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Ottoman Defence Against the ANZAC Landing by Mesut Uyar

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Ottoman Defence Against the ANZAC Landing
Paperback Australian Army Campaigns 
By Mesut Uyar[1] 

Paperback | 188 pages 
ISBN10 1925275019 

ISBN13 9781925275018

Publication date 31 Mar 2016 
Publisher Big Sky Publishing Publication 
Newport, NSW, Australia 

    
The landing at Gallipoli on 25 April 1915 represents a defining moment, not only for Australia and New Zealand, but also for Turkey. However a detailed account of the landing from the Turkish perspective has yet to be published in English despite the 100 years that has elapsed since the first ANZACs scrambled ashore. Descriptions of the Ottoman forces such as the composition of units, the men who commanded them, their weapons, capabilities and reactions to the ANZAC invasion have generally remained undocumented or described in piecemeal fashion based on secondary sources. The lack of a Turkish perspective has made it almost impossible to construct a balanced account of the events of that fateful April day. 

The Ottoman Defence against the Anzac Landing: 25 April 1915 seeks to redress this imbalance, portraying the Ottoman experience based on previously unpublished Ottoman and Turkish sources. This meticulously researched volume describes the Ottoman Army in fascinating detail from its order of battle, unit structure and composition, training and doctrine to the weapons used against the ANZACs. Using Ottoman military documents, regimental war diaries, personal accounts and memoirs, author Mesut Uyar describes the unfolding campaign, unravelling its complexity and resolving many of the questions that have dogged accounts for a century. This valuable chronicle will enhance readers' understanding of the Ottoman war machine, its strengths and weaknesses and why it proved so successful in containing the Allied invasion. Detailed maps and photographs published for the first time add clarity and portray many of the men the ANZACs referred to with grudging respect as `Johnny Turk'.

A Military History of the Ottomans : From Osman to Ataturk
Hardback Praeger Security International 
By  Mesut Uyar, Edward J. Erickson
  
The Ottoman Army had a significant effect on the history of the modern world and particularly on that of the Middle East and Europe. This study, written by a Turkish and an American scholar, is a revision and corrective to western accounts because it is based on Turkish interpretations, rather than European interpretations, of events. As the world's dominant military machine from 1300 to the mid-1700's, the Ottoman Army led the way in military institutions, organizational structures, technology, and tactics. In decline thereafter, it nevertheless remained a considerable force to be counted in the balance of power through 1918. From its nomadic origins, it underwent revolutions in military affairs as well as several transformations which enabled it to compete on favorable terms with the best of armies of the day. This study tracks the growth of the Ottoman Army as a professional institution from the perspective of the Ottomans themselves, by using previously untapped Ottoman source materials. Additionally, the impact of important commanders and the role of politics, as these affected the army, are examined.
The study concludes with the Ottoman legacy and its effect on the Republic and modern Turkish Army. This is a study survey that combines an introductory view of this subject with fresh and original reference-level information. Divided into distinct periods, Uyar and Erickson open with a brief overview of the establishment of the Ottoman Empire and the military systems that shaped the early military patterns. The Ottoman army emerged forcefully in 1453 during the siege of Constantinople and became a dominant social and political force for nearly two hundred years following Mehmed's capture of the city. When the army began to show signs of decay during the mid-seventeenth century, successive Sultans actively sought to transform the institution that protected their power. The reforms and transformations that began frist in 1606successfully preserved the army until the outbreak of the Ottoman-Russian War in 1876. Though the war was brief, its impact was enormous as nationalistic and republican strains placed increasing pressure on the Sultan and his army until, finally, in 1918, those strains proved too great to overcome.
By 1923, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk emerged as the leader of a unified national state ruled by a new National Parliament. As Uyar and Erickson demonstrate, the old army of the Sultan had become the army of the Republic, symbolizing the transformation of a dying empire to the new Turkish state make clear that throughout much of its existence, the Ottoman Army was an effective fighting force with professional military institutions and organizational structures.


[1] Graduate of Turkish Military Academy in 1991. Got MA on politics and Ph.D. on international relations from Faculty of Political Sciences Istanbul University. Specialized on war studies, particularly on operations other than war. As a career officers he served at platoon leader and company and battalion  commander positions in various infantry units and several tours of peace support operations duties as military observer at UN mission in Georgia and as staff officer in Afghanistan. He served as assistant professor of international relations at the Turkish Military Academy for ten years. He was also the curator of the Military Academy Archive and Museum Division for five years  where he started his research about Ottoman military history. He spent one year as an instructor and academic advisor at the Peace Support Training Center in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He is currently working as an associate professor of Ottoman military history at the University of New South Wales, Canberra.

Books
Uyar M, 2015, The Ottoman Defence Against The Anzac Landing 25 April 1915, Australian Army History Unit,, Canberra

Uyar M; Erickson EJ, 2009, A Military History of the Ottomans From Osman to Atatürk, ABC-CLIO

Book Chapters
Uyar M, 2015, 'Peacekeeping', in Baker D (ed.), Key Concepts in Military Ethics, UNSW Press New South, Sydney, pp. 163 - 168

Uyar M, 2015, 'Ottoman strategy and war aims during the first world war', in The Purpose of the First World War: War Aims and Military Strategies, pp. 163 - 185

Uyar M, 2006, 'An American Military Observer of Turkish Independence War: Charles Wellington Furlong', in A Bridge Between Cultures: Studies on Ottoman and Republican Turkey in Memory of Ali Ihsan Bağış, Isis Press, istanbul, pp. 179 - 191, http://www.theisispress.org/book.html,2006_1

Journal articles
Uyar M, 2016, 'Who Called for a Ceasefire? Gallipoli 1915', Wartime, vol. 73, pp. 54 - 59

Uyar M; Güvenç S, 2016, 'One Battle and Two Accounts:The Turkish Brigade at Kunu-ri in November 1950', The Journal of Military History, vol. 80, pp. 1117 - 1147

Uyar M, 2016, 'Remembering the Gallipoli campaign: Turkish official military historiography, war memorials and contested ground', First World War Studies, pp. 1 - 27, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19475020.2016.1234965

Uyar M, 2015, 'The Ottoman Empire and the Early Modern World', Agora, vol. 50, pp. 22 - 28

Uyar M, 2013, 'Ottoman Arab officers between nationalism and loyalty during the first world war', War in History, vol. 20, pp. 526 - 544, http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0968344513494658

Uyar M; Varoğlu AK, 2008, 'In Search of Modernity and Rationality', Armed Forces & Society, vol. 35, pp. 180 - 202, http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0095327x07312085

Conference Papers
Uyar M, (eds.), 2016, 'Ottoman Third Corps in Crisis: Easd Pasha', in Experience of a Lifetime: People, Personalities and Leaders in the First World War, Massey University Press, Massey University, Wellington, New Zealand, pp. 43 - 59, presented at The Experience of a Lifetime: People, Personalities and Leaders in the First World War, Massey University, Wellington, New Zealand, 22 - 24 August 2014

Uyar M, 2012, 'With the Germans in Afghanistan: A Turkish Staff Officer's Experiences during the Foundation of Kabul Multi-National Brigade', in Auftrag Auslandseinsatz: Neueste Militargeschichte an der Schnittstelle von Geschictswissenschaft, Politik, Offentlichkeit und Streitkraften, Rombach Verlag, Potsdam, Germany, pp. 251 - 262, presented at 52. Internationale Tagung fur Militargeschichte, Potsdam, Germany, 26 - 28 September 2011

Uyar M, (eds.), 2008, 'The Impact of Asymmetric Warfare on the Military Profession and Structure: Lessons Learned from the Ottoman Military', in Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution: Sociological Perspectives, Emerald, Durban, South Africa, pp. 49 - 60, presented at “The Quality of Social Existence in a Globalising World”, XVI ISA World Congress, Durban, South Africa, 23 - 29 July 2006, http://books.emeraldinsight.com/display.asp?K=9781848551220

Uyar M, (ed.), 2005, 'A UN Type Conflict Management: Dilemmas of Military Observer Missions in the Example of UNOMIG', in Military Missions and Their Implications Reconsidered: the Aftermath of September 11th, Elsevier, Ankara-Turkey, pp. 583 - 594, presented at ISA/RC01 Interim Conference, Ankara-Turkey, 07 - 09 July 2004

Other
Uyar M, "Crimean War, Balkan Operations" in War in the Balkans: An Enyclopedic History

Uyar M, "Greco-Ottoman War, 1897" in War in the Balkans: An Encyclopedic History

Uyar M, "Kumanovo, Battle of, 1912" in War in the Balkans: An Encyclopedic History

Uyar M, "Ottoman Counterinsurgency Operations in the Balkans and Crete" in War in the Balkans: An Encyclopedic History

Uyar M, "Sarkoy and Bolayir, Battle of 1913" in War in the Balkans: An Encyclopedic History


Uyar M, "Shipka Pass, Battles of 1877-1878" in War in the Balkans: An Encyclopedic History


Yashim Cooks Istanbul: Culinary Adventures in the Ottoman Kitchen

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Mavi Boncuk |

Yashim Cooks Istanbul: Culinary Adventures in the Ottoman Kitchen 2016

By Jason Goodwin[1]

Hardback | 224 pages
Publication date 17 Nov 2016
Argonaut Books
Bridport, United Kingdom
ISBN10 0957254016
ISBN13 9780957254015
   
Inspired by recipes in Jason Goodwin's bestselling historical Investigator Yashim series, Yashim Cooks Istanbul evokes the colors and flavors of the Ottoman world, combining Turkish recipes, illustrations and tempting descriptions from the novels.

Yashim Cooks Istanbul covers the full spectrum of Turkish cookery, from simple meze and vegetable dishes to meat, fish and puddings. Good in the kitchen, good on the table, it will draw the reader into the extraordinary atmosphere of old Istanbul. Imagine you could step back into Yashim's world. Imagine that the flavours and colours of old Istanbul could come to life. Yashim Cooks Istanbul is about time travel - and you don't have to leave your kitchen to make the trip!

Fans of the series have been asking for this book ever since Yashim made his first appearance in The Janissary Tree (2006), winner of the Edgar Award for Best Novel. 

As The Guardian wrote: "A Yashim cookery book would be an appetising prospect." 

[1] Novelist, traveller and historian, Jason Goodwin lives in England and writes the 'Spectator' column for Country Life. He has written about tea, walking 2000 miles to Istanbul, and his 'Lords of the Horizons: A History of the Ottoman Empire', was described by Jan Morris as 'a high-octane work of art'. Time Out called it 'perhaps the most readable history ever written on anything'. 
His Istanbul-based series of historical thrillers began with The Janissary Tree, winner of the Edgar Award for Best Novel. Translated into over 40 languages, the five-novel series now has its own illustrated cookbook, YASHIM COOKS ISTANBUL: Culinary Adventures in the Ottoman Kitchen. 
Jason's a member of the Guild of Food Writers and sits on the committee of Headread, the annual Estonian literary festival.

Two Books by Michael Provence

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The Last Ottoman Generation and the Making of the Modern Middle East
by Michael Provence

Format Paperback | 314 pages
Publication date 06 Mar 2019
Publisher CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
Cambridge, United Kingdom

ISBN10 0521747511
ISBN13 9780521747516

The modern Middle East emerged out of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, when Britain and France partitioned the Ottoman Arab lands into several new colonial states. The following period was a charged and transformative time of unrest. Insurgent leaders, trained in Ottoman military tactics and with everything to lose from the fall of the Empire, challenged the mandatory powers in a number of armed revolts. This is a study of this crucial period in Middle Eastern history, tracing the period through popular political movements and the experience of colonial rule. In doing so, Provence emphasises the continuity between the late Ottoman and Colonial era, explaining how national identities emerged, and how the seeds were sown for many of the conflicts which have defined the Middle East in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. This is a valuable read for students of Middle Eastern history and politics. 


The Great Syrian Revolt and the Rise of Arab Nationalism
Format Paperback | 223 pages
Publication date 30 Aug 2005
Publisher University of Texas Press
Austin, TX, United States

ISBN10 0292706804
ISBN13 9780292706804
  
The Great Syrian Revolt of 1925 was the largest and longest-lasting anti-colonial insurgency in the inter-war Arab East. Mobilizing peasants, workers, and army veterans, rather than urban elites and nationalist intellectuals, it was the first mass movement against colonial rule in the Middle East. The revolt failed to liberate Syria from French occupation, but it provided a model of popular nationalism and resistance that remains potent in the Middle East today. Each subsequent Arab uprising against foreign rule has repeated the language and tactics of the Great Syrian Revolt.


In this work, Michael Provence uses newly released secret colonial intelligence sources, neglected memoirs, and popular memory to tell the story of the revolt from the perspective of its participants. He shows how Ottoman-subsidized military education created a generation of leaders of modest background who came to rebel against both the French Mandate rulers of Syria and the Syrian intellectuals and landowners who helped the colonial regime to function. This new popular nationalism was unprecedented in the Arab world. Provence shows compellingly that the Great Syrian Revolt was a formative event in shaping the modern Middle East.


[1] Michael Provence teaches modern Middle East history. He received the Ph.D. from the University of Chicago in 2001. During 2017-2018 he will be  Chercheur Résident (Research Fellow in Residence),  Institut d’Etudes Avancées de Nantes, France.  In 2010-11 and 2014 Provence was an Alexander von Humboldt fellow at the Zentrum Moderner Orient in Berlin, Germany.
He is the author of two books: The Great Syrian Revolt and the Rise of Arab Nationalism (2005). Also in Arabic. And The Last Ottoman Generation and the Making of the Modern Middle East (2017)

His research focuses on the Ottoman, colonial, and post-colonial Arab world. 


Provence lived and studied over the course of many years in several Middle Eastern countries, particularly Syria and Lebanon between 1998 and 2006. He returns as often as possible.

EU Watch | Turkey's High Election Board Schedules a Re-run.

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Mavi Boncuk |

President Erdogan's party had lodged a complaint and demanded the rerun of the neck-and-neck race in the metropolis and on Monday the Turkey's High Election Board (YSK) has set June 23 for a re-run of local elections in Istanbul. Turkey's election board members accepted the AK Party's objection on Monday with seven votes in favour and four votes against, state-run Anadolu news agency reported.

Re-run of Istanbul election set for June 23: AK Party. 

According to the final tally announced by the provincial election board on April 17, Imamoglu secured the mayoral seat with 4,169,765 votes, while the AK Party's Binali Yildrim received 4,156,036 votes - a difference of 13,729 votes.

Istanbul's mayorship has been controlled by the AK Party for the last 15 years. Erdogan was also the mayor of Istanbul between 1994 and 1998. 

10 Books on Balkan Cooking

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Serbian Cooking : Popular Recipes from the Balkan Region
By Danijela Kracun, Charles McFadden
SBN10 0764347608
ISBN13 9780764347603
   
Fifty-three recipes make up this Eastern European cookbook. Inside, find all types of traditional Serbian fare, including potato salad, lentil soup, and an assortment of pita dishes, as well as sauces and a multitude of delectable desserts, such as creme puffs, baklava, and crepes. Most Serbian cooking traditions are intertwined with the cultures of its neighboring countries. So, don't be surprised if some of these dishes seem similar to some of your own family's traditional recipes. Also, be prepared for some differences. In Serbia, lunch is the biggest meal of the day, while dinner happens to be the lightest, typically focusing on merely cold cuts and bread. Throw in an afternoon snack of a baked pastry and coffee and consider yourself a convert! Many of the recipes are vegetarian, but feel free to add your choice of meat to any dish. 

Ultimate Balkan Cookbook : Top 35 Balkan Dishes That You Can Cook Right Now
By  Slavka Bodic
ISBN10 1981045694
ISBN13 9781981045693
    
Learn to how cook DELICIOUS Balkan recipes!Sarma, musaka and original kajmak recipes inside!

Within these pages, you will learn 35 authentic recipes from a Balkan cook. These are not ordinary recipes you'd find on the Internet, but recipes that were closely guarded by Balkan mothers and passed down from generation to generation. Main dishes, Appetizers and Desserts included!

If you want to learn how to make homemade musaka, sarma (stuffed cabbage rolls), Croatian green peas stew and 32 other authentic Balkan recipes, then start with our book! Also, I reveal the best homemade versions of kajmak west of Serbia! Kajmak is a delicious butter cheese cream spread that is a staple at Balkan tables.

Within this book, you'll learn 20 different Balkan main dishes includings my fantastic Sarmic od zelja (green rolls), Bosanski Ionac (Bosnian pot stew), prebranac (Serbian baked beans) in addition to other Balkan favorites. 9 different types of appetizers and 5 different desserts including authentic Baklava and gibanica (our Queen of Pies)!

Main Dishes Appetizers and Breakfast Desserts
Bonus - How to make "modern" homemade kajmak!35 authentic and delicious recipes you can cook right now!

I've gathered my best Balkan recipes to transform you into a Balkan chef! As I wrote each recipe, I smiled remembering all the nice moments eating these dishes over the years.


Romanian, Bulgarian and Balkan : 70 Traditional Dishes from the Heart of Eastern Europe
By Lesley Chamberlain,Trish Davis
ISBN10 0754815862
ISBN13 9780754815860
   
This outstanding volume on the food and cooking of Romania, Bulgaria and the East Adriatic region presents a collection of recipes from a fascinating and undiscovered culinary world, in which shellfish, summer fruits and vegetables are transformed with fresh herbs and spices into piquant dishes with a variety of different tastes and textures. The fertile soil and temperate climate of the Balkan region produce a rich harvest of ingredients, which combine with the influence of Mediterranean, Middle Eastern and European styles of cooking to create a distinctive cuisine. An informative introduction illustrated with maps and photographs gives the background and history of the region's cooking, and describes the unusual ingredients that make it so unique. This is followed by the recipes, more than 70 dishes ranging from soups and appetizers, through meat, fish, vegetables, and pasta, to desserts and baked goods. All are explained step-by-step and accompanied by photographs of every stage of the process and a beautiful picture of the finished dish.

This comprehensive guide to the food and cooking of a largely unexplored cuisine presents a superb group of recipes full of surprises, ranging from fiery chillies to delicate rose petals, offering unusual and inspiring dishes for any occasion. This book will be an unexpected treasure in any cookbook collection.

The Balkan Cookbook : Traditional Cooking from Romania, Bulgaria and the Balkan Countries 
By Trish Davies , Volume editor Catherine Atkinson , Edited by Lesley Chamberlain 
ISBN10 184215107X 
ISBN13 9781842151075 More than 70 recipes exploring the cuisines of Romania, Bulgaria and the former Yugoslavia, including soups and apppetizers, meat and poultry. 

Balkan Comfort Food : Home Cooking from the Heart
By Jas Brechtl
ISBN10 1534789405
ISBN13 9781534789401
   
Get over 50 flavorful recipes with mouthwatering photos of favorite dishes from the Balkan region. Whether you are familiar with this cuisine or not, here you will find a dish that you’ll fall in love with, guaranteed! Discover the mix of flavors from Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, Kosovo, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, and European Turkey. 

Chef Baba Cookbook : Eastern European Cuisine
By Miroslava Perge, Damir Perge
   
Chef Baba, the 85-year-old Eastern European grandmother living in America, teaches her charming and funny son Damir how to cook in her YouTube series Chef Baba TV. It quickly becomes obvious that Damir has never lifted a finger to cook -- but why should he when Baba is a master chef? Due to popular demand from Chef Baba's fans, Damir finally got off of his smartphone to help his mother publish her legendary cooking secrets. 

Chef Baba's authentic, old world recipes were handed down for generations in Baba's family. This book contains the secrets to preparing classic Eastern European cuisine including Gibanica, Sarma, Meat Crepes, Lepinjice, Krofne, Keks Torta, plus many more! 

Dalmatia : Recipes from Croatia's Mediterranean Coast
By Ino Kuvacic
ISBN10 1743792557
ISBN13 9781743792551
   
At its heart, Dalmatian cuisine is frugal, honest and rustic, with distinctive flavours, including silver beet, varenik (grape molasses) and prosek (Dalmatian fortified wine) that give it an identity all of its own. Similar to Greek and Italian food, fish, seafood, tomatoes and olives reign and the foundation of most dishes is good quality produce grown in pure, clean earth and treated simply. Some dishes include the famous Dubrovnick creme caramel, Rozata, Brujet (Dalmatian fish stew) and pasticada, a slow-cooked beef cheek with prunes, apples and potato dumplings.

In his first book, Dalmatia, Ino Kuvacic brings us over 100 authentic Croatian dishes.

With chapters covering vegetables and salads, meat dishes, fish and seafood and sweets, the book reveals authentic recipes and cherished food traditions of this little-known part of Europe - the spectacular Dalmatian coast. It is a region defined by the sea, and its cuisine has evolved from the a long and complex history that has brought many foreign influences both to its shores and its food.

Accompanied by stunning local photography of both this beautiful region and the culinary experiences and traditions it offers, Dalmatia will transport you to the sparkling coastline of Croatia from your own kitchen.

The Lost Chef: Hajro Dizdar and the art of Bosnian Cooking 
by Leila Chalk (Author), Andrew Chalk (Photographer)
ISBN-10: 0648073807
ISBN-13: 978-0648073802

Written by his niece, this is a story about a Chef who got lost in a war and the recipes he was famous for. 

This book is Bosnian cooking made modern and simple, with easy to follow instructions, and a paddock to plate philosophy. 

Learn how to make regional favourites to tantalise your family and guests. 

It also offers a glimpse into the life of one man, the food he fed his family, and tells, with refreshing honesty, the story of a region blighted by war.


Leila Chalk nee Lejla Bošnjak is a lawyer and a cook. She is the child of two worlds, having been born in Australia, she grew up in Bosnia from 1986 till mid 1994. Her family, including our Chef, moved as refugees, mostly in camps, for the entirety of the war; Bosanksa Gradiška, Banja Luka, Zagreb, Novi Travnik, Travnik, Bugojno. In 1994, Leila and her immediate family escaped the war and lived in a detention camp in Varaždin, Croatia, for fifteen months. A further two years of international post refugee re-settlement dramas in Australia and Bosnia, before they finally settled in Melbourne, Australia, in late 1997. There, Leila studied, loved, laughed, cooked, and finally, wrote.

Cooking in Croatia & Bosnia: 425 Croatian and Bosnian Recipes
by Karmela Kis
ISBN-10: 1419620010
ISBN-13: 978-1419620010 


Recipes range from appetizers, to soups and main courses, and naturally, deserts. With an aim to restore the joy of cooking in the American kitchen, some of the delectable recipes presented include catfish in cream, eggplant mousaka, goose stuffed with chestnuts, and a host other mouth watering offerings ready for your table.

The Balkan Cookbook
by Vladimir Mirodan 
ISBN-10: 0882897381
ISBN-13: 978-0882897387

How would one begin to prepare such Balkan delights as chorba, cashcaval, borsh, ghiveci, and papanashi? 

Vladimir Mirodan, a native Romanian, introduces the reader to a world of cooking primarily unknown to the West.

The cuisine of Romania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia is derived from a culture that evolved along the Danube River--at a crossroads where French, Russian, and Eastern influences meet. It is a tantalizingly unique cuisine, as the author
demonstrates through 180 authentic recipes based on traditional Balkan ingredients.

Actor-director Mirodan is a lifelong gourmet committed to the promotion of his native region's imaginative cooking. He has drawn recipes from family and friends, as well as from a well-established personal collection, and offers such delicacies as: Peppers Filled with Aubergine Caviar; Mushrooms with Fetta Cheese and Herbs; Salads with Bulgarian Yoghurt Dressing; Chorba with Meat Balls; Chicken Terrine in Garlic Aspic; Marinaded Trout; Braised Lamb with
Spinach; and Beef Stew with Quinces. To complement the full array of recipes, Mirodan provides a brief history of Balkan cooking. He is dedicated to its preservation, but notes that changes in Balkan society could mean the eventual extinction of this cuisine. His emphasis is understandably on his native Romania, which he describes as "an enclave of Latin indulgence in a sea of Slav earthiness."



In this complete entertaining guide, Mirodan also offers full Balkan menus, along with an index of appropriate wines and spirits.

6th Fleet | Historical Documents

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Mavi Boncuk | From Mavi Boncuk Files








Turkish Labor Party | Call For Election Registration

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Mavi Boncuk | 
Source: Mavi Boncuk Files

"Yeter! Söz Milletindir!" | Turkish Posting on Selçuk Milar

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Mavi Boncuk |

Selçuk Milar (1917 - 21 Şubat 1991), İstanbul'da doğdu. Robert College'den sağlık nedenleri ile ayrılmak zorunda kalan Milar, 1937 yılında Galatasaray Lisesi'ni bitirdi. 1938'de İstanbul Güzel Sanatlar Akademisi, Mimarlık Fakültesi'ne girerek 1942-43 döneminde mezun oldu. Akademi müdürü Burhan Toprak'ın tavsiyesi ile Ankara'ya gelerek Erkek Teknik Öğretim Müşavirliği Mimari Bürosu'nda ünlü hoca Paul Bonatz'la çalıştı. Genel büro çalışmaları yanında Denizli Erkek Sanat Okulu ve Malatya Erkek Sanat Okulu gibi tamamen kendi telifi olan projeleride yaptı ve detaylandırdı.

"Yeter! Söz Milletindir!"[1]


1946'da hazırladığı Yeter Söz Milletindir afişi, bütün tahminlerin ötesinde bir etki yaparak Demokrat Parti'nin iktidara gelmesinde üstüne düşeni yaptı. 

Demokrat Parti çevresinde büyük saygınlık kazanmış olmasına rağmen hiçbir zaman bundan faydalanma yoluna gitmeyen Milar, Celal Bayar’ın kendisini “Bizim partidendir” şeklinde tanıtması üzerine; “Hayır Sayın Bayar! Ben bir demokratım, ama Demokrat Partili değilim” diyerek itiraz etmiştir.
 

Demokrat Parti sonraki dönemlerde Milar'dan esinlenerek çeşitli çalışmalar yapsa da pek başarılı olamadı.

Eşref Paşa halkevi projesinden eline geçen ücreti ile 1947 Temmuz'da Eser[2] adında, başta mimarlık ve Dekorasyon olmak üzere bütün sanat kollarını kucaklayan bir dergi çıkardı. Ancak iki sayı yayınlanabildi.

1948 - 1950 Seneleri
1948'de Cündoğlu Hanı projesini hazırladı ve inşaatında uygulamaya katıldı. Bu arada çeşitli ev, mağaza projeleri hazırladı ve uygulamalarını yaptı. 1950'de 31.Dönem Yedek Subay Okulu'nu bitirdi ve Genelkurmay Başkanlığı İstihkam Dairesinde, İstanbul Kağıthane İstihkam Okulu projesini yaptı. Askerden sonra Demokrat Parti'ye ikinci bir afiş daha yaptı.



Endüstri Meslek lisesi Taş atölye binaları . 

SEE: Article Kentin “Modern Harabeler”inin İncelenmesi: Denizli Taş Atölyeleri Örneği 

Excerpt: Taş Atölyeler, Yusuf Batur Endüstri Meslek Lisesinin uygulama birimleri olarak inşa edilmiştir. Mimarı erken Cumhuriyet döneminde Türkiye’nin ulusal mimari yaklaşımını oluşturmak üzere davet edilen Alman Mimar Paul Bonatz’ın asistanı ve öğrencisi olan Selçuk Milar’dır. Bonatz, 1940larda Ankara’da Saraçoğlu Mahallesi’nin tasarımı, Sergievi’nin Opera Binasına dönüşümü gibi önemli projelere imza atmıştır. Milar’ın Bonatz ile olan usta-çırak ilişkisi ise görev aldığı Milli Eğitim Bakanlığına bağlı Erkek Teknik Eğitim Müşavirliği Mimari Bürosunda başladı. Selçuk Milar İstanbul Güzel Sanatlar Akademi Mimarlık Bölümü’nde aldığı eğitimin ardından Bonatz’la birlikte çalışmalarda bulunmuştur. Denizli Yusuf Batur Endüstri Meslek Lisesi ile birlikte yıkılan Malatya Erkek Sanat Okulu Milar’ın önemli eserleri arasındadır. 

Yaptıklarımız, yapacaklarımızın teminatıdır
Demokratlar Yeter Söz Milletindir afişindeki el gibi, halkta büyük etki yapacak bir afişle karşılaşmamak için, dünyada hiç görülmemiş bir kanun çıkarmışlar ve seçim afişlerinde, resim, çizgi, fotoğraf kullanılmasını yasaklamışlardı. Ayrıca halkın bir kısmı yapılan icraattan şikayetçiydi. Halkın memnun olanı da olmayanı da aldatılmamalıydı. Sonuç : Yaptıklarımız, yapacaklarımızın teminatıdır!

1953 - 1957 Mimar ve Mühendis Odaları Birliği Kanunu[3]
1953'te Ada apartmanı projeleri ve uygulaması yürürken bir yandan Mimarlar Birliği çalışmaları da yürüyordu. Amaç, Mimar ve Mühendis Odaları Birliği Kanunu'nu (TMMOB) TBMM'den çıkarmaktı. İncelemeler gösteriyordu ki bu kanunun yıllardan beri çıkmamasının asıl nedeni, işi Mimarlar Birliği ele aldığı zaman tasarıyı mimarların yararına ele alıyordu. Oysa o öyle bir tasarı tüm meslek kurumlarını kapsamalıydı. Uzun süren çalışmalardan sonra ortaya çıkan prototip kanun tasarısı, TBMM komisyonunda başarı ile sonuna kadar yaklaşmışken , yönetim kurulu düşürüldü. Selçuk Milar şimdiki kanundan sonra'da, Mimarlar Odasında önemli görevler üstlendi. Odalar Birliğinde, basın komisyonunda Bülten adı ile bir haber bülteni yayımladı.



1952 yılında TYMB Yöneticileri Atatürk huzurunda. Ortada Başkan Selçuk Milar, yanında Yönetim Kurulu Üyesi Selma Demren. (Mimarlık Dergisi, 1951)

Çeşitli gazete ve dergilerde yayımlanan makaleleri, bilirkişilikleri, mimari proje yarışmalarında, Milli Kütüphane Daimi Resim ve Heykel Galerisi'nin ve Devlet Resim ve Heykel Sergisinin jüri üyelikleri, ayrıca reklam ve amblem alanında eserleri vardır. CICA (Confederation International des Credits Agricols) amblemi, bugüne kadar uluslararası olmuş ilk Türk Eseridir. Milar, Ankara Devlet Mühendislik ve Mimarlık Akademisi'nde mimari proje, iç mimari, ince yapı dersleri vermiştir.[4]

1957 yılına gelindiğinde Milar, Ankara'nın ilk sanat galerisi olan Galeri Milar’ı açtı. Bu galeri belki de ilk mobilya ve dekorasyon galerisiydi. Milar Galerisi, Bedri Rahmi Eyüpoğlu, Füreya Koral, Orhan Peker, Gencay Kasapçı, Cevdet Altuğ gibi birçok ünlü sanatçıların sergilerini ev sahipliği yaptı ve yeni bir mobilya anlayışına öncülük etti.

1963 Yılında Aynur Alanson (vefati 2017) (Mazhar Alanson'un ablası) ile evlenen Milar'ın bu ikinci evliliğinden 1964 yılında Kerim Han Milar, 1966 yıllında Kemal Milar adını verdiği iki oğlu oldu. 

Selçuk Milar'ın Vefatıyla birlikte Arkitekt Dergisinde yakın arkadaşları Vedat Dalokay, Şevki Vanlı, Gencay Kasapçı, Turan Erol, Yiğit Gülöksüz, Abidin Dino, Mehmet Gürlek uzun uzun Milar'la olan güzel anılarını paylaşmışlardır.






See Also : Selçuk Milar: Mimar, Tasarımcı, Galerici, Editör, Yayıncı 
17/4/2012 / skopbülten Çetin Ünalın

[1] Necati Özkan'ın "Seçim Kazandıran Kampanyalar" (MediaCat Kitapları-2002).
 kitabı "Bu sloganın öyküsü" ayrıntısıyla anlatılır 
1950 seçimlerinden önce CHP iktidarının Milli Eğitim Bakanı Hasan Ali Yücel, "Yeter söz milletindir" sloganının yaratıcısı "Memurunu"çağırır...
Selçuk Milar'ı:
-Demokrat Parti'nin "Yeter Söz Milletindir!" afişini siz yaptınız değil mi?
-Evet efendim, altında imzam var.
-Sizi yürekten kutlarım.
İnsanda hayranlık uyandıran çok üstün bir başarı.
-Teşekkür ederim.
Özellikle sizin beğenmiş olmanız beni çok mutlu etti.
-Asıl sizden biz yararlanmak isterdik...
-Siz benden böyle bir hizmet isteseydiniz yapmazdım.
Çünkü ben Türk milletinin demokrasi gerçeğini dinlemesini değil, yaşamasının hasreti içindeyim.
O nedenle sizin iktidarı halkın oylarıyla kaybetmeniz ve muhalefetteki partinin iktidara gelmesini istiyorum.
-Peki ama "Yeter" sözü ile ne demek istiyorsunuz...
"Ne yeter?" -Muhalifleri destekleyen vatandaşlara yapılanlar yeter; her gün gazetelerde okuduğumuz tatsız olaylar yeter; devletin görevi olan hizmetlerin muhalefetteki vatandaşlardan esirgenmesi yeter...
-Bu afişi sizden kim istedi?
-Onu size kesinlikle söyleyemem Bakanım.
Neden?
-Başlarına neler geleceğini bildiğim için.

Milli Eğitim Bakanı Hasan Ali Yücel "Yeter söz milletindir" sloganının yaratıcısı "Memur Selçuk Milar'a" teşekkür eder... Elini sıkar.
20 gün sonra... Selçuk Milar'ın "Urfa'da bir şantiyeye" tayini çıkar.
Selçuk Milar da "İstifayı basar." Bugün...
Selçuk Milar'ı kimse bilmiyor ama... "Efsane sloganı" hâlâ yaşıyor:
"Yeter söz milletindir." 

[2] ESER’in ilk sayısında önsöz niteliğinde şöyle denilmektedir:

“ATATÜRK, bize şu parolayı verdi: 'Sanat ve sanatkârdan mahrum bir cemiyetin hayatiyeti olamaz'”

“Bir millet daima verdiği eserler kadar büyüktür. Bugün, sanatın her kolunda yeni bir nesil ilk eserlerini vermeğe başlamış bulunuyor. Yeninin gelişmesi, gerinin zararlı baskısından kurtulması lazım. ESER, genç sanatkârların seslerini içeriye ve dışarıya duyuracak bir buluşma merkezi. Sözle iş arasındaki farktan kurtulmak için, sözü bırakıp işe girişiyoruz.”

İkinci sayıda ise okuyucuya şöyle seslenir:

“Fikir ve sanat sözden ibaret değil. Memleketimizde ne kadar dergi varsa hepsi de sözle yetiniyor. Biz, bu çerçevenin dışına çıkarak, çok büyük bir ihtiyacı karşılamağa, bomboş bir yeri gücümüzün yettiği kadar doldurmağa çalışıyoruz.”

[3] 1931 yılında Türk Güzel Sanatlar Birliği Mimari Şubesi’ne kayıtlı 86 üyenin 30 tanesinin adlarından anlaşıldığı kadarıyla Rum ve Ermeni kökenlidir. 1940 tarihinde 205 üyenin ise 34 tanesinin gayrimüslim olduğu görülmektedir.


Birliğe üye olmak için resmi bir zorunluluk bulunmamaktadır. Türk Yüksek Mimarlar Birliği, Dernekler Kanuna tabii, mesleki amaçlar doğrultusunda gönüllü katılıma dayalı bir örgütlenme biçimidir.
[4] "Nizami Yaver’in başarısına ek olarak, 1939 ve 1945 yılları arasında Marie Louis Sue’un Akademi’nin Tezyini Sanatlar şubesi şefi olması; yine 1940’lı yıllarda Utarit İzgi gibi modern tasarım yönelimli mimar hocaların Akademi’de ders vermeye başlaması, 1953 yılında mimar Fazıl Aysu ve içmimar Baki Aktar’ın Beyoğlu’nda Türkiye’nin ilk mobilya ve dekorasyon mağazası Moderno’yu açması, 1957 yılında Sadi Öziş, Şadi Çalık, İlhan Koman’ın Kare Metal Atölyesi’ni kurmaları, 1960’lı yıllarda Akademi öğrencilerinden Yıldırım Kocacıklıoğlu ve Turhan Uncuoğlu’nun Interno’yu kurmaları, eş zamanlı olarak mimar Ratip Erhan ve Sadun Ersin’in Form adıyla bir mobilya ve dekorasyon mağazası açmaları; Ankara’da Azmi ve Bediz Kozun’un MDP’yi (Mobilya, Dekorasyon, Proje) açmaları, yine Ankara’da Selçuk Milar ve Ali İhsan Şark’ın Şark Mobilya’yı kurmaları ve Turgut Cansever, Şevki Vanlı gibi isimlerin bu mağaza için tasarımlar üretmeleri, Türkiye’de modern iç mekân ve mobilyanın üretiminin önemli aşamalarıdır. Bu noktada kurulum fikri 1930’lara dayanan Tatbiki Güzel Sanatlar Yüksek Okulunun 1957 yılında kurulması ve kurumda Mobilya ve İçmimarlık adıyla bir bölümün açılması, İçmimarlık eğitimin kurumsallaşmasında diğer önemli bir aşamadır."

Şumnu, 2014,s.9. | Şumnu, Umut (der.), 2014, Türkiye’de İçmimarlık ve İçmimarlar, İçmimarlar Odası Yayınları, Ankara.

ARTICLE


Örgütçü, Mimar, Tasarımcı, Galerici, Yazar, Editör, Yayıncı Selçuk Milar
Çetin Ünalın, Mimar
Mimarlar Derneği 1927, arşivinde bulunan mimar, tasarımcı, galerici, yazar, editör, yayıncı ve mimarların örgütlenmesine büyük emeği geçmiş Selçuk Milar’a ait 1950-1956 arasında yapılmış 16 özgün afişi, 17 Nisan 2012’de Ankara’da açılışını yaptığı bir sergi ile ilk defa izleyicilerle buluşturdu. 
MİLAR HAKKINDA (1)
21 Şubat 1991’de kaybettiğimiz Milar, 1917’de İstanbul’da vali oğlu olarak doğmuş, Robert Kolej’den sağlık nedenleriyle ayrılmak zorunda kaldıktan sonra 1937’de Galatasaray Lisesi’ni bitirmiştir. 1938’de İstanbul Güzel Sanatlar Akademisi’ne girerek 1943’te mezun olmuş, bir dönem Ankara’da Erkek Teknik Öğretim Müşavirliği Mimari Bürosu’nda Paul Bonatz’la çalışmıştır. Daha 18 yaşındayken Varlık dergisine hikâyeler yazmıştır. Akrabası Necip Fazıl Kısakürek’in Büyük Doğu dergisinde de yazıları çıktığı söylenir.  Ankara’daki Cündoğlu Han (1948), Denizli Erkek Sanat Okulu (1945), Malatya Erkek Sanat Okulu (1946), İzmir Eşref Paşa Halkevi (1947) gibi pek çok mimari ve dekorasyon projesi hazırlamış, bunları uygulama şansı bulmuştur. Mimari proje ve çeşitli plastik sanatlar yarışmalarında jüri üyeliklerinde yapmıştır. Reklam ve amblem alanında eserleri vardır. Ankara Devlet Mimarlık Mühendislik Akademisi’nde mimarlık, iç mimarlık ve ince yapı dersleri vermiştir.
MİMARLARIN ÖRGÜTLENMELERİNE KATKILARI (2)
Milar’ın sergisine evsahipliği yapan Mimarlar Derneği 1927, 1927’de Ankara’da Türk Mimarlar Cemiyeti adıyla kurulan, 1934’ten sonra “Türk Yüksek Mimarlar Birliği” (TYMB) adını alan örgütün günümüzdeki devamıdır. 
Milar TYMB Yönetim Kurulları’nda şu görevlerde bulunmuştur:

29 Aralık 1948 – 24 Aralık 1949, Yedek Üye
24 Aralık 1949 – 23 Aralık 1950, Yedek Üye, Genel Sekreter ayrılınca Genel Sekreter, 
31 Aralık 1951 – 4 Eylül 1952, Genel Sekreter, Başkan ayrılınca Başkan

Milar, Oda yapısında örgütlenmeye en çok inanlardan, TMMOB Kanun taslağının hazırlanmasında ve takibinde büyük emeği geçenlerden birisidir. Mimarlar dernek olarak ilk örgütlenmelerinden çok kısa bir süre sonra Oda statüsüne geçmelerinin onları daha güçlü kılacağına inanmışlar, bu yönde inançla, ısrarla çaba göstermişler, taslaklar hazırlamışlar, bunları ilgililerine iletmiş, kamuoyuyla paylaşmış, takipçisi olmuşlardır. Ancak 1931’deki “Mimarlar Odaları Kanunu” önerileri, zamanın Nafia Bakanı’nın kapsamının genişletilmesi isteği nedeniyle bir süre sonra mühendisler de devreye girmiş, çeşitli komisyonlarda yıllarca sürecek, sonuç alınamayan çalışmalar (çatışmalar) başlamıştır. Komisyon çalışmalarının sonuç vermemesi üzerine, mühendisler 20.06.1951’de tasarılarını meclise iletmişlerdir.

Mühendislerin taslaklarını Meclise iletmeleri ve 31.12.1951’de Yönetim Kuruluna Genel Sekreter seçilmesi sonrası 09.02.1952’de Milar, Odalar Kanunu takibi raportörlüğüne talip olmuş, bunun üzerine Yönetim Kurulundan bazı üyeler itiraz ederek istifa etmişlerdir. Ancak Dernek karar defterlerinden Milar ve yeni oluşan Yönetim Kurulunun hızla, biraz da kızgınlıkla gece geç saatlere kadar çalışarak, 14.02.1952’de kanun tasarısı hakkındaki görüşlerini oluşturdukları anlaşılmaktadır. Bu görüşler tartışarak 17.05.1952’de de Süleyman Kuranel eliyle Bayındırlık Komisyonu’na mimarların TMMOB Kanun taslağı olarak iletilerek gündeme alınmasını sağlanmıştır. Bayındırlık Komisyonu Başkanı, Gaziantep milletvekili, mimar Süleyman Kuranel, Milar yerine 04.09.1952’de yapılan Olağanüstü Genel Kurulda, üç dönem 25.12.1954’e kadar sürdüreceği TYMB Başkanlığına seçilmiştir.

Milar her zaman örgütlü mücadele fikrine en çok inananların başında gelmiştir. Ancak sanatçı kişililiği, projeciliği ile daha çok mimarlığın bürokrasi ve uygulama bölümünde çalışan, kendisinden yaklaşık on yaş büyük Talat Özışık, İsmet Barutçu, Nizamettin Doğu gibi Derneğe büyük emekleri geçmiş kişilere karşı adeta tek başına bir muhalefet oluşturmuştur. Kişisel yapısı da buna uygundur. Bu ilişki Odanın kurulması aşamasında da görülmüş, Milar hep Ankaralılarla değil İstanbullulara birlikte hareket etmiştir.

Milar 15.12.1954’te yapılan ilk Genel Kurulda, Mimarlar Odası Genel Merkezi Haysiyet Divanı (Onur Kurulu) üyesi olarak seçilmiştir. Burada dikkati çeken, yönetime seçilenlerin, Ankaralı Milar dışında tümünün İstanbullu olmasıdır. Bu ilişki daha sonra da sürmüştür. O dönem İstanbul’da bulunan Oda Merkez Yönetimi tarafından Ankara Şubesi Kurucu Yönetim Kurulu’na 24.111955’te Milar, Vedat Dalokay, Necdet Şalvuz, Cemil Topçubaşı, Ertuğrul Özakdemir ile birlikte atanmıştır. Bu listenin özelliği ise, Milar dışındakilerin hiçbirisinin daha önce TYMB Yönetim Kurullarında görev almamasıdır. Bu Oda kuruluşunu hayata geçirenlerin Dernek kanatlarından çıkma kararlarından kaynaklanmaktadır. Dernek defteri yazışmalarından anlaşıldığı kadar, bu grup adına hareket eden, o dönem İstanbul’da bulunan Oda ile ilişkileri kuran en aktif üye Milar’dır.

Daha sonra 25.12.1955’te yapılan ilk Genel Kurulda seçilen Mimarlar Odası Ankara Şubesi Yönetim Kurulunun sekreter üyesi Milar’dır. İlk yılların kuruluş dönemi yokluk ortamında Milar’ın Ankara, Posta Caddesi Cündoğlu Han’daki ofisi Ankara Şubesi’nin resmî çalışma merkezidir ve adres olarak burası gösterilmiştir. Ankara Şubesi’nin 23.12.1956’da yapılan 2. Dönem Genel Kurulunda bu yönetim tamamen tavsiye edilmiş “Dernekçilerin” oluşturduğu bir kadro yönetime gelmiştir. Bundan sonra Milar’ın adına Oda ve Dernek Yönetiminde rastlamıyoruz. Sadece 01.02.1956’da çıkan TMMOB Bülten dergisinin ilk ve tek, o sayısının yayın müdürü olarak mimar ve mühendislerin örgütlenme ortamında görülmüştür.

MİLAR’IN AFİŞLERİ
Siyasî tarihimizin belki de en önemli, bazılarınca Demokrat Parti’nin seçimi kazanmasında büyük etkisi olduğu söylenen “Yeter Söz Milletindir!” sloganı ve afişi Milar’a aittir. Kazanılamayan 1946 seçimleri için hazırlanan afiş, kazanılan 1950 seçimlerinde de kullanılmıştır.(3) Afişin halk tarafından benimsenmesi, basında geniş yer bulması üzerine dönemin Milli Eğitim Bakanı Hasan Ali Yücel, o sırada Teknik Öğretim Müsteşarlığı’nda çalışan Milar’ı işyerinde sitemini belirtmek için ziyaret etmiştir. Bu olaydan yaklaşık 20 gün sonra Milar’ın Urfa'da bir şantiyeye tayini çıkmış, bunu üzerine görevinden ayrılmıştır.(4)
Ancak Demokrat Parti, seçimlerde büyük bir zafer kazanarak iktidar olmasına rağmen böyle güçlü afişlerle karşılaşmamak için, seçim afişlerinde resim kullanımını yasaklayan özel bir kanun çıkarmıştır. Yıllarca yürürlükte kalan böyle bir kanunun dünyanın başka hiçbir ülkesinde görülmediği Milar tarafından belirtilmiştir.

Hatırını kıramayacağı bazı dostlarının büyük ısrarla bir afiş daha istemeleri üzerine, iktidar partisinin bazı uygulamalarını kınamasına rağmen, halkın bir kısmının yapılan icraattan şikâyetçi olduğu düşüncesiyle, halka inanmadığı bir şey söylememek için kanun uyarınca resimsiz, sadece üç kelimelik bir afiş hazırlamıştır: “Yaptıklarımız Yapacaklarımızın Teminatıdır.” 
Demokrat Parti çevresinde büyük saygınlık kazanmış olmasına rağmen hiçbir zaman bundan faydalanma yoluna gitmemiş, onunla bütünleşmemiştir. Celal Bayar’ın kendisini “Bizim partidendir” şeklinde takdim etmesi üzerine, “Hayır, ben bir demokratım, ama Demokrat Partili değilim” diyerek itiraz etmiştir.(5) 
Uzun yıllar Ziraat Bankası reklam afişlerini hazırlamıştır. Şevki Vanlı(6) Ziraat Bankası’nın başak benzeri ambleminin Milar’a ait olduğunu söyler. Ayrıca yakın tarihe kadar kullanılan, bugün basit bir değişime uğramış Şekerbank amblemi de ona aittir. 
ESER DERGİSİ
1947’de başlığında “mimarlık, resim, heykel, dekorasyon, musiki, tiyatro, sinema” gibi konuları kapsayacağı belirtilen Eser dergisini yayımlamıştır. Eşref Paşa Halkevi projesinden eline geçen ücretle yayımlamaya başladığı iki aylık dergi Temmuz-Ağustos 1947 ve Nisan 1948 olmak üzere iki sayı çıkmıştır. “Sahibi ve yayın müdürü, sayfaya koyan, kapak kompozisyonu, başlıklar ve büyük harfleri çizen: Milar”dır. İzmit Kâğıt Fabrikası’nın yaptırdığı özel bir kâğıda bastırmıştır. Yurtiçinde ve yurtdışında çoğu mimar dostları olmak üzere temsilcileri vardır. “Türkiye’de basılmıştır” ibaresinin ayrıca İngilizce ve Fransızcada yazılmış olması, uluslararası olma hayallerinin göstergesidir. Dergide Abidin Dino, Nurullah Berk, Bedri Rahmi Eyüboğlu gibi sanat toplumundan önemli kişilerin yazıları ve Le Corbusier’den bir çeviri bulunmaktadır. Kendisi de “Yeni Türk Sanatı” ve “Paul Bonatz” başlıklı iki yazı yazmıştır. Ayrıca haberler, notlar ve aktüalite bölümleri vardır.

GALERİ MİLAR
1957 yılında Ankara’nın ilk sanat galerisi “Galeri Milar”ı kurmuştur. Burada dönemin birçok ünlü sanatçısının resim, batik, dekoratif ahşap işleri, mozaikleri gibi plastik sanatların çeşitli kollarını sergilemiştir. Şevki Vanlı (7) gerçek resmi, heykeli, mobilyayı Ankara’ya onun tanıttığını belirtir; galeride Celal Bayar’ı, Hasan Ali Yücel’i gördüğünü ilave eder. Bu galeri sadece plastik sanatlarının sergilenmesinin ötesinde, ülke ölçeğinde sanatsevenlerin buluştuğu sosyal iletişim ortamı olma özelliğini de yükümlenmiştir.(8)
Vedat Dalokay, Milar’ın projesini yaptığı Cündoğlu Hanın duvarlarında Abidin Dino’nun resimlerine yer vererek onu sanat dünyasına tanıtılmasına katkı sağlamaya çabaladığını anlatır.(9)
Milar’ın tasarladığı ve imal ettirdiği mobilyaları da Galeri Milar’da sergilemiş, yeni bir mobilya anlayışına öncülük etmiştir. Bu özgün tasarımların yanı sıra dönemin İtalyan ve Danimarka tasarımlarını, niteliklerinde hiçbir eksilme olmadan Türkiye’de ilk kez Milar üretmiş, detaylarda, malzeme seçimlerinde ve imalattaki titizlik neticesi yıllarca bu mobilyalar Ankara’da birçok evin en seçkin ve en sağlam eşya olarak kalmıştır.(10)
TMMOB BÜLTEN DERGİSİ
TMMOB tarafından üçüncü çalışma döneminde çıkarılmaya başlayan TMMOB haber ve fikir organı Bülten dergisinin ilk sayısının yayın müdürü Milar’dır. Ayda iki defa çıkarılan derginin 01.02.1956 tarihli ilk sayısının kapak sayfasında “Neşriyatı Milar idare etmiştir” notu özellikle belirtilmiştir. TMMOB Yönetim Kurulu Bülten’i yalnızca mesleki konuları içermeyip, ülke çıkarları açısından topluma sunulacak bir yayın organı olarak yayımlanmasını kararlaştırılmıştır. Dergi tüm üyelere ödemeli gönderilmiş, bunun 3.500’ü abone olmuştur.(11) İkinci sayıdan itibaren Milar’ın adına dergide rastlamamaktayız. Milar’ın titiz kişiliği ve TMMOB Yönetiminin önerdiği bütçeyi ayırmaması nedeniyle birlikte çalışmaya devam edememişlerdir.(12) 
HAKKINDA YAZILANLAR
1991’de vefatının ardından Arkitekt dergisinde dostları tarafından yazılanlardan birkaç kısa not ile kendisini analım(13) :
Şevki Vanlı:

Milar, mimarlık ve sanat dünyasında Ankara’ya simge olmuştur. Yurtdışından, İstanbul’dan gelen her sanatçı ona uğrardı. Milar’ın en büyük kabahati, geniş çevrelere uyum sağlamaması oldu. Çünkü en iyiyi yapmaktan kimse onu vazgeçiremedi ve çok az kişi onun kıymetini bildi.  Milar niteliğin savunucusu, niteliğin simgesi oldu ve nitelik için kendini feda etti. Nitelikli bir çalışma yapma olanağı bulamadığı için dünyaya darıldı, uzun yıllar ızdırap içinde yaşadı. İçinde yaşadığımız koşullara gittikçe yabancılaştı ve biz hiçbir şey yapamadık.
Ama eksiksiz bir Avrupalıydı. Çok çalıştı, elli yıla yakın mimarlık hayatında, özellikle 1945-70 yılları arasında önemli etkileri oldu.  Elli yıl mimarlığa ve topluma her şeyini verdi ve hiçbir şey istemedi. Çok ama çok farklı bir insandı. Arkasında bir Cündoğlu Hanı ile birkaç mobilya, Türkiye’nin Batılılaşmasına katkılarını bıraktı. Biraz taviz verseydi kim bilir neler yapabilirdi? Ama vermedi, veremedi. Çünkü nitelik onun kişiliğiydi. 
Abidin Dino:

Bana gelince, İstanbul’dan apar topar uzaklaştırılıp birkaç yıl sürgünde yaşadıktan sonra sonunda Ankara’da ikamet etmeme müsaade edilmişti. Ankara’ya geldiğimi duyar duymaz fırladı, aradı, buldu beni Milar. Bunda şaşılacak bir şey yok sanılabilir. Oysa sürgünden yeni dönen, gözaltında bulunan bir kişi ile görüşmek o yıllarda herkesin göze aldığı bir ahbaplık değildi. Gerçi siyasal bakımdan herhangi bir yakınlık yoktu aramızda. Fakat Türk mimarisi ve sanatı üstüne düşündüklerimiz bağdaşıyordu.  
NOTLAR
1. 1991, “Selçuk Milar”, Arkitekt Yaşama Sanatı, sayı: 3/1991, s.46.

2. Bu bölümün hazırlanmasında şu kitaptan yararlanılmıştır: Çetin Ünalın, 2002, Türk Mimarlar Cemiyeti’nden, Mimarlar Derneği 1927’ye, Mimarlar Derneği 1927 Yayını, Ankara.



3. Soner Yalçın, 2007, “Yeter! Söz Milletindir”, Hürriyet, 10.06.2007.

4. Selçuk Milar, 1988, “Yeter Söz Milletindir Afişi Nasıl Doğdu”, Tarih ve Toplum Dergisi, cilt:9, sayı:54.

5. Emin Nedret İşli, 1999, “Eser Dergisi ve Selçuk Milar”, Sanat Dünyamız, sayı:74, s.243.

6. 1991, Arkitekt Yaşama Sanatı.

7. Çetin Ünalın (ed.) 2013’te yayımlanacak, “Sözlü Tarih Çalışması, 1954 / Kuruluşa Doğru”, Mimarlar Odası: Sözlü Tarih, Mimarlar Odası Yayınları, Ankara.

8. Başak Önsal, 2006, Ankara’da Sanat Galericiliğinin Oluşumu 1950’ lerin Öncü Üç Galerisi Üzerine Bir Çalışma, yayımlanmamış yüksek lisans tezi, Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Hasan Ünal Nalbantoğlu, ODTÜ, Ankara.

9. 1991, Arkitekt Yaşama Sanatı.

10. Şevki Vanlı, 1991, Arkitekt Yaşama Sanatı.

11. 2004, TMMOB 50. Yıl Andıcı, TMMOB Yayınları, Ankara.

12. 1956, Güzel Sanatlar Balo Gazetesi, 11.02.1956

13. 1991, Arkitekt Yaşama Sanatı.



KAYNAKLAR

Couch, C. ve C. Fraser, 2008, Introduction: The European Context and Theoretical Framework, Urban Regeneration in Europe, (ed.) C. Couch, C. Fraserand, S. Percy, Blackwell Science, Oxford, İngiltere.

Dinçer, İ. 2012, “Kentsel Dönüşüm Sürecini ‘Sorun Eksenli’ Olarak Ele Alma Biçiminin Getirdiği Olanaklar”, Batı Akdeniz Mimarlık, sayı: 51, ss.23-29

Roberts, P. 2000 “ The Evolution, Definition and Purpose of Urban Regeneration” , Urban Regeneration A Handbook , (ed.) P. Roberts, H. Sykes, ss.9-36, Sage, Londra.

Social Exclusion Unit, 2001, A New Commitment to Neighbourhood Renewal, National Strategy Action Plan, www.cabinet-office.gov.uk/seu.

Wallace, Moira, 2001, “ A New Approach to Neighbourhood Renewal in England “, Urban Studies, sayı: 38, ss.2163-2166.

Word Origin | Mitil and more

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Mavi Boncuk |
Mavi Boncuk |

Mitil: quilt EN[*] 1.yüz geçirilmemiş yatak, yorgan, yastık ya da minder.
2. çok eskimiş, paçavra durumuna gelmiş yatak, yorgan, giysi vb.

Erzurum Ağzı: mitil Anlamı : yüzlenmemiş yorgan Ermenice: mt’il


SourceErzurum Ağzında Ermenice Ödünç Sözcükler Astrid Menz (Uppsala / İstanbul) 
Workshop on Turkish Dialects II Orient-Institut Istanbul, 18-19 November 2005 Türk Dilleri Araştırmaları, 19, 2009: 89-106 

[*] Quilt (n.) c. 1300, "mattress with soft lining," from Anglo-French quilte, Old French cuilte, coute "quilt, mattress" (12c.), from Latin culcita "mattress, bolster," of unknown origin. Sense of "thick outer bed covering" is first recorded 1590s.


Yastık : pillow EN[1]from oldTR yasta- yassıltmak +Ik from oldTRyas- yaymak, açmak +It-→ yassı
Oldest Source yastuk "bir tür sikke, yassılaştırılmış şey" [ Uygurca (1100 yılından önce) ] yastuk "yastık" [ Divan-i Lugat-it Türk (1070) ]

Yorgan : quilt, duvet, comforter, eiderdown EN[2] from oldTR yogur- katıştırmak, yığıştırmak +gAn → yoğur-
Oldest Source:yogurkan "kalın yatak örtüsü" [ Uygurca (1000 yılından önce) ]

Battaniye :blanket EN[3] From AR? biṭān بط‎ان devenin karnına sarılan kuşak, gömlek içine giyilen yün kuşak dromAR baṭn بط‎ن karın → batın1
Oldest Source: battaliye [ İlan-ı Ticaret: Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e İstanbul (1900) : Yataklara mahsus en zarif ve kalın battaliye ve yorganlar ve çarşaflar. ] battaniye [ İlan-ı Ticaret: Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e İstanbul (1900) : Bilezikler, battaniyeler, bastonlar ]

Çarşaf : sheet EN[4]from FA çādarşab چادرشب gece örtüsü FA çādar چادر örtü + Faşab شب gece → çadır, şebboy
Oldest Source: çarçav [ Codex Cumanicus (1300) ] çārşeb, vulg. çārşef/çārşaf [ Meninski, Thesaurus (1680) ]

Pike :from FR piqué[5] corded cotton, twilled cotton EN[5] Stiff fabric, typically cotton, woven in a strongly ribbed or raised pattern. ‘a white cotton piqué shirt’ 1. sivri bir şeyle delinmiş, gagalanmış, 2. ikiş tabakaka kumaşın üstüste dikilmesiyle elde esilen bir tür dokuma, 3. uçağın dikey olarak dalışa geçmesi < Fr piquer gagalamak, sivri bir şeyle delmek → pik2
Oldest Source:"bir tür kumaş" [ Ahmet Rasim, Şehir Mektupları (1899) : pike yelekli, görülmeyecek kadar ince kordonlu, paçası az bol pantalonlu ]
"uçağın dalışı" [ TDK, Türkçe Sözlük, 1. Baskı (1945) ]

[1] pillow (n.) Middle English pilwe, from Old English pyle "pillow," from West Germanic *pulwi(n) (source also of Old Saxon puli, Middle Dutch polu, Dutch peluw, Old High German pfuliwi, German Pfühl), an early borrowing (2c. or 3c.) from Latin pulvinus "little cushion, small pillow," of uncertain origin. Modern spelling is from mid-15c. Pillow fight (n.) attested from 1837; slang pillow talk (n.) first recorded 1939.

[2] quilt (n.) c. 1300, "mattress with soft lining," from Anglo-French quilte, Old French cuilte, coute "quilt, mattress" (12c.), from Latin culcita "mattress, bolster," of unknown origin. Sense of "thick outer bed covering" is first recorded 1590s.

duvet (n.) 1758, from French duvet "down," earlier dumet, diminutive of dum "down."

comforter (n.) mid-14c., "one who consoles or supports in distress, anger, etc." (originally in religious use, with capital C-, "the Holy Ghost"), from Anglo-French confortour (Old French conforteor) "helper, adviser, supporter," from Vulgar Latin *confortatorem, agent noun from Late Latin confortare "to strengthen much" (see comfort (v.)). As a kind of knitted, crocheted scarf fit for tying around the neck in cold weather, from 1817; as a kind of quilted coverlet, from 1832.

eiderdown (n.) "soft feathers of the eider-duck" (such as it uses to line its nest), 1774; see eider + down (n.1). Ultimately from Icelandic æðardun, via a Scandinavian source (compare Danish ederdunn) or German Eiderdon.

[3] blanket (n.) c. 1300, "coarse white woolen stuff," also "a large oblong piece of woolen cloth used for warmth as a bed-covering" (also as a cover for horses), from Old French blanchet "light wool or flannel cloth; an article made of this material," diminutive of blanc "white" (see blank (adj.)), which had a secondary sense of "a white cloth."

As an adjective, "providing for a number of contingencies," 1886 (blanket-clause in a contract). Wet blanket (1830) is from the notion of a person who throws a damper on social situations in the way a wet blanket smothers a fire. In U.S. history, a blanket Indian (1859) was one using the traditional garment instead of wearing Western dress.

Only 26,000 blanket Indians are left in the United States. ["Atlantic Monthly," March 1906]

[4] Old English sciete (West Saxon), scete (Mercian) "cloth, covering, towel, shroud," from Proto-Germanic *skautjon-, from *skauta- "project" (source also of Old Norse skaut, Gothic skauts "seam, hem of a garment;" Dutch schoot; German Schoß "bosom, lap"), from PIE root *skeud- "to shoot, chase, throw."

Sense of "piece of paper" first recorded c. 1500; that of "any broad, flat surface" (of metal, open water, etc.) is from 1590s. Of falling rain from 1690s. Meaning "a newspaper" is first recorded 1749. Sheet lightning is attested from 1794; sheet music is from 1857. Between the sheets "in bed" (usually with sexual overtones) is attested from 1590s; to be white as a sheet is from 1751. The first element in sheet-anchor (late 15c.) appears to be a different word, of unknown origin.

sheet (n.2) "rope that controls a sail," late 13c., shortened from Old English sceatline "sheet-line," from sceata "lower part of sail," originally "piece of cloth," from same root as sheet (n.1). Compare Old Norse skaut, Dutch schoot, German Schote "rope fastened to a sail."

This probably is the notion in phrase three sheets to the wind "drunk and disorganized," first recorded 1812 (in form three sheets in the wind), an image of a sloop-rigged sailboat whose three sheets have slipped through the blocks are lost to the wind, thus "out of control." Apparently there was an early 19c. informal drunkenness scale in use among sailors and involving one, two, and three sheets, three signifying the highest degree of inebriation; there is a two sheets in the wind from 1813.

It must not be wondered at that the poor, untutored, savage Kentuckyan got "more than two thirds drunk," that is, as the sailors term it, three sheets in the wind and the fourth shivering, before the dinner was ended. [Niles' Weekly Register, May 2, 1812]

[4] bed (v.) Old English beddian "to provide with a bed or lodgings," from bed (n.). From c. 1300 as "to go to bed," also "to copulate with, to go to bed with;" 1440 as "to lay out (land) in plots or beds." sheet (n.1)

bed (n.) Old English bedd "bed, couch, resting place; garden plot," from Proto-Germanic *badja- "sleeping place dug in the ground" (source also of Old Frisian, Old Saxon bed, Middle Dutch bedde, Old Norse beðr, Old High German betti, German Bett, Gothic badi "bed"), sometimes said to be from PIE root *bhedh- "to dig, pierce" (source also of Hittite beda- "to pierce, prick," Greek bothyros "pit," Latin fossa "ditch," Lithuanian bedu, besti "to dig," Breton bez "grave"). But Boutkan doubts this and writes, "there is little reason to assume that the Gmc. peoples (still) lived under such primitive circumstances that they dug out their places to sleep."

Both the sleeping and gardening senses are found in Old English; the specific application to planting is found also in Middle High German and is the only sense of Danish bed. Meaning "bottom of a lake, sea, or watercourse" is from 1580s. Geological sense of "a thick layer, stratum" is from 1680s.

Bed and board "in bed and at the table" (early 13c.) was a term in old law applied to conjugal duties of man and wife; it also could mean "meals and lodging, room and board" (mid-15c.). Bed-and-breakfast in reference to overnight accommodations is from 1838; as a noun, in reference to a place offering such, by 1967.

[5] Piqué, or marcella, refers to a weaving style, normally used with cotton yarn, which is characterized by raised parallel cords or geometric designs in the fabric.[1] Piqué fabrics vary from semi-sheer dimity to heavy weight waffle cloth. Twilled cotton and corded cotton are close relatives.

The weave is closely associated with white tie, and some accounts[which?] even say the fabric was invented specifically for this use. It holds more starch than plain fabric, so produces a stiffer shirt front. Marcella shirts then replaced earlier plain fronts, which remain a valid alternative. Marcella's use then spread to other parts of the dress code and it is now the most common fabric used in the tie and waistcoat of white tie. A knit fabric with a similar texture is used in polo shirts.

Marcella weaving was developed by the Lancashire cotton industry in the late 18th century as a mechanised technique of weaving double cloth with an enclosed heavy cording weft. It was originally used to make imitations of the corded Provençal quilts made in Marseille, the manufacture of which became an important industry for Lancashire from the late 18th to the early 20th century.[2] The term "marcella" is one of a number of variations on the word "Marseille". 


Pique fabrics are a type of dobby construction. Piques may be constructed in various patterns such as cord, waffle, honeycomb and birdseye piques. These fabrics require the addition of extra yarns, called stuffer yarns. These stuffer yarns are incorporated into the back of the fabric to give texture and added depth to the fabric design. Some piques may be made using the Jacquard attachment on the loom. Although made of 100% cotton today, cotton-silk blends and even pure silk versions were made in the past and in a variety of weaves. Twills can be divided into even-sided and warp-faced. Even-sided twills include foulard or surah, herringbone, houndstooth, serge, sharkskin, and twill flannel. Warp-faced twills include cavalry twill, chino, covert, denim, drill, fancy twill, gabardine, and lining twill. Soiling and stains are less noticeable on the uneven surface of twills than on a smooth surface, such as plain weaves, and as a result twills are often used for sturdy work clothing and for durable upholstery. Denim, for example, is a twill. 

(Sewing) (= cousu) machine-stitched [dessus de lit] quilted 






In Memoriam | Yavuz Özkan (1942-2019)

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Mavi Boncuk | 

.
Yavuz Özkan was born in Yozgat in 1942. Between 1956 and 1966, he worked for magazines and newspapers. He then wrote and directed theater plays. Özkan founded the Kocaeli Theatre. He performed in the Dostlar Theatre and Theater Töb-Der. In the 1970s, Özkan shot short films and wrote screen plays. In 1974, he directed the documentary film “Vardiya”. It was followed by another film “Maden” (1978) and “Demiryol” (1979). In 1980, Özkan went to Paris and stayed for 7 years. He wrote and directed two TV films “Bekleyiş” and “Son Savaşçı” for French TV FR3. He also acted in Philippe Nuil’s “The Tree Under the Water.” After his return to Turkey, Özkan has continued to shot one film per year. He has won many awards for his films in national and international film festivals. He has also been invited to many conferences and meetings. In 1995, Özkan founded the “Z-1 Film Workshop,” and gave free classes on cinema with 33 tutors including cinema maestros, artists, academician, philosophers, literatures, and communication scientists. In 1999, he wrote and directed the plays “Herkesin Bildiği Sırlar” and “Karşı Penceredeki Kadın.” Between 1999 and 2002, Özkan served as a General Director of the Association of Film Directors.

Awards:
1978, Antalya Altın Portakal Film Festival, the Best Film Award for "Maden"
1991, Antalya Altın Portakal Film Festival, the Best Second Film and the Best Director Awards for "Ateş Üstüne Yürümek"
1993, Ankara International Film Festival, the Best Film, Jury Special Prizes for "İki Kadın"
1993, International Istanbul Film Festival, the Best Film, the Best Director Awards for "İki Kadın"
1994, Ankara International Film Festival, the Best Film, the Best Director, the Best Scenario Awards for "Bir Sonbahar Hikayesi"
1994, Adana Altın Koza Film Festival, the Best Film Award for "Bir Sonbahar Hikayesi"
1994, International Istanbul Film Festival, the Best Film Award for "Bir Sonbahar Hikayesi"
1994, Antalya Altın Portakal Film Festival, the Best Film, the Best Director Awards for "Bir Sonbahar Hikayesi"
1995, International Istanbul Film Festival, mantion award for "Yengeç Sepeti"

1995, Antalya Altın Portakal Film Festival, Belgin Doruk Special Prize for "Bir Kadının Anatomisi"

Director (14 credits)

 1999 Hayal kurma oyunlari 
 1997 Bir erkegin anatomisi 
 1995 Bir kadinin anatomisi 
 1994 Bir sonbahar hikayesi 
 1994 Yengeç sepeti 
 1992 Iki Kadin 
 1991 Ates üstünde yürümek 
 1990 Büyük Yalnizlik 
 1989 Filim Bitti 
 1988 Umut Yarina Kaldi 
 1987 Yagmur kaçaklari 
 1979 Demiryol 
 1978 Maden 
 1974 2x2=5 

Writer (12 credits)

 1997 Bir erkegin anatomisi 
 1995 Bir kadinin anatomisi 
 1994 Bir sonbahar hikayesi 
 1994 Yengeç sepeti (screenplay) 
 1991 Ates üstünde yürümek 
 1990 Büyük Yalnizlik 
 1989 Filim Bitti (writer) 
 1988 Umut Yarina Kaldi 
 1979 Demiryol 
 1978 Maden (writer) 
 1976 Bekleyis AKA The Waiting (TV Movie) 
 1974 2x2=5 

Actor (7 credits)

 1985 L'arbre sous la mer 
Thomas
 1977 Indestructible Man 
 1974 2x2=5 
 1972 Bir Garip Adam 
 1972 Thirsty for Love, Sex and Murder 
 1972 Cehennemin bes delisi 
 1971 Kara gün 

Producer (5 credits)

 1997 Bir erkegin anatomisi (producer) 
 1995 Bir kadinin anatomisi (producer) 
 1989 Filim Bitti (producer) 
 1988 Umut Yarina Kaldi (producer) 

 1979 Demiryol (producer) 

A List of Turkish Villages and Towns in Bulgaria

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Mavi Boncuk |

Turkish and Other Muslim Minorities of Bulgaria 
by Ali Eminov[1] 
Hardcover: 219 pages
Publisher: Routledge (September 4, 1997)
Language: English
ISBN-13: 978-0415919760

ISBN-10: 0415919762

SOURCE

A List of Turkish Villages and Towns in Bulgaria
Based on M. Türker Acaroglu,
Bulgaristan’da Türkçe Yer Adları Kılavuzu
(Guide to TurkishPlace Names in Bulgaria). Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlı
 Milli Folklor Arastırma DairesiYayınları, 1988. The second expanded edition of this book, published in 2006 by Atatürk Kültür,Dil ve Tarih Kurumu, includes information on additional Turkish place names in Bulgaria.

Following two books are very useful for research on Turkish place names in Bulgaria:

Petır Koledarov and Nikolay Miçev, 
"Promenite v Imenata i Statuta na Selitata v Bılgariya, 1878-1972"
(Changes in Names and Status of Villages in Bulgaria, 1878-1972)

Nikolay Miçev and Petır Koledarov (1989).
"Reçnik na Selitata i Selitnite Imena v Bılgariya, 1878-1987"
(Dictionary of Villages and Village Names in Bulgaria, 1878-1987). Sofia: Nauka i Izkustvo.

This list includes only villages and towns for which there are both Turkish and Bulgarian names.

For comments, corrections, additions and deletions please write to: 
Ali Eminov[1] E: atalemino1(at)wsc(dot)edu.



[1] CURRICULUM VITAE
I was born in the village of Ibrahimle(Avramovo),* Ardino municipality, in the Eastern Rhodope mountains of southern Bulgaria. After completing elementary school in my village and middle school in Hota (Rusalsko), I continued my education at the "Sabahattin Ali" high school in Egridere (Ardino). I dropped out of high school in the tenth grade for reasons not worth telling here. In the fall of 1959 I was admitted to the building trades school in Kircaali. If I had remained in Bulgaria I would have become an erector, a spider-man. But fate had other things  planned for me. While in trade school I met a young man from Kosukavak (Krumovgrad) by the name of Ahmet Halilov. We became close friends. On his initiative we decided to escape from Bulgaria. 

On February 1, 1960 we managed to escape into Greece. In December 1960, after close to a year's stay in Greece, I came to the United States of America as a political refugee. After learning English in night classes, I completed my high school education at Hartford Public High School in Hartford, Connecticut. I continued my education at Central Connecticut State College in New Britain, Connecticut majoring in Anthropology, Sociology and Social Psychology and earned my Bachelor of Arts (B.A.) degree in 1969. I did graduate work in Social and Cultural Anthropology at Indiana University in Bloomington, Indiana, earning a Master of Arts (M.A.) degree in 1972 and a Doctor of Philogophy (Ph.D.) degree in 1976. 

I taught for one year as a Visiting Assistant Professor of Anthropology (1976-1977) at Colby-Sawyer College for Women in New London, New Hampshire and one year as a Visiting Assistant Professor of Anthropology (1977-1978) at State University of New York at Cortland. In the fall of 1979 I secured a tenure-track position at Wayne State College in Wayne, Nebraska. Between 1989 and 2003 I taught a wide variety of Anthroplogy and Sociology courses at this college as Assistant, Associate and full Professor. I retired as Emeritus Professor of Anthroplology in 2003. I still live in Wayne, Nebraska with my wife Catherine who is a Professor of Linguistics at Wayne State College. We have two sons who reside in California. Adem works for Google Corporation in Mountain View while Deniz is  pursuing a doctorate in linguistics at UC Santa Cruz.

I did research and wrote articles on the history and experience of Turks and other Muslims living in Bulgaria and other Balkan countries. My articles appeared in Ethnic Groups, International Journal of Turkish Studies, Nationalities Papers, Islamic Studies, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Third World Review, Folia Slavica, Anthropology of East Europe Review, Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, and elsewhere. A few of these articles, revised and expanded, were collected in my book, Turkish and Other Muslim Minorities of Bulgaria (London: Hurst Publishers; New York: Routledge, 1997). This book was awarded the John D. Bell Book Prize in 1999 by the Bulgarian Studies Association for most outstanding recent scholarly book within an area of Bulgarian studies. 

I continue to do research and write in my retirement. *The name of the village was changed to Avramovo in 1934. It is the Bulgarian equivalent of Ibrahimler, meaning Ibrahims village or Avrams village in Bulgarian. The Turkish names of hundreds of villages and towns throughout the country were Bulgarianized during the same year.

Article | Erdogan’s Failure on the Nile

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Mavi Boncuk |

ERDOGAN’S FAILURE ON THE NILE | SOURCE
by Soner Cagaptay
Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Spring 2019

Soner Cagaptay is the Beyer Family Fellow and director of the Turkish Research Program at The Washington Institute. He would like to thank Egecan Alan Fay for his assistance with this article, which is an excerpt from his forthcoming monograph on Turkish foreign policy under Erdogan.

How Turkey’s president went from being a regional Islamist leader in the Arab Spring to sharing Qatar’s role as the Middle East’s odd man out.

READ THIS ARTICLE ON OUR WEBSITE

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is one of the most consequential leaders in the history of the Turkish republic. Over the past two decades, he has gradually parted ways with Kamal Ataturk’s West-centric and inward-looking foreign policy model, instead embracing an activist and neo-imperialist foreign policy. He has accordingly pivoted Turkey to the Middle East to build influence over the politics of the region. Often dubbed “neo-Ottomanist,” Erdogan’s foreign policy toward the region is informed by his belief that Turkey can rise as a great power if it becomes the leader in the Middle East first. 

At home, Erdogan has consolidated power while defanging the secularist Turkish military and, through that, undermining Ataturk’s secularist legacy in the country. In a set of trials between 2008 and 2011, collectively dubbed Ergenekon, Erdogan locked up nearly a quarter of Turkey’s generals with the help of prosecutors and police aligned with the movement of political Islamist Fethullah Gulen, his ally at the time. In the summer of 2011, the Turkish military’s top brass resigned en masse, recognizing that Erdogan (and Gulen) had won. Around that time in 2010, Erdogan passed a referendum with help from his allies in the Gulen movement, which gave him the prerogative to appoint a majority of judges to the country’s high courts without a confirmation process. 

Although a raw power struggle between Erdogan and Gulen would unfold later—culminating in the Gulenist-led July 2016 coup attempt against Erdogan—in the early 2010s, Erdogan increasingly grew confident in his power at home. During the coinciding Arab uprisings, he looked to the Middle East to project Ankara’s influence in the region. 

At the onset of the Arab uprisings, Ankara’s fortunes indeed seemed to be rising across the Arab-majority world. After the fall of the Hosni Mubarak regime in Egypt, Erdogan (then the country’s prime minister) quickly moved in to build influence in Cairo, followed by other regional capitals. At this time, he placed all of his bets on Mohammed Morsi, a fellow political Islamist linked to the Muslim Brotherhood and a candidate for president in Egypt. Erdogan subsequently won great influence in Cairo after Morsi came to power in Egypt in June 2012. However, following the ouster of Morsi by General Abdel Fattah El-Sisi in the summer of 2013, Erdogan completely lost his Egyptian gains—almost overnight. 

Oddly, the events of the Arab Spring, specifically Morsi’s ouster through a popular protest movement backed by the military, strongly resonated in Turkish domestic politics by shaping Erdogan’s thinking toward his opposition. In May 2013, a popular uprising in Istanbul against the destruction of a historic park by Erdogan’s government, dubbed the Gezi Park movement, rapidly became a source of mass mobilization against the Turkish leader. Erdogan still feared that he too could be ousted by a military-led coup, even though he had neutered Turkey’s Armed Forces. This is because Erdogan lives with a constant fear that the once-mighty Turkish military could return to politics. His worst nightmare appeared to be coming true—as he saw it—in the summer of 2013, just as Morsi was losing power through the machinations of a popular unrest movement backed by the Egyptian military. Erdogan feared that what happened to Morsi was about to happen to him, and therefore violently cracked down on pro-Gezi Park rallies. 

The violence of that crackdown has poisoned Turkish politics, creating a rift between two halves of the country: the first, which adores the Turkish leader and thinks he can do no wrong, and the second, which loathes him and thinks he can do no right. The ensuing crisis has resulted in deep domestic tensions, consuming Turkey’s energy and undermining Ankara’s ability to fully project its political power in the Middle East. 

Thus in 2013, Turkey pivoted from being a prospective leading country of the region to being embroiled in its own domestic troubles. At the same time, the demise of Morsi and other Muslim Brotherhood-related leaders and movements in the Middle East backed by Erdogan has left Ankara with nearly no allies or friends in the region. Essentially, Erdogan’s grand “neo-Ottoman” aspirations to shape the Middle East from Istanbul—where he often works in offices carved out of Ottoman-era palaces—have come to a halt. 

Today, Ankara is nearly isolated in the Middle East. With the exception of Qatar, Turkey has no friends or allies in the region. How exactly did Ankara end up so alone? What went wrong, and what accounts for Erdogan’s “Arab fall”? 

TRANSCENDING RACIST TURKISH VIEWS TOWARD ARABS

A little-known fact about Turkey: there is a high prevalence of racist views held toward Arabs ingrained in the country’s popular culture. Unknowingly, many people outside of the Middle East often associate Turks with Arabs due to Islam, a religion shared by a majority of Arabs and an overwhelming majority of Turks. Their common faith notwithstanding, many of Turkey’s citizens harbor racist sentiments toward Arabs, and few would wish to be associated with Arab cultures.

Some of these opinions are embedded in recent Turkish history. In this regard, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire sheds light on the relationship between Turkey’s citizens and their neighbors—in this case, the Arabs. As the empire withered away in the early twentieth century, a wave of Arab nationalism spread through its Middle Eastern provinces, especially in Syria. During this period, the Young Turks running the empire increasingly espoused Turkish nationalism. Specifically, Cemal Pasha—one of the three Young Turk leaders who was appointed governor of Syria in 1915—spearheaded a wave of persecution of Arab nationalist leaders in 1916. He ordered the execution of these leaders, including seven in Damascus and others in Beirut. To this day, a major square in the Lebanese capital is named “Martyrs Square,” honoring Arab nationalists sent to the gallows by him. The Young Turk leader is notoriously remembered as “Jamal Basha Al-Saffah” in Arabic, or “Cemal Pasha the Bloodthirsty.” 

During World War I—anticipating the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and making plans to reconfigure the Middle East in order to maintain control over the strategic seaways to India—Great Britain courted Arab leaders in the region in its quest to gain influence. Enter British policymakers and spies, including Lawrence of Arabia, who ingratiated himself with Arab leaders, most notably the Hashemite family in Mecca. 

Convinced the British would present them with their own independent state, the Hashemites and their local followers rose against the Ottomans in a 1916 rebellion stretching from Syria to Yemen (to which Cemal Pasha and his companions responded with vengeance). Despite the persecution of Arab nationalist leaders under Ottoman rule, this legacy of “betrayal” by Arabs against the administration in Ottoman Istanbul during World War I has left a bitter taste in Turkish mouths. To this day, the best-known cultural icon by Turkey’s citizens that commemorates World War I battles is the “Yemen Turkusu” (Ballad of Yemen), a gloomy recounting of the story of an Anatolian soldier who perished in Yemen—fighting Arabs. Generations of Turks, including Erdogan, were taught in Turkish schools during the twentieth century that the “Arabs stabbed the Turks in the back,” and at least some have internalized strongly anti-Arab nationalist tendencies. 

The Ottoman Empire for centuries faced Europe, treating its Middle Eastern possessions mostly as an afterthought. An overwhelming majority of the nearly 300 grand viziers (a political rank at the level of prime minister) who served under the sultans in Istanbul hailed from the Balkans and the Caucasus. Many of them were ethnic Albanians, Armenians, Bosnians, Bulgarians, Circassians, Georgians, Greeks, and Serbs. There was even the unlikely sprinkling of Italians and Western Europeans among the list of grand viziers. Yet, excluding those whose ethnic origins still cannot be traced, the first Arab to hold the office, Mahmut Shevket Pasha, assumed power only in January 1913, barely five years before the collapse of the six-century-old empire. 

The Turkish language bears linguistic signs of a longer history of Arab disenfranchisement in the Ottoman Empire as well as uneasy Turkish-Arab coexistence beyond the events of World War I. Anti-Arab expressions, many of them widely circulated in contemporary Turkish popular culture, literature, movies, and slang include: “like Arab’s hair” (a mess from which there is no exit); “neither Damascene candy, nor the Arab’s face” (a situation when one has two bad options to choose from); and others that are even less flattering. Erdogan and his foreign affairs minister Ahmet Davutoglu, at the onset of the Arab uprisings, deserve credit for taking an emphatic and passionate interest in the Arab nations and, more importantly, transcending Turkish racist views toward Arabs. Overcoming this mentality was critical to Erdogan’s foreign policy ambitions, and also self-serving. Erdogan believes that Turkey can emerge once again as a great power by leading Muslim countries, starting with the Arab-majority states of the Middle East. By and through Muslims, Turkey can become a great power if Turks are given a superior role in this constellation. At the beginning of the Arab uprisings, which promised to bring Muslim Brotherhood-related parties backed by Ankara to power in various Arab capitals, Erdogan believed this goal was within his reach. 

In the wake of the 2011 revolt that ended President Hosni Mubarak’s three-decade-long regime in Egypt, Erdogan became one of the first foreign leaders to visit Cairo in support of the uprising. This was part of a larger North African tour for the Turkish leader, who simultaneously visited Tunisia and Libya, both of which were similarly shaken by the Arab uprisings. Erdogan landed in Cairo in September 2011. Egyptian crowds greeted him as a hero. Large billboards featuring his face lined the expanse of highway from the Cairo airport to the downtown area. He presented Turkey as a model of modern Islamic democracy and secularism. Although Erdogan’s support for secularism surprised his Egyptian hosts, it was actually an insightful and wise warning—which they ignored—to maintain sufficient public support to deter a military takeover. 

Egyptian newspapers suggested that a new alignment with Turkey would put pressure on Israel, and Erdogan publicized the fact that he was considering a visit to Gaza to signal Turkish support for Hamas and the broader Gaza population. In the end, the Gaza visit did not take place, reportedly due to opposition from Egypt’s then-ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. Following the Cairo visit, Davutoglu called for a Turkish-Egyptian alliance, or “the axis of democracy.” Indeed, close bilateral ties were established with the election victories of the Muslim Brotherhood (known as Ikhwanul Muslimin, or simply “Ikhwan” in Arabic) and its candidate Mohamed Morsi in Egypt in June 2012. 

Erdogan visited Cairo a second time in November 2012, this time with a large delegation from his government and the private sector. He delivered a speech at Cairo University praising Morsi for the decision to withdraw Egypt’s ambassador to Israel in response to Israeli airstrikes on Gaza. Erdogan further suggested that an “Egyptian-Turkish alliance” would ensure peace and stability in the Eastern Mediterranean, implying that such an alliance would constrain Israel’s ability to use force. Erdogan praised Egyptian youth activists for bringing down Mubarak’s “dictatorship” and proclaimed, “Egypt and Turkey are one hand,” a play on the Egyptian military’s slogan “the army and the people are one hand.” 

Yet, Erdogan’s ambitions for a strategic partnership with Egypt ran aground as Morsi’s handle on rule began to slip. Soon after taking office, the latter set in motion a hasty power grab, granting himself judicial control above any Egyptian court and ramming through a new constitution drafted largely by political Islamists, excluding other groups in Egypt. The speed with which Morsi was able to establish himself as the sole ruler of Egypt in less than a year made Erdogan’s own gradual accumulation of power in Turkey since 2003 appear mild by comparison. 

Anti-Morsi and anti-Ikhwan demonstrations in Cairo began in November of 2012 and grew increasingly violent, while attempts at a dialogue between Morsi and the various opposition parties collapsed. By the spring of 2013, the anti-Morsi Tamarod movement had begun organizing mass protests scheduled for June 30, the one-year anniversary of Morsi’s rule. As reports circulated that Morsi had tried to remove General El-Sisi from his position as defense minister, Egypt’s military leadership issued warnings that the army might have to intervene to “prevent Egypt from entering a dark tunnel.” 

Erdogan’s appeal to the Egyptians searching for a new political approach remained strong through this period, mainly because of Turkey’s economic success up to 2013. Unlike Erdogan, who boasted about Turkey’s then-booming economy, Morsi faced a deepening economic crisis. Morsi’s 2012 visit to Ankara was significant because it resulted in a $1 billion loan deal from Erdogan, but this was not enough to improve the Egyptian economy. Western and Turkish efforts to help Morsi reach an agreement with the International Monetary Fund to bolster the Egyptian economy also collapsed, and Morsi withdrew support for reforms only hours after his office announced them. Ankara offered Egypt concessionary trade deals and promoted Turkish private investment, but Morsi’s administration appeared increasingly paralyzed. 

As the June 30 protests drew closer, Erdogan sent Turkey’s national intelligence chief, Hakan Fidan, to visit the Egyptian leader. Subsequent reports in both the Egyptian and Turkish media suggested that Fidan’s mission was to warn Morsi of an impending coup and perhaps even discuss how to avoid it. Whatever the real substance of the visit, the Egyptian military and its civilian allies perceived the visit as final proof of Erdogan’s alignment with Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood. As scheduled, millions of Egyptians took to the streets on June 30, this time to protest the brotherhood’s power grab and its failure to tackle ongoing economic and security problems. Brotherhood politicians labeled the protests “a coup attempt” designed to oust their democratically elected leader from the beginning, echoing rhetoric used by Erdogan, who at the time faced the Gezi Park rallies in Istanbul which had begun only weeks before the protests against Morsi. 

Yet, when General El-Sisi announced on July 3, 2013 that the army had removed Morsi from power to save Egypt from the specter of civil war, he received support from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia, which oppose the Ikhwan in Egypt and regionally. Erdogan’s carefully cultivated relationship with the new Egyptian leadership was over. He referred to El-Sisi as “a tyrant” and accused the interim Egyptian government of practicing “state terrorism.” Erdogan also started to allow pro-Ikhwan and anti-Sisi Egyptian media networks to operate freely from within Turkey. 

El-Sisi struck back. Egyptian media accused Ankara of “supporting the terrorist campaign” against the Egyptian security services in the Sinai Peninsula following Morsi’s removal from power. Huseyin Avni Botsali, a seasoned diplomat and Turkey’s ambassador to Cairo, went from being embraced across the spectrum of Egyptian politics to facing anti-Turkish demonstrations at the gates of his residence. Ankara and Cairo canceled plans confirmed during Morsi’s tenure to hold joint naval maneuvers in the Eastern Mediterranean. Finally, in November 2013, the Egyptian Foreign Ministry expelled Botsali, severing ties with Ankara. 

Erdogan’s support for Morsi and the Brotherhood in Egypt after their ouster went on to cost Turkey dearly. To retaliate, Cairo started talks with Athens to delineate Egyptian and Greek maritime economic areas in the Mediterranean. In November 2014, El-Sisi held a three-way summit with the Cypriot president and Greek prime minister to promote a deal supplying natural gas from undersea fields off the coast of Cyprus to Egypt. In doing this, he was almost certainly seeking to challenge Erdogan’s power in the Eastern Mediterranean. El-Sisi’s government drove out Turkish businesses, which were a source of Ankara’s ascendancy in the Middle East. Turkish businesses that remained in Egypt have suffered since, undermining Ankara’s cherished soft-power goals. 

The continued tension up to the present day in the Turkish-Egyptian relationship is shaped by Erdogan and El-Sisi’s perceptions of each other. Erdogan is the political Islamist leader who has imprisoned secular generals, while El-Sisi is the secular general who has locked up political Islamists. As long as these two men are in charge of their respective countries, it is hard to imagine Ankara and Cairo establishing (much less maintaining) truly friendly relations. 

ERDOGAN’S PRIMAL FEAR

The roots of Ankara’s reaction to Morsi’s ouster, and ultimate break with Cairo, lie as much in Erdogan’s past—namely his traumatic and conflict-ridden relationship with Turkey’s own secularist military—as they do in the events of 2013. A looming fear of “the coup” resides in Erdogan and his Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, or Justice and Development Party (AKP), members, even though he brought the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) under his authority in the last decade with the help of the Gulenist police and judicial apparatus via the aforementioned Ergenekon trials (2008 to 2011). 

These fears can be traced to the “soft coup” of February 1997, in which the TAF orchestrated a civilian protest movement to oust the AKP’s democratically elected political Islamist predecessor, the Welfare Party (RP) and the RP’s leader Necmettin Erbakan (1926-2011). Erbakan was Turkey’s leading political Islamist politician. Erdogan at one time held Erbakan in such high regard that he named one of his sons after him in 1981. 

After the Turkish courts shut down the RP in 1998, they sentenced Erdogan—a member, and then-mayor of Istanbul—to a ten-month jail-term (of which he served four months) for reciting a poem that allegedly undermined Turkey’s secular constitution. The outside world stood with the Turkish military’s coup, yet many Turks championed Erdogan as a heroic prisoner as well as the ideological and political successor of Erbakan, in chains. 

Of course, by the events of summer 2013, political Islam in Turkey and Erdogan himself had come a long way from the 1997-1998 “soft coup” and a prison sentence. After the RP was forcibly shut down, Erdogan and some younger leaders broke away from Erbakan and his anti-democratic rhetoric, officially founding the AKP in 2001. The new AKP stormed into power in the November 2002 Turkish general election. 

When the AKP came to power, Erdogan and the party leadership made an alliance with the Gulen movement, a Turkish political Islamist congregation adhering to the teachings of Muslim cleric Fethullah Gulen. The Gulen movement had thousands of members across Turkey and abroad working in education, the police, media, and the judiciary, as well as private business. The Gulenist-AKP alliance proved to be fruitful indeed for both sides as the Erdogan administration went on to deliver a decade of phenomenal economic growth. In the 2011 parliamentary elections, 49.9 percent of the electorate supported Erdogan and his party, up from 34 percent nine years earlier. 
Subsequently, by 2013 Erdogan had become Turkey’s most powerful leader in nearly a century. However, although he was entrenched in power, Erdogan continued to fear a potential coup. In this regard, the events of 2013 in Turkey and Egypt represent a turning point in Erdogan’s career. 

THE TURNING POINT: GEZI PARK AND BEYOND

Initially, downtown Istanbul’s Gezi protests happened for no discernible reason, according to Erdogan and his government ministers. The protesters—at first—were small groups of anti-capitalists and environmentalists with little influence in Turkey, much less in Istanbul. However, on May 30, 2013, a brutal police crackdown on these insignificant groups spearheaded mass urban protests in many Turkish cities. 

In the matter of a few days, nearly 2.5 million had joined rallies in almost all of Turkey’s eighty-one provinces. The Erdogan-led state was blindsided by the demonstrations and many posited that Erdogan himself would be forced to call early elections, which would lead to his own and his party’s demise. Yet, Erdogan proved resilient, and with backing from his Gulenist allies, he held onto power and hit back at the protesters. His state security forces broke up the protests across the country after a few weeks, resulting in the deaths of seven protesters and police officers by the end of the summer in 2013. 

Meanwhile, the ousting of Erdogan’s ally and fellow political Islamist Morsi—with the tremors of the Gezi Park rallies still rumbling, albeit softly in Turkey—marked a new direction for Erdogan and Turkey in the Middle East. Despite crushing the Gezi Park protests, Erdogan’s actions post-summer 2013 indicate that he was a man fearful of suffering Morsi’s fate. Gezi Park and Morsi’s ouster made Erdogan become more authoritarian in quashing any similar protests he feared could oust him in the future. Domestically, this decision increased Turkey’s democratic backslide. Harassment of opposition members and media outlets became increasingly common, as did political interference in the judicial process. In 2015, renewed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) violence against the Turkish government in southeastern Turkey provided Erdogan with a reason to crack down on his broader opposition beyond Gulenist and pro-PKK constituencies. Furthermore, the failed July 15, 2016 coup against Erdogan, by segments of the TAF with anti-Erdogan Gulenist support, meant that Erdogan and his government were even more emboldened to clamp down on dissidents in the country. 

For years, Erdogan had been a master of reading the global zeitgeist and responding to it with a public relations executive’s craftiness, for instance portraying his AKP as a “democracy-loving (and formerly political-Islamist) faction” soon after the September 11, 2001 attacks. However, after the summer of 2013 and the Gezi Park rallies, he lost this magic touch and ability to awe the international community. The image of Erdogan as an authoritarian leader belatedly started to take shape in many Western capitals and in financial circles. Investment into Turkey started to dry up, and rising anti-Erdogan sentiments in the West only fed into Erdogan’s rooted resentment toward the West from his political past. 

ONLY PALS WITH QATAR

In foreign policy, too, Erdogan faces troubles, especially in the Middle East. With the notable exception of Qatar, following the events of 2013 in Turkey and Egypt, Turkish ties with the Arab monarchies within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE, have suffered severely because of Erdogan’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood in the Middle East. These Gulf monarchies have a deep aversion to the Brotherhood, and see them as their main domestic security threat. 

Meanwhile, Erdogan’s pro-Brotherhood stance found limited success in the rest of North Africa, where Ankara fared better in Tunisia than it did in Libya. When Libya descended into civil war, Erdogan threw his support behind the political Islamist factions in Tripoli’s western-based “Dawn Coalition,” which opposed Libya’s “Dignity Coalition” led by General Khalifa Haftar in Tobruk in the northeast. El-Sisi and his ally the UAE worried about the ascent of political Islam in Libya next door to Egypt and, eager to undermine Erdogan, were quick to assist the Tobruk government; they carried out air strikes aimed at the Tripoli factions. Because of its support for the “Dawn Coalition,” Turkey lost many of the pre-war economic contracts and commercial ties it had painstakingly built in Libya over the previous decades. Ankara also failed to build influence on the UN-led peace process regarding Libya, because many Libyans and key international players did not view Erdogan as neutral. This was illustrated by the ostracized Turkish delegation at the Libya conference in Palermo, Italy, on November 12-13, 2018. 

Erdogan invested heavily in Tunisia after Zine El Abidine Ben Ali’s fall to help the political Islamist Ennahda party, which joined the government in November 2011. A notable initiative in this regard was the establishment of the High Level Strategic Cooperation Council (HLSCC) between Tunis and Ankara, which was signed in Ankara by Erdogan and the then-prime minister of Tunisia, Hamadi Jebali, on December 25, 2012. The declaration created mechanisms for security, military, economic, and trade cooperation. During the first meeting of the HLSCC, the delegations made twenty-one agreements and declared twenty-four twin cities in both countries. Since then, Ankara has provided half a billion dollars’ worth of credit to post-Arab Spring Tunisia, though Turkey’s clout has decreased since Ennahda stepped down from government in 2014. 

By 2019, Qatar was Erdogan’s only friend in the Middle East. Doha and Ankara have much in common when it comes to their foreign policies. Both countries support political Islamist groups, including the Ikhwan in Egypt and Hamas in Gaza, as well as Brotherhood-affiliated groups in Syria and Libya. The Turkish-Qatari alliance solidified after Turkey sided with Doha in a GCC dispute in 2017. On June 5, 2017, the dispute broke into the open when Bahrain, Egypt, Libya’s eastern-based government, the Maldives, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Yemen severed relations with Qatar, citing Doha’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood and accusing it of supporting terrorism. 

Turkey’s immediate reaction to the crisis was to try to remain neutral and call for dialogue. Just a few days into the blockade, however, it became clear that Ankara had decided to take a pro-Qatar stance. Erdogan condemned the Saudi-led coalition’s blockade of Qatar, saying that the isolation imposed on Qatar was inhumane and against Islamic values, even comparing the blockade to a “death sentence.” As the blockade dragged on despite U.S. efforts at mediation, Turkey’s role as a critical lifeline for Qatar became increasingly evident. 

THE MIDDLE EAST’S NEW POWER GAME: “AXIS” VS. “BLOC”

Regional dynamics in the Middle East have aligned Turkey and Qatar, almost molding them into a bilateral axis competing against other regional powers including Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Egypt, and occasionally Jordan and Kuwait in a bloc-like formation, with Israel occasionally supporting this grouping behind the scenes. 

The “axis” and the “bloc” are informal alliances, but competition between them remains fierce. For instance, throughout the Arab uprisings and their aftermath, Turkey and the UAE ended up on opposite sides of almost every conflict. Despite their initial shared hostility toward a common enemy in the form of the Al-Assad regime in Syria, the Turkey-Qatar axis and the UAE have supported rival groups within the Syrian opposition. 

In Palestine, the UAE and Egypt have been trying to broker a deal between the rival Fatah and Hamas movements, while the Turkey-Qatar axis supports Hamas. This competition now extends to East Africa, where the axis is vying for influence against the bloc along the Nile Valley and around the Horn of Africa in a new Great Game. 

In the Horn of Africa, Doha and Ankara teamed up to cultivate influence in Somalia in 2011 and later in Sudan. In this alliance, Ankara provides the manpower on the ground while Doha supplies the investments, thanks to Qatar’s deep pockets. The two countries have accordingly invested heavily in supporting various segments of the government and taking control of ports, as well as building military facilities. In Somalia, these investments are centered in the capital of Mogadishu, and in Sudan, Turkey has set out to build a port in Suakin on the Red Sea coastline. Here Ankara is literally trying to bring an abandoned Ottoman-era port back to life. This presence is limited but has not gone unnoticed by regional players. However, it has yet to be seen whether, following the fall of Omar Al-Bashir in Khartoum, Turkey and Qatar’s influence in Sudan will remain unchanged. Egypt and its allies have already recognized the post-Bashir government in Khartoum, potentially undermining the Doha-Ankara axis there. 

Underlying this rift is the visceral reaction that the Ikhwan and its regional supporters evoke from the bloc. For Egyptian leader El-Sisi, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman, and his homologue UAE Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Zayed, the term “Muslim Brotherhood” has become synonymous with Erdogan’s Turkey, Doha, and with “radical political Islamism” as they understand it. While Turkey’s regional initiatives can be explained through the lens of nationalism or geopolitics, the bloc’s readiness to ascribe all Turkish motives to the Muslim Brotherhood agenda and all Sunni Muslim extremism to the influence of the Ikhwan has deepened the already severe policy differences between the bloc and the axis. 

Within the GCC bloc, Turkey’s ties are the worst with the UAE, Erdogan’s archenemy in the Persian Gulf and perhaps the entire Middle East as of 2019. Abu Dhabi took a strong stance against Erdogan’s support for Morsi and his subsequent opposition to El-Sisi after the fall of the Brotherhood in Cairo. Erdogan’s September 24, 2014 speech at the UN, in which he implied El-Sisi was an illegitimate tyrant, was the straw that broke the proverbial camel’s back regarding Ankara-Abu Dhabi ties. Following this, the UAE launched a successful campaign to block Turkey’s bid to join the UN Security Council for its 2015-2016 term. Since then, Turkish-Emirati ties have hit a historic low, with the two countries using any opportunity to undermine each other’s policies, from Syria—where Abu Dhabi supports Bashar Al-Assad and opened its embassy in December 2018—to Somalia, where Ankara backs the central government in Mogadishu and Abu Dhabi backs Somalia’s breakaway regions in the north. 

TURKEY AND SAUDI ARABIA

Saudi ties with Turkey, however, deserve separate treatment from the axis and the bloc. A devout Muslim, Erdogan has been deferential toward the Saudi kings, whom he respects as the “Guardians of Islam’s Two Holy Shrines” in Mecca and Medina. In fact, in recent years, Turkish-Saudi ties did improve a bit after Saudi Arabia’s vehemently anti-Ikhwan King Abdullah died in January 2015. However, these ties took a nosedive when Turkey sided with Qatar in the GCC dispute, only to dip further following the October 2, 2018 murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. Erdogan used this incident for his own sake, slowly leaking evidence to the media, incriminating Crown Prince Mohammed in the murder, and embarrassing Bin Salman internationally. 

Overall, the Khashoggi episode has left the crown prince bitter toward Erdogan. Bin Salman has embraced the other members of the bloc, bonding with El-Sisi and Mohammed Bin Zayed even more strongly in their opposition to Erdogan. In 2019, Erdogan therefore faces an Arab triumvirate composed of El-Sisi, Mohammed Bin Salman, and Mohammed Bin Zayed, all of whom aim to undermine him and his regional policies. With Iran and its allies, namely the Al-Assad regime and Hezbollah, also opposing Erdogan, this leaves the Turkish leader almost alone in the Middle East, as well as facing pushback from the Saudis and their allies on one side and the Iranians and their allies on the other. 

A FAILED PIVOT AND AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE

Erdogan and his AKP leadership have carefully recalculated their domestic and foreign policies since 2013 to deal with pressing issues at home and abroad. The mirroring of the Gezi Park protests and the ousting of Morsi in Egypt have left a lasting impact on Erdogan’s leadership in Turkey. He has continued to clamp down on protests and dissent after 2013, up to the present day. In foreign policy, Erdogan has faced off against the Gulf countries, trying to influence the outcomes of the Arab uprisings by exclusively supporting the Brotherhood. However, the horse on which Erdogan bet came in last place. This has created a rift between Turkey and almost all other Sunni powers of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. In hindsight, perhaps no one could have guessed that the Brotherhood would rise and fall so fast. However, as crafty statesmen, Erdogan and Davutoglu should have had the insight to not bet on just one horse, but rather on multiple regional competitors in foreign policy. In addition, Turkey’s Syria policy has put it at odds with the Al-Assad regime and Al-Assad’s regional patron, Iran. Although Turkey’s ties with Iraq have improved a bit since 2017, when Baghdad and Ankara came together to object to the Kurdistan Regional Government’s unilateral independence referendum, Ankara retains less influence in Baghdad than does Tehran.

Accordingly, today Ankara is more isolated than ever in the Middle East. Without a doubt, this all has recalibrated the Turkish government’s and many of Turkish citizens’ regional weltanschauung. Erdogan’s Middle Eastern engagement has resulted in sour Turkish views of Arabs and new stereotypes toward them. Ankara’s poor relations with Abu Dhabi are a case in point. In Turkey’s most recent significant spat with the UAE in December 2017, UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan shared a post on Twitter that accused Fahreddin Pasha, an Ottoman general who fought to defend Medina during the Arab revolt of 1916 in World War I, of stealing priceless artifacts and bringing them to Istanbul at the time. “These are Erdogan’s ancestors, and their history with Arab Muslims,” the tweet concluded. The taunt sprung from a deep well of bitterness. On the propaganda front, the UAE has turned to sniping at Turkey, casting it as a foreign power seeking to impose its supremacy over the Arabs. 

Stung by the insult, Erdogan fired back at the minister: “While my ancestors were busy defending Medina, you impudent man, what were your ancestors doing?” Erdogan’s spokesperson Ibrahim Kalin also chimed in, calling Bin Zayed’s comments a “propaganda lie that seeks to turn Turks and Arabs against one another.” Erdogan advisor Yigit Bulut piled on criticism too, deriding the UAE as the “52nd state of the U.S.” (Israel, he said, “is the 51st state”). Pro-Erdogan Turkish press sprang into action with stories and op-eds glorifying Fahreddin Pasha and excoriating the UAE for insulting his character. Ironically, Erdogan’s Middle East pivot, which aimed to undo Turks’ racist views of Arabs, seems to have not only failed in transcending such prejudices, but also encouraged a new generation of unfortunately negative perceptions of and tensions with Arabs. 


In memoriam | Eşref Kolçak (1927-2019)

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Turkish actor Eşref Kolçak died at age 92 on Sunday. Kolçak died at Gemlik State Hospital in northwestern Bursa, where he had been receiving treatment since January for pulmonary edema. 

A funeral and burial for the famous actor was held on Tuesday in Gemlik. 





My favorite Eşref Kolçak film " Erkek Ali" by Atif Yilmaz.


Mavi Boncuk | 

Eşref Kolçak [1] (28 January 1927 – 26 May 2019) was a Turkish actor.He was born in Erzurum but at the age of 14, his family moved to Istanbul. At age 14, he moved with his family to Istanbul's Kasımpaşa district. He graduated from Sultan Ahmet Arts Institute. He also later worked as a carpenter and a cobbler, and owned a carpentry and furniture shop in Kasımpaşa. He studied at the Sultan Ahmet Arts Institute. In 1944, he appeared in his first play at the Atilla Review. In 1947, he made his film debut and went on to appear in over 180 films and series. 

Kolçak won a Golden Orange in 2000 for his performance in Güle Güle. He was the father of musician Harun Kolçak, who died of prostate cancer on 19 July 2017.

In the 1950s and 1960s, Kolçak was one of the prominent actors in melodramas and epic films, starring in Bir Şoförün Gizli Defteri (The Secret Book of a Chauffeur), Namus Uğruna (For the Sake of Honor) and other notable movies.


Filmography
New York'ta Beş Minare (2010)
Kollama (2010)
Yalan Dünya (2007)
Tutkunum Sana (2006)
Kınalı Kuzular: Nişanlıya Verilen Söz (2006)
Zeynep (2005)
Kimsesiz Zaman Tasvirleri (2004)
Kayıp Aşklar (2004)
Yadigar (2004)
Yağmur Zamanı (2004)
Çanakkale: Son Kale (2003)
Umutların Ötesi (2003)
Kınalı Kar (2002)
Yeşil Işık (2001)
Aşk Hırsızı (2000)
Ağaçlar Ayakta Ölür (2000)
Güle Güle (1999)
Sırılsıklam (1998)
Affet Bizi Hocam (1998)
İntizar (1997)
Bir Umut (1997)
Hüzün Çiçeği (1996)
Sahte Dünyalar (1995)
Çiçek Taksi (1995)
Kanayan Yara - Bosna Mavi Karanlık (1994)
Rüyalara Gelin (1993)
Berlin in Berlin (1993)
Zirvedekiler (1993)
Hüdayi Yolu / Aziz Mahmud Hüdai Hz. (1993)
Yağmur Beklerken (1992)
Polis (1992)
Aile Bağları (1991)
Köroğlu (1991)
Vurguna İnmek (1990)
Yuva (1990)
Kanun Savaşçıları (1989)
Meçhul Tohum (1988)
Yaşamak (1988)
Hanım (1988) - Necip
Benim Olsaydın (1987)
Bomba (1987)
Çakırcalı Mehmet Efe (1987)
Yavrumu Kurtarın (1987)
Çatallı Köy (1987)
Kuruluş / Osmancık (1987)
Dikenli Yol (1986)
Yarın Ağlayacağım / Erkekler de Ağlar (1986)
Çalıkuşu (1986)
Altar (1985)
Domdom Kurşunu (1985)
Yaranamadım (1985)
Suçlu Gençlik (1985)
Kahreden Gençlik (1985)
Feryat (1983)
Kahır (1983)
Esir (1983)
İkimiz De Sevdik (1983)
Küçük Ağa (1983)
Dört Yanım Cehennem (1982)
Kelepçe (film) (1982)
Öğretmen Kemal (1981)
Takip (1981)
Unutulmayanlar (1981) -
Önce Hayaller Ölür (1981)
Fırat (1979)
Hayat Harcadın Beni (1979)
Süpermen Dönüyor (1979)
Ölüm Görevi (1978)
Kaybolan Yıllar (1978)
Görünmeyen Düşman (1978)
Denizin Kanı (1978)
Akrep Yuvası (1977)
Şeref Sözü (1977)
Silah Arkadaşları (1977)
Lanet / İlenç (1977)
Yuvanın Bekçileri (1977)
Hain (1977)
Hedefteki Adam (1977)
Yıkılmayan Adam (1977)
Bedia (1977) - Halil
Tek Başına (1976)
Kader Bu (1976)
Mikrop (1976)
Örgüt (1976)
Seni Sevmekle Suçluyum (1976)
Bizim Düğün Ne Zaman (1976)
Gurbetçiler Dönüyor (1976)
Şafakta Buluşalım (1975)
Cemil (1975)
Kanlı Sevda (1974)
Kalleş (1974)
Alo Polis (1974)
Eski Kurtlar (1974)
Şehitler (1974)
Kurt Kapanı (1973)
Soğukkanlılar (1973)
Topal (1973)
Vahşet (1973)
Bu Toprağın Kızı (1973)
Cezanı Çekeceksin (1972)
Son Duanı Et (1972)
Silahlar Affetmez (1971)
Üç Öfkeli Adam (1971)
Kartallar (1971)
Bela Çiçekleri (1970)
Bu Yumruk Sana (1970)
Ölüm Pazarı (1970)
Günahını Kanlarıyla Ödediler (1969)
Beyaz Mendilim (1969)
Emmioğlu (1969)
Eşkiya Aşkı (1969)
Satılık Gelin (1969)
Şeytanın Oyunu (1969)
Kardeş Kurşunu (1969)
Mekansız Kurtlar (1968)
Cehennemde Boş Yer Yok (1968)
Kurşun Yolu (1968)
Bir Mahkum Kaçtı (1968)
Kızgın Adam (1968)
Dertli Pınar (1968)
Kara Kartal (1967)
Kocadağlı (1967)
İslamoğlu (1966)
Kanlı Pazar (1966)
Kıran Kırana (1966)
Namus Borcu (1966)
Ölüm Busesi (1966)
Dalgacı Mahmut (1965)
Düşman Kardeşler (1965)
Kanunsuzlar (1965)
Yumruk Yumruğa (1965)
Filinta Kadri (1964)
Yalnız Efe (1964)
Erkek Ali (1964)
Yarın Bizimdir (1963)
Korkusuz Kabadayı (1963)
Gecelerin Hakimi (1963)
Rüzgarlı Tepe (1963)
Öksüz Hasan (1963)
Hancının Kızı (1963)
Beyoğlu Piliçleri (1963)
Başımı Belaya Sokma (1963)
Çıkar Yol (1962)
Dağlar Bulutlu Efem (1962)
Bardaktaki Adam (1962)
Aşk Bekliyor (1962)
Boşver Doktor (1962)
Beş Kardeştiler (1962)
Kurşun Yağmuru (1962)
Silah Arkadaşları (1962)
Çöpçatan (1962)
Ümitler Kırılınca (1962)
Düğün Alayı (1961)
Kaderin Önüne Geçilmez (1961)
Şoför Ahmet (1961)
Ayşecik Şeytan Çekici (1960)
Gece Kuşu (1960)
Namus Uğruna (1960)
Beklenen Bomba (1959)
Dağlar Şahini Yörük Efe (1959)
Düşman Yolları Kesti (1959)
Hayatım Sana Feda (1959)
Unutulmayan Aşk / Zeynebim (1959)
Civan Ali (1958)
Kumpanya (1958)
Ninni Talihsiz Yetime (1958)
Sokak Çocuğu (1958)
Bir Şoförün Gizli Defteri (1958)
Kin (1957)
Ceylan Emine (1957)
Öksüz Ayşe (1957)
Yangın (1956)
Zeynep'ın İntikamı (1956)
Şehir Yıldızları (1956)
Yetim Yavrular (1955)
Kanlarıyla Ödediler (1955)
Çılgınlar Cehennemi (1954)
Gülnaz Sultan (1954)
Ölüme Giden Yol (1954)
Çalsın Sazlar Oynasın Kızlar / Oyna Kızım Oyna (1954)
Affet Beni Allahım (1953)
Fedakar Ana (1949)

[1]  Babası İspir Gaziler köyünden Harun Kolçakoğlu, annesi ise daha sonra Hateme adını alan, Rus kökenli Katya'dır. 1941 yılında İstanbul'a geldi. Sultanahmet Sanat Enstitüsü'ne girdi ancak bitiremedi. Marangozluk ve ayakkabı tamirciliği gibi işlerde çalıştı. 1944 yılında Atilla Revüsü'nde, 1945 yılında Ses Opereti'nde sahneye çıktı. 1947 yılında ilk filmini çevirdi.

Sanat hayatı boyunca 180 sinema filmi ve televizyon dizisinde rol aldı.

Book | Black Sea by Caroline Eden

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See: Turkey’s Black Sea coast: food to drive for | Travel | The Guardian

Mavi Boncuk |

Black Sea
Dispatches and Recipes – Through Darkness and Light
Caroline Eden[1]

ISBN:9781787131316
Pages:288
Publisher:Quadrille Publishing Ltd
Published:21 May 2019

Winner of the John Avery Award at the André Simon Food and Drink Book Awards for 2018

'‘The next best thing to actually travelling with Caroline Eden – a warm, erudite and greedy guide – is to read her. This is my kind of book.’ Diana Henry

'A wonderfully inspiring book about a magical part of the world' Viv Groskop, author of The Anna Karenina Fix

‘Part travelogue, part recipe book, this is a love letter to “the sea that welcomes strangers”, soaked in colour, history, myth and the flavours of many cultures.’ Nick Hunt author of Where the Wild Winds Are

This is the tale of a journey between three great cities – Odessa, built on a dream by Catherine the Great, through Istanbul, the fulcrum balancing Europe and Asia and on to tough, stoic, lyrical Trabzon.

With a nose for a good recipe and an ear for an extraordinary story, Caroline Eden travels from Odessa to Bessarabia, Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey’s Black Sea region, exploring interconnecting culinary cultures. From the Jewish table of Odessa, to meeting the last fisherwoman of Bulgaria and charting the legacies of the White Russian émigrés in Istanbul, Caroline gives readers a unique insight into a part of the world that is both shaded by darkness and illuminated by light.

Meticulously researched and documenting unprecedented meetings with remarkable individuals, Black Sea is like no other piece of travel writing. Packed with rich photography and sumptuous food, this biography of a region, its people and its recipes truly breaks new ground.
   


[1] Caroline Eden

Caroline Eden is a travel and food writer focusing on the former Soviet Union and south Asia. She has written for various publications including the Daily Telegraph, Financial Times and the Guardian. Caroline's first book, Samarkand[2] , won the Guild of Food Writers Award for best food and travel book in 2017. She lives in Edinburgh, Scotland.


See: Cookbook of the week: 'Samarkand' maps the stories and food from around the Silk Road city

[2] Samarkand: Recipes & Stories from Central Asia & The Caucasus

ISBN1909487422, 


9781909487420
Length 224 pages

Over hundreds of years, various ethnic groups have passed through Samarkand, sharing and influencing each other's cuisine and leaving their culinary stamp. This book is a love letter to Central Asia and the Caucasus, containing personal travel essays and recipes little known in the West that have been expertly adapted for the home cook.

An array of delicious dishes introduce the region and its different ethnic groups-Uzbek, Tajik, Russian, Turkish, Korean, Caucasian, and Jewish-along with a detailed introduction to the Silk Road and a useful store cupboard of essential ingredients.
Chapters are divided into A Shared Table, Soups, Roast Meats & Kebabs, Warming Food for Long Winters, Plovs & Pilafs, Accompaniments, Breads & Doughs, Drinks, and Desserts & Sweetmeats. One hundred recipes are showcased, including Apricot & Red Lentil Soup, Chapli Kebabs, Rosh Hashanah Plov with Barberries, Pomegranate, & Quince, Kefir Pancakes with Blackberry Syrup, and the all-important regional breads. And with evocative travel features such as Lunch on the Road to Samarkand, A Banquet on the Caspian Sea, and Shopping under Kyrgyzstan's Sacred Mountain, you will be charmed and enticed by this relatively untouched region and its cuisine.

Marshall Plan Nostalgia

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Mavi Boncuk |Turkey always next to Greece. Greece backed up by France and Germany. 
The Marshall Plan (officially the European Recovery Program, ERP) was an American initiative passed in 1948 to aid Western Europe, in which the United States gave over $12 billion (nearly $100 billion in 2018 US dollars) in economic assistance to help rebuild Western European economies after the end of World War II.

Article | Turkey and Russia are not friends, despite appearances

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Mavi Boncuk |

Turkey and Russia are not friends, despite appearances
By Soner Cagaptay and Andy Taylor, opinion contributor 
The Hill  06/16/19

SOURCE

Soner Cagaptay is a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and author of “Erdogan’s Empire: Turkey and the Politics of the Middle East.” Follow him on Twitter @SonerCagaptay.

Andy Taylor worked in the U.S. House of Representatives from 2010-2019, where he covered Turkey on the House Foreign Affairs Committee staff.

The 70-year-old alliance between the United States and Turkey is heading for its most turbulent period in decades. Congress voted this past week on legislation to punish Ankara for its planned acquisition of the Russian-made S-400 missile system and what lawmakers perceive as Turkish coziness towards Russia. Washington is preparing to curtail defense cooperation with Ankara and sanction Turkey. However, these actions will inadvertently deepen Ankara’s ties with Moscow.

Tukey, a key member of the NATO alliance, is prepared to take possession of a sophisticated Russian anti-aircraft system initially designed to track and shoot down NATO fighter jets. This is inconceivable to the United States. A law passed in the wake of Russia’s interference in the 2016 election requires the president to impose sanctions against anyone engaged in significant transactions with Russia’s defense or intelligence sectors — a threshold that certainly would be met by the S-400 deal.

Turkey, once adored by many in Washington as a role model for Muslim-majority countries, today has few friends left on Capitol Hill. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s crackdown on press freedoms, political opponents and democracy itself has engendered deep animosity towards him in Washington. Frequent meetings between Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin, and Turkey’s growing defense ties with Russia, leave the impression that Ankara is becoming a Moscow ally. The truth is that Ankara feels threatened by its massive neighbor to the north.

Between the 17th and 20th centuries, the Ottoman and Russian empires were deadly rivals. Until the collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917, Turks and Russians fought 17 major wars, which the Turks overall lost. Later on, Turkey’s decision to enter NATO in the 20th century was driven by its fear of Russia. In 1946, Stalin demanded territory from Ankara. Seeing this as the return of historic Russian aggression, Turkey pivoted to the United States, entering NATO in 1952. In addition, as recently as 2015, Turkey shot down a Russian jet in connection with the civil war in Syria, where Ankara and Moscow generally have backed opposing forces.

Turkey’s decision to pursue the S-400 system requires more context. For a decade now, Ankara attempted to procure American-made Patriot missiles without success. The U.S. resisted Turkey’s demands for technology transfer and local production. As a result, Ankara sought unlikely substitutes, including a Chinese missile system in 2013, which fell through because of U.S. objections. Following the 2016 coup attemptagainst Erdogan, including the aerial bombing of the Turkish parliament, Ankara’s — and Erdogan’s — search for an anti-aircraft system grew even more imperative.

Of course, Putin is happy to sell weapons to a NATO member to drive a wedge in the alliance. Moscow can use the S-400 system to conduct invaluable intelligence-gathering efforts against the F-35, America’s next-generation fighter jet. Turkey has been a critical partner in developing the aircraft since 2002, with significant industrial participation. What is more, Ankara plans to procure 100 of these jets. The Trump administration has halted the transfer of F-35s to Turkey until Ankara drops its plans to acquire the S-400. Simultaneously, Washington has made an “attractive” offer to sell Turkey Patriot missiles, provided Ankara walks away from the S-400 deal.

Despite the threat of being kicked out of the F-35 program, looming economic sanctions in the midst of a recession at home, and a clear alternative U.S. offer for NATO-interoperable Patriot missiles, Erdogan likely will move forward with Putin’s offer because of Russia’s significant leverage over Turkey.

In Syria, where Erdogan has backed rebels to oust the Moscow-allied Assad regime, Putin can deal the Turks their 18th defeat by Russia. A Russian-led onslaught against rebel-held Idlib province, home to 3 million people, would trigger a massive wave of refugees towards Turkey, overwhelming Ankara. Turkey also would face a stream of jihadists from Idlib, posing a grave threat to its security.

Moscow could unleash Kurdish proxies in neighboring Syria to wage a campaign of destruction and violence in Turkey. What is more, Putin can halt Russian tourism — more Russians visit Turkey annually than visitors from any other country — and block the import of Turkish agricultural products, as it did after Ankara’s 2015 shootdown of the Russian jet, further squeezing Turkey’s feeble economy.

Putin also can threaten energy supplies to Turkey, the second-largest consumer of Russian gas in Europe after Germany. This is not to mention the Kremlin’s sophisticated propaganda and disinformation efforts in Turkey, whose society suffers from rock-bottom levels of interpersonal trust among advanced economies.

So, no, Turkey and Russia are not allies or friends. Erdogan’s security concerns, mistrust of the West, and inability to secure American-made missiles left him searching for an alternative. Erdogan is unlikely to walk away from Putin’s shrewd S-400 offer because he fears Russian reprisal. As a result, the consequences for U.S.-Turkey relations could be grave.

Turkey has the second-largest military in NATO and is home to Incirlik base, a major overseas post Washington uses to carry out strikes against ISIS and safeguard U.S. nuclear weapons. What is more, bordering Iran, Iraq, Syria, formerly ISIS held-territories and Russia across the Black Sea, Turkey provides strategic real estate for the United States. Turkey remains a critical country for American interests, despite Erdogan’s autocratic tendencies and actions unbecoming of a treaty ally. Policymakers should tread carefully with this information in mind.

Ottoman and Turkish Mausers

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Mavi Boncuk | 



Pictured 1903 Ottoman Mauser

In the decade up to 1914 the Ottoman government invested heavily in the modernisation of its army's weapons and equipment. This programme concentrated on buying material directly from foreign companies rather than building domestic industrial capacity. As part of this modernisation process the Ottoman government invited a German military mission to advise the army on its choice of modern weapons and how best to use them. Under the influence of these advisers most of the pre-war military contracts went to large German arms manufacturers, including Krupp, Mauser and Rheinmetall.


Unfortunately for the Ottoman Empire, many of the arms purchased recently were lost in the Balkan Wars of 1912–13. The Ottoman Army went to war in 1914 with significant gaps in its arsenal, particularly machine guns and field artillery. When neutral Bulgaria and Greece closed their borders and the Russian, British and French navies imposed a blockade on maritime trade, the Ottoman Empire was cut off from its German arms suppliers.


This isolation prevented the Ottoman Army fully replacing the losses in artillery it had suffered during the Balkan Wars. Stocks of artillery shells also fell to dangerously low levels. The Ottoman field armies had to fight their battles without the intensive use of artillery fire that the armies of the other Great Powers came to rely on. The situation was improved somewhat by Bulgaria’s entry into the war on the side of the Central Powers in October 1915. The invasion and conquest of Serbia a month later opened a direct land route to Germany and restored the Ottoman Empire’s access to German arms and munitions factories. From then to the war’s end the Turks received considerable military aid and assistance from Germany. But this was never enough to completely make good both the original shortfalls in weapons and equipment and the continuing losses as the war went on.

The Ottoman Army’s most modern rifle – as good as any used by the other Great Powers – was the 7.65-mm M1903 Mauser[1] bolt-action rifle. This German-designed and manufactured weapon used a five-round removable box magazine and had an effective range of up to 600 m. It was issued to the Ottoman Army’s best front-line infantry units. Just over 200,000 were received before the war. Previous versions of the Mauser design had been adopted from the early 1890s and these weapons – the 7.65-mm Mauser M1890 and M1893 bolt-action rifles – continued to be used. In 1914 the Ottoman Army had almost 800,000 7.65-mm Mauser bolt-action rifles and carbines (shortened versions made especially for use by cavalry). Obsolete weapons like the 9.5-mm Mauser M1887 rifle and the single-shot Peabody-Martini 11.43-mm M1874 rifle were issued to second-line units, Kurdish and Arab auxiliaries and the paramilitary Jardama. The standard handguns used by officers and specialist branches (such as military policemen) were 7.63-mm Mauser C96 and 9-mm FN-Browning M1903 pistols. Older revolvers were used by second-tier army and Jardarma units. Officers were allowed to purchase their own handguns and possessed a great variety of European makes and models.



Turkey bought literally hundreds of thousands of Mausers, some of which were “standard” and others which had unique features and dimensions. Also, if a Turkish contract had not been totally filled when the Mauser Factory developed a new model, Mauser would finish out the order with the newer, or improved, model. This helped to keep the Turkish military up to date with the latest, most current Mausers. It also meant that the Turkish military soon had a lot of different models and variations of the Mauser. Currently, one of the most common Turkish Mausers advertised is the Model 1938. 

In the late 30s, the Turkish military authorities initiated a major program to standardize the many different models they had in service. This entailed taking Model 98GEW’s, Model 1893’s, Model 1903’s, Czech 98/22’s, plus many others, and rebarreling any 7.65mm guns to 8x57 and reworking all of them so they all looked basically like the Model 1903 rifle. Model 1893's received a lot of modifications when converted to 8mm Mauser. 

It seems that the conversions were done in the 1930's at the Ankara arsenal.


[1] Mauser, begun as Königliche Waffen Schmieden, is a German arms manufacturer. Their line of bolt-action rifles and semi-automatic pistols have been produced since the 1870s for the German armed forces. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Mauser designs were also exported and licensed to a large number of countries which adopted them as military and civilian sporting firearms.

See also:  Weapons of the Ottoman Army

Gewehr 1871/84

A variant of the M71/84, the M1887 chambered in 9.5x60mm was ordered by the Ottoman Empire, becoming the first in a long series of "Turkish" Mausers. The Turkish contract specified that if any other nation ordered Mauser rifles with more advanced technology, that design would be used in the Model 1887 to fill the remainder of the Turkish order. This clause was utilized after Belgium adopted the Model 1889 rifle.

The Mauser Model 1871 was the Mauser brothers' first rifle. It was adopted by the German Empire (except for the Kingdom of Bavaria) as the Gewehr 71 or Infanterie-Gewehr 71 (I.G.Mod.71 was engraved on the rifles). Production began at the Oberndorf factory for the infantry version, which fired a black powder 11×60mm round from a long 850 mm (33 in) barrel. Shorter versions were introduced with the 700 mm (28 in) barreled Jäger and 500 mm (20 in) cavalry carbine.

Slightly modified versions were widely sold to other countries, firing bullets that would today be considered very large, typically 9.5mm to 11.5mm. Such large bullets were necessary due to the limitations of black powder, which hindered velocities. Serbia designed an improved version of the Model 71 in 10.15mm, made in Germany and called the Mauser-Milovanović M1878/80. In 1884 an 8-shot tubular magazine was added by Mauser to the Model 71/84. The Turkish model 1887 rifle was the first of a series of rifles produced for the Turkish Army. Its design echoed that of the German Gewehr 71/84 service rifle: a bolt-action weapon with a tubular magazine beneath the barrel. 

The M71/84 was a repeating bolt-action rifle developed from the earlier Gewehr M1871 single-shot rifle designed by Paul and Wilhelm Mauser, and was the last blackpowder Mauser. A tubular 8-round magazine, designed by Alfred von Kropatschek, was added below the barrel. Interestingly, it was loaded from the top of the receiver with the bolt open. The rifle would not last long in service, being replaced by the M1888 Commission rifle just 5 years later.

1891 Mauser Rifle

The Ottoman Empire purchased 280,000 of the identical M1890 rifles also chambered in 7.65x53mm Mauser.

After the Mauser brothers finished work on the Model 71/84 in 1880, the design team set out to create a small caliber repeater that used smokeless powder. Because of setbacks brought on by Wilhelm Mauser's death, they failed to have the design completed by 1882, and the German Rifle Test Commission (Gewehr-Prüfungskommission) was formed. The commission preferred to create their own design. Paul Mauser created two different variations of the same rifle, one with a stock strengthened with a barrel shroud and a traditional design following the layout of the 71 series in hope he might be able to overturn the commission's decision, or at least sell his design to the Kingdom of Bavaria, which adopted its own arms. The two rifles became known as the 89 Belgian (with a barrel shroud) and the 91 Argentine (with a 71 layout) Mausers, identical in their function and feed system. The main features were the ability to use stripper clips to feed the magazine (a revolution in rate of fire), and its rimless 7.65×53mm Argentine ammunition, advanced for the time.

The system proved impressive at the 1884 Bavarian Arms Trials. Both firearms were a success, but decision-makers were not convinced that the stripper feed was superior to the en-bloc system employed by Mannlicher. In response, Mauser started small-scale production of the design in an effort to interest foreign nations, but failed to convince any of the European major powers.

The Belgian attache, however, urged his government to contact Mauser, hoping the design might give them a chance to found a domestic arms industry. The heavy-barreled Mauser with the barrel shroud resulted in the founding of arms manufacturer FN Herstal. FN could not keep up with orders, so they outsourced production to the Birmingham Small Arms Company in England.

The Belgians' talks with Mauser prompted the Ottoman Empire to consider the design. In the end they ordered their own simpler variation of the 91 Argentine Mauser known as the 90 Turkish. While this was taking place, the Argentine Small Arms Commission contacted Mauser in 1886 to replace their Model 71s; since they wished to keep retraining of their armed forces to a minimum, they went for the Mauser 91. As with other early Mausers, most such arms were made by the Ludwig Loewe company, who in 1896 joined with other manufactures to form Deutsche Waffen und Munitionsfabriken.

All variations used the same 7.65 mm round-nosed cartridge. Many parts were interchangeable, with the exception of the bayonets of the 89 and 90/91; the barrel shroud made the bayonet ring too wide. The 89 Mauser rejected by Germany in 1884 entered service in 1940 with the second-line units of Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Belgium.

A non-rotating Mauser claw extractor was introduced in the Model 92. Several variations of this model participated in rifle trials for the U.S. Army of that year; the Norwegian Krag–Jørgensen rifle was ultimately chosen.

The M1891 Argentine Contract rifle was developed from the earlier Belgian M1889, which was the first Mauser designed with a single-piece bolt body and firing a smokeless powder cartridge. The M91 did away with the M89's barrel shroud, but in other respects was virtually identical. It featured a 29.1" barrel, ladder-type rear sight, short handguard, and straight-gripped single-piece stock. A cock-on-closing design, it is easily identified by its single-column magazine, which projects down from the stock directly in front of the trigger guard. Chambered in 7.65x53mm Mauser.

The M1892 Mauser rifles submitted to the US Army trials was based on this design; each incorporated a large external claw extractor (a feature used on all subsequent Mausers) and some were equipped with magazine cutoffs. The most advanced of these, Rifle No.5, featured a one-piece magazine and triggerguard. Rifles in 7.65x53mm and .30-40 Krag were tested, but the Krag-Jørgensen design was chosen instead.

1893 Spanish Mauser

The Ottoman Empire ordered 200,000 M1893 rifles chambered in 7.65x53 Belgian. Each rifle featured a magazine cutoff on the right side of the receiver. Many of these rifles were later converted to 7.92x57mm by the Turkish Republic and may be seen with straight or pistol-gripped stocks and with-or-without the magazine cutoff box. These are designated M1893/33.

The Mauser Model 1893 is a bolt-action rifle commonly referred to as the "Spanish Mauser", though the model was adopted by other countries in other calibers, most notably the Ottoman Empire. The M93 introduced a short staggered-column box magazine as standard, holding five smokeless 7×57mm Mauser rounds flush with the bottom of the rifle, which could be reloaded quickly by pushing a strip of rounds from the top of the open bolt. It still had only two locking lugs.

The M1893 was the first Mauser rifle to incorporate both the non-rotating claw extractor and the staggered-column box magazine developed by Paul Mauser. Unlike other Mauser designs, the bottom of the M1893's bolt face was square, which was believed to be necessary for feeding staggered cartridges. This feature is present on all M1893 Mausers, but was found to be unnecessary and was eliminated from subsequent designs. It fired the high-velocity 7x57mm cartridge developed by Paul Mauser in 1892. Initial production was by Ludwig Loewe & Co. in Berlin; in 1896 the Spanish arsenal at Oviedo took over production. Production of the M1893 lasted until the mid-1930s. During the Spanish Civil War, the rifle was widely used by both Republican and Nationalist forces.

This rifle's performance against United States troops during the Spanish-American war led directly to the development of the American M1903 Springfield.



EU Watch | MAM Gets Lucky the Second Times Around

EU Watch | CAATSA me CAATSA you..

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Since Russia and Turkey signed an agreement to purchase the Russian-made S-400 missile defence system in December 2017, the deal has become one of the most contested issues between Ankara and Washington.

Mavi Boncuk |

Rift over S-400 purchase deepens. Acting U.S. Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan warned his Turkish counterpart in a letter last week the U.S. could levy sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, or CAATSA, over Ankara’s decision to move forward with the contentious purchase of a Russian missile system that U.S. officials say threatens the F-35 fighter jet.

Turkish F-35 pilot training halted. In the letter, Shanahan notified Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar that he is taking significant steps to cut Turkey out of the F-35 program altogether. Lara Seligman got the scoop about the the letter, which laid out measures including mandating that Turkish F-35 pilots currently training in the United States must leave the country by July 31 and halting training for new students. Turkish defense firms will also eventually be cut from the program, eliminating a significant source of revenue.

Turkey is still showing no signs that it will cave to pressure, with officials telling Turkish media outlets after Shanahan’s letter that Ankara will move forward with the S-400 purchase.

Sanctions will sting. This would not be the first time the United States has slapped sanctions on Turkey, notes Amanda Sloat, a former U.S. diplomat and expert on trans-Atlantic relations at the Brookings Institution. However, she acknowledged the move to impose CAATSA sanctions–and cutting Ankara out of the F-35 program–will have dire effects on Turkey’s already fragile economy and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s popularity as his party faces the prospect of losing the Istanbul mayoral election for a second time.

‘Dangerous trajectory.’ U.S. Defense Department officials stressed that they want to keep the F-35 vs. S-400 spat separate from broader cooperation on a range of issues with a key NATO ally. However, experts note that Erdogan’s move to acquire the S-400 despite such strong opposition may signal the country’s broader pivot away from the transatlantic alliance — toward Moscow.

“This sets Turkey on a dangerous trajectory and it will make the Turkish military more prone to Russian meddling,” Aykan Erdemir, a Senior Fellow with the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. 

SOURCE

Third Army of the Ottoman Empire

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Mavi Boncuk | Today the Turkish Third Army one of the four field armies of the Turkish Land Forces is a field army of the Turkish Army and is the country's largest army. 

It traces its origins to 1923, but further back, the Ninth Army Troops Inspectorate was re-designated the Third Army Troops Inspectorate on 15 June 1919. General Ragıp Gümüşpala commanded the army between 1958 and 1960. In the days of the Soviet Union the Third Army was stationed on the Caucasus border to counter any Soviet attack by the Transcaucasus Military District. In 1973 the Army, with headquarters at Erzincan, had the 8th Corps at Elâzığ (including the 12th Infantry Division (Turkey), today 12th Mechanized Infantry Brigade at Ağrı[2]), the 9th Corps at Erzurum (including 9th Infantry Division at Sarıkamış (which was active to at least 1996), and the 11th Corps at Trabzon. After 1974–75 and the Turkish invasion of Cyprus 11th Corps headquarters was moved to North Cyprus.




Enver Paşa with German officers at the Caucasian front

Third Army of the Ottoman Empire
military.wikia.org SOURCE

August 5, 1914-October 15, 1918[1]
BattlesCaucasus Campaign (World War I)

Commanders
Hasan Izzet Pasha (November 1–December 19, 1914)
Hasan İzzet Paşa, Hasan İzzet Arolat, (1871; Constantinople (Istanbul) – 3 March 1931)

Enver Pasha (December 22, 1914–January 10, 1915)
Ismail Enver Pasha (Ottoman Turkish: اسماعیل انور پاشا‎; Turkish: İsmail Enver Paşa; 22 November 1881 – 4 August 1922) 

Hafiz Hakki Pasha (January 12- February 13, 1915)
Hafız Hakkı Paşa, (24 April 1878, Edirne, Ottoman Empire - 15 February 1915; Erzurum)
Hafız was appointed by Enver Pasha to take over the remnants of the Ottoman army in the Caucasus in early 1915. He died of typhus in Erzerum in 1915 just a few weeks later.

Mahmud Kâmil Pasha (February 13, 1915–February 23, 1915)
Mahmud Kâmil Pasha (1880   Heleb (Aleppo)– June 1922 Constantinople (Istanbul) 

Abdul Kerim Pasha (February 23, 1915-February 16, 1916)
Abdul Kerim Pasha ( Abdülkerim Paşa; born 1872 and died January 16, 1923), also known as Abdülkerim Öpelimi. Abdul Kerim was married to Mevedet Vlora, the older daughter of Ismail Qemal Bej Vlora [*] 

 [*]  Qemal Bej Vlora was an Albanian politician and publicist who served as the 1st Prime Minister as well as Foreign Minister of Albania from 1912 to 1914.[He is considered to be the Founding Father of Modern Albania and the principal author of the Declaration of Independence. 

Qemali embarked on a career as an Ottoman civil servant reaching high government positions in European and Asian parts of the empire after he moved to Istanbul in May 1860. He identified with the liberal reform wing of Midhat Pasha, the author of the Ottoman constitution (1876) with whom Qemali was a close collaborator, and he became governor of several towns in the Balkans. During these years he took part in efforts for the standardization of the Albanian alphabet supporting the use of Latin characters for writing Albanian[7] and the establishment of an Albanian cultural association.

By 1877, Ismail seemed to be on the brink of important functions in the Ottoman administration, but when Sultan Abdulhamid II dismissed Midhat as prime minister, Ismail Qemali was sent into exile in western Anatolia, though the Sultan later recalled him and made him governor of Beirut. Qemali in 1892 presented the sultan with a plan for a Balkan Confederation.[8] It involved an entente between Balkan states and the empire eventually bound by mutual defense and economic development of resources agreements within a unified Great Eastern state with Turkey as its centre and return of old borders.[8] In this framework, Albania like Macedonia was not treated as a separate state but as part of Turkey.[8] In time his liberal policy recommendations caused him to fall out of favour with the Sultan again. Qemali was aware that the empire came close to intervention from the Great Powers due to the Armenian crisis of 1895. Abdulhamid II awarded Qemali the position of governor (vali) of Tripoli, however he viewed the high post as exile.

In May 1900 Ismail Qemali boarded the British ambassador's yacht, claimed asylum and conveyed out of the empire were for the next eight years he lived in exile. Qemali left for Athens and issued proclamations explaining his abandonment of service to the empire.
.
Vehib Pasha (February 1916–June 1918)
Wehib Pasha also known as Vehip Pasha, Mehmed Wehib Pasha, Mehmet Vehip Pasha (modern Turkish: Kaçı Vehip Paşa or Mehmet Vehip (Kaçı), 1877 1877 Yanya (present day: Ioannina), then part of the Ottoman Empire–Istanbul 1940), was a general in the Ottoman Army. He fought in the Balkan Wars and in several theatres of World War I. In his later years, he acted as a military advisor to the Ethiopian army in the Second Italo-Abyssinian War. 

Esad Pasha (June–October 1918)
Mehmed Esad Pasha (Yanya (now Ioannina18 October 1862 – Istanbul 2 November 1952), known as Mehmet Esat Bülkat after the 1934 Surname Law, was an Ottoman general active during the First Balkan War, where he led the Yanya Corps, and in World War I, where he was the senior Ottoman commander in the Dardanelles Campaign. In February 1918 he was placed in command of the Fifth Army, and in June, of the Third Army on the Caucasus front. After the Armistice of Mudros, and until his retirement on 22 November 1919, he served as Inspector-General of the mostly demobilized Second Army.

The Third Army was originally established in the Balkans and later defended the northeastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Its initial headquarters was at Salonica, where it formed the core of the military forces that supported the Young Turk Revolution of 1908. Many of its officers who participated in the Revolution, including Enver Pasha and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, rose to fame and power. By 1911, the Army had been moved to Erzincan in northeastern Anatolia, and with the onset of World War I, it was moved to Erzurum. During the war, it fought against the Russian Caucasus Army, Armenian volunteer units and behind the lines dealt with the Armenian Resistance at his responsibility area. During this period, the Battle of Sarikamish, Battle of Koprukoy and the Battle of Erzurum were significant engagements. The army's headquarters was moved to Susehir (a town near Sivas) after the dusastrous Battle of Erzurum, and by late 1916 the army lacked any offensive capability. After the Russian Revolution, the Russian Caucasus Army disintegrated. Between 1917 and 1918 it advanced against forces of theArmenian national liberation movement established by Armenian Congress of Eastern Armenians which became the Armenian Army with the declaration of the Democratic Republic of Armenia. During this period, the Third Army engaged the Armenian forces at Sardarapat, Abaran, and Karakilisa.

Order of Battle, 1908

After the Young Turk Revolution and the establishment of the Second Constitutional Era on July 3, 1908, new government initiate a major military reform. Army headquarters were modernized. Its operational area was Western Rumelia, and it had units in Europe (Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia) and Minor Asia (Aydın). It commanded the following active divisions:[2] The Third Army also had inspectorate functions for twelve Redif (reserve) divisions:[3][4]

Third Army
5th Infantry Division (Beşinci Fırka)
6th Infantry Division (Altıncı Fırka)
17th Infantry Division (On Yedinci Fırka)
18th Infantry Division (On Sekizinci Fırka)
3rd Cavalry Division (Üçüncü Süvari Fırkası)
Fortress Artillery Battalion x 4
Redif divisions of the Third Army (name of the division denotes its location)
9th Monastir Reserve Infantry Division (Dokuzuncu Manastır Redif Fırkası)
10th Köprülü Reserve Infantry Division (Onuncu Köprülü Redif Fırkası)
11th Salonika Reserve Infantry Division (On Birinci Selânik Redif Fırkası)
12th Aydın Reserve Infantry Division (On İkinci Aydın Redif Fırkası)
28th Üsküp Reserve Infantry Division (Yirmi Sekizinci Üsküp Redif Fırkası)
29th Pirştine Reserve Infantry Division (Yirmi Dokuzuncu Pirştine Redif Fırkası)
30th Pirzerin Reserve Infantry Division (Otuzuncu Pirzerin Redif Fırkası)
31st Serez Reserve Infantry Division (Otuz Birinci Serez Redif Fırkası)
32nd Berat Reserve Infantry Division (Otuz İkinci Berat Redif Fırkası)
33rd Görüce Reserve Infantry Division (Otuz Üçüncü Görüce Redif Fırkası)
34th Debre-i Bala Reserve Infantry Division (Otuz Dördüncü Debre-i Bala Redif Fırkası)
54th Gevgili Reserve Infantry Division (Elli Dördüncü Gevgili Redif Fırkası)

Order of Battle, 1911
With further reorganizations of the Ottoman Army, to include the creation of corps level headquarters, by 1911 the Army was headquartered in Erzincan. The Army before the First Balkan War in 1911 was structured as such:[5]

Army Headquarters, Erzincan
IX Corps, Erzurum
28th Infantry Division, Erzurum
29th Infantry Division, Bayburt
X Corps, Erzincan
30th Infantry Division, Erzincan
31st Infantry Division, Erzincan
32nd Infantry Division, Mamuret'ül Aziz
XI Corps, Van
33rd Infantry Division, Van
34th Infantry Division, Muş
1st Tribal Cavalry Division, Erzurum
39th Cavalry Regiment, Eruzurum
1st Tribal Cavalry Regiment, Erzurum
2nd Tribal Cavalry Regiment, Kiğı
3rd Tribal Cavalry Regiment, Varto
4th Tribal Cavalry Regiment, Hınıs
5th Tribal Cavalry Regiment, Hasankale
6th Tribal Cavalry Regiment, Sivas
2nd Tribal Cavalry Division, Kara Kilise
24th Cavalry Regiment, Kara Kilise
7th Tribal Cavalry Regiment, Eleşkirt
8th Tribal Cavalry Regiment, Kara Kilise
9th Tribal Cavalry Regiment, Kara Kilise
10th Tribal Cavalry Regiment, Kara Kilise
11th Tribal Cavalry Regiment, Kara Kilise
12th Tribal Cavalry Regiment, Tutak
13th Tribal Cavalry Regiment, Diyadin
14th Tribal Cavalry Regiment, Beyazıt
3rd Tribal Cavalry Division, Erdiş
25th Cavalry Regiment, Erdiş
15th Tribal Cavalry Regiment, Kop
16th Tribal Cavalry Regiment, Erdiş
17th Tribal Cavalry Regiment, Erdiş
18th Tribal Cavalry Regiment, Saray
19th Tribal Cavalry Regiment, Başkale
4th Tribal Cavalry Division, Mardin
20th Cavalry Regiment, Mardin
20th Tribal Cavalry Regiment, Cezire-i İbn-i Ömer
21st Tribal Cavalry Regiment, Mardin
22nd Tribal Cavalry Regiment, Mardin
23rd Tribal Cavalry Regiment, Viranşehir
24th Tribal Cavalry Regiment, Siverek
Order of Battle, 1914Edit
The acting commander Hasan Izzet Pasha (October–December 1914) and Enver Pasha (December 1914–January 1915). Prior to Sarikamish, the Army consisted of 118,660 troops in the following units and commanders:[6][7]

IX Corps - Mustafa Fevzi Pasha
17th Infantry Division
28th Infantry Division
29th Infantry Division
X Corps - Hafiz Hakki Pasha
30th Infantry Division
31st Infantry Division
32nd Infantry Division
XI Corps - Abdulkerim Pasha
18th Infantry Division
33rd Infantry Division
34th Infantry Division
2nd Cavalry Brigade
Van Cavalry Brigade
Following the battle of Sarikamish, it was reduced to some 20,000 men with loss of all guns and heavy equipment.[6][8]

Order of Battle, 1915
The acting commander Hafiz Hakki Pasha (January 12 – February 1915) died of typhus in Erzerum in 1915. Mahmut Kamil Paşa (February 1915 – February 1916) took the command.

In 1915 the 3rd Army was slowly brought back up to strength. In July of that year it was strong enough to win a victory against the Russians at Malazgirt. Later in the year the losses the Ottomans took at Galllipoli diverted manpower away from the 3rd Army, and it would never again reach its normal strength, and numbered 60,000 in the fall of 1915.[9]

Order of Battle, 1916
The acting commander Vehip Pasha (February 1916–June 1918).
IX Corps
17th Infantry Division
28th Infantry Division
29th Infantry Division
X Corps
30th Infantry Division
31st Infantry Division
32nd Infantry Division
XI Corps
18th Infantry Division
33rd Infantry Division
34th Infantry Division
36th Infantry Division
37th Infantry Division

also: 2nd Cavalry Division, 15-20 battalions of frontier guards and gendarmes, and a few thousand Kurdish irregular.

When the Russians launched their surprise offensive in January 1916, culminating in the Battle of Koprukoy the army numbered 65,000 men and 100 guns.[10] The army lost nearly 15,000 killed, wounded, for frozen, and about 5,000 prisoners. There were also about an estimated 5,000 deserters.[11] About 20-30 guns were lost. The XI Corps took the heaviest losses, about 70% of its effective strength. The army fell back on the fortified city of Erzurum, its base.

The army could expect reinforcements from the 1st and 2nd Armies after their victory at Gallipoli, but due to the poor nature of the Ottoman railroad it was going to take time for them to reach the 3rd Army. The army numbered about 50,000 troops.[12] The army was also short machine guns and needed more artillery to properly defend the city. Mahmut Kamil returned from leave and resumed command of the army from Abdul Kerim. The Russians stormed the city, penetrating its outer defenses, forcing Mahumt Kamil to abandon the city and retreat to the west. The army numbered perhaps 25,000 men and 30 or 40 guns.[13] Morale was very poor. Mahmut Kamil was replaced by Vehip Pasa.[14] The army continued to retreat, losing Trebizond on the coast. A counterattack by the army was unable to retake the city.

In July 1916 the Russians launched another series of attacks on the 3rd Army, costing the army about 30% of its strength and leaving its morale badly shaken.[15] By September 1916 the army was very weak and desertions were a major problem. By October there were an estimated 50,000 deserters in the rear of the army.[16] The 3rd Army could not play any role in the Ottoman offensives planned for that fall.

Order of Battle, 1917Edit
The acting commander Vehib Pasha (February 1916–June 1918).

The army underwent a major reorganization at the winter of 1916. At the turn of 1917, it was reorganized as follows:[16]

I Caucasian Corps
9th Caucasian Division
10th Caucasian Division
36th Caucasian Division
II Caucasian corps
5th Caucasian Division
11th Caucasian Division
37th Caucasian Division

Over the winter of 1916-1917, the Russian Revolution effectively stopped the Russian Army in its tracks, and eventually caused the Russian Army in the Caucasus to melt away. The army later advanced and recaptured in 1917 and 1918 all that it had lost, and even advanced to Kars, lost to the Russians in 1877.

References

1  David Nicolle, colour plates by Rafaelle Ruggeri, The Ottoman Army 1914-18, Men-at-Arms 269, Ospray Publishing Ltd., 1994, ISBN 1-85532-412-1, p. 14.

2 Edward J. Erickson, Defeat in Detail: The Ottoman Army in the Balkans, 1912-1913, Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2003, p. 17.

3 Edward J. Erickson, Defeat in Detail: The Ottoman Army in the Balkans, 1912-1913, Westport, Praeger, 2003, p. 19.

4 T.C. Genelkurmay Başkanlığı, Balkan Harbi, 1912-1913: Harbin Sebepleri, Askerî Hazırlıklar ve Osmanlı Devletinin Harbe Girişi, Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1970, pp. 87-90. (Turkish)
5 Edward J. Erickson, Defeat in Detail, The Ottoman Army in the Balkans, 1912-1913, Westport, Praeger, 2003, pp. 379-381.

6 Hinterhoff, Eugene (1984). The Campaign in Armenia. Marshall Cavendish Illustrated Encyclopedia of World War I, vol ii. New York: Marshall Cavendish Corporation. p. 500. ISBN 0-86307-181-3.

7  Edward J. Erickson, Ordered to Die; A History of the Ottoman Army in the First World War, (Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut, USA), 57.

8  . Allen and Paul Muratoff, Caucasian Battlefields, A History of Wars on the Turco-Caucasian Border, 1828-1921, 288. ISBN 0-89839-296-9

9  . Allen and Paul Muratoff, Caucasian Battlefields, A History of Wars on the Turco-Caucasian Border, 1828-1921, 320. ISBN 0-89839-296-9

10  . Allen and Paul Muratoff, Caucasian Battlefields, A History of Wars on the Turco-Caucasian Border, 1828-1921, 331. ISBN 0-89839-296-9

11. Allen and Paul Muratoff, Caucasian Battlefields, A History of Wars on the Turco-Caucasian Border, 1828-1921, 342. ISBN 0-89839-296-9

12  . Allen and Paul Muratoff, Caucasian Battlefields, A History of Wars on the Turco-Caucasian Border, 1828-1921, 353. ISBN 0-89839-296-9

13  . Allen and Paul Muratoff, Caucasian Battlefields, A History of Wars on the Turco-Caucasian Border, 1828-1921, 364. ISBN 0-89839-296-9

14  . Allen and Paul Muratoff, Caucasian Battlefields, A History of Wars on the Turco-Caucasian Border, 1828-1921, 375. ISBN 0-89839-296-9

15  . Allen and Paul Muratoff, Caucasian Battlefields, A History of Wars on the Turco-Caucasian Border, 1828-1921, 407. ISBN 0-89839-296-9

16. Allen and Paul Muratoff, Caucasian Battlefields, A History of Wars on the Turco-Caucasian Border, 1828-1921, 437. ISBN 0-89839-296-9

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