Güney’s YOL – The Full Version.

Almost fifteen years ago, when the relationship between contemporary cinema and its own memory was about to be shaken by the emergent arrival of digital
technology, the Festival de Cannes created Cannes Classics, a selection that displays the work of valorisation of heritage cinema carried out by the production companies, the right-holders, the cinematheques or the national archives around the world.

•1982: Yol – The Full Version (The Way/La Permission) by Yilmaz Güney, directed by Serif Gören (1h53, Switzerland): Palme d'or ex-æquo, Prix de la Critique Internationale- FIPRESCI

Presented by DFK FILMS LTD. Zürich. Restoration from the original 35mm negative,from the interpositive and the positive print. Restoration and new sound mix from the original digitized tapes. 

International Sales: The Match Factory.


Mavi Boncuk |


Yılmaz Güney’s YOL – The Full Version
ca. 111 mins / 1982 / 2011-2017 / almost complete
Regie. Serif Gören, Yılmaz Güney
Drehbuch. Yılmaz Güney
Schnitt (The Full Version). Tobias Frühmorgen, Peter R. Adam
Schnitt (Original Version). Yılmaz Güney, Elizabeth Waelchli
Kamera. Erdoğan Engin
Musik. Sebastian Argol[1]
Vertrieb. The Match Factory
Palme d’Or 1982, Prix de la Critique Internationale FIPRESCI
TARIK AKAN Seyit Ali
HALİL ERGÜN Mehmet Salih
NECMETTİN ÇOBANOĞLU Ömer
HİKMET ÇELİK Mevlüt
GÜVEN ŞENGİL Süleyman
TUNCAY AKÇA Yusuf
ŞERİF SEZER Zine
MERAL ORHONSOY Emine
SEVDA AKTOLGA Meral
GÜNGÖR BAYRAK Nazife
SEMRA UÇAR Gülbahar

[1] Composed By, Producer – Sebastian Argol (Zülfü Livaneli) Mixed By – Pascal Cheteville Producer – Oldrich Horak Notes Original Motion Picture Soundtrack to the film Yol by Yilmaz Güney. Mixed in Studio Merjithur. 

EU Watch | Winners and Losers

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Mavi Boncuk |

The debate over the validity of the April 16 referendum results has dominated discussions in Turkey's legal and political spheres lately. Some have even delved into the top election body's decision, saying that the results were not clean and could further be challenged through alternative legal means. Amid ongoing debates, Justice Minister Bekir Bozdağ, speaking to private broadcaster A Haber yesterday, said the decision by Turkey's Supreme Election Board (YSK) regarding unstamped ballots was appropriate. He further added that neither the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) nor the Constitutional Court had authority to rule over the referendum result, according to the Constitution.

EU POST | The Cartoonist is MAM

In Memoriam | Levon Panos Dabağyan (1933-2017)

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Mavi Boncuk |

Levon Panos Dabağyan (11 November 1933; Aksaray, Fatih, İstanbul, Turkey – 7 May 2017, Istanbul) was a Turkish writer and researcher of Armenian descent. A member of Turkish Historical Society, he claims that there was no genocide of Armenians.[1]

He was the candidate in Istanbul for the far-right Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) in the 1969 Turkish parliamentary elections.

[1] Levon Panos Dabagian, Armenian historian living in Turkey also thinks so. It is appropriate mention that Dabagian was one of the first of few representatives of Armenian lobby who openly speaks against "genocide" campaign. At the same time Dabagian considers Armenian demands concerning the "genocide" groundless on the basis of historical facts. The historian studying the history of the Ottoman Empire's Armenians for a long time published his own book entitled "The history of Turkish Armenians" in 2003. It is known that right away after the decision of French Parliament Dabagian appeared in Turkish mass media and criticized such action of French MPs.

Dabagian confirms that throughout all Turkish history there were never events even closed to Armenian genocide, and all statements relating that are based on the political interests: "During World War I Turkey deported Armenians living in its territory and it is generally accepted but Turkey has never had conducted a genocide policy against Armenians." According to Dabagian, the decision concerning the mentioned deportation was taken due to the wartime conditions: "Anyway, the actions cannot be called genocide."...

See more at: Source

American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee

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Mavi Boncuk | The American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, also known as the Joint or the JDC, is a Jewish relief organization based in New York City.
The JDC was founded in 1914, initially to provide assistance to Jews living in Palestine under Turkish rule.By 1914, approximately 59,000 Jews were living in Palestine under Ottoman rule. The settlement—the Yishuv—was largely made up of Jews that had emigrated from Europe and were largely dependent on sources outside of Palestine for their income. The outbreak of World War I destroyed those channels, leaving the community isolated and destitute. With disaster looming, the Yishuv’s leaders appealed to Henry Morgenthau, Sr., then the U.S. ambassador to Turkey. Morgenthau was moved and appalled by the misery he witnessed. Soon after seeing what he did, Morgenthau sent an urgent cable to New York-based Jewish philanthropist Jacob Schiff,[1] requesting $50,000 of aid to keep the Jews of Palestine from starvation and death.

The plea found concerned ears in the U.S. In a month, $50,000 (the equivalent of $1 million in the year 2000) was raised through the efforts of what was intended to be an ad hoc and temporary collective of three existing religious and secular Jewish organizations: the American Jewish Relief Committee, the Central Committee for the Relief of Jews Suffering Through the War, and People’s Relief Committee.

In 1915 a greater crisis arose with the Jewish communities of the Pale of Settlement caught up in the fighting along the Eastern Front. Under the leadership of Judah Magnes the committee was able to raise another five million dollars by the end of the year. In 1921, following the post-revolutionary civil war of Russia, the committee was one of only two organizations left in America sending aid to combat the famine.

[1]Jacob Henry Schiff (born Jakob Heinrich Schiff; January 10, 1847 – September 25, 1920) was an Jewish-American banker, businessman, and philanthropist. Among many other things, he helped finance the expansion of American railroads and the Japanese military efforts against Tsarist Russia in the Russo-Japanese War.

Born in Frankfurt, Germany, Schiff migrated to the United States after the American Civil War and joined the firm Kuhn, Loeb & Co.[1] From his base on Wall Street, he was the foremost Jewish leader from 1880 to 1920 in what later became known as the "Schiff era", grappling with all major Jewish issues and problems of the day, including the plight of Russian Jews under the Tsar, American and international anti-semitism, care of needy Jewish immigrants, and the rise of Zionism.[2][3] He also became a director of many important corporations, including the National City Bank of New York, Equitable Life Assurance Society, Wells Fargo & Company, and the Union Pacific Railroad. In many of his interests he was associated with E. H. Harriman.

The European Union | The Acquis and Turkey

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Out of 16 opened chapters Turkey opened and closed only one chapter. 
25. Science & Research.17 other Chapters are frozen and can not be openedincluding

Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights

Chapter 24: Justice, freedom and security


Mavi Boncuk |

During the process of the enlargement of the European Union, the acquis was divided into 31 chapters for the purpose of negotiation between the EU and the candidate member states for the fifth enlargement (the ten that joined in 2004 plus Romania and Bulgaria which joined in 2007). These chapters were:

Chapters of the acquis

Chapter 1: Free movement of goods

Chapter 2: Freedom of movement for workers

Chapter 3: Right of establishment and freedom to provide services

Chapter 4: Free movement of capital

Chapter 5: Public procurement

Chapter 6: Company law

Chapter 7: Intellectual property law

Chapter 8: Competition policy

Chapter 9: Financial services

Chapter 10: Information society and media

Chapter 11: Agriculture and rural development

Chapter 12: Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy

Chapter 13: Fisheries

Chapter 14: Transport policy

Chapter 15: Energy

Chapter 16: Taxation

Chapter 17: Economic and monetary policy

Chapter 18: Statistics

Chapter 19: Social policy and employment

Chapter 20: Enterprise and industrial policy

Chapter 21: Trans-European networks

Chapter 22: Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments

Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights

Chapter 24: Justice, freedom and security

Chapter 25: Science and research

Chapter 26: Education and culture

Chapter 27: Environment

Chapter 28: Consumer and health protection

Chapter 29: Customs union

Chapter 30: External relations

Chapter 31: Foreign, security and defence policy

Chapter 32: Financial control

Chapter 33: Financial and budgetary provisions

Chapter 34 - Institutions

Chapter 35 - Other issues


Article | Reaching a U.S.-Turkish Deal in Syria: Four Steps

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Soner Cagaptay is the Beyer Family Fellow and director of the Turkish Research Program at The Washington Institute, and author of The New Sultan: Erdogan and the Crisis of Modern Turkey.

Mavi Boncuk |
POLICYWATCH 2801
Reaching a U.S.-Turkish Deal in Syria: Four Steps

Soner Cagaptay
May 12, 2017

SOURCE

Erdogan may be willing to give President Trump a free hand in Raqqa, but only if Washington supports Turkish action against the PKK in Sinjar and continues the conversation on Fethullah Gulen.

On May 16, Turkish leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan will meet with President Trump in the White House to discuss a variety of interconnected issues, including the U.S. campaign to liberate the Syrian city of Raqqa with Kurdish help and the Turkish campaign against the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). Can Washington and Ankara reach an understanding on taking Raqqa, the unofficial capital of the so-called Islamic State (IS)? The answer lies in Turkey's complicated views regarding the various Kurdish factions fighting in Syria and Iraq, among other issues. To move the conversation forward with Erdogan and strike a viable deal, the Trump administration should focus on the following four steps.

FIRST STEP: RAQQA

In gearing up for the Raqqa campaign, Washington has reportedly picked the Syrian Kurds as its main ally on the ground -- specifically the People's Defense Units (YPG) and the broader umbrella group it dominates, the Syrian Democratic Forces. The mainly Kurdish SDF appear to be the only local rebel faction capable of fielding the roughly 10,000-12,000 troops needed to take Raqqa from IS.

Yet Ankara objects to this alliance, arguing that the YPG and its political arm, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), are closely tied with the PKK, the U.S.-designated terrorist group that has waged war against the Turkish government for decades. This long-running conflict broke out into active hostilities once again after the last ceasefire collapsed in July 2015. More recently, President Erdogan sought to secure a yes vote in a close constitutional referendum last month by boosting his nationalist image, which meant further hardening his stance against Kurdish nationalism. Going forward, he will no doubt continue that strategy in order to peel off voters from the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) and increase support for the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which he rejoined on May 2. The referendum switched Turkey from a parliamentary political system headed by a prime minister to an executive system headed by a partisan president, allowing Erdogan to formalize the paramount authority that he had already been wielding in practice. Now he hopes to defeat the PKK in order to prepare the ground for an AKP victory in the 2019 parliamentary elections, which would give him de facto power over the legislative branch as well.

These considerations are deeply relevant to President Trump's calculus in Syria. While the United States can launch a YPG campaign on Raqqa without securing Turkey's blessing, Ankara might decide to play the spoiler by targeting the YPG through its Arab rebel proxies elsewhere in northern Syria. Moreover, the U.S. military likely plans on using Turkish bases, including Incirlik, to provide crucial air, logistical, and intelligence support to the YPG; losing access to these bases would force Washington to consider other, more complicated options.

SECOND STEP: SINJAR

Trump could convince Erdogan to make a deal on Raqqa by agreeing to support a potential Turkish campaign against Sinjar, an emerging PKK base that straddles the Iraq-Syria border. The PKK has long used Qandil on the Iraq-Iran border as its main base, but lately the group has been moving leadership and infrastructure to Sinjar. It is unclear whether this transfer is temporary or permanent, but it is clearly driven by events in Syria. Sinjar is much closer to Rojava, the self-declared Kurdish autonomous region in northern Syria, giving the PKK excellent lines of communication and logistics into YPG-controlled territory. And while much of Rojava is flat and therefore exposed to Turkish military action, the mountainous Sinjar area gives the PKK the advantage of rugged terrain more suited to its traditional guerrilla tactics.

Even so, Ankara has already signaled that it will not allow the PKK to establish permanent headquarters in Sinjar. Turkish forces unilaterally struck the area on April 25 and seem ready to take further action if necessary. In contrast, hitting PKK forces in Qandil would require Ankara to obtain Iran's blessing, which seems unlikely given Tehran's close ties with the PKK. Moreover, Turkey and Iran's relations have deteriorated due to their opposing stances next door: Ankara has put its muscle behind the rebels in Syria and the Kurds and Sunni Arabs in Iraq, while Tehran supports the Assad regime in Syria and the Shiite-dominated central government in Baghdad.

The Turks are also likely to opt for a Sinjar operation because of the strong support they have received from Iraq's Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), which dominates the Kurdistan Regional Government and controls the area around the Sinjar Mountains. The PKK first began moving into Sinjar in 2014 to help liberate it from IS, and the group has maintained a presence through its proxy Sinjar Resistance Units (YBS), organized among the area's original Yazidi Kurdish inhabitants. The KDP has asked the PKK to withdraw from Sinjar, invoking the example of Kobane, Syria -- KDP fighters entered that city in October 2015 to help the YPG stave off an IS assault, but they promptly left after completing their mission. To back up its stance on Sinjar, the KDP skirmished with YBS forces there in March.

During his White House visit, Erdogan will likely seek U.S. backing for a potential Turkish-KDP operation to drive the YBS and PKK out. This may mean pledging to help Ankara allay Iraqi objections to Turkish operations in Sinjar, one of several areas under dispute between Baghdad and the KRG. Such a promise could convince Erdogan to avoid actively opposing a U.S.-YPG campaign against Raqqa (though he, or his proxies, would likely still criticize the campaign in public). Overall, increased U.S. assistance against the PKK, including in the intelligence realm, would show Erdogan that he has secured a good deal with President Trump.

THIRD STEP: GULEN

For nearly a decade, Erdogan was close allies with Fethullah Gulen, a man who controls a powerful religious-political movement in Turkey and furthered the AKP's efforts to dismantle the country's secular political system. He also helped Erdogan consolidate power -- for instance, Gulen-aligned judges and police officers have locked up many political opponents, journalists, and secular military figures over the years.

Yet once the two men eliminated the military's domestic political power and took over the high courts, a raw power struggle ensued. Erdogan believes that Gulen-aligned officers formed the core of the failed 2016 coup, and the two sides have viewed each other as enemy number one ever since. Although Ankara has yet to give the United States evidence that Gulen personally ordered the coup, Erdogan is coming to Washington with this animus in mind -- particularly given Gulen's continued residence on U.S. soil. Demonstrating empathy toward Erdogan's concerns on this issue would help President Trump conclude a fruitful meeting with him, including a potential deal on Raqqa and Sinjar.

FOURTH STEP: DEMOCRACY IN TURKEY

Even if the two leaders reach an understanding on near-term military action in Syria, Turkey's deep societal polarization may prevent Erdogan from delivering on any wider bilateral bargains. After a decade-and-a-half in office, Erdogan has become the most unassailable Turkish leader since Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, but half of the country still loathes him. The April 16 constitutional referendum gave him unprecedented powers, but the unfairness of the campaign and the ballot irregularities in a very narrow vote have called into question just how much of a mandate he has to rule as omnipotent president. Erdogan has decided to push ahead regardless, and his self-declared mandate will only exacerbate Turkey's polarization. In the best-case scenario, the country is entering a permanent state of crisis, making it a less than ideal partner for the United States. Therefore, President Trump should privately encourage Erdogan to recognize Turkey's diversity and allow for broader freedoms to alleviate social tensions.

Article | The Turkey I no longer know By Fethullah Gulen

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Mavi Boncuk |
Washington Post | Opinions
The Turkey I no longer know

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. (Adem Altan/Agence France-Presse via Getty Images)
By Fethullah Gulen May 15 at 7:41 PM
Fethullah Gulen is an Islamic scholar, preacher and social advocate.

SAYLORSBURG, Pa.
As the presidents of the United States and Turkey meet at the White House on Tuesday, the leader of the country I have called home for almost two decades comes face to face with the leader of my homeland. The two countries have a lot at stake, including the fight against the Islamic State, the future of Syria and the refugee crisis.

But the Turkey that I once knew as a hope-inspiring country on its way to consolidating its democracy and a moderate form of secularism has become the dominion of a president who is doing everything he can to amass power and subjugate dissent.

The West must help Turkey return to a democratic path. Tuesday’s meeting, and the NATO summit next week, should be used as an opportunity to advance this effort.

Since July 15, following a deplorable coup attempt, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has systematically persecuted innocent people — arresting, detaining, firing and otherwise ruining the lives of more than 300,000 Turkish citizens, be they Kurds, Alevis, secularists, leftists, journalists, academics or participants of Hizmet, the peaceful humanitarian movement with which I am associated.

As the coup attempt unfolded, I fiercely denounced it and denied any involvement. Furthermore, I said that anyone who participated in the putsch betrayed my ideals. Nevertheless, and without evidence, Erdogan immediately accused me of orchestrating it from 5,000 miles away.

The next day, the government produced lists of thousands of individuals whom they tied to Hizmet — for opening a bank account, teaching at a school or reporting for a newspaper — and treated such an affiliation as a crime and began destroying their lives. The lists included people who had been dead for months and people who had been serving at NATO’s European headquarters at the time. International watchdogs have reported numerous abductions, in addition to torture and deaths in detention. The government pursued innocent people outside Turkey, pressuring Malaysia, for instance, to deport three Hizmet sympathizers last week, including a school principal who has lived there for more than a decade, to face certain imprisonment and likely torture.
In April, the president won a narrow referendum victory — amid allegations of serious fraud — to form an “executive presidency” without checks and balances, enabling him to control all three branches of the government. To be sure, through purges and corruption, much of this power was already in his hands. I fear for the Turkish people as they enter this new stage of authoritarianism.
It didn’t start this way. The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) came into power in 2002 by promising democratic reforms in pursuit of European Union membership. But as time went on, Erdogan became increasingly intolerant of dissent. He facilitated the transfer of many media outlets to his cronies through government regulatory agencies. In June of 2013, he crushed the Gezi Park protesters. In December of that year, when his cabinet members were implicated in a massive graft probe, he responded by subjugating the judiciary and the media. The “temporary” state of emergency declared after last July 15 is still in effect. According to Amnesty International, one-third of all imprisoned journalists in the world are in Turkish prisons.

Erdogan’s persecution of his people is not simply a domestic matter. The ongoing pursuit of civil society, journalists, academics and Kurds in Turkey is threatening the long-term stability of the country. The Turkish population already is strongly polarized on the AKP regime. A Turkey under a dictatorial regime, providing haven to violent radicals and pushing its Kurdish citizens into desperation, would be a nightmare for Middle East security.

The people of Turkey need the support of their European allies and the United States to restore their democracy. Turkey initiated true multiparty elections in 1950 to join NATO. As a requirement of its membership, NATO can and should demand that Turkey honor its commitment to the alliance’s democratic norms.
Two measures are critical to reversing the democratic regression in Turkey.
First, a new civilian constitution should be drafted through a democratic process involving the input of all segments of society and that is on par with international legal and humanitarian norms, and drawing lessons from the success of long-term democracies in the West.

Second, a school curriculum that emphasizes democratic and pluralistic values and encourages critical thinking must be developed. Every student must learn the importance of balancing state powers with individual rights, the separation of powers, judicial independence and press freedom, and the dangers of extreme nationalism, politicization of religion and veneration of the state or any leader.

Before either of those things can happen, however, the Turkish government must stop the repression of its people and redress the rights of individuals who have been wronged by Erdogan without due process.

I probably will not live to see Turkey become an exemplary democracy, but I pray that the downward authoritarian drift can be stopped before it is too late.


German Center GFZ on Istanbul Quake

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The GFZ German Research Centre for Geosciences, also known as GFZ Helmholtz Centre Potsdam or just GFZ, is the national research center for Earth Sciences in Germany, located on the Telegrafenberg in Potsdam, in the German federal state of Brandenburg, and is part of the Helmholtz Association of National Research Centres.

"GFZ" stands for GeoForschungsZentrum (Geo-research Centre).The seismic gap south of Istanbul

Mavi Boncuk |
 Geoscientists expect an earthquake along the North Anatolian Fault
How prone is Istanbul to Earthquake risk?

17.01.2010 | Potsdam: The chain of earthquakes along the North Anatolian fault shows a gap south of Istanbul. The expected earthquakes in this region represent an extreme danger for the Turkish megacity. A new computer study now shows that the tensions in this part of the fault zone could trigger several earthquakes instead of one individual large quake event. In the latest issue of Nature Geosciences (Nature Geoscience, vol 3, doi:10.1038/NGEO739) Tobias Hergert of the Karlsruhe Institute for Technology and Oliver Heidbach of the GFZ German Research Centre for Geosciences present the results of the computer simulation, which was developed within the framework of the CEDIM (Centre for Disaster Management and Risk Reduction Technology).project “Megacity Istanbul”. 

The Izmit-Earthquake of August 1999 resulted in 18,000 death victims and was, with a magnitude of 7.4, the most recent quake of a series, which began in 1939 to the east of Turkey and gradually ran along the plate border between the Anatolian and the Eurasian Plate from east to west. Therefore, the next quake in this series is expected to take place west of Izmit, i.e. south of Istanbul. The city has, thus, a threatening earthquake risk.

An important factor in judging seismic hazard is the movement rates of the tectonic fault. For their study Hergert and Heidbach divided the area into 640,000 elements, in order to determine, three-dimensionally, the kinetics of the fault system. “The model results show that the movement rates at the main fault are between 10 and 45% smaller than accepted to-date”, explains Oliver Heidbach of the GFZ. “In addition the movement rates vary by 40% along the main fault.” The authors interpret this variability as an indication that the built-up tension in the Earth’s crust can also unload in two or three earthquakes with a smaller magnitude rather than in one enormous quake. This, however, by no means implies an all-clear for Istanbul. The authors explicitly point out in their article that the short distance of the main fault to Istanbul still represents an extreme earthquake risk for the megacity. The fault zone is less than 20 kilometres from the city boundary, disaster precaution before the occurrence of a quake is essential.

SOURCE

Seismic gap outside of Istanbul

Seismic Risk, Turkey
Is this where the expected Marmara earthquake will originate from?
18.06.2013 | Potsdam: Earthquake researchers have now identified a 30 kilometers long and ten kilometers deep area along the North Anatolian fault zone just south of Istanbul that could be the starting point for a strong earthquake. The group of seismologists including Professor Marco Bohnhoff of the GFZ German Research Centre for Geosciences reported in the current online issue of the scientific journal Nature (Nature Communications, DOI: 10.1038/ncomms2999) that this potential earthquake source is only 15 to 20 kilometers from the historic city center of Istanbul.
The Istanbul-Marmara region of northwestern Turkey with a population of more than 15 million faces a high probability of being exposed to an earthquake of magnitude 7 or more. To better understand the processes taking place before a strong earthquake at a critically pressurized fault zone, a seismic monitoring network was built on the Princes Islands in the Sea of Marmara off Istanbul under the auspices of the Potsdam Helmholtz Centre GFZ together with the Kandilli earthquake observatory in Istanbul. The Princes Islands offer the only opportunity to monitor the seismic zone running below the seafloor from a distance of few kilometers.
The now available data allow the scientists around GFZ researcher Marco Bohnhoff to come to the conclusion that the area is locked in depth in front of the historic city of Istanbul: "The block we identified reaches ten kilometers deep along the fault zone and has displayed no seismic activity since measurements began over four years ago. This could be an indication that the expected Marmara earthquake could originate there”, says Bohnhoff.
This is also supported by the fact that the fracture zone of the last strong earthquake in the region, in 1999, ended precisely in this area - probably at the same structure, which has been impeding the progressive shift of the Anatolian plate in the south against the Eurasian plate in the north since 1766 and building up pressure. The results are also being compared with findings from other fault zones, such as the San Andreas Fault in California, to better understand the physical processes before an earthquake.
Currently, the GFZ is intensifying its activity to monitor the earthquake zone in front of Istanbul. Together with the Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency of Turkey AFAD, several 300 meter deep holes are currently being drilled around the eastern Marmara Sea, into which highly sensitive borehole seismometers will be placed. With this Geophysical borehole Observatory at the North Anatolian Fault GONAF, measurement accuracy and detection threshold for microearthquakes are improved many times over. In addition, the new data also provide insights on the expected ground motion in the event of an earthquake in the region. Bohnhoff: "Earthquake prediction is scientifically impossible. But studies such as this provide a way to better characterize earthquakes in advance in terms of location, magnitude and rupture progression, and therefore allow a better assessment of damage risk."

Marco Bohnhoff, Fatih Bulut, Georg Dresen, Peter E. Malin, Tuna Eken, Mustafa Aktar: “An earthquake gap south of Istanbul”, Nature, DOI: 10.1038/ncomms2999, 18.06.2013)

SOURCE: 

The Saracens are Coming...The Saracens are Coming...

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Premiership Rugby announced on Wednesday a new four-year deal to stage regular-season games in the US, starting, as previously reported in the Guardian, with Saracens – “the Manchester United of rugby” – against Newcastle in Philadelphia on 16 September.

Mavi Boncuk |

Saracens were founded in 1876 by the Old Boys of the Philological School in Marylebone, London (later to become St Marylebone Grammar School). The club's name is said to come from the "endurance, enthusiasm and perceived invincibility of Saladin's desert warriors of the 12th century".

The fact that their local rivals were called the Crusaders may also have been a factor. The Crescent and Star appearing in the club's emblem are reminiscent of those appearing on the flag of Ottoman.

Saracens amalgamated with neighbouring club Crusaders two years later. Nickname: Sarries, The Men in Black, Wolf Pack, Fez Boys

Recommended | Katharina Mommsen


Article | The Kurdish Path to Socialism in Syria by Fabrice Balanche

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Mavi Boncuk |

Article | The Kurdish Path to Socialism in Syria by Fabrice Balanche[1]

May 16, 2017

Source

To maintain its dominant position and stay true to its ideological roots, the PYD is pushing socialist policies on a skeptical Rojava populace, with uncertain consequences for the future of the Syrian Kurdish zone.

In northern Syria, the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) aims to promote a political and economic system based on self-sufficiency and local democracy. Yet a closer look at the measures being implemented reveals a clear effort to apply the anti-capitalist ideology of Abdullah Ocalan, leader of the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK). It remains unclear whether this ideology is compatible with local economic conditions, however, and Kurdish authorities might resort to full normalization with the Assad regime instead if key stakeholders resist.

OCALAN AND "LIBERTARIAN MUNICIPALISM"


Ocalan has written a series of books proposing a societal model for the Kurdish people. His "Ocalanism" was directly inspired by American social theorist Murray Bookchin, a radical leftist who wanted to break down capitalism through "libertarian municipalism." Bookchin believed that capitalism's fatal flaw lay in its conflict with nature -- that is, by destroying the environment, capitalism will inevitably create a major crisis and consume itself. In his first book on radical ecology, he recommended the decentralization of polluted metropolitan centers and pesticide-ridden industrial farms so that people could live on a smaller scale, produce their food locally, use renewable energy, and manage their own affairs.

On the latter front, he recommended democratizing urban neighborhoods by empowering citizen assemblies. These assemblies could then confederate at different levels: city, region, former nation, and so forth. They would send delegates to confederal councils to coordinate and administer policy. Power would be based among the people, who would be directly represented at the top. In time, he theorized, confederal municipalities would become a counterweight to the nation-state and capitalism would naturally disappear. Municipalities would expropriate major economic resources and "municipalize" the economy, which the community would take possession of.

Bookchin's model is close to Maoism, Ocalan's principal early source of inspiration. Unsurprisingly, the PKK leader became Bookchin's ideological disciple in 2004 after reading several of his works. A year later, at the group's 2005 congress, he made "libertarian municipalism" the official PKK political ideology.

COMMUNES AS BASE POLITICAL UNITS

The PYD seeks to implement Ocalan's municipalist principles in northern Syria. Although the party does not officially plan to build a Kurdish state or even an autonomous area there, it does seek to create a democratic and ecologically responsible society within the framework of a federal system.

In 2013, the PYD began to administer territories under its control by establishing the Movement for a Democratic Society (TEV-DEM), a coalition of civil associations and political parties such as the PYD, the Syriac Union Party (SUP), the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Peace Party (PADKS), and the Kurdistan Liberal Union Party (PYLK). The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Syria (PDK-S) and other members of the Syrian Kurdish National Council (ENKS) are not part of TEV-DEM; rather, they are regarded as political enemies.

In November 2013, TEV-DEM announced the creation of its own autonomous administration: Rojava, which is divided into three cantons, Jazira ("Cizire" in Kurdish), Kobane, and Afrin. At the head of each canton is a Kurdish prime minister assisted by two vice prime ministers, most of whom are non-Kurdish (e.g., Sunni Arab or Christian). Although the PYD is an avowedly Kurdish party pursuing a clear ethnosectarian policy, Rojava's prime ministers are careful to respect diversity.

The three cantons are supposed to be governed by an elected assembly that controls Rojava's executive bureau, but elections have not yet taken place. TEV-DEM scheduled them for an unspecified day in 2017, contrary to Bookchin's model of creating municipalities that elect delegates to confederal councils. In Rojava, such municipalities are known as communes ("komun" in Kurdish), each containing roughly 150 houses and around a thousand inhabitants. An elected communal council manages relations between individual villages and the established authorities who still run local public services such as water and electricity, since the administrative framework of the prewar municipalities has not disappeared. Ideally, new municipalities would arise naturally from the communes, but in reality the new and old structures exist in parallel. The communes deliver certificates to the population for bread and fuel at low prices; they also supervise the local community and participate in its political education. This corresponds roughly with the village "committees" of Communist China.

In addition, Rojava's communes are supposed to organize economic life by promoting cooperatives. In the countryside, farmers are organized in groups of fifteen and asked to work together and exchange surplus production with other cooperatives, including in the cities. This practice is in line with the goal of designing communes to be self-sufficient, with the eventual aim of eliminating traders and money while establishing a bartering system.

Yet skepticism is warranted about the principles behind these measures and their application on the ground. Until recently, the war's economic disruption pushed Rojava's population to organize a subsistence economy, and the Kurdish zone's isolation created practical reasons to favor self-sufficiency. Yet now that overland links are reopening, this policy can only be justified on the ideological level.

INCOMPATIBLE WITH ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION
In the agricultural sector, the new authorities in Jazira want to reduce the canton's share of cereals and cotton, the main crops produced in the area, in order to make room for activities that would make local communities more self-sufficient in feeding themselves, such as market gardening and arboriculture. To effect this change, large estates and public lands need to be entrusted to the population and organized in cooperatives. Yet the people seem unlikely to embrace this new economic system. The TEV-DEM program could seduce the landless peasants of Jazira, to whom the PYD plans to distribute former public domains, but it is unpalatable to existing owner-farmers, who would no doubt prefer to continue working individually. Moreover, market gardening requires much greater personal investment than cereal farming, which is hardly compatible with the collectivist spirit the PYD has sought to inculcate.

Meanwhile, industry is almost absent from all of the cantons, mainly because the Assad regime preferred to keep things that way for "security reasons." For instance, only two cotton mills were built in the Hasaka area of Jazira. This means Rojava authorities will not have to nationalize any factories -- but only because such facilities are nonexistent. To fill this gap and meet local needs, they would like to develop agro-food and manufacturing industries. They might also try to make fuller use of local oil resources (estimated at 150,000 barrels per day in 2011), which would require foreign investment.

Yet attracting investors into such an anti-capitalist system would be difficult. Entrepreneurship is encouraged in Rojava, but only within the framework of cooperatives. Similarly, engineers and technicians are needed to work for the "revolution," but individuals who have the necessary degrees and training tend to leave Rojava because salaries are too low there. Moreover, many young men fear conscription and prefer to take refuge in Iraq. The middle classes in particular are experiencing this demographic hemorrhage, since liberal professionals and entrepreneurs are largely excluded from the economic system currently being set up.

REVEALING ROJAVA'S RELATIONS WITH DAMASCUS

The application of Ocalan's theories is still modest in Rojava's economic sphere, as the PYD is aware that it risks alienating a large part of the population, especially those who only rallied to the group for fear of the Islamic State. The reopening of land communications with the Assad regime zone in western Syria is encouraging a return to the lucrative exportation of cereals and cotton. Moreover, manufactured goods from the regime zone will likely flood Rojava markets before any local production could develop. Accordingly, local authorities may resort to protectionism to defend the cantons economically, perhaps by imposing tariffs and cutting off the western Syrian market.

If the PYD's cooperative economic system fails due to these pressures, the party would have two choices: coercing locals into accepting Ocalan's theories, or declaring a "pause" in implementation due to wartime circumstances, much like Vladimir Lenin did with the Soviet Union's New Economic Policy in 1920. In the first case, the "communalization" of Rojava's economy would entail the expropriation of property belonging to certain social groups, namely, constituencies that are deemed opponents of the PYD. This property would then be redistributed to the party's own base with the objective of strengthening its influence and eliminating the Assad regime's. Such efforts would also indicate a separatist mindset, despite the federal model the PYD has been outwardly promoting.

In the second case, a "pause" in economic collectivization would likely spur the PYD to renounce its intention of changing Rojava society and agree to normalize relations with Damascus. The Kurdish cantons would then be reinstated in the Syrian economic space and the impediments to private initiative lifted. Whichever approach the party chooses, the local population -- Kurdish and non-Kurdish -- will be more inclined to accept the pursuit of some form of autonomy if their living conditions improve.

[1] Fabrice Balanche, an associate professor and research director at the University of Lyon 2, is a visiting fellow at The Washington Institute.

Balanche, who also directs the Research Group on the Mediterranean and the Middle East (GREMMO), has spent ten years in Lebanon and Syria, his main areas of study, since first engaging in fieldwork in the region in 1990. Today, he is frequently called upon as an expert consultant on Middle East development issues and the Syrian crisis. His publications include Geopolitics of the Middle East (2014, in French), Atlas of the Arab Near East (2012, in French and Arabic), and the book version of his thesis, The Alawite Region and Syrian Power (2006, in French). Balanche holds a doctorate in geography from the University of Tours (2000).

EDUCATION


PhD, geography, University of Tours; MA, geography, University of Tours; BA, geography and history, University of Besançon

See also: 
The Lines That Bind: 100 Years of Sykes-Picot
December 19, 2016 | Policy Focus

Syrian Kurds as a U.S. Ally:November 18, 2016 | Policy Focus

Cannes 2017 |Turkish Stand in Film Market

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Mavi Boncuk | 


Turkey’s Ministry of Culture and Tourism commissioned the Ankara Cinema Association to run the Turkish stand at the 70th Cannes Film Festival, which will be held between May 17-28, 2016. Three separate catalogs will be produced in English, one for short films and documentaries, one for full-length features and the other for film companies and film festivals, the objective being to promote Turkish cinema. Separately, DVD of selected shorts and short documentaries will compiled. 


YouTube Acquires Turkish Street Cats Documentary Film ‘Kedi’ for YouTube Red

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Mavi Boncuk |
YouTube has acquired exclusive streaming rights to “Kedi,” a heartwarming and critically acclaimed documentary film about the stray cats in Istanbul, to be available next month on its YouTube Red subscription service.

“Kedi” will debut on YouTube Red on May 10, while it will continue its theatrical run in select locations throughout the year. YouTube reached the distribution deal with Oscilloscope Laboratories. The film has grossed $2.4 million to date in the U.S., per Box Office Mojo, making it the third-highest-grossing foreign-language documentary ever (behind 2010’s “Babies” and Wim Wenders’ dance documentary “Pina”).

The film, which premiered at the 2016 Istanbul Independent Film Festival, was produced by Termite Films’ Ceyda Torun and Charlie Wuppermann. Torun also serves as the film’s director and Wuppermann as the cinematographer. The film was executive produced by Thomas Podstawski and Gregor Kewel.

“Kedi” (which means “cat” in Turkish) takes viewers on a cat’s-eye journey through the winding streets of Istanbul, inviting the audience to experience the communal approach of the residents who care for the cats while allowing them to retain their independence. The seven cats featured in the film are: Sari (“The Hustler”), Duman (“The Gentleman”), Bengü (“The Lover”), Aslan Parçasi (“The Hunter”), Gamsiz (“The Player”), Psikopat (“The Psycho”), and Deniz (“The Social Butterfly”).

“We know the YouTube audience has a never-ending fascination with all things cats,” said Susanne Daniels, YouTube’s global head of original content. “Ceyda Torun and Charlie Wuppermann’s visually stunning documentary featuring seven charismatic felines navigating the streets of Istanbul has resonated with theatergoers around the world, and it has all the right elements to be incredibly popular on YouTube Red.”

YouTube Red, which costs $9.99 per month, provides ad-free access to YouTube, YouTube Music, YouTube Gaming and YouTube Kids as well as access to original series and movies. The service is currently available in the U.S., Australia, New Zealand, Mexico and South Korea.

Book | Central Asia in World History

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Mavi Boncuk |

Central Asia in World History (New Oxford World History) 1st Edition, Kindle Edition
by Peter B. Golden[1]

A vast region stretching roughly from the Volga River to Manchuria and the northern Chinese borderlands, Central Asia has been called the "pivot of history," a land where nomadic invaders and Silk Road traders changed the destinies of states that ringed its borders, including pre-modern Europe, the Middle East, and China. In Central Asia in World History, Peter B. Golden provides an engaging account of this important region, ranging from prehistory to the present, focusing largely on the unique melting pot of cultures that this region has produced over millennia. Golden describes the traders who braved the heat and cold along caravan routes to link East Asia and Europe; the Mongol Empire of Chinggis Khan and his successors, the largest contiguous land empire in history; the invention of gunpowder, which allowed the great sedentary empires to overcome the horse-based nomads; the power struggles of Russia and China, and later Russia and Britain, for control of the area. Finally, he discusses the region today, a key area that neighbors such geopolitical hot spots as Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and China.

ISBN-13: 978-0195338195 ISBN-10: 0195338197 [1] Peter Benjamin Golden (born 1941) is Professor Emeritus of History, Turkish and Middle Eastern Studies at Rutgers University. He is the author of a wide array of books, articles and other written works on Turkic and Central Asian Studies. A native of New York City, he grew up in Washington Heights and graduated from Music & Art High School.

He was Director of the Middle Eastern Studies Program (2008-2011) and retired from Rutgers University in 2012. He earned his bachelor's degree from CUNY Queens College in 1963 and his M.A. and PhD in History from Columbia University in 1968 and 1970, respectively. Golden also studied at the Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi in Ankara (1967-1968). He is an honorary member of the Türk Dil Kurumu and Kőrösi Csoma Társaság/Csoma de Kőrös Society of Hungarian Orientalists and was a member of the School of Historical Studies at the Institute for Advanced Study (Princeton) 2005-2006.

EU Watch | MAM is In...or Not In

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Mavi Boncuk | 

EU Watch | MAM is In...or Not In
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