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EU Watch | Pots and Pans

April 18, 2017, 1:54 pm
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Mavi Boncuk |

Residents in several neighborhoods of Turkey's largest city Istanbul banged pots and pans from their windows on Sunday in a traditional form of protest as President Tayyip Erdogan claimed victory in a tightly-fought referendum. Residents protested in at least four districts of Istanbul, witnesses said. Video and pictures posted on social media showed small pockets of protesters taking to the streets in some areas.
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EU Watch | A Compendium of the 2017 Referendum Cartoons by MAM

April 18, 2017, 1:55 pm
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Word Origin | Şaibe, Mühür, Sultan,Turk Padişah, Kral, İmparator

April 19, 2017, 2:21 pm
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Mavi Boncuk |

Şaibe: [ Meninski, Thesaurus, 1680] şāyibet, şāyibe: Res impura & dubium, suspicio. [ Şemseddin Sami, Kamus-ı Türki, 1900] şāibe: Leke, noksan, nakıse, kusur. From AR şāˀiba(t) شائبة  leke, bulanıklık, karışıklık, kusur from AR şāba شاب karıştırdı, kirletti, lekeledi

Mühür: seal[1], stamp[2] EN mühr [ Borovkov ed., Orta Asya'da Bulunmuş ... Kuran Tefsiri, 1300] [ Codex Cumanicus, 1303] sigillum [mühür] - Fa & Tr: moghor ... sigillo [mühürlerim] - Tr: moghorlarmen
From FA muhr مهر damga; oldFA mudrak; Sanskrit mudrā मुद्रा 

Sultan: Sultan[3] EN [ Kutadgu Bilig, 1069] ilig (...) eḏgü sulṭān turur [hükümdar iyi sultandır] [ Codex Cumanicus, 1303]rex - FA: padisa & soltan - TR sultan. From AR sulṭān سلطان  1. egemenlik, iktidar, 2. hükümdar from Aramaic şilṭōn, şulṭānā שִׁלְטוֹן iktidar, egemenlik from Hebrew şālaṭ שלט elle tutma, (bir ülkeye) sahip olma. The Ottoman sultan. The great Turk[4] Der große Türke GER

Padişah: padişah [1300] From FA pādişāh پادشاه hükümdar, iktidar sahibi oldFA pātaχşāh oldFA pāti-χşāyath  pāti- bey, iktidar sahibi.

Kral: king[5] EN [AşZ 1502] ve Engürüs'üŋ [Macar] kralı güc-ile kurtuldı, yalŋız kaçdı gitdi Serbian kral hükümdar;  karlaz adam, erkek GER.

İmparator: Emperor [6] "Habsburg hükümdarının unvanı" [ Selanikli Mustafa Âli, Tarih-i Selanikî, 1600] Üngürüs taḥtınuŋ krallığın ve imperadorlığın alı-virem fromLatin imperator ordu kumandanı, serdar, Roma'nın askeri hakimi olan Augustus'un benimsediği unvan from L. imperare, imperat- buyurmak, komuta etmek +orL. in+parare, parat- tedarik etmek, donatmak

[1] seal (v.) Look up seal at Dictionary.com
"to fasten with (or as with) a seal," c. 1200, from seal (n.1). Meaning "to place a seal on (a document)" is recorded from mid-14c.; hence "to conclude, ratify, render official" (late 15c.). Sense of "to close up with wax, lead, cement, etc." is attested from 1660s, from the notion of wax seals on envelopes. In reference to the actions of wood-coatings, 1940. Related: Sealed; sealing. Sealing-wax is attested from c. 1300. To seal (one's) fate (1799) probably reflects the notion of a seal on an execution warrant.

seal (n.1) "design stamped on wax," especially one attached to a document as evidence of authenticity, c. 1200, from Old French seel "seal on a letter" (Modern French sceau), from Vulgar Latin *sigellum (source of Italian suggello, Spanish sello; also Old Frisian and Middle High German sigel, German Siegel), from Latin sigillum "small picture, engraved figure, seal," diminutive of signum "mark, token" (see sign (n.)). An earlier borrowing directly from Latin is represented by Old English insigel. Technical use, "what prevents the escape of a gas or liquid" is from 1853.

[2] stamp (n.)  mid-15c., "instrument for crushing, stamping tool," from stamp (v.). Especially "instrument for making impressions" (1570s). Meaning "downward thrust or blow with the foot, act of stamping" is from 1580s. Sense of "official mark or imprint" (to certify that duty has been paid on what has been printed or written) dates from 1540s; transferred 1837 to designed, pre-printed adhesive labels issued by governments to serve the same purpose as impressed stamps. German Stempel "rubber stamp, brand, postmark" represents a diminutive form. Stamp-collecting is from 1862 (compare philately).

stamp (v.) Old English stempan "to pound in a mortar," from Proto-Germanic *stamp- (source also of Old Norse stappa, Danish stampe, Middle Dutch stampen, Old High German stampfon, German stampfen "to stamp with the foot, beat, pound," German Stampfe "pestle"), from nasalized form of PIE root *stebh- "to support, place firmly on" (source also of Greek stembein "to trample, misuse;" see staff (n.)). The vowel altered in Middle English, perhaps by influence of Scandinavian forms. 

Sense of "strike the foot forcibly downwards" is from mid-14c. The meaning "impress or mark (something) with a die" is first recorded 1550s. Italian stampa "stamp, impression," Spanish estampar "to stamp, print," French étamper (13c., Old French estamper) "to stamp, impress" are Germanic loan-words. Related: Stamped; stamping. To stamp out originally was "extinguish a fire by stamping on it;" attested from 1851 in the figurative sense. Stamping ground "one's particular territory" (1821) is from the notion of animals. A stamped addressed envelope (1873) was one you enclosed in a letter to speed or elicit a reply.

[3] sultan (n.)  1550s, from Middle French sultan "ruler of Turkey" (16c.), ultimately from Arabic (Semitic) sultan "ruler, prince, monarch, king, queen," originally "power, dominion." According to Klein's sources, this is from Aramaic shultana "power," from shelet "have power." Earlier English word was soldan, soudan (c. 1300), used indiscriminately of Muslim rulers and sovereigns, from Old French souldan, soudan, from Medieval Latin sultanus. Related: Sultanic.

sultana (n.) 
wife, mother, daughter, or concubine of a sultan, 1580s, from Italian sultana, fem. of sultano (see sultan). Middle English had soudanesse "sultaness" (late 14c.).

sultanate (n.) 
1794, from sultan + -ate (1).

[4] Turk (n.) c. 1300, from French Turc, from Medieval Latin Turcus, from Byzantine Greek Tourkos, Persian turk, a national name, of unknown origin. Said to mean "strength" in Turkish. Compare Chinese tu-kin, recorded from c. 177 B.C.E. as the name of a people living south of the Altai Mountains (identified by some with the Huns). In Persian, turk, in addition to the national name, also could mean "a beautiful youth,""a barbarian,""a robber." 

In English, the Ottoman sultan was the Grand Turk (late 15c.), and the Turk was used collectively for the Turkish people or for Ottoman power (late 15c.). From 14c. and especially 16c.-18c. Turk could mean "a Muslim," reflecting the Turkish political power's status in the Western mind as the Muslim nation par excellence. Hence Turkery "Islam" (1580s); turn Turk "convert to Islam." 

Meaning "person of Irish descent" is first recorded 1914 in U.S., apparently originating among Irish-Americans; of unknown origin (Irish torc "boar, hog" has been suggested). Young Turk (1908) was a member of an early 20c. political group in the Ottoman Empire that sought rejuvenation of the Turkish nation. Turkish bath is attested from 1640s; Turkish delight from 1877.

[5] king (n.)  a late Old English contraction of cyning "king, ruler" (also used as a title), from Proto-Germanic *kuningaz (source also of Dutch koning, Old Norse konungr, Danish konge, Old Saxon and Old High German kuning, Middle High German künic, German König). 

This is of uncertain origin. It is possibly related to Old English cynn "family, race" (see kin), making a king originally a "leader of the people." Or perhaps it is from a related prehistoric Germanic word meaning "noble birth," making a king etymologically "one who descended from noble birth." The sociological and ideological implications render this a topic of much debate. "The exact notional relation of king with kin is undetermined, but the etymological relation is hardly to be doubted" [Century Dictionary]. 

General Germanic, but not attested in Gothic, where þiudans (cognate with Old English þeoden "chief of a tribe, ruler, prince, king") was used. Finnish kuningas "king," Old Church Slavonic kunegu "prince" (Russian knyaz, Bohemian knez), Lithuanian kunigas "clergyman" are forms of this word taken from Germanic. Meaning "one who has superiority in a certain field or class" is from late 14c.

As leon is the king of bestes. [John Gower, "Confessio Amantis," 1390]

In Old English, used for chiefs of Anglian and Saxon tribes or clans, of the heads of states they founded, and of the British and Danish chiefs they fought. The word acquired a more imposing quality with the rise of European nation-states, but then it was applied to tribal chiefs in Africa, Asia, North America. The chess piece is so called from c. 1400; the playing card from 1560s; the use in checkers/draughts is first recorded 1820. Three Kings for the Biblical Wise Men is from c. 1200.

[I]t was [Eugene] Field who haunted the declining years of Creston Clarke with his review of that actor's Lear. ... Said he, "Mr. Clarke played the King all the evening as though under constant fear that someone else was about to play the Ace." ["Theatre Magazine," January 1922]

king (adj.)  
king (n.) applied, at first in natural history, to species deemed remarkably big or dominant, such as king crab (1690s); the U.S. king snake (1737), which attacks other snakes and is regarded especially as the enemy of the rattlesnake; king cobra (1894). In marketing, king-size is from 1939, originally of cigarettes. A king-bolt (1825) was the large bolt connecting the fore part of a carriage with the fore-axle.
The King-snake is the longest of all other Snakes in these parts, but are not common; the Indians make Girdles and Sashes of their Skins, and it is reported by them, that they are not very venemous, and that no other Snake will meddle with them, which I suppose is the Reason that they are so fond of wearing their Skins about their Bodies as they do. [John Brickell, "The Natural History of North-Carolina," Dublin, 1737]

[6] emperor (n.) early 13c., from Old French empereor "emperor, leader, ruler" (11c.; accusative; nominative emperere; Modern French empereur), from Latin imperiatorem (nominative imperiator) "commander, emperor," from past participle stem of imperare "to command" (see empire). 

Originally a title conferred by vote of the Roman army on a successful general, later by the Senate on Julius and Augustus Caesar and adopted by their successors except Tiberius and Claudius. In the Middle Ages, applied to rulers of China, Japan, etc.; non-historical European application in English had been only to the Holy Roman Emperors (who in German documents are called kaiser), from late 13c., until in 1804 Napoleon took the title "Emperor of the French."

empress (n.) mid-12c., emperice, from Old French emperesse, fem. of emperere (see emperor). Queen Victoria in 1876 became one as "Empress of India."

Caesar c. 1200, see caesarian; Old English had casere, which would have yielded modern *coser, but it was replaced in Middle English by keiser, from Norse or Low German, and later in Middle English by the French or Latin form of the name. Cæsar was used as a title of emperors down to Hadrian (138 C.E.), and also is the root of German Kaiser and Russian tsar (see czar). He competes as progenitor of words for "king" with Charlemagne (Latin Carolus), as in Lithuanian karalius, Polish krol. In U.S. slang c. 1900, a sheriff was Great Seizer.

czar (n.) 
1550s, from Russian tsar, from Old Slavic tsesari, from Gothic kaisar, from Greek kaisar, from Latin Caesar. First adopted by Russian emperor Ivan IV, 1547.
The spelling with cz- is against the usage of all Slavonic languages; the word was so spelt by Herberstein, Rerum Moscovit. Commentarii, 1549, the chief early source of knowledge as to Russia in Western Europe, whence it passed into the Western Languages generally; in some of these it is now old-fashioned; the usual Ger. form is now zar; French adopted tsar during the 19th c. This also became frequent in English towards the end of that century, having been adopted by the Times newspaper as the most suitable English spelling. [OED]
The Germanic form of the word also is the source of Finnish keisari, Estonian keisar. The transferred sense of "person with dictatorial powers" is first recorded 1866, American English, initially in reference to President Andrew Johnson. The fem. czarina is 1717, from Italian czarina, from Ger. Zarin, fem. of Zar "czar." The Russian fem. form is tsaritsa. His son is tsarevitch, his daughter is tsarevna.

tsar (n.) 1660s, the more correct Latinization of Russian czar, from prehistoric Slavic *tsesar, from a Germanic source, ultimately from Latin Caesar. See czar. Related: Tsardom; tsarevich; tsarina; tsarevna.

Basil masc. proper name, from Latin Basilius, from Greek Basileios "kingly, royal," from basileus "king," which is of unknown origin, possibly from a language of Asia Minor (compare Lydian battos "king"). St. Basil the Great lived 4c. and was the founder of Eastern monasticism.

basilica (n.) 
1540s, "type of building based on the Athenian royal portico, large oblong building with double columns and a semicircular porch at the end," from Latin basilica "building of a court of justice," from Greek (stoa) basilike "royal (portal)," in Athens the portico of the archon basileus, the official who dispensed justice in Athens; from fem. adjective of basileus "king" (see Basil). 

In Rome, the style of building used for halls of justice, many of which were subsequently appropriated as churches, and so it became a standard plan for new churches. The word is applied to the seven principal Roman churches founded by Constantine. The specific reference to Christian churches in English is attested by 1560s.
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2019 | Where the Votes Are

April 20, 2017, 5:50 am
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EU Watch | Post Referendum Blues

April 20, 2017, 3:01 pm
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EU Watch | Post Referendum Blues

Mavi Boncuk |
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Armenian and Greek Celebrities in Turkish Cinema

April 21, 2017, 6:01 am
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Mavi Boncuk |
Hidden Armenian and Greek Celebrities in Turkish Cinema
By Uzay Bulut

Source
Being a celebrity is often associated with having a certain lifestyle. Fame often brings fortune, privileges, and opportunities—whether they are career-related or not. Celebrities are thought to have an “easier” life, in which they get special treatment wherever they go—well, except for celebrities in Turkey who are Armenian, Greek, Kurdish, Jewish, or members of any other ethnic or religious minority. Sometimes, even being associated with them is considered unacceptable.

Ayhan Işık, for example, was the most beloved Turkish leading actor in the 1950’s and 1960’s. He was also a movie producer, director, script writer, singer, and painter. He was nicknamed by Turkish people “the king without a crown”– a king who had to change his Armenian-sounding last name to be able to have an acting career.

Ayhan Işık

His parents were originally from Salonika (now Thessaloniki, Greece). Born in Izmir in 1926, Ayhan lost his father at the age of six. His family then moved to Istanbul, where he attended the painting department of the State Fine Arts Academy. He first became a painter and graphic designer and worked for several magazines in Istanbul. According to his known biography, upon the insistence and encouragement of the editor-in-chief of Yıldız magazine—for which he was then working—he entered an acting competition organized by the magazine and came in first. But before he entered it, he had a major concern: his last name, Işıyan, could have been perceived to be Armenian. This concern made him change his surname and adopt a Turkish one: Işık.

Thanks to his enormous talent, good looks, and charisma, he became a living legend in Turkish cinema and played in numerous movies. Işık died in 1979 at the age of 50, which shocked his family, friends, and fans.

Nubar Terziyan, another well-known actor from Turkey, was one of the few Armenian actors who did not change his name. He was devastated by the untimely death of Işık, who used to call him “father.” In 1979, Terziyan placed a notice in the Turkish newspaper Hürriyet, which read:

“My son, Ayhan, this world is ephemeral. Death is the fate of us all. But you did not die. For you still live in our hearts and in the hearts of millions of people that you have left behind. How blessed you are. (…) Your uncle, Nubar Terziyan.”

Ayhan Işık and Nubar Terziyan share a scene

Apparently, Işık’s family was concerned, terrified, and even infuriated that the notice could have made people think Işık was Armenian. They responded with a public display of racism in a counter-notice in Hürriyet:

“Important correction: Our dearest Ayhan Işık has nothing to do with the notice undersigned as ‘your uncle’. (…) We regretfully announce as we see it necessary. -His family.”

30 years later, Berç Alyanakziya, the son of Terziyan, gave an interview to Hürriyet in 2009 about the tension between his father and Işık’s wife following his death. According to Hürriyet,

“Events that happened right after he placed a death notice for Işık in the daily Hürriyet made him more sorrowful. Işık’s wife, Gülşen, reacted negatively toward Terziyan, who wrote below the notice ‘your father Nubar,’ as Işık called him. The reason was that the real surname of Işık was Işıyan, which had been kept a secret. Because the name Işıyan reminds one of an Armenian name, he changed it to Işık.

“Terziyan’s son Berç Alyanakziya said the following about the reason for the wife’s reaction: ‘Everyone thought that Ayhan Işık was Armenian because of his real surname, Işıyan. When my father placed this notice and wrote ‘your father Nubar,’ people thought that they were close relatives and Işık was an Armenian, too.”

Because of this negative reaction, on June 21, Terziyan placed another notice in the paper in which he disclaimed his former notice.

But according to Professor Fatma Müge Göçek, Işıyan was indeed Armenian. She wrote in her 2014 book Denial of Violence: Ottoman Past, Turkish Present, and Collective Violence against the Armenians, 1789-2009:

“Such silencing also occurred in the case of another famous actor, Ayhan Işık, who was also of Armenian origin but carefully silenced his ethnic identity.”


Kenan Pars (Kirkor Cezveciyan) with child actress Zeynep Değirmencioğlu, also known as ‘Ayşecik’

One of the precautions many Armenians in Turkey take against racist attacks is to adopt a Turkish name to use in their social and job-related interactions with Turks. One was Kirkor Cezveciyan, an Armenian superstar of Turkish cinema. He was registered with his real name on his official identification card, but used a Turkish name for the screen: Kenan Pars. The journalist Nayat Karaköse wrote in 2008 after Pars’s death:

“Pars was only one of the many Armenians who changed their names… he was one of the hundreds of Armenians with two business cards. Some Armenians−particularly men−possess two business cards in Turkey. They have both an Armenian name and a Turkish one they later adopted. Armenianness is visible only within the [Armenian] community; it is not visible in public sphere. Particularly 20 or 30 years ago, this ‘invisible’ Armenian phenomenon was even more widespread.”

In an interview, Pars said that because he was a non-Muslim, he was not given guns while doing his compulsory military service in the city of Balikesir. Instead, he was given tools to dig.

Hürriyet noted a reality that speaks volumes about the level of racism and bigotry against indigenous peoples in Turkey: “Most Armenian and Greek artists changed their names to Turkish names for the screen upon request of producers.” Adile Naşit, one of the greatest actresses in Turkish cinema, was only one of them.

Adile Nasit’s family: grandmother Küçük Virjin, uncle Niko, mother Amelya and brother Selim Naşit. (Photo: Hurriyet)

Known for her joyous and remarkable laughter, her family movies and her TV show in which she told children tales and stories, she was known by Turks as “mother Hafize”– after a character she performed in one of her movies.  But the “mother” of Turkish people was hiding something: her Greek roots.

Some internet sources claim that Naşit was of Armenian origin. But according to the official website of the Women’s Museum Istanbul, Naşit was the granddaughter of a well-known Greek dancer, who was born in 1870 and known as Küçük Virjin. A graduate of the Galata Greek Primary School, Küçük Virjin was the first Greek canto dancer in the Ottoman Empire. Her husband, Yorgi, as well as her two sons− Niko and Andre−were all musicians. Her daughter, Amalia, also became a well-known canto dancer and theatre actress in the late Ottoman era.

Her granddaughter, Adela, Amalia’s daughter, was born in the Turkish Republic, which has been hostile to Greeks. She adopted a Turkish name, “Adile,” became “Adile Naşit,” and never used her real Greek name during her career.

The scholar Gönül Dönmez-Colin writes in her 2008 book Turkish Cinema: Identity, Distance, and Belonging:

“The one-nation policy of the Turkish Republic established in 1923 made life difficult for all minorities. Many converted to Islam and kept their identity secret all their lives.


Nubar Terziyan


“Like the Kurds and other ethnic minorities, non-Muslims have also been invisible in Turkish cinema. Several ethnic minority personalities made their mark in the industry, but often their identity had to be masked… Nubar Terziyan (Alyanak) remains an important character actor in Turkish cinema with his lovable ‘uncle’ image in over 400 films. Although he never hid his Armenian identity, very few people knew that Kenan Pars, who played the bad man in more than 500 films, was actually born Kirkor Cezveciyan. 

Sami Hazinses (Samuel Agop Uluçyan), who devoted 45 years to Turkish cinema, had to hide his Armenian identity (Samuel Uluç) all his life for fear of reprisals; his secret was discovered only at his funeral when the procession had to be transferred from the mosque to the church.”

One could be the most peace-loving, law-abiding, and hard-working citizen of Turkey. One could even be unlimitedly talented, and have the best looks and work ethic. But sadly, one’s non-Turkish roots are still a “challenge” in one’s social life and career.

For one to have a safe life and a successful career in Turkey, he or she has to be Turkish and a Muslim. Turkishness and Islam are believed by much of the Turkish public to be intertwined. But if minority citizens still have the courage to keep their non-Turkish names and non-Islamic faith, they still know that they had better not be very outspoken about these things. Non-Muslims in Turkey – through real-life “experiences” − are always “taught” to know their place.

The Turkish state has demonized Armenians, Greeks, Assyrians, Jews, Kurds, and other minority citizens to such an extent that it has made many of them carry their ethnic roots like a burden on their shoulders. It has turned their identities into giant faults—even “crimes.” That is what prevented these very talented people from proudly expressing and being who they really were.


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In Memoriam | Yüksel Arslan ( 1933-2017)

April 21, 2017, 6:28 am
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Mavi Boncuk | Yüksel Arslan[1] (b. 1933, Istanbul, Turkey- d. 2017 Paris, France)
 



Image: Yüksel Arslan, “L’Homme XXVI: Hallucinations, Arture 385” [2] (detail), 1988. Handmade pigments and ink on paper, 13 1/4 x 10 3/4 inches. Photo by Cengiz Tacer.


Until recently, Turkish artist Yüksel Arslan remained almost unknown to a broader public. In 1962, he left his homeland and went to live in Paris where he has worked ever since on a visual oeuvre by and through the reception of cultural, sociological, philo­sophical and artistic literature in his apartment. 


Yüksel Arslan (b. 1933, Istanbul, Turkey) has often been associated with the loosely-structured surrealist movement in Turkey and was affiliated with the intellectual circles of 1960s Paris that included Jean-Paul Sarte, André Breton, and Jean Dubuffet. For the past 60 years, Arslan has been mining the depths of the unconscious mind, bringing together Western and Eastern aesthetics and philosophy in finely wrought works that he calls Artures . His Artures work on paper using a unique technique with special paints and being marked by an expressiveness that Eugène Delacroix has already looked upon as a typical characteristic of the orient. Thematically, the work is permeated by a confrontation with the relationship between thought and mysticism, between myth, science, and visual arts, and the philosophical, literary and musical currents which might be described as the foundation of Western thought, in the awareness that the knowledge anchored here could hardly have arisen without the experience of other peoples and cultures.

Serial in format, the hundreds of drawings he has produced deal with subjects as varied as schizophrenia and the eroticism of de Sade, Bataille, and Artaud, as well as visual interpretations of artists, poets, writers, scientists, musicians, and philosophers that have influenced his thinking. Arslan’s working process includes the use of self-made and antique tools and the production of his own colors using ancient methods of combining raw pigments with his own saliva, blood, urine, and other organic materials like honey, earth, and egg whites. 

Arslan does not use classical paints, but mixes pigments with various vegetable extracts, bodily fluids, other natural elements (petals, grass etc.), and additional substances such as oil, coal and stones. This process of production is an important part of the pictorial invention process, and does not represent any separate preparation of the actual artistic work. In Arslan’s opinion painting, since the dawn of modern art, has degenerated into a medium whose origins numerous artists have increasingly neglected. Like Jean Dubuffet, the artist seeks to throw off the ballast of today in order to bring out what – before the beginning of a culture – constituted the “essence”. It is only the path via what has superficially been transcended by culture, but in reality only distorted, that allows Arslan to rediscover the pristine, which he then consistently venerates, for example procreation and sexuality. As he occupies himself with modern and ancient languages, history, philosophy, music and ancient cultures, he is familiar with the cultural “ballast”. Arslan has come to recognize that much of this does not reflect the essence of man. He senses similarities of the vernacular in the origins of cultures all over the world.

Arslan’s Artures are created in groups that unite not only socially relevant themes and questions, but also thematize the experiences that relate to his own life story. The three cycles with the titles L’Homme I – III, Le Capital are general in their approach, while the two series Influances I & II stand for the artist’s occupation with personalities and their achievements, which are not only relevant to his approach but also emphasize his great affinity to literature and music. In this sense he has cre­ated works relating to, among others, Johann Sebastian Bach, Charles Baudelaire, Samuel Beckett, René Descartes, Sigmund Freud and Franz Kafka. 

From this point onward Arslan's style becomes less experimental and his fixations ever more pronounced. Much of the 1970s was devoted to producing didactic illustrations of Marx's Capital, images chockablock with fat, grasping capitalists and lumpen factory workers. Other cycles of Artures include pseudoscientific drawings of eyes, testicles, breasts and penises; various creatures copulating and hybrids of men and insects; dalliances with mysticism; and portraits of artistic and philosophical heroes including Kant, Beckett, Cage and Brecht (in the series "Influences" from the 1980s and the 2000s). Over time, pictorial complexity is abandoned in favor of more diagrammatic treatments.






[1] 

Yüksel Arslan (1933-2017) studied Art History at Istanbul University but discontinued his studies to practice painting more intensely. In 1962, invited by André Breton and art dealer Raymond Cordier, he settled to Paris, where he created the Homunculus-cucus-palus, and the Planus-phallus-micrococus series. There, he became part of intellectual circles and started to develop a unique body of artistic work driven by cultural, sociological, philosophical, and artistic writings. Also in Paris, he opened his first solo show a year after he moved. Arslan, combining the word “art” with the “ure” suffix in French (like in “peinture” or “écriture”) to create the word “arture”, a series which he painted these with plants, herbs, stones, soil, and even blood and urine. He concentrated his reading on works by Marx and Engels, as well as Nietzsche and Freud, he completed his series which involved The Capital (1967) drawings. This was the first of his series which have been compiled in books, followed in the 1980’s by Influences, Auto-Artures, and  Human. Apart from Paris, his works were exhibited in various French cities, among them Sarcelles, Rennes and Nice, as well as at the Vienna Modern Arts Museum and the Prague National Gallery. The final volume of Human was published in 1999. 

He started painting his environment: flowers, glasses, stones, bricks, coals and soap pieces in his childhood. He studied Art History at Istanbul University but discontinued his study to practice painting on his own time. Arslan had his first solo exhibition at the Maya Gallery in 1955. In 1961, he was invited to Paris to by Andre Breton and the art dealer Raymond Cordier, and he moved to Paris. During his stay in Paris, he produced the "Homunculus-cucus-palus", "Planus-phallus-micrococus" series.  He kept working on his “Artune” series in 1969 using the ancient methods of combining raw pigments with earth, oil, his blood, urine, saliva, and natural dyeing. In 1962 he had his third solo exhibition beside Raymond Cordier. It was followed by “Arture” series in Copenhagen and Berlin. After he exhibited 22 paintings in Frankfurt, Arslan went back to Paris and opened another “Arture” exhibition. In 1967 he came to Turkey and had his exhibitions in Ankara and Istanbul. In the same year he began painting the series of “Capital” (1967) having been inspired by the writings of Karl Marx. It was published in Paris in 1975. One of Arslan’s recent exhibitions was held at the Drawing Centre in New York, called "Visual Interpretations" curated by Brett Littman in 2008. Arslan′s works were also included in the "Modern and Beyond: 1950-2000" exhibition at Santral Istanbul in 2007-2008. He was inspired by the writings of Nietzsche, Marx and Freud. Arslan brought together the Western and Eastern traditions and deals with various subjects like psychology, erotism and the subconscious. It is possible to see the influence of Eastern miniatures and Anatolian folklore such as the Karagöz and Hacivat (the lead characters of the traditional Turkish shadow play) in his works. Arslan’s most famous series besides the above mentioned ones are "Influences", "Autoartures", "L’Homme" and "Nouvelles Influences". Arslan currently lives and works in Paris.

Reference:  artnet.com; arkitera.com.tr; thy.com; edebiyatsanat.com; Sotheby’s London Contemporary Art Turkish, 4 March 2009 (London 2009), p. 79 and 99.

[2] In the series Autoartures, Arslan deals exclu­sively with autobiographical events: memories relating to his family and his background – the con­frontation with his own pristinity.

The term “pristinity” is often associated with “myth”. Many works, both in their structure and in their use of text and pictures, resemble scientific tables and taxonomies at first, for example Arture 439, L’Homme 80 (1992), Arture 463, L’Homme 104: Schizophrénies (1996) or Arture 467, L’Homme 108: Schizophrénies (1996). It is from this confrontation that, for the artist, the ongoing actuality of archetypes and myths is derived: they are forms of pristine classificatory images that show man­kind still in harmony with nature. These ideas are based on something other than a sensibility that romanticizes a yearning for nature. What Arslan is aiming at is the pristine unity in the cycle of creation, such as for example in Arture 362, L’Homme III (1986) and Arture 378, L’Homme XIX: Course de spermatozoids (1987). This unity is symbolized for example in the image of man, beast and landscape. “Being an animal” is in his opinion being placed by fate in the rhythm of birth, ex­istence and death, and transferred from the coincidentally individual into the sphere of the general. Thus for Arslan the animal is often the inwardly sought-after partner of the human being, the en­counters are not hostile, but natural phenomena like the wind, thunderstorms, lightning strikes, flames and electrical discharge. In line with this understanding, he is interested by the particulari­ties of the landscape, less in the topographic sense than as the expression of hidden forces. At the same time they appear as pristine codes that express a reciprocal relationship between all earthly occurrences. For Arslan, the pristine is the as-yet-undivided.


Not just since Claude Lévi-Strauss have we known that myth represents an ordering structure sui generis, and thus in no sense a pre-scientific stage of development on the historic path to any theo­retical conceptuality. Myth is seen as a form of explication of the world in general, an explication in which, by analogy, everything is linked to everything else, and in accordance with which things are no mere lifeless objects, but integrated parts of a comprehensive order, and as such, represent particular qualities in each instance. Contrasted with myth, rational and functional thought neces­sarily means critique of myth, and ultimately brings about the dissolution of a thus represented whole. Immediate experience is replaced by the scientific principle of individuation and classifica­tion, or: causality rather than interpretation. By way of example, his works relating to gesture, schizophrenia or hallucinations can be mentioned: Arture 381, L’Homme XXII: Névrotiques (1988) and Arture 385, L’Homme XXVI: Hallucinations (1988). For all the inevitable abbreviation of the subject matter, this formula nevertheless shows that scientific insight is always coupled with a certain feeling of loss. Arslan makes this aspect clear. In the process, he shows that pristinity can only exist from the point of view of progress: individuation is an empty word without the concept of the whole. In correlations of this kind, then, there appears something that belongs to the past, something that has been superseded. Thus the mutual conditionality of pristinity and progress finds, so to speak, a graphic reflection in the dialectic of modernity’s break with tradition.







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Word Origin | Derbi

April 23, 2017, 10:41 am
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Mavi Boncuk |

Derbi: [ Cumhuriyet - gazete, 1931]Romanya'dan gelen hayvanlar arasında geçen sene Romanya'nın (Derbi) koşusunu kazanmış derby EN [1]önemli spor karşılaşması from Derby 1778'de 12. Derby Kontu Edward Smith-Stanley tarafından tesis edilen at yarışları 

[1] 1Derby (n.): type of hat," manufactured in U.S. 1850, name appears 1870, perhaps from annual Derby horse race in England, where this type of hat was worn. Race was begun 1780 by the 12th Earl of Derby; the name was used for any major horse race after 1875. Derby the English shire is Old English Deorby "deer village," from deor "deer" + by "habitation, homestead," from a Scandinavian source (see bylaw).
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US President Trump’s statement on Armenian Remembrance Day

April 24, 2017, 9:51 am
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Mavi Boncuk |

Here is Trump’s statement on Armenian Remembrance Day, provided by the White House:

“Today, we remember and honor the memory of those who suffered during the Meds Yeghern, one of the worst mass atrocities of the 20th century. Beginning in 1915, one and a half million Armenians were deported, massacred, or marched to their deaths in the final years of the Ottoman Empire. I join the Armenian community in America and around the world in mourning the loss of innocent lives and the suffering endured by so many.

“As we reflect on this dark chapter of human history, we also recognize the resilience of the Armenian people. Many built new lives in the United States and made indelible contributions to our country, while cherishing memories of the historic homeland in which their ancestors established one of the great civilizations of antiquity.

“We must remember atrocities to prevent them from occurring again. We welcome the efforts of Turks and Armenians to acknowledge and reckon with painful history, which is a critical step toward building a foundation for a more just and tolerant future.”
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Turkish President's Message to Patriarch Aram Ateşyan

April 24, 2017, 9:53 am
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Mavi Boncuk |

Message Sent by H.E. Mr. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, President of the Republic of Turkey, to the Religious Ceremony Held in the Armenian Patriarchate of Istanbul on 24 April 2017
24.04.2017

“Reverend Patriarch Aram Ateşyan, General Vicar of the Armenian Patriarch of Turkey,

My distinguished Armenian citizens,

I salute you with love and respect.

This year, I once again pay our respects to the Ottoman Armenians who lost their lives under the harsh conditions of the First World War and convey my condolences to their descendants.

Turks and Armenians, as two ancient nations of this region, have shared a common history and culture in this geography, where they lived side by side for a thousand years.

The Armenian community has made great contributions to the Ottoman Empire, as well as to our Republic, which is nearing its centennial, through the valuable generations it has raised.

Armenians, as equal and free citizens, have important roles in the social, political and commercial life of our country today, as they did in the past.

It is our common objective for these two peoples, who have shared the grief and happiness of centuries, to heal the wounds of the past and strengthen people to people ties.

We have taken many steps in this direction in the past 14 years and launched historic reforms.

We are determined to advance our efforts and preserve the memory of the Ottoman Armenians and the Armenian cultural heritage in the future.

On this occasion, I would like to emphasize that the peace, security and happiness of our Armenian community are of special importance to us.

We have no tolerance for the alienation and exclusion of our Armenian citizens and for a single Armenian citizen to feel second-class.

I convey my hope for the speedy conclusion of the election of the Armenian Patriarch of Turkey and wish you success in this endeavour.

With these thoughts, I once again pay tribute to the memories of the Ottoman Armenians who lost their lives in the beginning of the 20th century.

May millions of Ottoman citizens deceased under the difficult conditions of the First World War rest in peace.

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan

President"
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EU Watch | No Door... No Key... No Care...

April 25, 2017, 8:36 am
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EU Watch | Till the Cows Come Home...(Part 1)

April 25, 2017, 8:44 am
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(Luxembourg, 3 October 2005) 
Principles governing the negotiations

Mavi Boncuk |


MEPs want a temporary freeze on EU accession talks with Turkey. In a resolution voted on Thursday, they say Turkey should nonetheless remain “anchored” to the EU. They also pledge to review their position when the "disproportionate repressive measures" under the state of emergency in Turkey are lifted.

"Turkey is an important partner of the EU”, say MEPs. "But in partnerships, the will to cooperate has to be two-sided (...) Turkey is not showing this political will as the government’s actions are further diverting Turkey from its European path", they add.

A temporary halt of the negotiations would entail that no new negotiating chapters be opened and no new initiatives be taken in relation to Turkey’s EU Negotiation Framework.

Capital punishment, a red line not to be crossed

The re-introduction of the capital punishment by the Turkish government would lead to a formal suspension of the accession process, say MEPs, pointing out that "the unequivocal rejection of the death penalty is an essential element of the Union acquis."

MEPs strongly condemn the "disproportionate repressive measures" taken by the Turkish government since the failed coup attempt in July 2016. These "violate basic rights and freedoms protected by the Turkish Constitution" itself, they say.

The resolution was approved by 479 votes to 37, with 107 abstentions.

Background

The procedure for suspending EU accession negotiations is set out in article 5 of the Negotiating Framework for Turkey. This stipulates that " in the case of a serious and persistent breach in Turkey of the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law on which the Union is founded, the Commission will, on its own initiative or on the request of one third of the Member States, recommend the suspension of negotiations and propose the conditions for eventual resumption".

The resolution voted by the European Parliament is not legally binding, because Parliament has no formal role in the initial triggering of such mechanisms, but it has to be informed once this has been done. 

Procedure: Non-legislative resolution
REF. : 20161117IPR51549
Updated: ( 24-11-2016 - 13:13)


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EU Watch | Till the Cows Come Home...(Part 2)

April 25, 2017, 8:58 am
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The Parliamentary Assembly of Council of Europe (PACE) has put Turkey under a political monitoring process Tuesday. The vote was 113 in favor, 45 against, and 12 abstentions.A report entitled “The process of democratic institutions in Turkey” was presented at the assembly.
Mavi Boncuk |


The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) decided today to reopen the monitoring procedure in respect of Turkey until “serious concerns” about respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law “are addressed in a satisfactory manner”.

The resolution adopted calls on the Turkish authorities urgently to take measures such as lifting the state of emergency “as soon as possible”, halting the promulgation of emergency decree laws which bypass parliamentary procedures “unless strictly needed” and releasing all the parliamentarians and journalists detained pending trial. It also calls on them to establish the Inquiry Commission on State of Emergency Measures, ensure fair trials with respect for due procedural guarantees and take urgent measures to restore freedom of expression and the media.

On the basis of a report by Ingebjørg Godskesen (Norway, EC) and Marianne Mikko (Estonia, SOC), the text adopted underlines that nine months after the attempted coup, “the situation has deteriorated and measures have gone far beyond what is necessary and proportionate”. The authorities have been “ruling through decree laws” going far beyond what emergency situations require and overstepping the parliament’s legislative competence. In this context, the Assembly stressed that “the reintroduction of the death penalty would be incompatible with membership of the Council of Europe”.

The Assembly also expressed deep regret that the constitutional referendum on 16 April 2017 had been contested on an “uneven playing field”, thus preventing the two sides in the campaign from having equal opportunities. Furthermore, the validation of unsealed ballot papers in contradiction with the 2010 election law “raised serious questions about the legitimacy of the outcome of the referendum”.

The Assembly resolved, in the framework of the monitoring procedure for Turkey, to assess progress made in a report to be presented in the course of the Assembly’s 2018 session. The members welcomed that, in the aftermath of the failed coup attempt, high-level political contacts and technical co-operation between Turkey and the Council of Europe have intensified.

Until today, Turkey was engaged in “post-monitoring dialogue” with the Assembly along with Bulgaria, Montenegro and “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”. It is now under the monitoring procedure along with nine other states (Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation, Serbia and Ukraine).

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EU Watch | Sinjar Mon Amour

April 26, 2017, 7:58 am
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Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu said Turkey is determined to prevent PKK terrorists from securing a base in northern Iraq's Sinjar region and indicated that Turkey plans to conduct a military operation against the PKK base in Sinjar. "We [Turkey] will use military options against the PKK in Sinjar. I'm not saying that we will only use military force if necessary, I'm saying that we will use military force without question,"Çavuşoğlu told Daily Sabah on his way to Brussels for the NATO. Foreign Ministers meeting on March 30. Underlining that from Turkey's perspective there is no difference between Sinjar and the Qandil Mountains where the PKK terrorists have bases in Iraq, Çavuşoğlu also added that this issue was among the topics that was discussed during U.S Secretary of State Rex Tillerson's visit to Ankara on March 30. Tillerson indicated that the U.S. also supports Turkey's possible military operation against the PKK. "U.S. officials told us that they also have plans to retreat and eliminate the PKK everywhere, including in Sinjar. They [the U.S.] told us that they will move in cooperation with us on this matter,"Çavuşoğlu added. (March 31, 2017)

The division between Turkey and the United States was only highlighted when the Kurdish news media posted photographs of a United States military officer, in the company of Y.P.G. leaders, visiting the site in Syria that was bombed. Mr. Erdogan is scheduled to meet with Mr. Trump in Washington next month. A statement issued by Ridor Kahlil, a spokesman for the Y.P.G., said 20 fighters were killed in the Turkish airstrikes. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, a monitoring group, said the targets included a radio station east of Hasaka owned by the Y.P.G.

Mavi Boncuk |

Turkish planes bombed Kurdish fighters in Iraq's Sinjar region and northeast Syria on Tuesday, killing at least 20 in a widening campaign against groups linked to the outlawed Kurdistan Workers Party.

A Turkish military statement said around 70 militants were killed in the operations inside the two neighboring states.

The air strikes in Syria targeted the YPG, a key component of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which are backed by the United States and have been closing in on the Islamic State bastion of Raqqa.

The Turkish raids showed the challenges facing U.S.-led attempts to defeat Islamic State in Syria and risk increasing tension between NATO allies Washington and Ankara over Kurdish combatants who have been crucial in driving back the jihadists.

In Washington, the State Department said it was deeply concerned by the air strikes, which were not authorized by the U.S.-led coalition fighting Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. Turkey is part of the coalition of more than 60 countries.

"We have expressed those concerns with the government of Turkey directly," State Department spokesman Mark Toner told reporters on a conference call. "These air strikes were not approved by the coalition and led to the unfortunate loss of life of our partner forces," he added.

Toner said the strikes hurt the coalition's efforts to go after the militants. "We recognize their concerns about the PKK, but these kinds of actions frankly harm the coalition's efforts to go after ISIS and frankly harm our partners on the ground who are conducting that fight."

A U.S. military officer accompanied YPG commanders on a tour of the sites hit near Syria's frontier with Turkey later on Tuesday, a Reuters witness said, demonstrating the close partnership.

The YPG said in a statement its headquarters in Mount Karachok near Syria's frontier with Turkey had been hit, including a media center, a radio station, communications facilities and military institutions. (Source : Reuters)
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NBA Draft | The Turks

April 26, 2017, 9:36 am
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The NBA released the names of the early entry candidates for the NBA draft[1], and a record-setting 182 players -- including 137 from American colleges -- were on the list. The deadline to file with the NBA was Monday night at midnight. 

There were 162 total players who filed as early entry candidates a year ago -- 117 from colleges and 45 international players. This year, there were also 45 international players, including French point guard Frank Ntilikina, who is considered a potential lottery pick by many NBA executives.







Mavi Boncuk |

NBA Draft | The Turks

Ömer Faruk Yurtseven (NC State)
Tolga Geçim (Banvit)
Ege Arar (Galatasaray Odeabank)
Berk Uğurlu (Fenerbahçe)
Berkan Durmaz (TOFAŞ)
Egemen Güven (Pınar Karşıyaka)
Ayberk Olmaz (İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi)

[1] The NBA draft is an annual event dating back to 1947 in which the thirty teams from the National Basketball Association (NBA) can draft players who are eligible and wish to join the league. These are typically college basketball players, but international players are also eligible to be drafted. College players who have finished their four-year college eligibility are automatically eligible for selection, while the underclassmen have to declare their eligibility and give up their remaining college eligibility. International players who are at least 23 years old are automatically eligible for selection, while the players younger than 22 have to declare their eligibility. Players who are not automatically eligible but have declared their eligibility are often called "early-entrants" or "early-entry candidates". The draft usually takes place at the end of June, during the NBA off-season. Since 1989, the draft has consisted of two rounds; this is much shorter than the entry drafts of the other major professional sports leagues in the United States and Canada, all of which run at least seven rounds. Sixty players are selected in each draft. No player may sign with the NBA until he has been eligible for at least one draft.


In the past, high school players were also eligible to be selected. However, starting in the 2006 draft, high school players were not eligible to enter the draft directly after graduating from high school. The rules now state that high school players will gain eligibility for draft selection one year after their high school graduation, and they must also be at least 19 years old as of the end of the calendar year of the draft. Some players have chosen to use that year to play professionally overseas for example, such as Brandon Jennings (Italy) or Emmanuel Mudiay (China). Thon Maker was eligible despite not going to college because he chose to undertake a postgraduate year, so he was technically one year removed from graduation.
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Article | How Democracies Die by Claire Berlinski

April 26, 2017, 10:42 am
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Mavi Boncuk |

HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE (SOURCE)
Guilty Men
CLAIRE BERLINSKI


Turkish democracy didn’t die all at once in last week’s referndum; it’s been languishing for years. Why did so many in the West fail to notice?

On April 16, Turkish voters narrowly approved a referendum that replaced their country’s parliamentary democracy with an “executive presidency.” Steven Cook, of the Council on Foreign Relations, was quick to pronounce modern Turkey dead. “RIP Turkey, 1921–2017,” read the headline of the article in which he explained that the Turkish public “gave Erdoğan and the AKP license to reorganize the Turkish state and in the process raze the values on which it was built.”

He rightly noted that the powers afforded the new presidency are vast. The office of Prime Minister has been eliminated; the President, once titular, now has sole and unsupervised authority to appoint and dismiss most judges, all ministers and other high officials, as well as issue decrees with the force of law, dissolve parliament on any grounds, and command the armed forces. Cook wrote that the passage of the Teşkilât-ı Esasîye Kanunu—the Law on Fundamental Organization—marked Turkey’s transition in 1921 “from dynastic rule to the modern era,” and this referendum, he added, brings the era to an end:

With massive imbalances and virtually no checks on the head of state, who will now also be the head of government, the constitutional amendments render the Law on Fundamental Organization and all subsequent efforts to emulate the organizational principles of a modern state moot. It turns out that Erdoğan, who would wield power not vested in Turkish leaders since the sultans, is actually a neo-Ottoman.

Cook noted with disappointment that “Erdoğan is an authoritarian, like those found throughout the world.”

Yet this is the same Cook who five years ago claimed,

I think if you were you to trace back, over the course of the previous decade…you would see that the Justice and Development Party had done everything that it can—while it has at times been under siege from other political forces in the country—trying to forge within the contours of Turkish secularism, a more democratic, open country in a predominantly Muslim country…. I think you had, especially in the early years, in 2003 and 2004, the Justice and Development Party, a party of Islamist patrimony, pursuing more democratic and open politics. They’re an interesting twist on their predecessors, who railed against the West. Justice and Development under Recep Erdoğan and Abdullah Gül, who’s now the president, sought to join the West.

Cook offered this optimistic assessment in 2012, following a massive wave of purges that targeted not only the military, but such figures as the physician Türkan Saylan, founder of the Turkish Leprosy Relief Association and steward of a charity devoted to the provision of education for girls in rural areas. She died in 2009 of cancer at the age of 73.* She had been accused of planning a military coup. As Cook spoke, many more innocents were languishing in jail. The Great Terror in Turkey had for years been underway.

I don’t single out Cook for special opprobrium. His name is just first, in alphabetical order, on a long list of experts who pronounced respectful ex cathedra encomiums to the AKP’s democratic instincts, often in near-identical language, throughout this period. This kind of praise, coupled with intimations that the AKP detractors were nothing but a bunch of rotten elitists who hated democracy, issued from a series of prominent think tanks, human rights organizations, university departments, and newspapers in the West. It poured forth, too, from the State Department, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs, the IMF, the World Bank, the Council of Europe, and a long list of advisers on promising emerging-market investments. No English-speaking, literate Turk could regard these folk with anything but contempt. It is something of a mystery why this happened, and a torment; it is a story that we should try honestly to understand.

Perhaps the myth was connected to Turkey’s acceptance as a full candidate for EU membership, in 2004. “Turkey is changing in surprising and encouraging ways,” wrote the New York Times that year, setting a constructive example for the entire Muslim Middle East. Under the leadership of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, an Islamic politician who favors democratic pluralism, it has enacted far-reaching reforms that are intended to meet the exacting admissions criteria of the European Union.

Contra collective belief, though, the AKP did not enact these far-reaching reforms. The AKP collected the fruits of a process that had begun in 1999 in Helsinki and continued with previous parliaments’ passage of so-called harmonization processes. Those determined to defend the notion that the AKP in its early years did “everything it could” to bring to this long-suffering nation more democratic and open politics and to join it to the West must reckon with the EU’s progress reports during the years in question. In 2007, to choose a (typical) year at random, there are 62 instances of the words “no progress.” There were only 11 instances of “good progress” and these had nothing to do with democracy, openness, or other displays of democratic pluralism; rather, progress had been made in banking, insurance supervision, a transport infrastructure needs assessment study, a national innovation strategy and accompanying action plan, and a working group on the Credit Transfer System for Vocational Education and Training.

Yet still the Western party line remained unchanged over many years:

“Turkey is now a vibrant, competitive democracy….” —New York Times, June 8, 2010

“A vibrant democracy…an example of reform in the region….” —Foreign Policy, May 26, 2011

“Regionally, a vibrant, democratic Turkey no longer under the military’s thumb, can offer the Arab world a true model…. The Turkish model could also provide a model of how Islamic factions can coexist alongside liberal and secular groups, despite their clashing worldviews….”—Haaretz, August 15, 201

“A vibrant democracy…led by Islam’s equivalent to the Christian Democrats….” —Financial Times, September 15, 2011

“A template that effectively integrates Islam, democracy and vibrant economics….” — New York Times, February 5, 2011

“Turkey is poised to become one of the most successful countries of the 21st century, a model of Muslim democracy and a powerful force for regional peace… —Boston Globe, June 14, 2011

“One of the most remarkable success stories of the past decade…a vibrant democracy and dynamic economy under the Muslim equivalent of Christian Democrats”…—Financial Times, April 19, 20121

The Justice and Development Party, known as the AKP and widely (if meaninglessly) described as a “moderately Islamist” party, came to power in 2002, at which point the rubicund encomiums from the press and foreign spokesmen began. I began visiting Istanbul in 2003, moved there a year or so later, stayed until 2013, and left after the so-called Gezi protests, when, only then, the cheery music in the media fairly abruptly stopped.

The West’s collective assessment of Turkey throughout that time, displayed in official diplomatic statements, the mainstream press, and just as often in the specialized media, was notably weird and notably wrong. It was either the cause or the consequence of an exceptionally poor understanding of Turkey by Western publics and their policymakers. It resulted in the crafting of policies toward Turkey that were neither in Turkey’s interests nor the West’s, and helped, at least to some extent, to usher in the disaster before us today.

There were distinguished exceptions: Joe Parkinson of the Wall Street Journal deserves every prize he gets. Gareth Jenkins, above all, is an outstandingly informed and meticulous reporter. It seemed, though, that only specialists read his work, and if it had an impact on American or European policy, I couldn’t discern it. Mostly, the foreign media sounded to me—as it did to most Turks who could understand it—kind of insane. And on the diplomatic side, I observed, to put it bluntly, that if my intention were to ensure that my country be held in contempt by the better angels in the Turkish public, I would have behaved precisely as our diplomats did—of which more below.

A large part of the reason Western observers got Turkey under the AKP so wrong is probably that they were fixated on the wrong things. Those things had to do first with a war gone haywire in Iraq and then the Syrian civil war, both of which, seriatim, turned Turkey in American eyes into a subsidiary consideration of more central geopolitical concerns. It seemed unwise to many to reprove what we hoped would be a useful ally in a pinch.

Probably even more important is that after 9/11 a lot of people in the West got Islam, Islamists, and the like on the brain to the exclusion of nearly everything else. So it followed, sort of, that many came to see that the most significant thing about the AKP was its “moderately Islamist” character. Many were perhaps so thrilled that they didn’t begin hanging homosexuals from cranes that they uncritically accepted the rest of the AKP’s story about itself: It was opening up an ossified system that was, in its words, “radically secularist.”

There is much truth in the criticism that the system was ossified, and it was also true that it was unfair to the visibly pious. It was even true that developments deep within Turkish society, well described by Ernst Gellner’s term “neo-fundamentalism,” explained the AKP movement’s rise and legitimacy. But this was the wrong focus. The same tunnel vision caused others to dwell hysterically on the impending prospect of sharia, which never arrived, even as they failed to notice the bog-standard authoritarianism that did. They had sweated exotic dictionary bullets to learn words like taqqiya, and they were going to use them, damn it. The concept they really needed—kleptocracy—eluded them.

The AKP early on grasped the jargon of structural reform and the hypnotic power it had over the international finance community. Within a month of the AKP’s inauguration, the IMF declared Turkey a success story and the senior managers of the World Bank welcomed it as model for other Islamic countries. “While other Muslim societies are wrestling with radicals,” reported the New York Times, “Turkey’s religious merchant class is struggling instead with riches.” The government claimed that it had trebled the size of the Turkish economy in a decade. Everyone began repeating this, including the Economist, even though it was not only untrue, but absurd.

The government boasted at some point that Turkey had become the 17th-largest economy in the world. This too was repeated by everyone. Remembered by few was the fact that Turkey’s economy had become the world’s 17th-largest in 1990. Nor was it, as the government kept saying, the world’s fastest-growing economy. Turkey’s GDP growth during this period was a very average 4.7 percent a year, below the 6.2 percent average for middle-income countries. The period of AKP rule was just like the preceding 52 years as far as GDP growth was concerned; in both periods, the annual average growth rate was 4.7 percent.2 What made people feel so good, by contrast (so long as they weren’t in jail), was consumption—fueled by vastly more expansive credit.

The phrase “privatization,” too, so beloved by authors of investment-advice newsletters, really meant the sale of state assets to Erdoğan’s relatives and sycophants. Anyone who agreed in exchange to lend their political and financial support to the party could buy stuff up; anyone who didn’t, couldn’t. “Improving the investment climate” meant improving it for AKP loyalists. For everyone else, there were punitive tax fines and exclusion from public procurement and tenders.

Beginning in 2008, the government promoted policies to stimulate the consumption of durables. This created the appearance of an energetic population with rising purchasing power. Credit card and consumer debt stood at three percent of GDP in 2003; ten years later it was 21 percent. In short, the AKP ran the economy on construction, credit, and surging capital inflows, mixed with a dash of crime. It worked well enough, but was nothing like a miracle. Now the capital is taking flight again. Years were wasted, with nothing really to show for it but a bubble of unsold housing and a balding, furious Sultan in a thousand-room palace, busily scheming to kill his enemies.

Now, no doubt, the AKP’s Sunni majoritarian politics are a real part of the problem. But this element of the party’s nature has been for a very long time now overstated compared to its far more significant problem; to wit, Erdoğan’s drive to bring the entire Turkish state apparatus under his personal control. While Turkey under the AKP became dangerously different, it was not, mainly, because it became more Islamic. Islamist politics were not the end, but the means. Power was the end.

As Cook was right to observe, there was no golden period of liberal democracy prior to the AKP’s ascent; that too is a myth. But the AKP did change Turkey’s internal balance of power—arrogating it all to itself—with consequences the West now, at last, sees clearly. These consequences should not have been hard to predict. All the warnings were there. Yet the West accepted, for at least a decade, that Turkey was not only liberalizing, but doing so vibrantly, to such an extent that it deserved promotion as a model for the rest of the so-called Islamic world.

In promoting this line, Europe and the United States made a substantial contribution to the inflation of Turkey’s reputational bubble, with baleful consequences. To extend the economic metaphor, Turkey’s political stock traded at prices considerably at variance with its intrinsic value; much of this discrepancy was owed to our eagerness to purchase large volumes of that stock. Turkey failed to benefit from honest and deserved criticism, both in the form of pressure from the United States and Europe to genuinely liberalize—to which it might even have responded, given that we held many cards we never used. Likewise, foreign investors firehosed cash into the country in part because we insisted so ardently that it was liberalizing—the phrase “EU candidate country,” in particular, soothed anxieties—and this deprived the country of the stern but constructive criticism that properly informed markets might have offered.

“Everything seemed to be going so well in Turkey,” wrote Howard Eissenstat, Amnesty International’s Country Specialist on Turkey, in September 2013, “until this past summer when popular protests broke out and were met by a violent government crackdown.” 2013? Really? By 2011, wives and daughters of the military officers arrested in the Balyoz trials had been begging Amnesty International to take up the plight of their fathers and husbands. They had presented the organization with hundreds of pages of evidence of the trial’s legal flaws and improper procedures. Amnesty didn’t want to know. Perhaps coruscating condemnation from human rights groups would have shamed or deterred the government; that’s the raison d’être of such groups, after all, and it’s been known to work.

Nothing can be said to be “going so well” when a government is holding massive show trials. These trials could have been sound; the sinister events to which they were said to be a response really happened; a credible investigation that unearthed the truth about those years would have served the country. But the trials held instead were notable for their contemptuous—and obvious—mockery of the principles of sound jurisprudence. The international media—prompted or echoed by timid, blind, or corrupt Western politicians—found this unworthy of remark.

That the United States failed to express displeasure about this was particularly bizarre given that many of those arrested were senior figures in the Army and Navy. Turkey’s NATO allies had every right, if not an obligation, to ask what effect this would have on the alliance’s military preparedness. Clearly, it couldn’t have been enhanced with some 10 percent of the land and air force officers and as many as 80 percent of the naval officers charged with defending NATO’s southern flank in prison. Perhaps this question was posed in private, but journalists from NATO countries neither asked the question nor speculated about the answer. Our Ambassador, Frank Ricciardone, offered only that he was “confused” by the trials. I am sure he wasn’t confused when a senior AKP official retorted that he shouldn’t “piss on a mosque wall”—an idiom meaning, roughly, that his demise was coming and that he had hastened it.

In the wake of this past summer’s failed putsch, the government undertook a fresh set of purges, targeting a different group of military officers, bureaucrats, judges, and civilians. You’ve read all about these purges. But why, actually? That our media put these purges on the front pages when it was blasé to the point of stone silence about the earlier ones leaves many Turks with an odd taste. It doesn’t suggest to them that we’ve suddenly developed an abiding interest in the integrity of their justice system and the quality of their democracy. The conclusion they draw from this is wrong, but it is natural. They figure our boys lost. They reckon we’re infuriated by it.

When Westerners were suddenly appraised, in 2013, of Turkey’s alarming “democratic drift” and “democratic backsliding,” they were shocked, even though there was no backsliding to speak of. What in fact happened was this: The rift between Erdoğan and the Poconos-based cleric Fethullah Gülen, who had worked together for years to attack their shared enemies, deprived the Prime Minister of the more sophisticated strategists in his external relations arm. Only then did Westerners learn that Erdoğan believed in something called “the interest-rate lobby,” or hear that a senior adviser subscribed to the theory that enemies of Turkey were attempting to kill the Prime Minister by means of telekinesis. The gist of these stories was that the formerly balanced and reformist Erdoğan had taken a sudden plunge off the precipice of lucidity. But tales of Erdoğan’s keen interest in a so-called interest-rate lobby and his intimates’ penchant for bizarre conspiracy theories could have been reported in tones of equally extravagant horror ages before. Why weren’t they?

Does it matter? Well, consider that 2013’s massive protests against the government, and the crackdown that ensued, came as a surprise to senior figures in the U.S. policymaking establishment. If we’d had in mind a realistic portrait of Turkey, we would have known this kind of explosion was possible and known how harshly it would be repressed. Turkish police had been behaving like this for a decade. The crackdown was bigger only because the crowds were bigger, but, said Senator John McCain, “None of us expected this in Turkey.” To be so misinformed is dangerous. Still, why would he have thought otherwise? He reads the same papers we all do. Thus Reuters from June 10, 2011:

A rising power with a vibrant, free economy and a U.S. ally that aspires to join the European Union, Turkey is held up as an example of marrying Islam and democracy and has been an oasis of stability in a region convulsed by ‘Arab Spring’ uprisings. AK has also overseen the most stable and prosperous period of Turkey’s history with market-friendly reforms….

These news outlets were literally parroting the language the AKP used about itself. Here is the Turkish President at the College of Europe at Natolin, Poland, on June 7, 2011: “Turkey is also becoming a source of inspiration of a vibrant democracy…”

It wasn’t Turkey that changed during the Gezi protests, nor was it Erdoğan. What changed were the victims of the crackdown: This time they included foreign journalists, diplomats, and politicians. Previously, the police had confined themselves to brutalizing Turkish citizens. This time, too, the media began directing its bile toward foreigners in novel way, provoking Erdoğan’s base to insist that something be done about them. So suddenly it was reported that Erdoğan, the great liberalizer, had gone mad, even if the exuberant violence of the police crackdown was so predictable to people who lived in Turkey that they in fact predicted it.

The vibrant democracy lie was especially galling to Turks who were struggling against the strangling of democracy because it was so resistant to contact with reality. Perhaps it would have helped if everyone who applauded Turkey’s vibrant democracy instead complained with the same regularity that Turkish politicians enjoyed virtually unlimited immunities that made them untouchable and unaccountable, or lamented that the corruption and cronyism with which Turkey had long been plagued had become worse under the AKP. Turkish journalists were afraid to report on this corruption for fear of losing their jobs or their liberty, and many did. But foreign journalists could have stepped up to the plate, and they mainly didn’t. Only in 2013 did the Committee for the Protection of Journalists at last usefully declare Turkey one of the world’s largest jailers of journalists.

Ordinary citizens were muzzled every bit as much as professional journalists. Some were arrested and subjected to years of legal harassment for drawing cartoons, waving a banner, or recycling a thought crime on Twitter. These things happened before Erdoğan came to power, and he expanded the tradition on his ascent. What was galling, though, is that without repealing or changing in substance the laws upon which these arrests were predicated, Turkey ceased to be a country of concern:

“Turkey’s vibrant democracy is an inspiration to Arab countries throwing off their autocratic yoke and their Western patrons…. the openness of the Turkish press cannot be denied.” —Middle East Online, June 16, 2011

Turkish citizens took to the internet with great enthusiasm as soon as it became possible for them to access it affordably. Their government took to restricting their access to it just as enthusiastically, becoming one world’s most comprehensive (and clumsy) internet censors. Throughout the vibrant-democracy years, the state indulged in extensive illegal wire-tapping. Personal information obtained from this surveillance was leaked to government-friendly newspapers to end rivals’ political careers or shape the public mood prior to their arrest. The AKP’s enemies, and Gülen’s, languished for years in pre-trial detention or trial under remand; the trials themselves became the punishments. The list of unsolved murders connected in some fashion with the state grew longer. Yet, thus sayeth the Economist on October 21, 2010: “Turkey is heading in a good direction. It remains a shining (and rare) example in the Muslim world of a vibrant democracy with the rule of law and a thriving free-market economy….”

During the vibrant-democracy decade, Turkey actually became a police state, in the simplest sense of the term: As the army’s visibility receded, the police replaced them in form and function. Foreign pundits and politicians heralded the military’s return to the barracks, but to those who confronted the Turkish state this was a distinction without a difference. Yes, political protesters were sometimes left in peace. But often, and increasingly, they were drenched by water cannon or choked in clouds of tear gas. During the Gezi protests, clouds of gas were visible from space, but long before, Turks had taken to publishing the #dailyteargasreport on Twitter. It was wise to consult it before heading out to buy groceries or take your cat to the vet.

So the real story throughout was that Turkey, a mildly authoritarian state as such states went, remained an authoritarian state. The flavor of this authoritarianism changed, it is true: Whereas before Turkey’s state-worship centered around Atatürk’s cult of personality, now it centers around Erdoğan’s. Turkey enjoyed a steady period of economic growth under the AKP—normal growth, but by no means the oft-reported “miraculous” growth. This, in tandem with the incompetence of Turkey’s opposition parties, enabled Erdoğan to stay in power long enough to transform the internal power balance of the country. And as the AKP managed to arrogate to itself powers that few parties had amassed in the history of the Republic, the swallowing by the executive of all rival power centers—the military, in particular—was hailed by the West as a democratic miracle.

Why would we have encouraged Turkey’s flawed but real parliamentary democracy to become a one-man regime that shares none of our values, one whose behavior is so erratic as to undermine our alliance? The cynical answer—believed by many Turks who can’t be judged insane for believing it—is that Turkish parliamentary democracy didn’t work for the United States either. Had Erdoğan been running a one-man show back in 2003, for example, he would have pushed through the resolution enabling the United States to invade Iraq through Turkey. Gülenist propagandists, and Americans on their payroll, made this point ceaselessly: Those secularists might look like Westerners, but trust us, we’re your real friends.

But surely someone, somewhere in the U.S. policymaking apparatus had to have been clear-sighted enough to see that if what we needed was a son-of-a-bitch of our own—to recall FDR’s famous (but maybe apocryphal) description of Anastasio Somozo—Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was not the son-of-a-bitch we were looking for. Erdoğan? How could we have told ourselves, in all seeming sincerity, that this was a vibrant democrat and a model for the Muslim world to boot?

The luminous Natalie Portman is the meme of the moment on Turkish social media. “So this is how democracy dies,” laments Senator Amidala in one of the Star Wars prequels. “With thunderous applause.” But that is not right. There is thunderous applause among Erdoğan’s supporters, of course. But even officially, only 51.3 percent of the voters approved the referendum. Its opponents took 48.7 percent of the vote. The poll took place under a state of emergency. A third of the judiciary has been fired; some are still in jail. Three members of the Supreme Election Board are in prison, too. It’s possible that they’re mostly Gülenist coup-plotters as charged, and possible that jail is exactly where they ought to be, but this doesn’t obviate the point: Nothing like an independent judiciary buttressed this referendum. In some cases, authorities prevented “no” campaigners from holding rallies and events; those opposing the motion were tear-gassed (of course), and prohibited from carrying signs or assembling, or even beaten or shot at. The “yes” campaign received vastly more publicity; its supporters were given hundreds of hours on television stations. Opponents, almost none. The government stripped the election board’s power to sanction stations that failed to devote equal time to both sides. The leaders of the leftist HDP, the third-largest party in the parliament, are now in jail, as are many other members of the HDP. Countless Kurds displaced by war in southeastern Turkey may have been unable to vote.

Hundreds of election observers were barred from doing their jobs, and at the last minute, the election board changed the standards required to prove accusations of ballot-box stuffing. Many instances of voter fraud appear to have been captured clearly on camera. Istanbul, Ankara, and the rest of Turkey’s largest cities voted “no,” which doesn’t necessarily imply fraud, since Erdoğan failed to carry many of these areas in the most recent presidential elections, too. But it does suggest this referendum would have lost under normal circumstances. Thunderous applause this is not.

At least this time there’s hand-wringing in the West. The EU issued a statement devoid of the word “congratulations.” The constitutional amendments, it said, “and especially their practical implementation, will be assessed in light of Turkey’s obligations as a European Union candidate country and as a member of the Council of Europe.” It would of course have been much more helpful had the EU murmured a word or two of disapprobation eight years ago, when these proposals were first mooted. The OSCE issued a withering report on the handling of the referendum, blasting the campaign, the media environment, and the government’s handling of voter registration and election observers. Too little, too late. Donald Trump became the first leader of consequence to call Erdoğan to congratulate him, but Lord only knows what that means; he’s probably playing Banach-space chess.

There was thunderous applause in Turkey, however—juxtaposed by almost total indifference in the West—when Turkey’s constitution, designed to maintain a balance among the parties, was dynamited by a constitutional amendment in 2007 permitting the direct election of the President. And thunderous applause, again—or well-mannered applause, at least—in both Turkey and the West for Turkey’s 2010 constitutional referendum, which was when Turkish democracy, what there was of it, really did die. This latest referendum was more like a burial than a murder, really. Why did the West—the media, the Turkey specialists, and a wide cohort of policymakers—pay so little attention to those earlier referenda? And yes, again, why did they herald them as democratic advances? In 2010 the European Union welcomed the approval of constitutional changes by Turkish voters, calling them “a step in the right direction.” The Spanish Foreign Minister said the referendum results sent a “clear signal of Turkey’s European vocation.” The Swedish Foreign Minister said, “This opens the European door.” The Council of Europe called it “an important step forward towards bringing the country closer to European standards and practices.”

The United States? We ritually praised the “vibrancy of Turkish democracy.” And here, really, we cannot absolve ourselves. No one appreciates more avidly than an American that the separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary are essential to democracy. Any bright high school student should have been able instantly to see the problem with bringing so much of the judiciary under the control of the executive, abolishing the critical check on Erdoğan’s power, which is exactly what that 2010 referendum did.

That referendum, too, flagrantly violated the Venice Commission’s code of good practice for referendums by bundling the poison pill into a package of otherwise salutary or neutral amendments. Voters couldn’t choose the amendments they favored: It was all or nothing. It should never have been submitted to the public in that form. And it would have been easy for the EU to object to it on these grounds alone, just as it would have been easy for Washington to pressure the EU to object to it on those grounds alone, or to do the pressuring ourselves. Instead, the Obama Administration publicly applauded it. Said State Department Spokesman Philip Crowley on September 13, 2010: “The referendum was an opportunity for the people of Turkey to have a strong voice in the future direction of their vibrant democracy.”

Why? Carelessness? Did Obama think he couldn’t afford to irritate Erdoğan, given Turkey’s strategic importance? If so, why not ask the question that naturally follows: Given Turkey’s strategic importance, was it wise to praise a move toward tyranny in a NATO ally as a democratic advance?

Polls show that Turkey is one of the most anti-American countries in the world. This is a recent development; it wasn’t true in the 20th century. A roughly accurate explanation for this is that some 30-40 percent of Turks hate us because they are Islamists or communists and truly do hate our values. But a considerable number—perhaps just as many—hate us because they embraced our values but feel we betrayed them. They are correct.

At times like these there is an unmistakable tendency for faces to get long as memories get short. On Monday, April 17, the Guardian published a lament by Turkish journalist Yavuz Baydar echoing the lachrymose verdict of Senator Amidala. “Turkey as we know it is over; it is history.”

The collapse of the rule of law that took place in slow motion after the Gezi Park protests has been followed by the erosion of the separation of powers and the annihilation of the independent media.

Baydar’s repetition of the fiction that the rule of law, the separation of powers, and the independent media were robust until the Gezi Park protests is unsurprising. It’s difficult to get a man to understand something when his salary depends on his not understanding it.

Of course it’s gone down Baydar’s memory hole that he used to favor annihilating the independent media. But why has it also gone down the Guardian’s? The evidence, after all, is only a Google search away. Also just a Google search away: the dates on which the governing party took control of the police, the higher education board, the directorate of religious affairs, the Turkish statistics institute, Turkey’s science funding agency, and Turkish Academy of Sciences. That is how democracy dies—not with thunderous applause, but piece by piece, with widespread international indifference, or “mild concern” followed by grudging acceptance. This includes the indifference of many Turks who registered their objection to their democracy’s death by posting the Amidala meme. I know who some of them are and what else they did: nothing. They should have been fighting when they still could. Instead they rolled over. But I can’t really blame them. It was a juggernaut; they were just kids. Besides, who wants to wind up in a Turkish prison?

It was disgraceful, though, that those outside of Turkey, who were at no risk at all of winding up in a Turkish prison, didn’t notice, didn’t care, or applauded democracy’s death. The George Marshall Fund’s expert commentator on Turkey, Joshua Walker, after offering the obligatory paeans to Turkey’s vibrant democracy, surveyed the situation in 2011 and decided that “one-party rule does not necessarily equate to weakening democracy and can often be a welcome formula for consensus-building, economic success, and political stability.” That Cuba, China, and North Korea were the most notable examples of this welcome formula did not trouble him.

For once, Erdoğan was perfectly correct when he said the recent referendum merely legally formalized the longstanding de facto state of affairs. His new palace, with its 1,100 rooms and toilets that are not made of gold (he’ll threaten to sue you for saying they are), had long since replaced the Turkish parliament. This referendum was actually more unusual for being widely noticed as a travesty than it was for actually being one.

Make no mistake: Turkey did this to itself. It’s an inexcusable conceit to imagine that everything that goes wrong in the world is somehow under American control and thus our fault. But we sure didn’t help. At every turn we misunderstood events, deliberately or through laziness; at every opportunity to speak when it might have made a difference, we were silent or said precisely what was least useful; we rewarded every step toward despotism with praise, indifference, or investment.

Had all the experts, politicians, human-rights monitors, and democracy-promoters spoken up before this and all the previous democracy-eviscerating lies and purges and referenda, who knows whether they might have made a difference? At least the West would have appeared to stand for something, to have principles. We were so quiet that you could be forgiven for thinking that this—one referendum, one day—is how democracies die. No: they die bit by bit, lie by lie. It’s hard to kill even a democracy of the imperfect sort Turkey’s was. It takes years.

The story of what really happened in Turkey still matters, even if it’s too late to help Turks. We all need to have a good think about how democracies die, because they’re dying like flies. It’s not too late to learn how it really happened. If we don’t, we can’t hope to draw the right lessons. These might apply to democracies still alive. They might even apply to our own.

*Correction: An earlier version of this article stated that Turkan Saylan died in prison. She died in the hospital.

1 I am indebted to Okan Altıparmak for compiling this list.

2 Tanju Yurukoglu, “Turkey: Taking Stock of a Decade and the Prospects for the Economy,” Eurasia Policy Associates (April 2015).

Claire Berlinski is a freelance journalist who lives in Paris. She is crowd-funding a book about European politics, Brave Old Word: Europe in the Age of Trump. She would be grateful for your support.
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Podcast | The Ottoman Erotic

April 26, 2017, 10:47 am
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Mavi Boncuk | 

LINK: http://www.ottomanhistorypodcast.com/2016/12/irvin-cemil-schick.html#more  

The Ottoman Erotic 
Episode 289 with İrvin Cemil Schick hosted by Susanna Ferguson and Matthew Ghazarian


What terms and ideas were considered erotic in early modern Ottoman literature, and what can studying them tell us about later historical periods and our own conceptions of the beauty, love, and desire? In this episode, we welcome İrvin Cemil Schick back to the podcast to discuss a project he is compiling with İpek Hüner-Cora and Helga Anetshofer: a dictionary called the "Erotic Vocabulary of Ottoman Literature." 

 Release Date: 18 December 2016 This episode is part of a series entitled "Women, Gender, and Sex in the Ottoman World."

İrvin Cemil Schick holds a PhD from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and has taught inter alia at Harvard University, MIT, and İstanbul Şehir University. He is the author of The Erotic Margin: Sexuality and Spatiality in Alteritist Discourse (1999), The Fair Circassian: Adventures of an Orientalist Motif (in Turkish, 2004), and Writing the Body, Society, and the Universe: On Islam, Gender, and Culture (in Turkish, 2011). His current research interests include the Islamic arts of the book; gender, sexuality, and the body in Islam; and animals and the environment in Islam.

Susanna Ferguson is a Ph.D. Candidate in Middle Eastern History at Columbia University. She is currently working on a dissertation entitled "Tracing Tarbiya: Women, Gender and Childrearing in Egypt and Lebanon, 1865-1939." 


Matthew Ghazarian is a Ph.D. student in Columbia University's Department of Middle Eastern, South Asian, African Studies. His research focuses on the intersections of sectarianism, humanitarianism, and political economy in central and eastern Anatolia between 1856 and 1893.
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Penguen Duo | Erdil Yaşaroğlu and Selçuk Erdem

April 29, 2017, 6:55 pm
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Mavi Boncuk |

Weekly satirical magazine  Penguen[1] Dergi is closing due to financial reasons. 4 issues left before saying goodbye. The founders promise to continue in digital media and formats.
Penguen Duo by Erdil Yaşaroğlu

"Why is your magazine named after a penguin?

The symbol of our magazine was drawn by Selçuk Erdem [another co-founder of the magazine, together with Erdil Yaşaroğlu and Bahadır Baruter, ed.]. This is a penguin trying to build wings to fly and is a metaphor rich in meaning. The bird is very far away in geography, but very close in spirit."
See also: Political and religious satire in Turkey. The old humour tradition, popularity among the masses, legal controversies. Our interview with Metin Üstündağ, cofounder of the humour and satire magazine "Penguen" 

08/04/2010 by Fazıla Mat

[1] Penguen (English: Penguin) is a Turkish satirical magazine. It was founded in 2002 by Metin Üstündağ, Selçuk Erdem, Erdil Yaşaroğlu and Bahadır Baruter.

The first issue was published in September 2002.

In March 2005 Penguen was sued by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan for several caricatures of him; the magazine was acquitted. In 2011 contributor Bahadır Baruter "faced a one-year prison sentence for a cartoon that [had] the words “There is no God, religion is a lie” on the wall of a mosque."


In May 2012 its offices were the subject of an arson attack. In April 2017 it was announced that Penguen would be closed after next four issues.
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TOP TEN ALL TIME TURKISH POP ALBUMS

April 29, 2017, 6:56 pm
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Top two albums by my class mates Mazhar and Bülent  we shared the same student desk at Kadikoy Maarif Koleji (now Kadikoy Anadolu Lisesi)

Mavi Boncuk |
TOP TEN ALL TIME TURKISH POP POP ALBUMS

1 ELE GÜNE KARŞI YAPAYALNIZ (MFÖ-1984)




  2 BENİMLE OYNAR MISIN (Bülent Ortaçgil-1974)




3 SEN AĞLAMA (Sezen Aksu-1984)

4 MED CEZİR (Levent Yüksel-1993)

5 GÜLÜMSE (Sezen Aksu-1991)



6 DÜNYA YALAN SÖYLÜYOR (mor ve ötesi-2004)




  7 ZAMAN ZAMAN (Fikret Kızılok-1983)




  8 KADIN (Şebnem Ferah-1996)




  9 AACAYİPSİN (Tarkan-1994)





  10 SULTAN-I YEGÂH (Nur Yoldaş-1981)

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Word Origins | Lascar, Asker

May 1, 2017, 6:04 am
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Mavi Boncuk |

Asker: Soldier EN[1] [ Dede Korkut Kitabı, 1400] Tekür daχı ˁaskerini cem edüp [ordusunu toplayıp] karşu çıkdılar
fromAR ˁaskar عسكر  ordu ≈Farsi laşkar لشكر ordu, leşker.

çeri: oldTR: [ Küli Çors yazıtı, 800] süŋüş bolsar çerig éter erti [savaş olsa ordu düzer idi] KazakTR: [ Codex Cumanicus, 1303] exercitus [ordu] Farsi: lasχar [leşker] TR: čeryi (...) armiragius [komutan] - TR: čeribasi << oldTRçerig savaşta asker safı, ordu.

A lascar was a sailor or militiaman from South Asia, Southeast Asia, the Arab world, and other territories located to the east of the Cape of Good Hope, who were employed on European ships from the 16th century until the middle of the 20th century.


Three lascar crew of the P&O liner RMS Viceroy of India

The Hindi word lashkar (army) derives from al-askar, the Arabic word for a guard or soldier. The Portuguese adapted this term to "lascarim", meaning Asian militiamen or seamen, specifically from any area east of the Cape of Good Hope. This means that Indian, Malay, Chinese and Japanese crewmen were covered by the Portuguese definition. The British of the East India Company initially described Indian lascars as 'Black Portuguese' or 'Topazes', but later adopted the Portuguese name, calling them 'lascar'. Lascars served on British ships under "lascar agreements." These agreements allowed shipowners more control than was the case in ordinary articles of agreement. The sailors could be transferred from one ship to another and retained in service for up to three years at one time. The name lascar was also used to refer to Indian servants, typically engaged by British military officers.[2] 

 The term Lascar is inextricably linked with the history of the Indian Ocean but has been more than often ignored by historians, deliberately. The roots of the Lascars can be traced to the western coast of India some hundred years after the advent of Islam. The Arab soldiers, who were on frequent trade expeditions to this area, were encouraged by the Indian princes and rulers of southern India to settle on the coastal area in order to impart their skills and knowledge in navigation, ship building and maritime affairs to their natives. Since the 7th century, the close interaction of the Indian rulers with Arab sailors made them realize that they could wield tremendous power and authority through trade and maritime activities. The indo-Arab partnership was consolidated by a relationship that over years produced a class of people of Indo-Arab blood, Known as lascars. 

In 1342 when iben Batuta, the famous Arab globe trotter visited India, he witnessed Calicut (today known as Kozhikode) as a prosperous and busy commercial port flanked with minarets and temples. By the 15th century, the lascars had attained good reputation of their expertise in seamanship, shipbuilding and port activities and successive Europeans Powers, batting to hold their grip in the Indian Ocean region, relied heavily on the services of the lascars. In 1498 Vasco da Gama , the first European to reach India by sea , sought services from the Arab navigator jbn Mazid and hired a lascars at Malindi (a coastal settlement in east Africa) to steer the Portuguese ships across the Indian Ocean to Calicut on the Malabar coast of India. Portuguese ships continued to employ lascars in large numbers throughout the 16th & 17th centuries mainly from Goa and other Portuguese colonies in India The need for employing the lascars arose because of high rates of sickness and death of European sailors of Indian-bound ships and their frequent desertions in India, thus leaving the ships short of crew for the return voyages. The European preferred the lascars because of their daring spirit, hard work, resilience, skills and knowledge of the Indian Ocean currents and winds. see more

[1] soldier (v.) "to serve as a soldier," 1640s, from soldier (n.). Related: Soldiered; soldiering. To soldier on "persist doggedly" is attested from 1954.
soldier (n.) 
c. 1300, souder, from Old French soudier, soldier "one who serves in the army for pay," from Medieval Latin soldarius "a soldier" (source also of Spanish soldado, Italian soldato), literally "one having pay," from Late Latin soldum, extended sense of accusative of Latin solidus, name of a Roman gold coin (see solidus). 

The -l- has been regular in English since mid-14c., in imitation of Latin. Willie and Joe always say sojer in the Bill Mauldin cartoons, and this seems to mirror 16c.-17c. spellings sojar, soger, sojour. Modern French soldat is borrowed from Italian and displaced the older French word; one of many military (and other) terms picked up during the Italian Wars in early 16c.; such as alert, arsenal, colonel, infantrie, sentinel. 

Old slang names for military men circa early 19c. include mud-crusher "infantryman," cat-shooter "volunteer," fly-slicer "cavalryman," jolly gravel-grinder "marine."


[2] Interracial marriage was fairly Common in Britains from the 17th century , when the British East India Company began bringing over thousands of Sylheti scholars, lascars and workers (mostly Bengali Muslims) to Britain , most of Whom married and cohabited with local English Women . 

This later became an issue , as a magistrate of the London Tower Hamlets area in 1817 expressed disgust at how the local English women in the area were marrying and cohabiting almost exclusively with foreign Indian lascars seamen. Nevertheless, there were no legal restrictions against mixed marriages in Britain. Families with Indian Lascars fathers and English mothers established interracial communities in Britains dock areas. 

This led to a growing number of mixed race children being born in the country, which challenged the British elite efforts to define them using simple dichotomies Of British Versus Indian , ruler versus ruled. The number of women of colour in Britain was often outnumbered by half-caste Indian daughters born from white mother and Indian fathers.
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