Mavi Boncuk |
The Turkish Studies Projectconference entitled War & Independence: Trauma, Memory, and Modernity in the Young Turkish Republic (1908-1950)[1][ took place on January 24-25 at the University of Utah, with the co-sponsorship of the Turkish Historical Society and TCA. The two-day event featured distinguished scholars and speakers from the United States, Turkey, and Azerbaijan.
[1] Sample ABSTRACTS
Panel 2: Foreign Policy of the Early Republic
Eldar Abbasov, History, Economics and Law Research Institute (HELRI), “Russia-Ottoman Relations After Bolshevik Coup: From the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk to the Armistice of Mondros (November 1917-October 1918).”
The Russian revolution in March 1917, the abdication of Tsar Nicholas II, and eight months later in November, the Bolshevik seizure of power in Petrograd changed not only the course of World War I, but also became a turning point in world history. Immediately after the Bolshevik coup on November 8 1917, the Second all-Russian Congress of Soviets adopted the "Decree on Peace" signed by the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars Vladimir Lenin, which called on all warring countries to stop the war and sign a peace without annexations and without indemnities. In fact, the Bolsheviks by this decree counted on the expansion and spread of the Communist revolution in Europe, primarily in Germany and Austria-Hungary. Germany as the leader of the Central powers accepted the call of Soviet Russia and on December 15, 1917, in Brest-Litovsk, controlled by the German armed forces and was signed between Soviet Russia on the one hand and the countries of the Central powers on the other hand a truce. The armistice extended to all land and air forces of the named States on the land front between the Baltic and Black seas. In the Russian-Turkish theater of operations in Asia, the truce was coming simultaneously. Following the Brest-Litovsk armistice, the Erzincan Armistice was signed on 18 December between Soviet Russia and the Ottoman Empire. The allies of tsarist Russia, the Entente rejected the call and refused to join the peace talks. After three months of difficult negotiations, a peace Treaty between Soviet Russia and the countries of the Central powers was signed in Brest-Litovsk on 3 March 1918. Turkey, as an ally of Germany, has benefited greatly from this deal. It regained not only all the occupied territories during the World War I, but also three districts (Ardahan, Kars and Batum – Elviye-i Selase ) lost after the war with Russia in 1877–1878. The signing of the Brest-Litovsk peace Treaty and the withdrawal of the Russian armed forces from the Caucasian front turned Turkey into a leading power in the South Caucasus, which actually pushed Azerbaijanis, Armenians and Georgians to declare their independent States. On June 4, the Imperial Ottoman government signed peace treaties with Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia and thus took control of the entire South Caucasus. At the request of the Azerbaijani government, the Ottoman government agreed to provide him with military assistance to clear Baku of the Bolshevik-Dashnak clique. In order not to irritate and cause a protest of Germany Enver Paşa sent his half-brother Nuri Paşa to Azerbaijan to form a special army from among the Turkish military and local Azerbaijani volunteers. Created a new army of a total population of 20 thousand is called "Islamic army of the Caucasus". After three months of heavy fighting, the Caucasian Islamic Army entered Baku on September 20 and returned it to the Azerbaijani government. The capture of Baku shocked the Bolshevik government of Russia. In the note of the people's Commissariat for foreign Affairs to the Minister of foreign Affairs of the Imperial Ottoman government Nesimi Bey of September 20 expressed deep indignation of Soviet Russia on the fact of "capture of one of the most important cities of the Russian Republic" and noted that "the Ottoman Government showed that the BrestLitovsk Treaty between Russia and Turkey no longer exists". It is no exaggeration to say that the capture of Baku by the Caucasian Islamic army in September 1918 was the last triumph of the Ottoman Empire in the World War I. By its significance, the capture of Baku can be put on a par with the victories of the Ottoman Empire in the Dardanelles operation (Çanakkale Savaşı) and Kut al-Amara. The move of the Azerbaijani government to Baku de facto confirmed the status of Baku as the capital of the Republic of Azerbaijan and became the practical implementation of its independence. If Baku had not been taken by Turkish troops, it would undoubtedly have become an exclave of Russia, like the Kaliningrad region However, the defeat in the World War I and the signing of the October 30 Armistice of Mudros with the United Kingdom crossed all the acquisitions of Turkey.
Sevtap Demirci, (Bogazici University), “Turco-Soviet Revolutionists 1917-22: A Search for a New Political Model for Turks or a Temporal Cooperation?.”
The WWI has been a global conflict that shaped the destinies of three grandiose empires, namely Austria-Hungarian, Russian and the Ottoman-, and the people who lived within the vast territories of these political entities. As far as the six-century old Ottoman Empire was concerned, the Great War of 1914-1918 was but the culmination of a long process of dissolution which came to be known as the Eastern Question. When the war ended in 1918, there was practically no Ottoman Empire. Similarly, the First World War led to the downfall of the Russian Empire. Following October Revolution, the Bolsheviks seized power in Petrograd on the night of 7/8 November 1917 with a program of “bread, peace and land (to the peasant)” of which peace, at any rate, could be realized.1 In light of the changing dynamics of the international relations the two empires -after having been an enemy power for centuries- experienced a rapprochement through which the Bolsheviks publicized the Allied secret agreements to the partitioning of the Empire and by doing so they assured the Ottoman government that the new government at Petrograd was willing to establish cordial relations. The paper will try to shed a light on the nature of the relations between the Turkish Nationalists who got engaged in a National Struggle (1919-22) against the foreign invaders, claiming power in the name of Turks and the Bolsheviks led by Leon Trotsky claiming power in the name of Soviets. Similarities and differences of these two movements will be elaborated. Besides, the question whether this regional/temporal cooperation stemmed from a search of a new political model for Turks or it were a necessity/preferred concurrence will be discussed.
Jamil Hasanli, (Baku, Azerbaijan), “Turkish-Soviet Relations: From Neutrality to Escalating Tensions.”
Turkey, which learned a bitter lesson in World War I, demonstrated wisdom and caution throughout World War II. During the period between the two world wars Soviet–Turkish relations passed through an interesting path of historical development. Both countries shared identical historical destinies in the 1920s; both states took their place within the system of international relations and both sought to maintain bilateral relations, collaborate on a wide range of issues, and consolidate their international positions. Until the mid-1930s, Soviet–Turkish relations were characterized as friendly, and in some cases as fraternal. The Moscow Treaty on Friendship and Brotherhood signed on March 16, 1921 between Soviet Russia and Turkey, the Kars Treaty between Turkey and Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia signed on October 13, 1921, as well as Treaty between Turkey and Ukraine of January 21, 1922, laid down principles of friendship between Turkey and the Soviet Union. It eventually evolved into the Treaty on Friendship and Neutrality of December 17, 1925, stipulating nonaggression and non-participation in hostile groupings in the event of military clashes. The treaty, signed for a term of three years, was automatically prolonged each year, unless one of the parties was to declare its termination six months in advance.
Panel 8: Political Culture and Leaders
Alp Eren Topal, (Marie Curie Fellow, University of Oslo), “Portrait of the Leader as a Savior:
Messianic Expectations in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Republic.” The cult of leadership surrounding Mustafa Kemal Atatürk during the early years of Turkish Republic and his posthumous deification is obvious to scholars and students of Turkish history. While the conscious effort of the early republican regime to promote Mustafa Kemal as an exceptional human with supreme agency is well-documented, Messianic political projections and expectations among the elite as well as the people in the late Ottoman Empire that facilitated the rise of Atatürk’s image is less understood and almost ignored. Although such Messianic visions did not take center stage in press and publications, an attentive search through late Ottoman literature (memoirs, pamphlets, treatises, essays) reveals that such visions were frequently expressed. Couched either in explicitly Islamic apocalyptic traditions or in relatively secularized political theologies that upheld charismatic leadership, such Messianic visions that called for a savior figure ran across ideological divides. Accordingly, this paper addresses the prevalence of Messianic expectations in the late Ottoman Empire and attendant to the rise of the Republic. I will first demonstrate empirically the prevalence of such visions and expectations using both known and previously ignored sources. Starting with Mahmud II we encounter a Messianic image of the sultans promoted by the Ottoman sultans themselves drawing on Islamic traditions such as the trope of müceddid[*]. By the early twentieth century, however, such expectations seems to have gained prevalence among the intelligentsia and the population with the successive crises of the Empire and the looming threat of imperial collapse. I have encountered several treatises from the final years of the Empire, which specifically address such expectations as well as admission of such expectations in the memoirs of prominent men of letters. My second contribution will be in addressing the temporalities of such expectations, that is, how a particular constellation of past, present and future imageries underscored these Messianic visions. Nostalgia for an idealized past, oppressive force of the present as a never-ending crisis and a bleak future all combined to foster such Messianic politics and seriously undermined more liberal and rational forms.
[*] it can be explained with the leader definition of Ziya Gökalp who had an important contribution to the development of sociology in Turkey.
In January, the Turkish Studies Projectat the University of Utah kicked off the new year with the launching of its website and hosting a conference. The Turkish Studies Projectis under the direction of Dr. Hakan Yavuz and sponsored by the Turkish Coalition of America (TCA).
The project's website showcases its past and current programs, publications, and op-eds. Topics cover a broad range: Memory, Identity, History, and Nationalism: Socio-Economic and Political Origins and Contemporary Challenges of Turkish Peoples in Europe, Caucasus, and Central Asia, Including Relations with Modern Turkey ("Origins and Contemporary Challenge of Turkic Peoples"). Further, the project supports the study of Orientalism and the dehumanization of the Turks in the Balkans and the Caucasus with a particular focus on Russia's role.
[1] Sample ABSTRACTS
Panel 2: Foreign Policy of the Early Republic
Eldar Abbasov, History, Economics and Law Research Institute (HELRI), “Russia-Ottoman Relations After Bolshevik Coup: From the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk to the Armistice of Mondros (November 1917-October 1918).”
The Russian revolution in March 1917, the abdication of Tsar Nicholas II, and eight months later in November, the Bolshevik seizure of power in Petrograd changed not only the course of World War I, but also became a turning point in world history. Immediately after the Bolshevik coup on November 8 1917, the Second all-Russian Congress of Soviets adopted the "Decree on Peace" signed by the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars Vladimir Lenin, which called on all warring countries to stop the war and sign a peace without annexations and without indemnities. In fact, the Bolsheviks by this decree counted on the expansion and spread of the Communist revolution in Europe, primarily in Germany and Austria-Hungary. Germany as the leader of the Central powers accepted the call of Soviet Russia and on December 15, 1917, in Brest-Litovsk, controlled by the German armed forces and was signed between Soviet Russia on the one hand and the countries of the Central powers on the other hand a truce. The armistice extended to all land and air forces of the named States on the land front between the Baltic and Black seas. In the Russian-Turkish theater of operations in Asia, the truce was coming simultaneously. Following the Brest-Litovsk armistice, the Erzincan Armistice was signed on 18 December between Soviet Russia and the Ottoman Empire. The allies of tsarist Russia, the Entente rejected the call and refused to join the peace talks. After three months of difficult negotiations, a peace Treaty between Soviet Russia and the countries of the Central powers was signed in Brest-Litovsk on 3 March 1918. Turkey, as an ally of Germany, has benefited greatly from this deal. It regained not only all the occupied territories during the World War I, but also three districts (Ardahan, Kars and Batum – Elviye-i Selase ) lost after the war with Russia in 1877–1878. The signing of the Brest-Litovsk peace Treaty and the withdrawal of the Russian armed forces from the Caucasian front turned Turkey into a leading power in the South Caucasus, which actually pushed Azerbaijanis, Armenians and Georgians to declare their independent States. On June 4, the Imperial Ottoman government signed peace treaties with Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia and thus took control of the entire South Caucasus. At the request of the Azerbaijani government, the Ottoman government agreed to provide him with military assistance to clear Baku of the Bolshevik-Dashnak clique. In order not to irritate and cause a protest of Germany Enver Paşa sent his half-brother Nuri Paşa to Azerbaijan to form a special army from among the Turkish military and local Azerbaijani volunteers. Created a new army of a total population of 20 thousand is called "Islamic army of the Caucasus". After three months of heavy fighting, the Caucasian Islamic Army entered Baku on September 20 and returned it to the Azerbaijani government. The capture of Baku shocked the Bolshevik government of Russia. In the note of the people's Commissariat for foreign Affairs to the Minister of foreign Affairs of the Imperial Ottoman government Nesimi Bey of September 20 expressed deep indignation of Soviet Russia on the fact of "capture of one of the most important cities of the Russian Republic" and noted that "the Ottoman Government showed that the BrestLitovsk Treaty between Russia and Turkey no longer exists". It is no exaggeration to say that the capture of Baku by the Caucasian Islamic army in September 1918 was the last triumph of the Ottoman Empire in the World War I. By its significance, the capture of Baku can be put on a par with the victories of the Ottoman Empire in the Dardanelles operation (Çanakkale Savaşı) and Kut al-Amara. The move of the Azerbaijani government to Baku de facto confirmed the status of Baku as the capital of the Republic of Azerbaijan and became the practical implementation of its independence. If Baku had not been taken by Turkish troops, it would undoubtedly have become an exclave of Russia, like the Kaliningrad region However, the defeat in the World War I and the signing of the October 30 Armistice of Mudros with the United Kingdom crossed all the acquisitions of Turkey.
Sevtap Demirci, (Bogazici University), “Turco-Soviet Revolutionists 1917-22: A Search for a New Political Model for Turks or a Temporal Cooperation?.”
The WWI has been a global conflict that shaped the destinies of three grandiose empires, namely Austria-Hungarian, Russian and the Ottoman-, and the people who lived within the vast territories of these political entities. As far as the six-century old Ottoman Empire was concerned, the Great War of 1914-1918 was but the culmination of a long process of dissolution which came to be known as the Eastern Question. When the war ended in 1918, there was practically no Ottoman Empire. Similarly, the First World War led to the downfall of the Russian Empire. Following October Revolution, the Bolsheviks seized power in Petrograd on the night of 7/8 November 1917 with a program of “bread, peace and land (to the peasant)” of which peace, at any rate, could be realized.1 In light of the changing dynamics of the international relations the two empires -after having been an enemy power for centuries- experienced a rapprochement through which the Bolsheviks publicized the Allied secret agreements to the partitioning of the Empire and by doing so they assured the Ottoman government that the new government at Petrograd was willing to establish cordial relations. The paper will try to shed a light on the nature of the relations between the Turkish Nationalists who got engaged in a National Struggle (1919-22) against the foreign invaders, claiming power in the name of Turks and the Bolsheviks led by Leon Trotsky claiming power in the name of Soviets. Similarities and differences of these two movements will be elaborated. Besides, the question whether this regional/temporal cooperation stemmed from a search of a new political model for Turks or it were a necessity/preferred concurrence will be discussed.
Jamil Hasanli, (Baku, Azerbaijan), “Turkish-Soviet Relations: From Neutrality to Escalating Tensions.”
Turkey, which learned a bitter lesson in World War I, demonstrated wisdom and caution throughout World War II. During the period between the two world wars Soviet–Turkish relations passed through an interesting path of historical development. Both countries shared identical historical destinies in the 1920s; both states took their place within the system of international relations and both sought to maintain bilateral relations, collaborate on a wide range of issues, and consolidate their international positions. Until the mid-1930s, Soviet–Turkish relations were characterized as friendly, and in some cases as fraternal. The Moscow Treaty on Friendship and Brotherhood signed on March 16, 1921 between Soviet Russia and Turkey, the Kars Treaty between Turkey and Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia signed on October 13, 1921, as well as Treaty between Turkey and Ukraine of January 21, 1922, laid down principles of friendship between Turkey and the Soviet Union. It eventually evolved into the Treaty on Friendship and Neutrality of December 17, 1925, stipulating nonaggression and non-participation in hostile groupings in the event of military clashes. The treaty, signed for a term of three years, was automatically prolonged each year, unless one of the parties was to declare its termination six months in advance.
Panel 8: Political Culture and Leaders
Alp Eren Topal, (Marie Curie Fellow, University of Oslo), “Portrait of the Leader as a Savior:
Messianic Expectations in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Republic.” The cult of leadership surrounding Mustafa Kemal Atatürk during the early years of Turkish Republic and his posthumous deification is obvious to scholars and students of Turkish history. While the conscious effort of the early republican regime to promote Mustafa Kemal as an exceptional human with supreme agency is well-documented, Messianic political projections and expectations among the elite as well as the people in the late Ottoman Empire that facilitated the rise of Atatürk’s image is less understood and almost ignored. Although such Messianic visions did not take center stage in press and publications, an attentive search through late Ottoman literature (memoirs, pamphlets, treatises, essays) reveals that such visions were frequently expressed. Couched either in explicitly Islamic apocalyptic traditions or in relatively secularized political theologies that upheld charismatic leadership, such Messianic visions that called for a savior figure ran across ideological divides. Accordingly, this paper addresses the prevalence of Messianic expectations in the late Ottoman Empire and attendant to the rise of the Republic. I will first demonstrate empirically the prevalence of such visions and expectations using both known and previously ignored sources. Starting with Mahmud II we encounter a Messianic image of the sultans promoted by the Ottoman sultans themselves drawing on Islamic traditions such as the trope of müceddid[*]. By the early twentieth century, however, such expectations seems to have gained prevalence among the intelligentsia and the population with the successive crises of the Empire and the looming threat of imperial collapse. I have encountered several treatises from the final years of the Empire, which specifically address such expectations as well as admission of such expectations in the memoirs of prominent men of letters. My second contribution will be in addressing the temporalities of such expectations, that is, how a particular constellation of past, present and future imageries underscored these Messianic visions. Nostalgia for an idealized past, oppressive force of the present as a never-ending crisis and a bleak future all combined to foster such Messianic politics and seriously undermined more liberal and rational forms.
[*] it can be explained with the leader definition of Ziya Gökalp who had an important contribution to the development of sociology in Turkey.
Explaining the structure of the leaders according to the types of Mechanical and Organic society and natural structures, Gokalp identifies two types of leaders as “müceddid ” and “mübdi “. Müceddit, or innovative leaders, are changing the fate of the society, that is, the future, with the contributions they make to the societies. Such societies are communities whose collective structure is predominant. Mübdi, the inventive leaders, can change the life of the society with the inventions they make in positive sciences. Such societies are the individualist western societies. Personal development needs to be on the frontline in these structures.